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Lead production on the northeast periphery: a study of the Bowes family estate, 
c.1550-1771. 
                                                       John W. Brown 
 
Abstract 
 
This is a study of a family estate‟s relationship with a high value mineral product. It  
 
aims to fill a knowledge gap in the extractive industry‟s history in the Northeast by  
 
examining the lead production process on Bowes‟ lands. The behaviour of the  
 
landowner as mineral lord and the extent of any individual‟s role is the over-arching  
 
theme. It involves the study of the gentry as entrepreneur, and the key role of the  
 
estate steward. The economic relationship between the region and the nation is also  
 
illuminated through the Bowes family‟s activities in both the North-East and London.  
 
The main focus is on the Bowes estate between 1720 and 1760 as this was the period  
 
when George Bowes was actively involved in developing the lead mining industry on  
 
his estates in North-East England.  
 
The chapters that follow examine the Bowes family‟s relationship with  
 
lead between 1550 and 1771. Chapter 2 attempts to establish the roots of this  
 
relationship in the sixteenth century; Chapter 3 focuses on the swing to inactivity in  
 
the lead business during the first half of the seventeenth century, followed by less  
 
passive involvement from the late 1670s into the early eighteenth century. The period  
 
of George Bowes patriarchy then becomes the focus of the thesis: Chapter 4 discusses  
 
the organisation and management of lead production on the Bowes estate in the mid- 
 
eighteenth century; Chapter 5 the development of lead mining; Chapter 6 smelting  
 
and related activities; Chapter 7 the lead market and carriage; chapter 8 the role of  
 
George Bowes; and Chapter 9 the transitional period between 1760 and 1771 prior to  
 
the arrival of the London Lead Company.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
Adit                                  An inclined tunnel driven, sometimes to drain a mine, into a   
                                         hill or valley side to access the lead vein 
 
Adventurers                      Shareholders in a mine 
 
Assay                                A test of ore for concentrate and silver 
 
Bail, Bole, Baal hill          A smelting place consisting of stone on three sides which  
                                          was fired using wood and lead ore 
 
Bing                                  Eight hundredweight of lead ore 
 
Bingstead                          A storage area where lead ore was dumped before smelting 
 
Bingtale                            Contract with miners for payment by weight of washed ore 
 
Blackwork                        oxidised lead smelted in a bole, part left for the second   
                                          firing, and part smelted in an oven 
 
Bouse                                Ore directly from the mine undressed 
 
Bucker                               Flat-headed hammer to break waste from ore on the knock  
                                          stone 
 
Concentrate                       Lead ore dressed ready for smelting    
 
Crosscut                            Level between two veins driven through dead ground  
 
Cupola                               Old name for smelting furnace  
 
Deadwork                          Driving through ground where there is no ore  
 
Dress                                  To remove waste materials from ore ready for smelting 
 
Fathomtale                         Contract with miners for payment by distance driven 
 
Flat                                     Horizontal ore deposit 
 
Fother, fodder, fudder        Weight by which smelted lead was sold. This measure  
                                            varied 
 
Galena                                Lead sulphide (PbS), the most commonly found ore of lead 
 
Gangue                              Waste materials attached to lead ore 
  
Gavelock                            Iron crowbar used for stirring the contents of an ore hearth 
 Gin                                     Horse driven machinery for lifting out of mine 
 
Groove, grove                    Old term for a lead mine 
 
Hush                                   Removing surface materials using a rush of water to reveal 
                                            a lead vein 
 
Kibble                                 Bucket for ore          
 
Knock stone                        Large flat round stone upon which ore was broken using  
                                            bucker 
 
Lease                                   Agreement of more than a year between the mineral lord  
                                            and adventures or miners to work 
               
Level                                    Driven from mine shafts to form galleries for working            
 
Liberty                                 The area where the miner was permitted to find and mine  
                                             for ore 
 
Meer                                    Area or tract of land, measured in yards along the vein,  
                                            where mining was permitted 
 
Mine shop                            Lodgings for lead miners 
 
Ore hearth                            Furnace where peat (or coal) was used as fuel, blown by    
                                             water-powered bellows, for smelting lead 
 
Pig                                        Cast lead piece in the form of an oblong with round ends 
 
Rake                                     Vein of lead in a vertical fissure running across the land 
 
Slag                                      Waste material produced in both bole and ore hearth  
                                             smelting which could be re-worked to make slag lead 
 
Slag hearth                           Furnace with hotter temperature to re-work slag and a  
                                             make slag lead, which was less pure than ore hearth lead 
 
Smelting mill or house         Building containing ore and slag hearths, water-powered 
 
Sough                                   Tunnel or adit for draining a mine 
 
Stamps                                  Machine for reducing size of ore before smelting 
 
Stemples                               Short timbers across the lead vein as platforms for waste                     
 
Stoping                                 Working overhead vertically up he lead vein 
 
Stowe                                   Wooden windlass positioned over s shaft for raising ore 
 Tack                                     Usually a one-year license to explore for lead 
 
Tontale                                 Contract with miners for payment by weight of lead  
                                             smelted 
 
Turnbole                              A variation on the bole, developed in Durham, whereby  
                                             the furnace could be revolved to face the prevailing wind 
                                              
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WEIGHTS & MEASURES 
 
 
There is a broad range of weights and measures in the British lead industry, the 
origins of which are probably regional. Those outlined below apply to the Bowes 
estate and the northeast in general during the period covered by this thesis, and should 
not be taken as standard for the rest of Britain.
1
 
 
In the eighteenth century: 
 
14 lbs  =  1 stone 
 
16 stones  =  224 lbs  =  2 hundredweights (cwt) 
 
1 ton  =  20 cwt  =  160 stones  =  2240 lbs 
 
Lead ore: 
 
1 poke  = 112 lbs   =  8 stones 
 
1 horse (load)  =  2 pokes  =  224 lbs  =  2 cwt 
 
4 horse (loads)  =   8 pokes  =  1 bing  =  896 lbs  =  64 stones  =  8 cwt  
 
 
Metallic lead or pig lead: 
 
Fother or fodder or fudder was generally used as a measure when lead was sold, but 
there were variations according to the local market/port: 
 
Newcastle                              2352 lbs   =   21 cwt 
 
Stockton                                 2464 lbs  =   22 cwt 
 
 
Lead was smelted into pieces or pigs: 
 
16 pieces or pigs  =  1 fother 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
  Weights and measures used on the Bowes estate are confirmed in D/St/B2/162 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Recently, bemoaning the absence of academic research into non-ferrous mining in the  
 
mineral economy, Burt resurrected the debate regarding the underestimated  
 
significance of the role of the extractive industries in creating „the defining context for  
 
the whole process of…industrialisation‟.2 This thesis is a case study of one family  
 
estate‟s relationship with a high value mineral – lead. It fits into the general  
 
historiography covering landownership and absenteeism, estate management, proto- 
 
industrialisation, and the economic and social history of the northeast. Although the  
 
subject of this thesis falls into the wider literature on estate management and  
 
protoindustrialisation, it develops a distinctive approach by focusing on lead mining  
 
on the Bowes estate in the mid-eighteenth century. 
 
The literature on landowners is mainly concerned with estate  
 
management as a whole, and where minerals are concerned it is coal not lead that is  
 
paramount. H. J. Habakkuk‟s „Economic Functions of Landowners in the  
 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries‟ in Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, VI  
 
(1953) was seminal. The role of landed estates in the process of early industrialisation  
 
through exploitation of mineral rights is given a very broad treatment by G. E.  
 
Mingay‟s English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century (London 1963) and The  
 
Gentry: the Rise and Fall of a Ruling Class (London 1976), whilst J. T. Ward & R.G.  
 
Wilson (eds) Land and Industry: the Landed Estate and the Industrial Revolution  
 
(Newton Abbot 1971) contains a chapter on landowners‟ exploitation of minerals,  
 
including lead, but chiefly in the nineteenth century. J.V. Beckett in The Aristocracy  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
  R. Burt, „The Extractive Industries‟, in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds) The Cambridge Economic 
   History of Modern Britain, Vol. 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860 (Cambridge 2004) pp. 417-418.  
in England 1660-1914 (Oxford 1986) draws on the full range of previous publications  
 
to summarise his subjects‟ developmental role on their estates. Another aspect of  
 
landownership, absenteeism, was dealt with by P. Roebuck in „Absentee  
 
landownership in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: a neglected factor  
 
English agrarian history‟ in the Agricultural History Review xxi, 1 (1972). 
 
  Academic interest turned to estate management and stewardship: G.E.  
 
Mingay, „The Eighteenth Century Land Steward‟ in E.L. Jones & J.D. Chambers  
 
(eds) Land, Labour and Population in the Industrial Revolution (London 1967); 
 
D.R. Hainsworth, Stewards, Lords and People: the Estate Steward and his world in  
 
later Stuart England (Cambridge 1992); and J.R. Wordie, Estate Management in  
 
Eighteenth Century England: the building of the Leverson-Gower Fortune (London  
 
1982) which focuses on coal.  J.V. Beckett‟s Coal and Tobacco: the Lowthers and the  
 
economic development of West Cumberland, 1660-1760 (Cambridge 1981) also  
 
concentrates on a family estate‟s development of coal. P. Hudson‟s (ed) Regions and  
 
Industries: a perspective on the Industiral Revolution in Britain (Cambridge 1989) 
 
examines the role of the region in industrialisation, but estates and lead do not  
 
feature on the northeast‟s pathway to growth. The hypothesis of proto- 
 
industrialisation stems from J. Thirsk‟s „Industries in the Countryside‟ in F.J. Fisher 
 
(ed) Essays in the Economic History of Tudor and Stuart England in Honour of R.H. 
 
Tawney (Cambridge1961).  It was F.F. Mendels who advanced the model of proto- 
 
industrialisation in „Proto-Industrialisation: the First Phase of the Industrialisation  
 
Process‟ in Journal of Economic History XXXII, 1972, and thereafter followed much  
 
debate and study of rural industries. L.A. Clarkson outlined the whole debate and  
 
indicated the concept‟s limitations in Proto-Industrialisation: the First Phase of  
 
Industrialisation? (London 1985). Yet the lead industry does not appear; textile 
 
industries predominate in descriptions of proto-industrialisation. More recently,  
 
M. Gill attempted to rectify this weakness by arguing for the role of lead mining in 
 
„Mining and Proto-Industrialisation‟ in British Mining no.41 (1990). This was  
 
followed by R. Burt „Proto-industrialisation and “Stages of Growth” in the Metal  
 
Mining Indutries‟ in The Journal of European Economic History Vol. 27 no.1 (1998), 
 
which presents the case for the inclusion of small scale, regional, rural metal mining  
 
in the proto-industrial model. 
 
 
Analysis of the Bowes estate‟s experience in Upper Teesdale will  
 
contribute to our knowledge of the history of the lead industry in the northeast, which  
 
until now has been dominated by study of the London Lead Company and the  
 
Blackett-Beaumont organisations.
3
  This study addresses aspects of change and  
 
continuity across two centuries in an estate‟s handling of mineral rights, extending  
 
both our knowledge of an important extractive industry and contributing to wider  
 
debates, such as landlord absenteeism, the estate as  „firm‟ and gentry  
 
entrepreneurship – including the roles of different family members - the estate  
 
steward, regional relationships and links with London, and proto-industrialisation.   
 
The main focus is on the Bowes estate between 1722 and 1760, when George Bowes  
 
as patriarch was actively involved in generating lead production on the family estate,  
 
when he was supposedly the archetypal absentee landlord. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to fill the gap in our knowledge of the lead  
 
industry in northeast England by examining the production process – finding lead,  
 
mining, smelting, and the lead trade through the participation of the Bowes as a  
 
landed gentry family. This study will focus on the Bowes estate and its relationship  
                                                 
3
  See historiography below in the introduction pp. 8-12. 
 with lead from the mid-sixteenth century through to 1771, when Mary Eleanor,  
 
George Bowes‟ daughter and sole heir, married and the family‟s lead mines were  
 
leased mainly to the London Lead Company. It will investigate whether the family  
 
were gentry entrepreneurs or absentee landlords as far as the exploitation of their  
 
mineral resource was concerned. The nature of their entrepreneurship – the extent 
of  
 
individual involvement over the generations – will also be revealed. The Bowes  
 
contribution to the development of an extractive industry will be considered within  
 
the context of the northeast, a region rich in factor endowment because of  
 
mineralisation.
4
 By 1700 they were mineral lords who could have chosen to 
maximise  
 
the advantage of coal resources and ignore other economic activity, or behave  
 
dynamically and take the opportunity to develop another natural advantage. Lastly,  
 
the Bowes family lead business will also help clarify the relationship between the  
 
northeast and London during the period in question, largely owing to George 
Bowes‟  
 
role – he was MP for County Durham from 1727 until his death in 1760 – in the   
 
development of the estate. 
                                                 
4
  Mineralisation is the process by which minerals appear in the geology of the terrain. In the case of  
   lead ore it is produced by the circulation of fluids, probably of igneous origin, which penetrate 
   the rock strata – carboniferous limestone in the Pennines – and become deposited. See J. Percy, The 
   Metallurgy of Lead (1870).  
  The research for this thesis can be justified in several ways. There is a gap in  
 
the knowledge of lead production in the northeast, and because of the location of lead  
 
veins this relates directly to Bowes lands in the region. The behaviour of the  
 
landowner as mineral lord and the extent of any individual‟s role is interesting,  
 
because there are few studies of this kind for the period under examination. The  
 
relationship between region and nation can be illuminated through the Bowes‟  
 
activities both in the northeast and London. A study of lead production in a region  
 
with high factor endowment will contribute to the debate about proto- 
 
industrialisation, as it fed into both regional and national markets. Lastly,  
 
entrepreneurship and management on a landed estate behaving as a firm can be  
 
explored as a catalyst for change.   
 
As far as methodology is concerned, this research exploits original sources,  
 
and in particular the Strathmore Papers, a substantial collection – 142 box files, 2000  
 
volumes, 412 boxes of manuscripts, and 300 plans - housed at the Durham  
 
County Record Office, where cataloguing was only completed in the 1980s.
 5
  There  
 
are also Bowes family papers at Glamis Castle which are largely personal and  
 
correspondence. Although it is recognised that there may be some limitations in using  
 
only the Strathmore Papers, the estate records at the DRO became the focus of  
 
research because they contain the lead business documents and George Bowes‟  
 
correspondence. A body of documents relating to lead from the sixteenth century  
 
through to the late eighteenth century onwards was identified during initial  
 
investigations and became the basis for this thesis. The study will apply the methods  
 
of economic history because it will focus on both quantitative data – in terms of  
 
production of lead ore and metallic lead, productivity, and the financial aspects of the  
                                                 
5
  DURHAM COUNTY RECORD OFFICE (DRO) D/St. 
 lead business – and qualitative in terms of the role of individuals. The quantitative and  
 
qualitative elements are both supported by the documentary evidence. It is evident  
 
that during the George Bowes epoch many of these documents – including letters,  
 
journals, ledgers, cash accounts, bank accounts, and receipts – were kept accurately  
 
regularly. Coal predominates, but lead and salt held far greater importance than  
 
perhaps would be expected. Personal and business correspondence offer insight into  
 
his management, organisation, and decision-making and evidence his acumen and  
 
astuteness. These sources do, however, pose several problems that require brief  
 
discussion in order to understand their usefulness and any inherent limitations,  
 
particularly those from which statistical data has been derived. 
 
The Strathmore Papers contain only a handful of records relating to the  
 
Bowes lead interests in the sixteenth century, and none before the 1550s.  
 
Consequently, the extent to which various Bowes family members were involved in  
 
mineral extraction at different times and places throughout the sixteenth century,  
 
largely appears in secondary sources which examine the histories of  mines, mining  
 
areas, Crown interest, and mining monopolists. The significance of the Strathmore  
 
documents lies in their content: detailed information regarding amounts of pig lead  
 
traded, the individuals involved, the sums of money that changed hands, and trade  
 
between the northeast and London. These details enhance the perspicacity offered by  
 
secondary sources about Bowes‟ activities in the lead industry, albeit to only a limited  
 
degree, and especially in the northeast with its Newcastle entrepot. 
 
There are no records for amounts of lead ore mined or pig lead smelted during  
 
the second half of the sixteenth century, nor are there any accounts for expenditure or  
 
income. Fortunately, some documents relating to trade have survived for the years  
 
1568, 1576, 1580, and 1593.
6
  These indentures are well written and highly detailed  
 
business documents giving some idea of the mechanism of the Bowes lead trade,   
 
amounts of money involved, the types of interested individuals, and the trading ports. 
 
The style and wording is of a legal nature, verifying the seriousness of dealing in lead  
 
and the level of risk undertaken in producing and selling it. 
 
Unfortunately, there are no records before the late 1730s regarding lead  
 
production or investment. The collection of extant records do, however, offer  
 
some evidence as to the nature and form of what appears to have been a mild revival  
 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Moreover, they offer reasonable  
 
proof that the Bowes were amongst those passive estate owners whose inactivity  
 
excluded them from the category of land-owning mineral lords who behaved as  
 
entrepreneurs during an era of expansion and change in lead production. The chapters 
 
that follow will demonstrate that greater commitment and financial involvement came  
 
belatedly. 
 
Mining became a growing source of employment, whether part-time or full- 
 
time, on the Bowes Estate in Upper Teesdale. Examination of mines pay bills,  
 
listing the earnings of  „bargains‟ for both individuals and groups of miners, do  
 
not present great enough detail about the numbers of men and women employed in  
 
either actual mining or the washing and dressing of ore before smelting.
7
 The  
 
ambiguous wording used by field agents who kept these records make it impossible  
 
to calculate accurately the numbers employed. For example, there are many entries  
 
providing the name of a miner followed by the words „and partners‟. Obviously, the  
 
omission of the number of partners means accuracy is out of the question. Historians  
                                                 
6
  D/St/B2/142-145, which have been transcribed by Margaret McCollum of the Department of 
   Palaeography and Diplomatic, Durham University, for which I am eternally grateful. 
7
  The „bargain‟ was the arrangement or contract to mine lead, between employer and employee, mine 
    owner and mineworker. There were variations on this arrangement. See C.J. Hunt The Lead Miners 
    of the Northern Pennines in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Manchester 1970) Chapter 3. 
 of lead mining consider that a „bargain‟ in was anywhere from three to twelve men.  
 
Again, this range of how many could be employed in a bargain only allows very  
 
broad estimates. There are some documents, however, which do specify names or  
 
numbers or both. 
 
A number of points of clarification should be made regarding the nature of the  
 
financial documents. Records show expenditure for the lead mines began in the early  
 
1730s, but exist mainly for the 1740s and 1750s. Regrettably, there are no annual  
 
figures for each mine. There are a number of possible reasons for the absence of  
 
annual statistics: the lack of any prescribed method of record keeping; variations in  
 
the ability of agents and stewards to maintain records; mines not being worked; or that  
 
documents either did not exist or no longer exist. For example, the financial records  
 
for Isabell-mea-Hill mine are quite thorough and detailed for the 1740s in particular,  
 
because it was undoubtedly viewed as the most productive and of greatest potential.
8
   
 
There are also other records for this mine, by way of general reports and estimates of  
 
expenses.
9
  
 
 Generally speaking, the accounting year-end was 31
st
 December, but there are  
 
documents containing apparently useful data, yet spanning other periods.
10
 For 
 
example, part years or twelve-month periods not commencing in January. The  
 
preparation of expenditure accounts was inconsistent, too; categories and items of  
 
expenditure are listed in different ways and in different years. Again, the accounts for  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill were written by the same steward for the 1740‟s and are therefore  
 
comparatively consistent and informative. Yet even within the better quality records  
                                                 
 
8
  There is a ledger of accounts for the 1740‟s D/St/B2/105 which contains excellent detail of all 
    items of expenditure. 
9
  D/St/B2/104 a steward‟s estimate of expenses for Isabell-mea-Hill. 
10
  For accounting practices on the Bowes estate in the eighteenth century see Oldroyd‟s work cited  
   below p.11.  
 there can be variations in detail as to the nature of any category of expenditure. So for  
 
example, there is no mention of „day work‟, wages for casual labour, in the accounts  
 
ledger, but in a memorandum entitled „Charge of Winning Oar at Isabell-mea-Hill  
 
1742‟ it is mentioned and the precise nature of the work detailed with it.11 In the same  
 
memorandum there is an item of £82-2s-0d for the building of a house near the mine,  
 
but it does not appear in the accounts ledger. Obviously, these two documents were  
 
written at different times for different reasons, but these inconsistencies can skew the  
 
perception of the scale of investment in lead. Lastly, expenditure on stock, tools for  
 
example, was treated as a debit together with other variable costs, whereas it may be  
 
considered as capital equipment. 
 
  Consequently, the expenditure records must be viewed with some 
 
caution and money noted as spent in documents other than accounts should be  
 
brought into the equation when assessing the extent of George Bowes‟ financial  
 
commitment to lead mining. In this analysis wherever possible other documents 
 
have been compared to ledger accounts, and extraordinary items of expenditure have  
  
been included if considered to be relevant and appropriate. As has already been seen  
 
above, this comparison was readily possible for records regarding the mine at Isabell- 
 
mea-Hill, and the same methodology is applied throughout. 
 
  Expenditure on the lead mines for the purpose of winning ore includes 
 
mainly pay bills for labour, materials, and tools. There is, however, a good spread  
 
across three decades which give an indication of the level of commitment to  
 
maintaining and developing ore production on the Bowes‟ estate. The documents  
 
examined are largely memoranda and pay bills which generally contain broad  
 
categories of expenditure rather than fine detail. Once again, records for Isabell- 
                                                 
11
  D/St/B2/105 a detailed ledger relating to expenditure and receipts for the mine and mills. 
 mea-Hill provide greater detail because of the way they were kept.  
 
Correspondence, leases, financial records, maps and plans for the period 1760- 
 
1800 are generally of very high quality both in terms of condition and content, and  
 
steer the history of lead production into three distinct periods in the years between  
 
George Bowes‟ death in 1760 and Mary Eleanor‟s in 1800. 
 
 Ideally, it would be useful to have a direct comparison with coal production on 
 
the Bowes estates in terms of entrepreneurship, management, the production process  
 
and profits, and any relationship between the exploitation of coal and lead. This  
 
would both enhance the historical context in which lead was exploited and perhaps 
 
reveal things of significance, particularly during the George Bowes era. A study of the 
 
Bowes family‟s coal activities is beyond the scope of this thesis; it would require  
 
further extensive research in the considerable body of coal business documents which 
 
form the largest portion of estate records. Wherever possible, however, comment is  
 
made about coal in order to justify good methodological practice. 
 
 
A survey of the historiography of the lead industry spanning the period  
 
from the mid-sixteenth century until the late eighteenth century highlights the  
 
absence of work on this particular non-ferrous extractive activity in the Upper  
 
Teesdale area of the northern Pennines, which happened to form part of the Bowes  
 
family estate. Most studies are regional, largely written by local historians who rely  
 
heavily upon the very limited range of academic publications, sometimes based on  
 
fieldwork and industrial archaeology, but with a slowly developing tendency to  
 
research primary sources. Regardless of form, histories of lead mining, including  
 
those about the northeast, are generally biased towards the nineteenth century,  
 
perhaps because of the nature and accessibility of records. 
 
 R. Burt‟s The British Lead Mining Industry (Redruth 1984) remains the first  
 
and only definitive national survey of a subject that has otherwise been largely   
 
neglected by economic historians. Lead mining in Teesdale receives some attention,  
 
but mainly for the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. His most recent  
 
contribution, „The Extractive Industries‟ in R. Floud & P. Johnson (eds) The  
 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume I Industrialisation 1700- 
 
1860 (CUP 2004) reiterates the need for further academic research into the role of a  
 
comparatively underestimated sector of the economy in the process of  
 
industrialisation.  
 
  
The most in depth area study of the lead industry is the longstanding A.  
 
Raistrick & B. Jennings‟ A History of Lead Mining in the Pennines (1965) which 
 
only refers to Teesdale lead production following the arrival of the London Lead  
 
Company in 1771, but offers some detail of the part performed by the Bowes family 
 
in the northeast lead industry in the late sixteenth century, especially their  
 
status as principal Merchant Adventurers trading out of Newcastle upon Tyne.  
 
Raistrick‟s other publications include „Lead Mining and Smelting in the Northern 
 
Pennines in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries‟ in Proceedings of the University 
 
of Durham Philosophical Society (March 1936), and „Ore Hearth Lead Smelting in  
 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries‟ in Proceedings of the University of Durham 
 
Philosophical Society, X part 7 (1950) which reveal nothing of the industry in  
 
Teesdale. His other works focus on lead mining in Yorkshire; essentially that in  
 
Wensleydale and Swaledale. C.J Hunt‟s The Lead Miners of the Northern Pennines 
 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Manchester 1970) is fundamentally a  
 
social history of lead mining, paying some attention to economic aspects, such as  
 
arrangement for working and methods of payment. Once again, however, the Bowes  
 estate in Upper Teesdale and the role of family members is absent, which is to be  
 
expected because this study is the result of research into the Blackett-Beaumont  
 
Papers. Lastly, The Mines of Yorkshire (British Mining no.72 Northern Mines  
 
Research Society 2003) by M. Gill & R. Burt is a significant statistical work  
 
compiling data from a broad range of sources, including the Strathmore Papers.  
 
 Most of the works cited here are indebted to K.C. Dunham‟s examinations of  
 
the geology of the North Pennines and the potential for profitable mineral  
 
exploitation. His classic volume, Geology of the Northern Pennine Orefield, vol. I  
 
Tyne to Stainmore, Economic Memoirs of the Geological Survey of Great Britain  
 
(HMSO 1948; second edition 1990) identifies mineral deposits, including lead veins, 
 
and outlines the history of the mines. This assists in clarifying the process of  
 
exploration and discovery on the Bowes estate during the period covered by this  
 
thesis in an age when there was no scientific geology only practical knowledge.  
 
Dunham‟s earlier article „The Production of Galena and Associated Minerals in 
 
 the Northern Pennines; with Comparative Statistics for Great Britain‟ in Transactions 
 
of the Institution of Mining and Metallurgy, LIII (1943-4) does not cast any light on  
 
lead production on Bowes land. His predecessors were T. Sopwith who in 1833 wrote  
 
An Account of the Mining District of Alston Moor, Weardale and Teesdale, and W.  
 
Forster, author of A Treatise on a Section of the Strata from Newcastle upon Tyne to  
 
Cross Fell with Remarks on Mineral Veins (1883). Classics of their time, neither of  
 
the two latter works have any pointers for this study. Recently, the work of Dunham  
 
and others was collated in Lead Mining Landscapes of the North Pennines Area of  
 
Outstanding Natural Beauty (Durham County Council 2003).  
 
L. Turnbull‟s The History of Lead Mining in the North East of England  
 
(Alnwick 1975; second edition 1987; third revised edition Hexham 2006) is a good  
 introduction to the subject, with maps and illustrations, drawn from a very  
 
restricted collection of secondary sources and apparently a range of primary sources  
 
not referred to in the short bibliography. There are several studies devoted to lead  
 
mining and smelting in specific parts of the northeast, which have included some  
 
discussion of the contributions to the lead industry‟s development made by certain  
 
gentry families. A useful collection of such local studies has been produced by R.A.  
 
Fairbairn: The Mines of Alston Moor (British Mining no.47 Northern Mines Research  
 
Society 1993); Weardale Mines (British Mining no.56 Northern Mines Research  
 
Society 1996); and Allendale, Tynedale, and Derwent Lead Mines (British Mining  
 
No.65 Northern Mines Research Society 2000). These are broad, though detailed,  
 
histories of mines, mining, and smelting, largely based upon secondary sources  
 
supported by some research on original documents held in local record offices.  
 
Fairbairn occasionally notes the activities of certain Bowes family members in the  
 
narrative of the pre-1700, but it is not his intention to enlarge upon either family  
 
entrepreneurship or estate management. His most recent mining history, The Mines of  
 
Upper Teesdale (British Mining no.77 Northern Mines Research Society 2005) is  
 
another narrative of various types of mining, including lead, but again drawing mainly  
 
from secondary works, with a smattering of references to the Strathmore Papers. 
 
Studies of the exploitation of lead and the expansion of the lead  
 
industry through the lens of the gentry estate in the northeast of England are rare.  
 
C. Newman‟s The Bowes of Streatlam County Durham: a study of the Politics and  
 
Religion of a Sixteenth Century Northern Gentry Family (unpublished PhD thesis  
 
York University 1991) study of the Protestant Bowes family in the sixteenth century  
 
focuses on their role as a member of a regional elite serving the Crown during a  
 
period of upheaval in the Church and State.
12
 Its theme is politics and religion, largely  
 
excluding economic affairs. Indeed as far as the region is concerned there is only M.  
 
Hughes‟ case study of the Blackett-Beaumont family‟s activities in Lead, Land and  
 
Coal as Sources of Landlord Income in Northumberland and Durham between 1700  
 
and 1850 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham 1963). This makes for a  
 
very useful regional comparator because of the large scale of the family‟s business  
 
and its significance in the lead market nexus centred on Newcastle. Unfortunately, it  
 
is narrowly directed at estate income to the detriment of other aspects which may have  
 
furthered our understanding of the importance of gentry entrepreneurship, estate  
 
management of mineral exploitation, and the lead industry in regional 
 
industrialisation. C.J. Hunt‟s volume relies on the Blackett-Beaumont Papers,  
 
but does not address the family‟s role. The other significant organisation in the  
 
northeast lead industry, the London Lead Company, has been given its status by  
 
A. Raistrick‟s Two Centuries of Industrial Welfare: the London (Quaker) Lead  
 
Company 1692-1905 (1930), and „The London Lead Company, 1692-1905‟ in  
 
Transactions of the Newcomen Society, vol. 14, (1933-34). This organisation was, of  
 
course, a corporate body rather than a family enterprise founded on landownership,  
 
but was another near- neighbour competitor. Most recently, D. Oldroyd‟s Estates,  
 
Enterprise, and Investment at the Dawn of the Industrial Revolution: Estate  
 
Management and Accounting in the North East of England, c. 1700-1780 (Ashgate  
 
2003) has successfully drawn together earlier research into three family estates,  
 
including the Bowes estate, and argues that their productiveness stemmed from  
 
accounting practices. His analysis of the Bowes estate concentrates on its hugely  
 
successful coal business. 
                                                 
12
  Dr Newman points to the lack of records relating to estate accounts, financial matters, mining and    
    metallurgical industries. 
  
The chapters that follow examine the Bowes family‟s relationship with  
 
lead between 1550 and 1771. Chapter 2 attempts to establish the roots of this  
 
relationship in the sixteenth century; Chapter 3 focuses on the swing to inactivity in  
 
the lead business during the first half of the seventeenth century, followed by less  
 
passive involvement from the late 1670s into the early eighteenth century. The period  
 
of George Bowes patriarchy then becomes the focus of the thesis: Chapter 4 discusses  
 
the organisation and management of lead production on the Bowes estate in the mid- 
 
eighteenth century; Chapter 5 the development of lead mining; Chapter 6 smelting  
 
and related activities; Chapter 7 the lead market and carriage; chapter 8 the role of  
 
George Bowes; and Chapter 9 the transitional period between 1760 and 1771 prior to  
 
the arrival of the London Lead Company. Throughout these chapters specific  
 
questions will be addressed relating to various aspects of Bowes‟ lead exploitation:  
 
the quantity of lead ore and pig lead produced; the market – prices, sales, and trade;  
 
finance – the sources of finance and the levels of expenditure; profits; productivity –  
 
in terms of ore production, yield of metallic lead from ore, and return on investment;  
 
the incidence of technological change; the role of the individual, by comparing with  
 
other lead producers in the region, and over time by comparing the roles of different  
 
Bowes family members from the mid-sixteenth century until 1771; and estate  
 
management and innovation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Merchants and Mining: sixteenth century foundations 
 
 
The Bowes family‟s association with metal mining, and particularly the extraction of  
 
lead, began in the sixteenth century, before mineral bearing lands in Upper Teesdale  
    
were granted to Sir George Bowes by Elizabeth I in 1593.
13
  Indeed, different 
members  
 
of the Bowes family were involved in mining not only in the Durham, but also in  
 
Scotland, the Lake District, and Derbyshire. During the sixteenth century, non-ferrous  
 
metal mining, particularly of lead, tin, and copper, was a developing sector in the  
 
British economy, when foreign expertise and technology began to infiltrate the mining  
 
industry, and when gentry, nobility and Crown officials supposedly worked hand in  
 
glove with the more technically advanced and experienced German experts in the  
 
search primarily for silver and gold to meet the bullion shortage.
14
  From at least 1550 
 
the Bowes family became involved in lead mining, smelting, and the lead trade. As  
 
the lead industry and lead production grew during the second half of the century, and  
 
particularly during the years 1580 to 1600, members of the Bowes family became key  
 
figures in the lead business in the north east and placed themselves at the forefront of  
 
the lead trade in Newcastle. Their experience of metal mining, lead in particular, in a  
 
century of market vicissitudes, technological change, state intervention, and  
 
reorganisation in the extractive industries, can be considered as the first stage of its  
 
ventures into the exploitation of an industrial metallic commodity in the northeastern  
 
economy and trade to London and abroad. This background is crucial to the  
 
understanding of the Bowes‟ involvement with lead in the following two centuries,   
 
                                                 
13
   D/St/D13/2/2. This Sir George Bowes (1593-c.1643) was a member of the Bradley and Biddick- 
    Waterville branch of the family, and possibly a grandson of Sir George Bowes of Streatlam (1527 
    -1580). For genealogical table in Streatlam and Gibside: The Bowes and Strathmore Families in  
    County Durham (Durham County Council 1980) pp. 46-47. 
14
   J.W. Gough, The Rise of the Entrepreneur (London 1969), p. 147, and B.A. Holderness, Pre- 
     Industrial England: Economy and Society from 1500-1750 (London 1976) pp. 150-153. 
particularly the eighteenth century. 
 
  The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate the contention that the  
 
Bowes family were directly involved in lead mining, smelting, and trade from the  
 
mid-sixteenth century, and that they may have gleaned experience and expertise  
 
through association with German mining experts introduced by the Crown to discover  
 
precious metals, and in their role as metal mine inspectors during the Elizabethan  
 
period. The nature and extent of their role in the production and supply of lead in the  
 
northeast will also be assessed. 
   
 
A brief outline of the significant features of the lead industry and the  
 
market for lead are an essential prerequisite to and a contextual framework for a  
 
discussion of the relationship between the Bowes family and lead production during 
 
the sixteenth century. These include the general state of the industry, including levels  
 
of production over time, scale, and technology; the involvement of the Crown and the  
 
granting of monopolies; and the market for lead and the factors affecting it.  
 
  Lead production during the Middle Ages was insufficient to meet any  
 
demand beyond that of local needs, and like copper, gold and silver in the late  
 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, was not growing vigorously.
15
 The main lead  
 
mining areas in this period were the Mendips, Derbyshire, central and north Wales,  
 
and Yorkshire. It is generally agreed that Derbyshire became the centre of English  
 
lead mining and smelting throughout the sixteenth century.
16
  The extraction and  
 
smelting of lead was fundamentally a rural and upland industry, largely because of the  
                                                 
15
  L.F. Salzman, English Industries in the Middle Ages (London 1923) p.67; W. Rees, Industry 
    before the Industrial Revolution (Cardiff 1968) Vol. I p.133; and J. Blair, & N. Ramsey (eds), 
    English Medieval Industries (London 1991), ch. 4, R.F Homer „Tin, Lead and Pewter‟. 
16
  C.G.A. Clay, Economic Expansion and Social Change: England 1500-1700 Vol. II Industry, Trade 
    and Government (Cambridge 1984) p.57; D. C. Coleman, The Economy of England 1450-1750 
    (Oxford 1977)  p.82; Gough, Rise, p. 133; Holderness, Pre-Industrial England, p.102; and for the 
    Derbyshire lead industry in this period see D. Kiernan, The Derbyshire Lead Industry in the  
    Sixteenth Century (Derbyshire Record Society 1989). 
 geology of mineralisation (see map opposite from R. Burt, The British Lead Mining  
 
Industry [Redruth 1984]). 
 
  Lead production was variable and very limited during the fifteenth  
 
century, but from the 1490s harbingers of growth appeared.
17
 Metal mining and  
 
smelting, including lead, began to develop from the beginning of Henry VIII‟s  
 
reign in 1509, rooted in his desire to become independent of European suppliers.
18
 By  
 
the 1530s England was still only a small lead producer,
19
 but lead was a primary  
 
export, more valuable than tin and copper.
20
  Blanchard has commented that „The lead  
 
industry, barely capable of supplying the needs of domestic consumption in 1400, had  
 
by 1500 become a major exporter and by 1600, with an output of 12,000 tons, was  
 
one of the world‟s leading suppliers‟.21  By the 1580s England had become the largest  
 
lead producer in the European market.
22
 Clay asserts that „unless existing estimates of  
 
production are seriously misleading, the mining and processing of lead seems to have  
 
expanded more rapidly than any other form of extractive activity and most forms of  
 
manufacturing industry‟ between 1500 and 1700, and therefore the lead industry  
 
witnessing considerable expansion before 1640.
23
 There was considerable growth in  
 
pig lead output, especially during the last twenty years of the sixteenth century: 625  
 
tons per annum in 1500; 3,200 tons in 1580; and by 1600 12,000 tons.
24
 Salzman  
 
points to the late Elizabethan period as the time when „mining, under the auspices of  
                                                 
17
  W.G. Hoskins, The Age of Plunder: The England of Henry VIII 1500-1547 (London 1976) p.167. 
18
  Rees, Industry, Vol. I p.133.  
19
  I.S.W. Blanchard „English lead and the international bullion crisis of the 1550s‟ in D.C. Coleman & 
   A.H. John (eds.) Trade, Government, and Economy in Pre-industrial England: essays presented to  
    F.J. Fisher (London 1976) p. 21.  
20
  Coleman, Industry, p.45. 
21
  I.S.W. Blanchard „Labour productivity and work psychology in the English mining industry, 1400-  
   1600‟ in EcHR 2nd series vol. xxxi no.1 1978 p.12; D.C. Coleman, Industry in Tudor and 
    Stuart England (London 1975) also remarks that lead was a primary export from c.1500, p.45. 
22
  Blanchard, „English Lead‟, p.21. 
23
  Clay, Economic expansion, Vol. II, p.57. 
24
  Clay, Economic expansion, Vol. II, p.58. These statistics are derived from Blanchard, Labour  
     productivity, in Appendix C. 
 English capitalists and German engineers, took on a fresh lease of life‟.25 Between  
 
1580 and 1600 annual production almost quadrupled,
26
 and by way of comparison,  
 
over the two centuries 1500-1700 pig-lead output increased forty-five times, but tin  
 
only three times.
27
 In the sixteenth century pig lead production grew a phenomenal  
 
twenty-fold. 
 
  What were the salient features of lead production at this time? The  
 
main areas of activity were Derbyshire, the Mendips, Wales, and to a lesser extent the  
 
northern Pennine fells. The Derbyshire lead industry was the chief contributor  
 
throughout the sixteenth century. It was essentially a rural industry and mining was  
 
small scale; generally a mine was shallow pits or trenches, up to twenty feet deep; the  
 
labour amounted to only five or six miners, most of whom were farmer-miners; and 
 
this small-scale production base was largely funded by landowners. Nobility and  
 
gentry who owned land were exploiters rather than innovators, with very few  
 
exceptions.
28
 Blanchard argues that the fundamental reason for the increase in mining  
 
output, lead ore, between 1433 and 1597, was the greater number of miners.
29
 Clay  
 
suggests that the underlying cause of enormous growth in pig-lead, smelted lead,  
 
production was technological improvement that reduced costs and improved quality,  
 
and that innovation was stimulated by the need to „counteract the very low prices‟  
 
after the lead market was saturated by old lead from the dissolution of the monasteries  
 
in the 1530s and 1540s.
30
 It is held that expert skills and knowledge from Germany  
 
attracted by the Government were at the root of innovation.
31
 Derbyshire, where  
                                                 
25
  Salzman, English Industries, p. 67. 
26
  Blanchard, „Labour productivity‟; a calculation based upon his statistics in Appendix C. 
27
  Clay, Economic expansion, Vol. II, p.58. 
28
  Holderness, Pre-industrial England, p. 153. 
29
  Blanchard,  „Labour productivity‟ p.12 
30
  Clay, Economic expansion, Vol. II, p.57 
31
  Mining developments are evidenced in two German works of technical literature of the early  
     sixteenth century: G. Agricola, De Re Metallica (1530); Anon, Eyn Nut lich Bergbuchlin (c.1500);  
     and anon, Probierbuchlein (early sixteenth century, about assaying). There was also V. Biringuccio,  
 smelters and merchants were also involved in financing lead mining, was the chief  
 
beneficiary of the process of technological diffusion from the Mendips and the  
 
entrepreneurial and innovative role of the Earl of Shrewsbury, rather than any  
 
specific continental source.
 32
 
 
The generally received view of the market for lead is that both home  
 
and overseas demand spurred the industry to greater levels of output.
33
  London was  
 
the largest home market for pig lead, 
34
  followed by the developing industrial areas of  
 
the West Midlands and Tyneside.
35
 Lead was exported to Spain and France, and 
 
re-exported from Spain to the Mediterranean and Central America.
36
 Antwerp was the 
 
chief recipient and gateway for the distribution of English lead into Northern and 
 
Central Europe.
37
 Hoskins wrote that English lead was one of Europe‟s most  
 
valuable commodities, and that it monopolised the Western European market during  
 
the first half of the sixteenth century.
38
  Lead exports in 1564/5 were valued at  
 
£26,200.
39
  The main lead ports during the sixteenth century were London, Hull, 
 
Bristol, and Newcastle, and for a brief period in the early 1550s Hull exported more  
 
lead than London.
40
  Indeed, one view is that in 1500 Hull, the outlet for lead  
 
from Derbyshire and Yorkshire, was the chief lead port.
41
 
 
  It has already been noted that lead production was a function of both 
 
                                                                                                                                            
     De la Pirotechnia (Venice 1540), a contemporary Italian volume. 
32
  Kiernan, Derbyshire lead, p.1; Gough, Rise, p.134; Clay, Economic expansion, Vol. II, p.57;  
     Holderness, Pre-industrial England, p.151. 
33
  Coleman, Industry p.14; J.A. Chartres, Internal trade in England (London 1977) p.35; Clay, 
     Economic expansion, Vol. II, p.57.  
34
  T.S. Willan, The English coasting trade, pp.72-74. 
35
  Coleman, Industry, pp.14; Clay, Economic expansion, Vol. II, p. 57. 
36
  Blanchard, English Lead, p.22. 
37
  Ibid. p.22 & p.28. 
38
  Hoskins, Age of Plunder, p.167. 
39
  Ibid, p.185. 
40
  Blanchard, English Lead, pp.24-29; Chartres, Internal Trade, p.35 also mentions Boston in  
      Lincolnshire, and Chester and Aberdovey on the West Coast. 
41
  Clay, Economic Expansion, Vol. II, p.108 
national and foreign demand. In the early sixteenth century England was an  
 
insignificant lead producer; by the end of the century it was a major supplier of lead 
 
in a worldwide sense and Europe‟s main source of supply.42 The major factor  
 
affecting market equilibrium was the huge increase in the supply of lead as a  
 
consequence of the dissolution of the monasteries. Prices in the home market fell 
 
drastically, and lead production became virtually extinct by the end of the 1530s. 
 
In the overseas market cheap English lead was exported mainly to France, Spain, and 
 
the Low Countries, and from Spain it was re-exported to the New World and the  
 
Mediterranean. The lead export trade shrank in the early 1540s, whilst the Crown held 
 
massive stocks which did not disappear until about 1550, and in the meantime,  
 
because of the war against France banned exports from 1544. European silver refiners  
 
bought cheap English lead, which in turn virtually obliterated Continental lead  
 
production. In 1548/9, however, lead exports reached ten times those of the pre- 
 
Reformation level. Commercial crises and further Crown restrictions on lead exports  
 
damaged trade again in the 1550s, a decline that went on until the mid-1560s.  
 
Recovery appears to have begun from the late 1560s, with lead production increasing  
 
rapidly between 1580 and 1600 as indicated above.
43
 
 
  During the Elizabethan era the search for bullion continued and metal  
 
mining became a focus of Crown interest. „In 1558, and until 1603, Queen Elizabeth 
 
paid much attention to the British mines. She sent to Germany, and obtained the  
 
services of a large body of practical miners. These were dispersed over the various  
 
mining districts of the kingdom, and they introduced a better system of mining, and  
 
more perfect processes of dressing the ores. This was especially observable in the  
 
                                                 
42
  Blanchard, English Lead, p. 21; Blanchard, „Labour Productivity‟, p.12; Hoskins, Age of Plunder,  
     p.167. 
43
  This paragraph is taken from Blanchard, English Lead, pp. 21-29, and Hoskins, Age of Plunder, pp.  
     167 -168. 
  
 
machinery employed for dressing the ores of tin and lead‟.44  In 1568 two companies  
 
were granted royal charters which in effect created monopolies for the production of  
 
metals: The Company of Mines Royal, an Anglo-German partnership, essentially for 
 
the production of copper in Cumberland, in which the English side was to a large  
 
extent fronted by high-ranking state officials; and the Company of Mineral and  
 
Battery Works concentrating on iron-plate, brass and bronze, and the manufacture of  
 
brass and iron wire, which consisted only of domestic shareholders, and was only one 
 
tenth of the size of the Company of Mines Royal. The Governor of the Company of  
 
Mines Royal was a German, Daniel Hochstetter, a master miner and smelter from  
 
Augsburg.
45
 Put bluntly, both these chartered Companies were unsuccessful, but some 
 
members of the Bowes family had involvement with the Company of Mines Royal,  
 
and this will be discussed below. 
 
  Clearly, metal mining, and lead production in particular, experienced 
 
growth during the 1500s with lead becoming a staple English export commodity as  
 
the century progressed. The Peak District was the focal point of the English lead  
 
industry at this time, whilst the Bowes family‟s activities in lead and other metal  
 
mining were conducted mainly in the north of England, but extended to Scotland,  
 
Derbyshire, and the Lake District. Therefore, a brief outline of the lead industry and  
 
trade in that region is essential to an understanding of the nature and extent of the  
 
family‟s place in both the national and regional scene (see map opposite from A.  
 
Raistrick & B. Jennings A History of Lead mining in the North Pennines [London  
 
                                                 
44
  R. Hunt, A Historical Sketch of British Mining (London 1887) p.52. The extent and nature of  
     this foreign influence is not described or evidenced by Hunt. 
45
  See M.B. Donald, Elizabethan Copper: The History of the Company of Mines Royal (London  
     1955, reprinted 1994), and M.B. Donald, Elizabethan Monopolies: The History of the Company 
     of Mineral and Battery Works (London 1961).   
1966]). 
 
  Lead was mined in the Alston area, and in the river valleys of the  
 
northeast, especially Weardale and Teesdale.
46
  Weardale lead mines and smelting  
 
saw renewed activity during the Elizabethan period when the demand for lead grew  
 
and prices rose.
47
 The Bishop of Durham was the biggest owner of lead bearing lands  
 
in the northeast;
48
 production was carried on largely by lessees in Weardale from the  
 
late fourteenth century.
49
 The primary market for lead from this region was London  
 
from the early fifteenth century. Pig lead was shipped down the Tyne from Swalwell  
 
and Whickham and out of Newcastle; smaller amounts from Stockton and 
 
Hartlepool.
50
 Coal was the most important commodity for the merchants of Newcastle  
 
upon Tyne, but lead was always sufficiently valuable to stock when available. It was  
 
extracted, smelted, then carried from the northern Pennines to Newcastle, and then  
 
shipped to London and overseas.
51
 By the early sixteenth century Newcastle 
 
monopolised the lead export trade, most lead coming from the Weardale mines, and  
 
the balance from Cumberland and Westmoreland.
52
 Blanchard estimates Newcastle  
 
had 10.5% of the lead export trade in 1548/9, 10.8% in 1551-54, and 12.4% in 1561- 
 
64,though the amount of lead it exported fell in line with the general trend from 300  
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  See Hunt, British Mining, pp.148-150. There is evidence of lead mining in Weardale from Roman 
     times, and on Alston Moor from c.1130, see Raistrick & Jennings, Lead Mining, p. 8 and p.48; in    
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  P. Bowes, Weardale: Clearing the Forest (1990), p.46. See also, N. Rhodes, „Lead smelting in 
     Weardale‟, in Journal of the Weardale Field Society, no.3 (1984) pp. 8-15. 
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  M. James, Family, Lineage and Civil Society: A study of society, politics, and mentality in the 
     Durham region, 1500-1640  (Oxford 1974) p.30.  
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  See J.L. Drury „Medieval smelting in County Durham‟ in Willies & Cranstone, Boles; and A. 
     Raistrick & B. Jennings, A History of Lead Mining in the Pennines (London 1965) ch. 2. 
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  Bowes, Weardale, pp.45-46. 
51
  Hoskins, Age of Plunder, p.168; T.S. Willan notes that lead was Newcastle‟s second export after  
     coal in this period, Studies In Elizabethan Foreign Trade (Manchester 1959) p.60. 
52
  Hoskins, ibid. p.201. Clay, Economic Expansion, p.108, cites Hull as the leading lead port c.1500. 
 tons, to 120 tons, to 54 tons respectively.
53
  
 
  The lead industry of the northern Pennines during the sixteenth century 
 
displayed a number of basic characteristics. Lead mining technology comprised of 
 
muscle power, waterpower, and simple tools, and the labour force generally consisted  
 
of farmer-miners. Smelting was done in boles, which proved quite efficient in terms  
 
of the yield of pig lead from ore, but the turnbole came into more general use from the  
 
late fourteenth century.
54
 In Weardale from the 1460s the Durham oven facilitated an  
 
increase in productivity, and from the 1530s the introduction of the ore hearth from  
 
Mendip produced slag that could be re-smelted in the Durham oven. In other words,  
 
the resultant improvement in productivity arose from the marriage of two  
 
technologies, which in turn allowed medieval mines to be re-worked when they would  
 
have otherwise remained unviable. The technology of refining lead changed in this  
 
period, but not that of extraction; the technological condition of the lead industry  
 
remained unchanged until at least the mid-seventeenth century. Lastly, it would  
 
appear that during the sixteenth century lead mining and smelting was more expansive  
 
and advanced in Weardale than in Teesdale.
55
 It was in this setting that the Bowes  
 
family delved into lead production and trade. 
 
  Having briefly examined the lead industry on a national and regional  
 
basis, and before examining the Bowes association with lead in the sixteenth and  
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early seventeenth centuries, it is now helpful to elucidate the entrepreneurial 
 
environment in which they became immersed. By the1520s England‟s transition from  
 
a medieval to capitalist economy was well underway, a function of the growth in  
 
consumer demand according to some historians, but surely this was only one aspect of  
 
a wider process of economic change.
56
 During this period, perhaps more so than in the 
 
eighteenth century, rural industry was stimulated, and enterprising gentry harnessed  
 
under-occupied labour for a range of productive tasks, including the extraction of  
 
lead. In areas like the north east of England, where pastoral agriculture required less  
 
labour, peasants could become miners, and there was profit available for gentry  
 
families with business acumen, like the Vernons in Derbyshire.
57
 The gentry invested  
 
in a „wide range of commercial and industrial enterprises‟, and „gained a reputation  
 
for taking decisive actions to change the world around them in order to make larger  
 
profits‟.58 The incomes of the majority of the gentry by the early sixteenth century,  
 
however, were rents, but some from office with government or the Crown, although in  
 
contrast to the higher aristocracy the „landed gentry had more of a reputation for  
 
enterprise‟.59 Their finances and inheritances were often bolstered by family alliances  
 
through marriage.
60
  
   
The Bowes as entrepreneurs were absorbed into a very different  
 
context from the mid-sixteenth century when the economic and social landscape was 
 
reconfigured by a culture of sponsored economic development. Patronage, at both  
 
local and national levels, became a dynamic source of entrepreneurship. The  
 
principal manifestation of patronage was various forms of monopoly: delegation of  
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fiscal rights to collect taxes or duties; patents permitting the overseeing of industry  
 
and trade; licenses giving exemption from certain laws; and the granting of an 
 
industrial monopoly – for example in mining. A mixture of underlying reasons  
 
account for this behaviour: protectionism; the Crown‟s financial needs; and  
 
inducement or payment for the services of the aristocracy and gentry. The participants  
 
were the powerful elites, including the higher aristocracy, landed gentry, the Crown,  
 
government officials, and merchants. The availability of grants of monopoly  
 
to courtiers presented a temptation for businessmen who offered money for  
 
countenance at Court to initiate schemes or projects.
61
  Thirsk has analysed the  
 
promotion of projects conceived by the marriage of cultural ideas and economic  
 
policy during the period 1540 to 1630, when economic ventures were launched to  
 
provide new occupations and achieve independence from other nations.
62
  These  
 
projects involved all aspects of industry and agriculture for the „commonweal‟, and  
 
contributed to the growth of a consumer society, but after 1580 became a source of  
 
scandal because of conflicts of interest involving Crown debts, private speculation for  
 
profit, and lawsuits, and especially so during the reign of Elizabeth I. At the core of  
 
this new business environment was an elite-State axis founded upon the granting of  
 
patents of monopoly for the production of a broad range of goods and raw materials.  
 
The standard-bearer for these projects was William Cecil, Elizabeth I‟s Secretary of  
 
State, who acted as an economic patron. We will observe below the Bowes  
 
connections with monopolies of the time created for the purpose of mineral  
 
exploitation, though it is evident that the Bowes were not granted a patent during  
 
Elizabeth‟s reign. Cecil himself invested in mining operations in the Lake District  
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during the 1560s, and was particularly interested in metal mining and refining.
63
  
 
Systemic abuse of the practice of granting monopolies, patents, and licenses resulted  
 
in its suspension by James 1 in 1603, and the introduction of a commission to review  
 
future requests. Francis Bacon, who became interested in monopolies during  
 
Elizabeth‟s reign, was a regular participant in the work of the commissioners.64 
 
Francis Bacon‟s philosophy on the reform of knowledge not only 
 
adopted mining as a metaphor for seeking the truth – the truth was „hydde in certain  
 
deep Mynes and Caves – but appears to have directed his views at mining  
 
entrepreneurs at the beginning of the Stuart age, perhaps influenced by his father‟s  
 
experience of being a shareholder in the Company of Mineral and Battery Works,  
 
shares he inherited in 1579. Bacon‟s thinking did have practical benefits for those  
 
involved in metal mining, and he was closely connected to Thomas Russell, a  
 
metallurgical entrepreneur with links to Robert Cecil - Secretary of State and  
 
Governor of the Mineral and Battery Works - and the senior personnel at the Royal  
 
Mint. The mechanical arts, including mining and smelting, were the focus of Bacon‟s  
 
attempt to convince the upper echelons of society to accept the mutually beneficial  
 
relationship between science and labour.
65
 The Bowes and others of their ilk had  
 
access to Bacon‟s radical philosophy; they were in the same social class, two  
 
members of the Bowes family were commissioned to inspect mines on behalf of the  
 
Mineral and Battery Works, and they were present in London and at Court. There are  
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scholars who portray Bacon in the role of influential mediator, though not himself a  
 
mining entrepreneur, in regular contact with mining experts.
66
 Unfortunately there is  
 
no firmer evidence at this stage of any contact between Bacon and the Bowes family. 
 
 
The culture of patronage was rooted in the ideas of political  
 
economists and the adverse financial circumstances of Elizabeth I and James I, but 
 
there was another, potentially obstructive, aspect to the culture of the period  –  
 
the clash between „social convention and market opportunity‟, „ a tension between 
 
the need for wealth to maintain status and the sense that the canons of gentility both 
 
demanded certain levels of expense and proscribed certain forms of moneymaking‟.67 
 
Heal & Holmes suggest that this tension between paternalism, characterised by  
 
beneficent estate management, and gentry entreneurship, defined by the un-Christian  
 
exploitation of tenants, remained until the early seventeenth century but that its  
 
intensity was much reduced by 1700 and, in the Bowes case by the mid-eighteenth  
 
century, capitalistic behaviour was evident. 
68
 The harsh realities of a developing  
 
market economy served as the breeding ground for the conflict between conscience  
 
and coin, because the gentry were confronted with quite rapid inflation between 1500  
 
and 1650, but the apparent opportunity to improve their rentier status was inhibited by  
 
slower wage rises and customary tenure on their estates that often prevented  
 
enclosure.
69
 The alternatives to the improvement of landed estates for profit 
 
and increased rental income were activities such as mining and metallurgy, trade and  
 
shipping, and urban development, all of which Heal & Holmes define as „marginal  
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and speculative‟ compared to gentry income from land which was always the basis of  
 
their wealth and status.
70
 From the early sixteenth century until the outbreak of the  
 
Civil War, there were evidently market opportunities for gentry entrepreneurship in  
 
estate management for improvement, in metallurgical resources and industry, and in  
 
urban development. Certain members of the Bowes family made the passage into  
 
mining and related trade at a time when „ traditional assumptions about the  
 
impropriety of a gentleman‟s direct involvement in commerce or usury, or the  
 
paternalistic values assumed to govern landlord-tenant relations, had to be  
 
reconsidered.‟71 
 
   
The Bowes family, well-established Durham landed gentry,
72
 seized  
 
upon the opportunity for financial gain presented by the existence of lead in Teesdale  
 
and Weardale. Their „connections with the Court and the service of the Crown‟73 was 
 
rewarded with lucrative positions. During Henry VIII‟s reign Sir Robert Bowes was  
 
warden of the Middle March and a member of the Council in the North, a member of  
 
the Privy Council and Master of the Rolls. The family patriarch held the position of  
 
steward of the Crown lordship of Barnard Castle. This extensive influence included  
 
an episcopal connection with the Bishop of Durham, from whom opportunities were  
 
provided for enrichment and local influence‟.74 Sir Robert Bowes as head of the  
 
Bowes family, along with other Durham gentry families, formed an alliance with  
 
Bishops who supported the Crown in order to win favour and achieve improvement in  
 
their prospects politically, socially, and financially. The Bowes family „were able and  
 
vigorous enough to seize new opportunities‟ in both metalliferrrous mining and coal  
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 mining during the second half of the sixteenth century, including both the Bowes of  
 
Streatlam and its younger branch at Biddick.
75
 
 
  In 1550 Edward VI granted Sir Robert Bowes and George Bowes „all 
 
that his lead-mines within the New Forest of Teesdale, in the aforesaid bishoprick; all 
 
and singular which premises and their appurtenances are scituate, lying, and being  
 
within the lordships of Barnard Castle, and within the Forest of Teesdale, in the  
 
aforesaid Bishoprick of Durham ………….for the term of twenty-one years; paying 
 
yearly for the aforesaid mine….forty shillings…. The lead-mine called Flakebrigge, 
 
scitiuate, lying, and being within the manor of Egleston……‟.76 After Sir Robert  
 
Bowes died in 1555, George Bowes surrendered the lease, and the new lessees were 
 
George and William Bowes for the remainder of the term at the same rent. 
 
  Flakebrigg lead mine, in the valley of Little Eggleshope Beck,  
 
produced ten loads of ore in 1563 at „ye newe grove in Eglishope‟, mined by Robert  
 
Baynbrig of Frere House near High Force for George Bowes.
77
 It seems that some  
 
time thereafter the mine fell into the hands of the Earl of Westmoreland, head of the  
 
Neville family, and then sequestered by Elizabeth I for his role in the Rising of the  
 
North in1569. In 1571 Flakebrigge lead mine was leased to Ralph Bowes for  
 
twenty one years at sixty shillings per annum rent and a fine of £6, even though 
 
it was „in great ruin and decay‟ when surveyed and valued by Robert Bowes 78 and  
 
Charles Chaytor on behalf of the Crown.
79
 The Bowes family leased this mine again  
 
in 1576, when Elizabeth I granted a twenty one year term to Sir George Bowes and  
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 his son, describing it as the demesne land of Barnard Castle with the lead mine in the 
 
New Forest of Teesdale.
80
 „For the Crown, leases in reversion probably appeared to  
 
be an efficient method of regarding royal servants‟, such leases were essentially 
 
for „the exploitation of the Crown lands for private gain‟, and „granted as a form of  
 
patronage‟.81 
 
James has discussed the changing nature of society in the Durham  
 
region consequent upon the growing wealth from coal, which led to aspirations for  
 
landed status.
82
 The process of change in gentry society was facilitated by older,  
 
established landed families adopting more enterprising roles in mineral extraction,  
 
and especially coal and lead. The Bowes family were in the vanguard of the upper  
 
gentry‟s enterprise in mineral exploitation, with Sir George Bowes leasing lead mines  
 
in Teesdale from the Crown, and in Weardale from the Bishop during the latter  
 
decades of the sixteenth century. 
 
  The bulk of the Bowes lead ore must have come from mines in  
 
Weardale where the Bishopric leased mines and mills to a „Moormaster‟ who 
 
became liable for all costs in involved in production in return for the output, minus 
 
a royalty to the Bishop, known as the Bishop‟s lot, and to the Rector of Stanhope,  
 
known as the parson‟s lot.83 During the late sixteenth century Sir George Bowes and  
 
his eldest son William were the Bishop‟s Moormasters.84 It is difficult to specify the  
 
exact period during which Bowes family members held the position, or to present any  
 
details of the mines and their production, because evidently the Bishop‟s Auditor‟s  
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 office records were destroyed in 1645.
85
  
 
It is suggested here that there are two possible dates when Sir George  
 
Bowes could have become Moormaster, both after the Rising of the North in 1569,  
 
when Sir George supported the crown and defended Barnard Castle against the rebels  
 
thereby winning royal favour; either 1571 or 1576. The earlier date is plausible  
 
because Elizabeth I appears to have rewarded the Bowes family, for their role in the  
 
Rising, out of the forfeiture of the Earl of Westmoreland by granting the lead mining  
 
lease for Flakebrigg to Ralph Bowes in 1571, and in 1576 granted a new lease for the  
 
same mine to Sir George and his son William. The year 1576 is particularly pertinent,  
 
because it marked the end of Bishop Pilkington‟s rule, who did not command the  
 
Queen‟s favour because he demonstrated a lack of leadership and fled Durham  
 
during the Rising. This is supported by the fact that Elizabeth I used the occasion of  
 
Pilkington‟s appointment to obtain land from the Bishop‟s estates, which during a  
 
time of financial constraints gave her an additional £700 per annum income.
86
 Later  
 
the Queen employed the Act of 1571, allowing her to sequester rebel lands following  
 
the Rising, to limit his privileges. After his father‟s death in 1580, the eldest son, Sir  
 
William Bowes continued as Moormaster. His lucrative position was undoubtedly  
 
bolstered between 1589 and 1595, during the rule of Bishop Hutton, when a daughter  
 
of Sir George Bowes married the Bishop‟s heir. The Bowes were a Protestant family  
 
at a time when the Church interest „stood for a considerable concentration of office,  
 
wealth, and influence‟.87 In the case of Sir William Bowes this position probably  
 
manifested itself in his role as the leading northeast lead producer. Lastly, it is known  
 
that Sir George Bowes died in 1580 and William in 1611, indicating that the family  
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remained as lessees of the Weardale mines until at least 1611. Therefore, if either of  
 
these dates are correct, it would mean that Sir George Bowes and his eldest son  
 
William controlled lead mining in Weardale from either 1571 or 1576 until 1611.  
 
   
The business structure of the Moormaster as in effect the head lessee 
 
of the Bishop‟s lead mines became the prevailing model for the Bowes during the 
 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on their own lands in Upper Teesdale south of  
 
the River Tees. This structure, established before Sir George Bowes held the 
 
position, was characterised by sub-letting mines to individuals and small partnerships  
 
who were financially liable for lead mining, with the Moormaster as monopsonist.  
 
Even more significantly he was completely in control of smelting, the profit centre of  
 
the whole structure. The Bishop and the Rector of Stanhope each received one-tenth  
 
duty ore, and Bowes retained four-fifths. The Moormaster dominated the whole lead  
 
production process but without the burden of risk in lead mining stage, which was  
 
sub-let to miners. In complete contrast to other lead mining areas, there was no  
 
regulation of any sort, and the miners or individuals or partners who leased the mines  
 
had no liberties or recourse against the Moormaster. The discussion below in chapters  
 
four to eight of the mid-eighteenth century Bowes‟ lead business will reveal  
 
similarities with that of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but also  
 
some key differences. More than anything else the initiation of the Bowes into the  
 
business of lead production and trade during the late sixteenth century provided, in the  
 
form of the institutional Moormaster role, a template for later developments.
88
  
 
During Sir William Bowes‟ time as Moormaster, he built a water- 
 
powered, bellows-blown smelt mill at Burtreeford probably before c.1595, which  
 
                                                 
88
  Blackburn, Mining, provides detailed analysis of the origins and operational aspects of the 
     Moormaster system pp. 69-75 
also received lead ore from Upper Teesdale.
89
 We noted above that ore hearth  
 
smelting was used in Weardale from the 1530s, married to the Durham oven for slag 
 
smelting - the latter technology being a Weardale development according to 
 
Blanchard - before construction of the Bowes mill at Burtreeford in Weardale  
 
adjacent to the mining areas. It must be assumed therefore, that in Teesdale lead ore  
 
was smelted in boles (or bales or bails) with slags smelted in the „blackwork oven‟.  
 
There are nineteen known sites in Teesdale entitled „bail hill‟, probably more  
 
unknown, dating from the twelfth to the sixteenth century.
90
  Bowes‟ building of a  
 
technologically up-to-date smelt mill at Burtreeford shifted the focus of smelting to a  
 
place higher up the Wear valley amongst the lead mines, and away from  
 
Wolsingham which, during the Episcopal exploitation of ores in the fifteenth and  
 
early sixteenth century, had developed as the lead smelting centre based on wood fuel  
 
from the lower valley hunting forest.
91
 It would appear that the economic benefits of a  
 
smelt mill at Burtreeford for Bowes mines in Weardale, simultaneously provided a  
 
focus for lead ore mined in Teesdale. The customs and practices of the Moormasters  
 
date from at least 1566, and in a strict business sense meant that the Bowes owned  
 
and operated a smelting business – the profit centre – free from the Bishop‟s  
 
regulation.
92
 Consequently, investment in the building of a smelt mill was very  
 
worthwhile.  
 
  The financial significance of lead to Sir William Bowes is  
 
demonstrated by the expansion of his lead interests in the 1590s when he became the  
 
owner of a well-established smelting business in Derbyshire. Following the death of  
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 Sir Godfrey Foljambe in 1595, Sir William married his widow, which brought into his  
 
hands a smelt mill at Walton, near Chesterfield. Subsequently, he owned a wharf on  
 
the River Idle at Bawtry, a lead market town frequented by London merchants and  
 
their agents, and inland transhipment point in the Derbyshire lead trade. Sir William 
 
took the reins of an existing smelting business, one of the few which had adopted ore  
 
hearth technology in the 1570s, and Bowes shipped lead from the River Humber  
 
mainly to the Billingsgate lead market in London and the rest abroad.
93
  
 
  In Weardale, Bowes controlled lead mining under the terms of his  
 
lease from the Bishop, which effectively made him the monopoly purchaser of  
 
lead ore. The smelt mill at Burtreeford was an improvement technologically,  
 
logistically, and in terms of spatial organisation of smelting. The Bowes were leading  
 
Newcastle lead merchants from the 1560s. In Derbyshire Bowes became one of the  
 
leading smelters and lead merchants in a very different production structure where  
 
smelters predominated from the early sixteenth century and consolidated their  
 
position so that by the mid-century many were landed gentry. They provided the  
 
capital needed for a production process dictated until the 1570s by bole technology –  
 
ore purchase, the cost of fuel, and especially for lead carriage to Hull. Moreover, they  
 
had the market contacts in London. Kiernan concluded that the old established  
 
smelting families, rooted in their bole technology, were disinclined towards  
 
commercial expansion in the latter part of the century, because they had achieved  
 
landed status from lead income, and formed „an uncompetitive elite of gentry smelters  
 
who controlled every aspect of lead production in the county‟.94 They exhibited a  
 
„social and technological conservatism‟, they had the economic power to restrict  
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supply in weaker markets, such as the 1540s and 1550s, and spend time on other  
 
activities on their estates. Evidently they exhibited a reluctance to be „regarded as  
 
merchants rather than gentlemen‟.95 Consequently, it must have been extremely  
 
difficult, if not impossible to penetrate the Derbyshire lead industry. Sir William  
 
Bowes achieved this by marrying the widow of a knightly and leading smelting  
 
family whose wealth from lead had expanded their land ownership since the fifteenth  
 
century.
96
 Although the Foljambes were less resistant to change than most of the  
 
Derbyshire smelting oligarchy, Bowes was new blood, possibly introducing a more  
 
commercial outlook founded upon his experience of the lead business in the northeast,  
 
which included every aspect of the production process, including shipping and trade  
 
to London, and his family had been landed gentry since the fourteenth century.  
 
Whether it be in Weardale, Teesdale, or Derbyshire, the Bowes involvement in lead 
 
production in the late sixteenth century warrants further investigation, probably based 
 
upon sources other than those explored for this thesis. Their very active role, and 
 
especially that of Sir George Bowes, may prove as significant as that of George  
 
Bowes during the mid-eighteenth century.     
  
 
  Sir George Bowes was the chief lead merchant of this period until his  
 
death in 1580.The minutes of the Newcastle Merchant Adventurers show that lead 
 
was a staple commodity in Newcastle‟s trade, and that in 1564 the Merchant  
 
Adventurers were regulated not to ship lead to foreigners in an attempt to prevent the  
 
lead trade becoming controlled by London and foreign merchants.
97
 Lead had been  
 
for some time „a cheiff traide and levinge to the bretherynge of this Fellowshype‟.98  
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The value of lead to Bowes and his fellow merchants, and his standing in the lead  
 
trade, was confirmed in 1569 when the Merchant Adventurers effected „An acte 
 
conserning Sir George Bowsse‟s leede‟,99  which meant that the Adventurers bought 
 
all his lead, which evidently was mined in Allendale as well as Weardale, before 
 
apportioning it amongst themselves according to a system of grading within the  
 
group. There was a subsequent decree that effectively fined merchants for trading in  
 
any other commodity out of Newcastle if they refused to take some of Bowes‟ lead. In 
 
1572 it was stipulated that any merchant dealing in Bowes lead must share it with  
 
other members or be fined. It seems twelve merchants were nominated on behalf of  
 
all members to buy from Bowes. Sir George Bowes was clearly the leading supplier 
 
of pig lead, and possibly a monopolist, and until new evidence suggests otherwise, his 
 
perceived personal contribution should not necessarily be overshadowed by any of his  
 
descendants. 
 
  In terms of the lead trade in Newcastle there is a dearth of evidence for 
 
the late sixteenth century, but some idea of its volume around the turn of the century  
 
can be derived from the little there is available. In 1599 the Bowes offered  
 
eighty fothers of pig lead to the Merchant Adventurers at £7 13s 4d per fother, and  
 
the following year the Bowes supplied another one hundred fothers. At this stage it is 
 
reasonable to deduce that the Bowes were probably the principal merchants supplying  
 
lead to Newcastle.
100
  
 
  The Bowes conducted business with London merchants both in  
 
Newcastle and London, and from the late 1560s the Bowes lead business was at  
 
certain times financed from London. London was the lead staple, based at Gibson‟s  
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Quay, one of the „legal quays‟ created following an Act of 1559 which defined the  
 
Elizabethan fiscal port of London as part of customs reform instigated by Lord  
 
Treasurer Winchester for the benefit of the Crown. This quay was let to William  
 
Wiggens in 1582 at a rent of £50 per annum, and thereafter it was known as Wiggens   
 
Quay.
101
 The organisation of the lead trade in both Newcastle and London, and the  
 
Bowes‟ role are illustrated by a very small collection of documents known as  
 
recognizances or bonds drafted and lodged at the High Court of Chancery in London. 
 
Under an agreement of the fourth of December 1567,Thomas  
 
Wilbraham advanced Sir George Bowes and his brother Robert Bowes of Barnes  
 
£500 for the delivery of eighty fothers of lead at the „weigh house or beam‟  
 
in Newcastle in four instalments of twenty fothers on the twenty-fifth of June in each  
 
of the four years following. The lead had to be „good lawful clean and  
 
merchantable‟. 102 The Bowes agreed to forfeit £1000 if they failed to deliver the lead  
 
on time, suggesting that business practice was to agree a recognizance or bond twice  
 
the amount of the capital advanced to the supplier(s) who accepted the conditions of  
 
the indenture.  
 
  In the 1570s dealings with a leading London merchant, Edward  
 
Hogan, were fraught with delays in delivering agreed amounts of pig lead.
103
 The  
 
pertinent recognizance of 14
th
 January 1576 cites details of numerous agreements  
 
beginning in 1571 between Sir George Bowes and various partners for the supply of  
 
Newcastle lead to Hogan to „Queen Majesty‟s beam at the wharf or quay at Gibson‟s  
 
quay‟. Partial delivery was not acceptable, although ultimately an agreement was  
 
reached for delivery by instalments, but the wording of the document was to ensure  
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 Hogan got his lead. At one point Bowes and his partners were in bond to Hogan for  
 
£600. Bonds and legal action would only be avoided if Edward Hogan received the  
 
lead he ordered, and the negotiated restructuring of the agreements made suggests  
 
Hogan was the source of capital advanced to subsidise mining and smelting.
104
  
   
The predominance of London lead merchants and the risks taken by Sir  
 
George Bowes and his co-suppliers, Robert Bowes of Aske and his son William, were  
 
emphasised when in 1580 they failed to meet a bargain with John Mendam for  
 
twenty-four fothers of Newcastle lead which „long since should have been delivered‟  
 
to Gibson‟s Quay in London.105 Bowes was forced, before the Chief Justice of  
 
England, to agree payment of the £400 forfeit in four instalments of £100 each June  
 
from 1580,
106
 because he had probably received a £200 advance. 
 
   The Bowes family and various partners or associates trading lead with  
 
London merchants from Newcastle, and occasionally to Hamburg and other European  
 
ports,
107
 but there was at least one variation in this structure when in March 1593 two  
 
other members of the family, Sir William Bowes of Bradley (and of Streatlam, son of  
 
Sir George Bowes d. 1580) Henry Bowes of Newcastle, and one Richard Willance,  
 
draper, of Richmond, agreed to deliver ten fothers of „soft merchantable lead in small  
 
pigs‟ by 1st  September 1593, to „the Queen Majesty‟s beam‟ Wiggens Quay,  
 
London.
108
 There is good indication that this lead was produced in Teesdale, because  
 
Hartlepool was the shipping port, and the indenture specified „Hartlepool weight‟ –  
 
twenty hundredweight per fother or 2240 lbs of pig lead.
109
  Again, it would appear  
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 that a London merchant, on this occasion George Bollis, a grocer, advanced monies  
 
waiting for delivery of pig lead, and the Bowes would suffer a £120 forfeit for  
 
non-delivery. 
 
  The members of the Bowes family involved in the lead industry were  
 
essentially merchants who also controlled mining and smelting on their leased mining  
 
areas, and were principal lead suppliers to the Newcastle Merchant Adventurers. The  
 
Bowes and fellow merchants sold lead to London merchants, who often advanced  
 
capital which financed the mining, smelting, and carriage of lead to Newcastle,  
 
though Hartlepool also played a minor role in the trade.
110
 It cannot, of course, be  
 
stated for certain that all monies obtained in London were used in lead production.  
 
Bowes lead was also an export commodity, either directly to European ports, or via  
 
the London market. Lastly, the nature of the documents analysed herein and the sums  
 
of money involved confirm that the trade in lead was tightly regulated; contracts were  
 
registered at the High Court of the Chancery in London, and failure to comply  
 
resulted in the enforcement of forfeits which were usually twice the amount advanced  
 
by London merchants.   
 
  Is it possible to assess the Bowes contribution to either local and/or 
 
national lead production? The lack of statistical information prevents even a poor 
 
estimate of their contribution to both local and national pig lead output, and is  
 
hampered by the absence of a chronological series, or statistics from different sources  
 
which could either be compared or cobbled together to form one acceptable body of  
 
statistics for lead output in this period. Most available information is in the form of  
 
trade statistics based on the research of Blanchard, Raistrick, Kiernan, and Hoskins.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
     hundredweight or 2464 lbs. 
110
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In 1567 the Bowes agreed to supply at least 20 fothers per annum for the next four  
 
years; equivalent to thirty-nine per cent of the average annual amount for the period  
 
1561-4 shipped out of Newcastle, and almost five per cent of the average amount  
 
shipped out of English ports.
111
 It should be noted that the 1567 agreement was only  
 
for one purchaser. In 1593 the Bowes agreed to deliver ten fothers to one London  
 
merchant, or just over two per cent of the total fothers shipped out of Newcastle but  
 
again the ten fothers was only one transaction. By way of comparison with another  
 
landed gentry family whose fortunes were deeply interwoven with lead, in 1585  
 
George Talbot 6
th
 Earl of Shrewsbury, and evidently the leading lead entrepreneur of  
 
the sixteenth century, smelted 100 fothers of lead.
112
 Unfortunately, there is no figure  
 
for Bowes production in or around the same year, although there was a contractual  
 
agreement to deliver twenty-four fothers to a London merchant in 1580, which they  
 
failed to meet. 
 
There is a more useful measurement of the Bowes‟ prowess in the  
 
northeastern lead industry at the end of the sixteenth century.  In 1599 Bowes  
 
supplied 80 fothers of pig lead to the Newcastle market, and 100 fothers in 1600.
113
 In  
 
1601 Newcastle shipped out 59 ¼ fothers of lead, equivalent to 1.48% of the total of  
 
4,006 ¼.
114
 Therefore, the amount of lead supplied by the Bowes in 1599 and 1600  
 
exceeded the level of exported lead in 1601. Again, a useful comparison can be made  
 
with the Talbots in Derbyshire; they smelted in excess of 240 fothers of lead in 
 
1600.
115
 The Bowes weight of 100 fothers supplied was approximately 42% of the 
 
estimated Talbot output of pig lead. 
 
  In summary, it is possible to give a broad indication of the Bowes trade  
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 in lead, but the actual output cannot be extrapolated in any meaningful way from the 
 
extremely restricted sources. It can be said that, because the Bowes controlled the  
 
productive Weardale lead mines and the smelting operations for approximately forty  
 
years, the amount of pig lead produced must have been considerably more than the  
 
very few recorded amounts supplied to the Newcastle market or exported down the  
 
cost to London.  
 
 
The Bowes family had established themselves at the forefront of the 
 
growth in lead production from the late 1560s in response to greater demand both 
 
in the domestic market and from overseas, and their involvement must have continued  
 
both in the northeast and Derbyshire until Sir William‟s died in 1611. Certain  
 
members of the Biddick branch of the family, however, were involved in the search  
 
for gold and silver instigated by the Crown and politicians. This deserves brief  
 
mention, because it demonstrates the knowledge and experience they had in mining,  
 
and the esteem in which they were held by the Crown for these attributes in the hunt  
 
for bullion at the turn of the century. It also reveals their involvement with German  
 
mining and smelting specialists with whom the Crown and Government had consorted  
 
with since the late fifteenth century, but to little avail, in an attempt to discover and  
 
extract precious metals and relieve the shortage of bullion. 
 
  George Bowes of Biddick, third son of Sir George Bowes of Streatlam  
 
(d. 1580) who was Moormaster of the Bishop‟s lead mines, was a member of the  
 
Privy Council and Marshal to Queen Elizabeth I. He and his younger brother Robert  
 
were recognised coal mining entrepreneurs in the lower Wear valley,
116
 and George  
 
Bowes utilised his coal mining knowledge as part of a three-man commission  
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 appointed in 1600 to investigate the state of the Lake District mines focused around  
 
Keswick, and exercise repeated in 1602.
117
 These mines were essentially copper  
 
producing, but there was some lead and silver, and after an initial degree of success in  
 
the late 1560s had fallen into decline. He visited the mines in April 1600, with his  
 
brother Robert and Daniel Hochstetter Jnr., and demonstrated his detailed knowledge  
 
in report on the condition of the mines based upon actual inspections and records and  
 
inventories.
118
 Evidently both reports confirmed lack of progress amounting to  
 
financial loss, and implied indictment of the operation the mines under German  
 
expertise and skilled labour. 
 
  George Bowes‟ working relationship with Daniel Hochstetter cannot  
 
be said to have led to any member of the Bowes family to introduce German mining  
 
methods or expertise into lead mining in either the northeast or elsewhere.   
 
Hochstetter was a „thorough business man, much superior to British industrialists of  
 
the day, and a very good metallurgist too‟,119 but George Bowes and his brother  
 
Robert were highly experienced men in the coal industry, and their elder brother, Sir  
 
William, leased the Bishop‟s lead mines as Moormaster, and their father before him.  
 
The Bowes‟ experience of coal and lead in the northeast suggests that existing  
 
methods and technology prevailed, that on-going local developments in mineral  
 
extraction were probably more significant than any techniques imported from abroad,  
 
and that techniques developed in the northeast were available for deployment 
 
elsewhere, such as in Scotland. It would appear that if there were a profound German  
 
influence it was most likely to have been organisational rather than technological.  
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 For example, George Bowes extended his mining activities into Scotland when  
 
he was appointed by James I‟s Privy Council to find and mine gold in the Wanlock  
 
area and sponsored with a Government subsidy of £300 in 1603.
120
 Bowes introduced  
 
a team of English miners to work alongside the local miners, but whether he found  
 
gold is still in question
121
. This shows, however, that he had sufficient faith in the  
 
skills and ability of his own miners to organise their migration to Wanlock. Bowes  
 
relinquished the mine believing he was insufficiently funded by the Crown. 
 
 
  There may be other records as yet undiscovered or unavailable which 
 
would shed more light on the Bowes family‟s dealings with lead in the sixteenth  
 
century. It has been possible to garner evidence from a range of secondary sources, 
 
though some of these are the work of historians who have examined materials  
 
currently beyond the range of this thesis. The Bowes family performed a leading  
 
entrepreneurial function in lead mining, smelting, and trade in the northeast, a role  
 
avoided by the Bishop who generally behaved as a rentier, with the exception perhaps  
 
of Wolsey and Pilkington. In particular Sir George Bowes and his son Sir William  
 
adopted a commercial outlook from the late 1560s, taking the changing market  
 
conditions as an opportunity for financial gain. There seems to have been hesitance 
 
at this time amongst landowners to venture into the mercantile world, but as Hatcher  
 
has remarked „The Bowes had no such inhibitions, and were heavily involved in both  
 
coal and lead-mining‟.122 There is the distinct impression that the Bowes derived a 
 
significant income from the lead industry, and although there was serious risk of  
 
forfeiture in some transactions, as some records confirm, this does not mean that the  
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Bowes lead production and trade was unsuccessful. Indeed, it is clear that they were 
 
the leading lead suppliers to the Newcastle Merchant Adventurers until at least the  
 
early seventeenth century, where self-regulation effectively installed them as  
 
monopolists. In London, their dealings with lead merchants must place them in the  
 
upper echelon of merchants trading in a high value semi-precious metal, which  
 
because of home and overseas demand became a staple commodity. Again, the sums  
 
of money contained in original documents verifies the Bowes‟ capacity to obtain cash  
 
on the basis of lead production in times of bullion shortage. This, of course, was  
 
possible in both Newcastle and London. Sir William Bowes immersion in he  
 
Derbyshire lead industry would undoubtedly have furthered the relationship with  
 
London merchants and their agents who visited the Bawtry lead market, and  
 
simultaneously developed ties with merchants and shippers in Hull. 
 
   
In the absence of findings regarding the financial aspects of mining,  
 
smelting, and trade during this period, there is only a broad indication of the level of  
 
production and trade, and the sums of money involved. Apart from the Bowes‟ mine  
 
at Flakebrigg, which is north of the River Tees, it can only be said that the lands  
 
acquired by the Bowes in Upper Teesdale, south of the river, provided the mineral  
 
rights potential for lead production, but we must conclude that they were not 
 
exploited. The absence of organised lead mining is confirmed by the archaeological 
 
fieldwork, which has revealed the inactivity in lead smelting south of the Tees  
 
compared to that north of the river.
 123
  It is possible to say that the construction of a  
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 Bowes in the late sixteenth century was an improvement in terms of lead refining  
 
technology, and a positive development in the organisation of production in  
 
Weardale. The pairing of foreigners and their supposed expertise and technology with  
 
the Bowes is unlikely. Apart from the Burtreeford smelt mill, boles probably  
 
remained in use for some time. Technique and technology in mining were unchanged,  
 
The Bowes‟ management of the leased mines and smelting in Weardale and Teesdale  
 
was characterised by small scale mining operations, but with an innovation in  
 
smelting, primarily aimed at reducing carriage costs by building the mill near the  
 
mines, thereby displacing the centralisation of smelting operations around  
 
Wolsingham. The Bowes family members were not unique in their chosen  
 
commercial role; other north east gentry were actively engaged in commerce and  
 
industry.
124
 The Bowes success in the lead trade during the sixteenth century must be 
 
primarily credited to business acumen, but their social and political standing in the  
 
north, their favour with the Crown, and direct Crown patronage, especially the  
 
granting of lands with mineral rights, were undoubtedly significant positive factors  
 
influencing the family‟s commercial and financial elevation. Nevertheless, it was  
 
during the sixteenth century that the interplay of these different factors created the 
 
foundations upon which, from time to time, Bowes descendants re-built to varying  
 
degrees their lead production business. 
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Chapter 3: Retrogression and Revival: 1611-1711 
 
 
This chapter will present reasons for the relative inactivity of the Bowes family in  
 
lead mining, smelting, and trade, and the changing nature of their role during the  
 
period 1611 to 1711 – from lessee entrepreneurs, as the Bishop‟s Moormasters, to  
 
lessor rentiers, as landowners and mineral lords. Indeed, after a half century and more  
 
of developing a lucrative business founded upon the Weardale mines, and a virtual  
 
monopoly of lead supply via the Merchant Adventurers in the Newcastle trade, their  
 
evidently well-established role in the northeast lead industry seems to have fizzled out  
 
in the early seventeenth century. The duration of the Bowes leasing and controlling  
 
the Bishop of Durham‟s Weardale lead mines ended in 1611 when Sir William Bowes  
 
died, and there followed a period of retrogression extending from 1611 until 1679.  
 
The Bowes estate records for the years from 1679 to 1711 do not evidence a revival of  
 
a latent business, quite the contrary: the nature of the Bowes interest in lead  
 
metamorphosed into an essentially rentier activity in which they acted as lessors of  
 
mines, or potential mining areas, on their own lands in Upper Teesdale.
125
 Lead  
 
production on the Bowes estate in Upper Teesdale later emerged as an incidental  
 
industrial activity during the second half of the seventeenth century, and bore no  
 
resemblance to the more structured business of the sixteenth or eighteenth centuries. 
 
  Before examining the Bowes‟ involvement with lead during the  
 
seventeenth century it is helpful to give an account of the British lead industry as the  
 
setting in which they changed from genuine entrepreneurs who had from the 1560s  
 
adapted to changing market circumstances for the production of lead as a source of  
 
income, to relatively passive landowning gentry. British lead production expanded 
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during the seventeenth century, particularly after 1650, whilst the Bowes‟ contribution  
 
ebbed rather than flowed.  
 
   
It is widely acknowledged that during the seventeenth century buoyant  
 
domestic market demand presented lead producers with an opportunity for profit.
126
   
 
Referring to the period from 1650 Coleman commented that the „consumption of lead  
 
almost certainly increased for it was used in a wide range of industries which must  
 
have expanded during the period‟, noting the rebuilding of London after 1666, the  
 
growth of provincial towns, and the demand for lead in the manufacture of pewter,  
 
paint, pottery, lead shot, coffins, and glass. Hoskins identified the period 1570 to 1640  
 
as one of extensive rebuilding throughout England,
127
 although evidence of regional  
 
variations points to the period between 1670 and 1720 are particularly marked in the  
 
north of England.
128
 The upward trend in the building cycle was broken only by the  
 
Civil War.‟ Clearly, the seventeenth century witnessed significant domestic demand  
 
for lead because of the growth in construction; approximately one-fifth of English  
 
lead production in the 1630s was consumed by „building, plumbing, and other  
 
domestic services‟.129  The Gibside house and estate, which came into the Bowes  
 
family through marriage in 1691, itself underwent rebuilding between 1603 and 1620,  
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and again in the 1720s.
130
  The rebuilding of wealthier houses was more likely to have  
 
consumed more lead, for roofing and water supply; domestic plumbing was increasing  
 
during this period. Overseas demand played a lesser role in the seventeenth century  
 
compared to the eighteenth century, and with the exception of 1663, lead exports were  
 
low in value.
131
 The average lead exports value for 1699-1701 was £128,000, yet was  
 
the most valuable of the non-ferrous metals exported. Burt, however, suggests that in  
 
the 1630s/1640s „exports of lead probably amounted to 40 or 50 per cent of total  
 
output‟,132 which implies an even greater market incentive to mine, smelt, and trade  
 
lead.  
 
  The trade in lead out of the ports of Newcastle and Stockton also  
 
confirms the growing level of demand both at home and abroad, because lead exports  
 
from both these ports grew during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In  
 
1638/9 Stockton shipped forty-four and three-quarter fothers of pig lead abroad, five  
 
and a half fothers in the costal trade, and received ten and a half fothers from Hull.  
 
The net effect was that thirty-nine and three quarter furthers must have been  
 
transported to Stockton from the northern Pennine ore fields in Swaledale,  
 
Arkengarthdale, and possibly Upper Teesdale.
133
 In 1656/6 Stockton sent 201 fothers  
 
overseas and 478 in coastal trade; in 1675/6 895 fothers overseas and 334 fothers  
 
coastwise.
134
 In 1649 Gray recorded coal, salt, grindstones, and salmon but not lead as  
 
Newcastle‟s chief exported commodities.135  Yet the coastal trade to Scotland alone  
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shows that lead was a regularly shipped commodity; in 1673/4 7,893 fothers of lead  
 
were carried by Scottish vessels leaving Newcastle, although Port Book statistics  
 
reveal trade in this particular commodity was subject to extreme highs and lows  
 
between 1660 and 1720. 
136
 In 1705 Newcastle‟s total trade in lead was 2,577 tons 
and  
 
Stockton‟s was 3,251tons.137  
 
The lead industry responded to the growth in demand. Clay has pointed 
 
to expansion in the late seventeenth century, and to a significant increase in  
 
production before 1640 evidenced by Derbyshire output,
138
 based upon technological  
 
change from the late sixteenth century. In 1600 output was 12,000 tons per annum; by 
 
1705/6 it was 28,000.
139
 The Derbyshire lead industry continued in its role as the main  
 
source of pig lead and „flourished throughout the century „ followed by Mendip and  
 
North Yorkshire.
140
 By 1600 it was producing in excess of 3,000 fothers per annum; 
in  
 
the 1680s over 10,000.
141
 Overall, the nature of growth does not appear to have been 
 
smooth. The Derbyshire lead industry experienced an enormous increase in output  
 
from the late sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, but only expanded further 
 
because of the greater capital investment and new technology,
142
 whilst in Mendip  
 
lead production fell into decline from the 1670s.
143
 By 1705/6 lead production was 
 
around 28,000 tons,
144
 and total exports in 1706 15,679 tons.
145
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   The established view is that the development of the British lead  
 
industry in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was spawned by landowners.  
 
Holderness asserts that „the chief contribution of the nobility and the gentry to  
 
economic development, however, lay in the exploitation of their estates‟.146 Mining  
 
and metallurgy based upon mineral wealth were a source of quite often considerable  
 
income, but Holderness maintains that, although landowners played a role of  
 
„initiating entrepreneurs‟ before 1700, „the nobleman or gentleman as innovators were  
 
rare birds‟.147 During the late sixteenth century and until 1640 one rare bird was the  
 
Earl of Shrewsbury, probably the leading industrialist of his time across Derbyshire,  
 
Shropshire, Staffordshire and Yorkshire in lead, coal, timber, and iron.
148
 . Other  
 
examples of gentry families who profited from lead were the Eyres of Hassop in  
 
Derbyshire, and the Brights of Carbrook in Yorkshire.
149
 Evidently, Richard Eyre  
 
became renowned for innovation in lead production and his advice in that regard was  
 
sought by the Crown. From the mid-sixteenth century, to meet the demand for lead,  
 
landowners supplied much of the working and fixed capital for deeper mining, in  
 
Wales, Yorkshire, and the north of England, though London-based merchants often  
 
ventured to finance the landowners.
150
 
 
In summary, the lead industry of the seventeenth century was 
 
characterised by increased output as a consequence of „significant changes in the  
 
organisation and structure of the industry‟ underpinned by greater capital investment,  
 
and technological change.
 151
 The level of domestic demand presented an opportunity  
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for financial gain, probably enhanced by mid-century overseas demand. In general  
 
terms, landed families blessed with lead veins exploited this opening to gain from the  
 
extraction of lead. Whether or not taking on the entrepreneurial function is another  
 
matter. Yet the Bowes, having been probably leading producers of lead in the  
 
northeast during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, if not monopolist  
 
suppliers to the Newcastle market and thereby playing a national role because of links  
 
with the London entrepot, appear to have vacated their position in an expanding  
 
market. There are a number questions to address. How and why did this retrogression  
 
before 1679 occur? What were the causes of the revival of involvement in the period  
 
1679 to1711? What form did it take, and what determined it?  
 
 
The Bowes family lost access to the lead mines of Weardale following  
 
the death of Sir William Bowes, eldest son of Sir George Bowes of Streatlam by his  
 
first marriage, in 1611. Clearly, the cessation of Bowes lead production when the  
 
lease for the Weardale lead mines left their hands, and the consequent financial loss,  
 
would have been a massive blow to the Bowes family. In the period 1611 to 1624 the  
 
Bishop‟s lead mines cannot be ascribed to any individual or organisation, but in 1624  
 
the Duke of Buckingham was granted a twenty-one year lease of „all the mines of  
 
silver and lead‟ within a ten mile radius of Muggleswick, which would encompassed a  
 
large area of Weardale as well as Blanchland and Derwent lead mines.
152
 Buckingham  
 
agreed to all liabilities in mining, and adherence to the mines royal by giving the King  
 
one-tenth of any silver produced and delivering the remainder to the Mint.   
 
At this point the Bowes, regardless of previous economic, social, and  
 
political standing, were out of the running for the lucrative Weardale mines. It is not  
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clear at this stage to whom or if, the Bishop appointed a new Moormaster lessee of the  
 
Weardale mines, but the impression given is that the lease to the Duke of Buckingham  
 
was a substitute for the position of Moormaster. In 1660 Bishop Cosin awarded it to  
 
Humphrey Wharton.
153
 In 1668 the lease of the lead mines was extended to embrace  
 
three lives in the Wharton family so it must be assumed that their lead business was  
 
proving at least worthwhile. The Bowes did not become lessees of the Weardale  
 
mines again. 
 
The Bowes had been awarded the Forest and Chase of Lune and 
 
Teesdale and the Manor of Mickleton by Elizabeth I in1593,
154
 whilst the twenty-one  
 
year lease of Flakebrig lead mine expired in 1597. The absence of evidence to the  
 
contrary leads to the hypothesis that in 1611 there was insufficient knowledge of the  
 
Upper Teesdale landscape, and certainly no discovery of lead veins on the scale of the  
 
eighteenth century. In any event, if there had been any lead workings in the early  
 
seventeenth century in Upper Teesdale it is doubtful that the level of ore production  
 
would have anywhere near replaced that from Weardale. Frankly, the Bowes family  
 
owned under-explored lead-bearing lands: at this stage it would have meant initiating  
 
searches yet investing only a low level of working capital. There is nothing currently  
 
to suggest that such a fundamental process being underway on the Bowes estate, but  
 
there was some minor lead mining activity in Upper Teesdale in the late 1650s, which  
 
is discussed below. Yet despite any foreign skills and knowledge introduced into  
 
metal mining during the Elizabethan period, the very limited knowledge of geology in  
 
the seventeenth century exonerates, to some extent at least, the Bowes passivity  
 
towards lead mining on their lands. Before the mid-seventeenth century „no  
 
independent science of the Earth as such‟ existed.155 There was most probably local  
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 lore; knowledge of practical mining disseminated orally within and between lead  
 
mining regions, but no body of literature, though there was there was some  
 
investigation into minerals in Restoration Britain.
156
 It could be said that, because of  
 
the family‟s earlier experience of lead‟s potential, that they were negligent in an estate  
 
management  sense. Only a short distance away in Westmoreland, Francis Clifford,  
 
4
th
 Earl of Cumberland and his son Henry paid a team of experienced miners for  
 
expert advice and the exploration for minerals on Knock Fell, where they discovered   
 
lead in 1617. Ultimately, when ironstone was found, he switched to very profitable  
 
iron production.  The previous Earl, George Clifford, exploited minerals on his  
 
Yorkshire estate, which included lead at Grassington mine in Craven. The Cliffords  
 
had a „family tradition of utilising mineral deposits‟ in Westmoreland going back to  
 
the fourteenth century.
157
 
 
  Probably the most important reason for the contrasting position of the 
 
early seventeenth century is the plain fact that there was not a male heir of age to take  
 
on the role of patriarch and possibly proceed with the development of the estate.  
 
Unlike a business, gentry economic activity depended upon family and its  
 
contingencies. Sir William Bowes died without heirs in 1611, which meant that by  
 
entail the estate passed to Sir Talbot Bowes of Streatlam, eldest son of Sir George  
 
Bowes by his second marriage, and therefore Sir William‟s younger half-brother, and  
 
Sir George Bowes of Biddick (1593- c.1643), son of George Bowes of Biddick the  
 
coal entrepreneur who died in 1606. The latter agreed to dispose of his property in  
 
return for a £100 annuity, probably because he inherited his father‟s wealth from coal  
 
and was uninterested or lacked motivation to develop his share of an estate that was  
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 essentially farmland, and waste and forest.  Sir Talbot was born in 1603, and was  
 
therefore only eight years old when Sir William died, and he died in1638, again  
 
without heirs. His successor was another Sir Talbot (also born in 1603 and died in  
 
1654) and his brother, Thomas. The latter was born in 1607 and died in 1661 or 1664.  
 
Thomas married Anne, a daughter of Anthony Maxton, Rector of Wolsingham and  
 
Prebend of Durham, with whom he had four sons; it was the fourth son William,  
 
born in 1656, who succeeded him, yet again too young to manage the estate. This  
 
family misfortune of either no heirs or male inheritors under the age of twenty-one  
 
effectively obliterated the Bowes family capacity to nurture a new lead business  
 
before 1679. It could be speculated that if Sir William‟s joint beneficiary in 1611, Sir  
 
George Bowes of Biddick, son of a mining entrepreneur, had inherited his father‟s  
 
abilities and taken up the reins of the estate, there may have been the green shoots of a  
 
lead business before 1679. Thomas Bowes‟ apparent ignorance of lead in the mid- 
 
seventeenth century is currently inexplicable. Overall, it could be said that the  
 
problems experienced by the Bowes family were typical of any landowning family  
 
of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seeking to convert its sources of  
 
business potential.
 158
 
 
   The Bowes were one of many gentry families who experienced  
 
genetic adversities, though not in extremis. It may be conjectural, but if between 1611  
 
and the1670s‟ a stronger, healthier, fecund patriarch as opposed to a weaker,  
 
unhealthy, sterile, and possibly feckless candidate, had existed, perhaps the Bowes 
 
would not have become divorced from the lead industry and trade. In this respect Heal  
 
and Holmes made two points of relevance to the Bowes experience: that „family  
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 continuity was at most risk from genetic chance but estates could be lost by the  
 
incompetence or misfortune of the occupier‟; and that „to counter the vagaries of  
 
fortune therefore, the gentry family depended heavily upon the personality and  
 
abilities of its head‟.159 
 
    There is evidence, scanty perhaps, indicating that where a minor male  
 
Bowes heir was inhibited because of age from performing the function of patriarch, 
 
that a female occasionally stepped into the void as the minor‟s representative and to  
 
protect the interests of the family estate until the heir came of age. When Sir Talbot  
 
inherited from Sir William in 1611, his mother Lady Jane Bowes and second wife of  
 
Sir George Bowes of Streatlam, acted on his behalf in the estate‟s lead business.  
 
Richard Daines 1614 map of Eggleston shows „Lady Bowes Leade Mylls‟. This 
 
suggests that the Bowes continued to be involved in lead production and before Sir  
 
Talbot reached his majority in 1624, though maybe smelting rather than mining and  
 
smelting, that they were buying in ore either from small scale operations on their own  
 
lands or elsewhere, or letting the mill to other mineral owners for rent. Unfortunately,  
 
there is no other evidence of the mill‟s activities. Later, in 1666, the award of lands in  
 
1593 by Elizabeth I was reinforced and expanded by a Bill introduced by Anne  
 
Bowes, mother of Sir William Bowes, when he was aged ten.
160
 Again, a female  
 
acted as guardian in order to protect the family estate, in this case perhaps  
 
unwittingly, for the imminent, if relatively subdued, revival of the Bowes interest in  
 
lead.  
 
  It is likely that had any member of the Bowes family considered  
 
re-entry into the lead business the effects of the English Civil war in the northeast 
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would probably have acted as a strong deterrent. The region succumbed to the needs  
 
of the Scottish army, the Tyne was blockaded in 1644, and there were severe  
 
outbreaks of the plague. It is difficult, if not impossible, to contemplate the effects on 
 
 lead production, which was a rural activity, and the lead trade out of Newcastle.  
 
There were signs of slow economic recovery after the departure of the Scottish army  
 
in 1647, and minor lead mining operations carried on in Weardale when the Scottish  
 
army invaded County Durham, but we have already seen that the Bowes were not  
 
present there as Moormasters after 1611.
161
 The Parliamentary Survey of 1647 listed  
 
nine working lead mines and one failed mine, which would have been sub-leases from  
 
the Whartons who were Moormasters at this time, and owners of the lead smelt mill in  
 
Wolsingham. The Surveyors valued the Bishop‟s income from lead as £15 per annum  
 
based upon mining during the period 1635-47, and intended to extort the Wharton‟s  
 
lease.  
 
The prohibitive effects on metal mining of the ancient concept of  
 
„mines royal‟ - the Crown right to claim gold, copper, tin, silver, and quicksilver even  
 
on private land - and the embodiment of this prerogative in the form of the  
 
monopolies granted in to 1568 the Company of Mines Royal and the Company of  
 
Mineral and Battery Works are often advanced as a primary reason for owners of  
 
mineral rights and mining organisations being reluctant to invest in metal mining until  
 
the late seventeenth century. The historian of both these companies, referring to the  
 
creation of the Mineral and Battery Work stated that the counties available to „the new  
 
patentees for mining royal metals were those left over from the previous patent‟. In  
 
other words, the Bowes lands in Upper Teesdale, which were in Yorkshire, fell under  
 
the jurisdiction of the Mines Royal, but not under that of the Mineral and Battery  
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 Works.
162
 Any lands in Durham, leased or owned, would have been covered only by  
 
 
 
the latter‟s remit.163 The Crown was only effectively interested in gold and silver for  
 
coinage, but there were no pure gold and silver mines in England, yet silver was  
 
generally found with lead which in theory caused complications for the lead mining  
 
industry, „the terror‟ of the mines royal as William Waller referred to it in 1700.164  
 
Seventeenth century contemporaries believed that mines royal damaged the lead  
 
mining industry, and deterred landowners from investing in the development of lead  
 
mining, which in turn meant the Crown lost a source of duty from the trade in lead.
165
 
 
  The Bowes‟ effective retirement from the lead industry before 1679  
 
was not influenced by mines royal, and there are three supporting facts. Firstly,  
 
Bowes lands in Upper Teesdale were outside the Mineral and Battery Works regime,  
 
so it could not grant leases for lead mining and smelting there.
166
 Secondly, the Mines  
 
Royal never succeeded in enforcing any claim to minerals in the Bishopric.
167
 The  
 
exception to this was the lease awarded to the Duke of Buckingham in 1624, which  
 
did not directly affect the Bowes‟ position, other than to exclude them and any other  
 
interested parties from obtaining the mineral rights in Weardale. Lastly, the activities  
 
of both chartered Companies were suspended during the Civil War.
168
 It was noted  
 
above that both these chartered Companies failed, nor did they appear to have any real  
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effect on lead mining in Britain. Moreover, the mines royal prerogative and pre- 
 
emption for precious metals, regardless of the existence of the chartered Companies,  
 
did not hinder the growth of lead production during this period, because common law  
 
and the rights of landowners prevailed.
169
 The ineffectiveness of government policy 
on  
 
the Bowes involvement with lead production adds weight to the conclusion drawn by  
 
Nef in his study of industry and government in France and England during the period  
 
1540 to 1640, that the „policy of granting industrial monopolies interfered less in  
 
England than in France with the progress of heavy industry and the rise of industrial  
 
capitalism……….mainly because it was much less generally applied‟.170  
 
  The various influences on and causes of the deterioration of the Bowes  
 
earlier attachment to the lead business have been discussed, but it may have been that  
 
potentially interested members of the family quite simply decided, for basic economic  
 
reasons, that lead mining and smelting were both non-viable and risky as sources of  
 
income before 1679. Heal & Holmes pointed to lead and other minerals as an  
 
alternative source of financial opportunity for the gentry during a time of inflation  
 
before 1650 that restricted agricultural development.
171
 Some gentry families seized  
 
this opportunity, like the Eyres of Hassop in Derbyshire and the Brights of Carbrook  
 
in Yorkshire, and benefited from the viability of their lead veins and business  
 
acumen.
172
 Others misjudged the risks that plagued the lead business, which brought  
 
financial ruin for some gentry families. Only a short distance from the Bowes‟ lands  
 
in North Yorkshire, Sir Solomon Swayle‟s lead mining enterprise in Swaledale 
 
failed because lead carriage costs to market made the whole operation non-viable with  
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devastating financial consequences.
173
 Another loser in lead was Sir John Wynn, who  
 
managed to supply the market but ultimately unprofitably, primarily because of a  
 
trade depression in Europe in the early 1620s.
174
 
 
 
The growing demand for lead both at home and abroad did not entice  
 
the Bowes into the market: they were non-participants between 1611 and 1679, whilst 
 
the Blackett family were busy trading pig lead to the Low Countries in the 1670s.
175
 
 
Any potential for lead mining and smelting on their Upper Teesdale lands remained  
 
untapped, and there was no access to any other part of the established lead industry in  
 
northeast England. There was no Bowes response to the two periods of higher prices  
 
1610-1615 and 1625-1640 – both higher than 1590-1610 - when European demand  
 
shrank, whilst demand from the Latin American silver industry simultaneously  
 
expanded.
176
 They made no contribution to the prodigious English output of the 
 
1630s.
 177
 The comparatively undeveloped potential mines on Bowes lands in Upper  
 
Teesdale precluded the option of re-opening existing workings in response to market  
 
opportunities, and that there was no infrastructure to support it. The systemic causes  
 
of the English lead industry‟s „crisis conditions‟ between 1640 and 1670 in  
 
Derbyshire, the Mendip, and South Yorkshire – failure to drain mines and restrictive  
 
mining laws or customs – were not the cause of inactivity on Bowes lands. 178  
 
Lead mining was insufficiently developed at this stage to incur drainage problems,  
 
and if it had existed there is no history of restrictive laws and customs of the type that  
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had become institutionalised in other areas.
179
 Lastly, lead prices rose steadily after  
 
1650 and peaked in 1670, which brought into production mines beyond the old  
 
established areas; „production in marginal ore fields in Wales, the southwest, and the  
 
central and north Pennines became a viable proposition for the first time in more than  
 
a century‟.180 Bowes‟ lead cannot be included amongst the up and coming mining  
 
areas; it was not until 1679 that any serious venture was underway on their lands.  
 
As far as the Bowes affair with lead is concerned in the period 1611 to  
 
1679, any potential for exploitation in Upper Teessdale was prevented by the absence  
 
of male heirs in the early seventeenth century, minority before the mid-century, and in  
 
two cases disinterest. The family‟s retrogression in the lead market both regionally  
 
and nationally were not influenced by the activities of the Mines Royal or Mineral and  
 
Battery Works. It could be argued that a change in the Bowes socio-economic  
 
standing in the County Palatine after 1611, combined with a temporary decline in the  
 
political power of the landed gentry and aristocrats as a consequence of the  
 
relationship between Bishop Neile and the Crown, nudged them out of contention for  
 
the Weardale lead mines lease or position of Moormaster. In reality, however, the  
 
Bowes had lost the most productive lead mines in the region, and then failed to 
 
produce males with appropriate hereditary qualities – a shortage of lead in the veins  
 
both below and above the soil. 
 
 
   The period from 1679 until the second decade of the eighteenth  
 
century were years of mild revival, defined by the management of small- scale  
 
potential on the Bowes estate in Upper Teesdale rather than a developmental  
 
approach. The Bowes family, with the exception of only one lead mine, were  
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uninvolved; passive management through the letting of mines prevailed. A different  
 
milieu existed after the Interregnum, which facilitated this relatively low-key return to  
 
the possibilities of lead as a source of supplementary estate income. 
 
  The lack of male heirs with longevity and possessing commercial 
 
attributes ended with the birth of Sir William Bowes in 1656. He went up to Trinity  
 
College Cambridge, and was admitted to Gray‟s Inn in the same year 1672. Charles  
 
II knighted William in 1684, and in the following year he was made Chief Warden of  
 
all the King‟s Forests and Chases within the Lordship of Barnard Castle, Teesdale and  
 
Marwood. Importantly, he had four sons, three of whom succeeded him after his death  
 
in 1706. Therefore, in Sir William Bowes the family now benefited from a patriarch 
 
who proved a capacity for developing their prosperity, and undoubtedly the most 
 
rewarding act was his marriage in 1691 to Elizabeth, granddaughter of Sir George  
 
Bowes of Biddick daughter and sole heiress of Sir Francis Blakiston of Gibside, a  
 
north County Durham estate well endowed with minerals, coal especially. 
 
During Sir William‟s time he granted only five leases for lead mines 
 
and potential mining areas, and after his death in1706, when his sons were minors,  
 
only another three leases were granted. Lead mining on the Bowes estate will be  
 
discussed below in detail, suffice to say here that only a lease of 1679, which formed  
 
the basis of an initial joint venture with a local smelter, directly involved members of  
 
the Bowes family. There was evidently no commitment to discover new and exploit  
 
existing lead veins in an organised way; lead production on the Upper Teesdale estate 
 
was viewed as a risky, incidental source of income, and its nature was haphazard and 
 
intermittent. The Bowes family owned the mineral rights, but apart from the  
 
partnership at Green Mines in the Forest of Lune in and an attempt to work Lunehead  
 
mine, they were not directly involved in mining to any significant extent either in  
 
their own right or with others.  
 
.  In a regional context the Bowes were laggards compared to two other 
 
lead mining and smelting operation; the Blacketts and the London Lead Company, the 
 
 
 
histories of which have been well documented.
181
 Both of these organisations were  
 
large scale investors in lead mining and smelting and exhibit the common factor of  
 
single company development. The Blacketts, who became the Blackett-Beaumonts as  
 
the estate passed down through the family, purchased the Allendale estate from the  
 
Fenwick family in 1694, and in 1698 bought the lease of the Weardale mines from the  
 
Wharton family, which carried with it the position of the Bishop of Durham‟s  
 
Moormaster. This reaffirms the Bowes family‟s exclusion from access to Weardale  
 
lead after for the second half of the seventeenth century. The London Lead Company 
 
can perhaps be seen as having a more national identity because it produced lead in  
 
both the Alston area and in Wales after 1704, and during the eighteenth century  
 
expanded its activities in the lead industry in Alston, Teesdale, and Derwent. By the  
 
second decade of the eighteenth century the Blacketts and the London Lead Company 
 
dominated lead production in the north east, with the Bowes conspicuous by their  
 
absence. 
 
  Although literature on mining was still negligible in the late  
 
seventeenth century, the Blackett and London Lead Company enterprises in the same 
 
region as the Bowes would suggest that sufficient local knowledge and skills were  
 
available had the Bowes intended to explore, discover, and exploit lead on their estate 
 
in Upper Teesdale. The Bowes may have been aware of current literature but  
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uninterested in lead mining, preferring to devote time and money to other activities.
182
   
 
Perhaps they were unmoved by what one historian, in discussing the purpose of this  
 
literature, has referred to as „some strong patriotic mercantilist reasons for gentry  
 
investment in mining enterprises‟.183 More likely is that by the late 1600s the Bowes‟  
 
knowledge of the sparsely inhabited frontier landscape of their north Pennine estate,  
 
compared to that of their lower Tees valley Streatlam estate and Gibside to the north,  
 
was quite simply far less compelling where mineral rights were concerned. 
 
  It has been established that throughout the seventeenth century a 
 
market opportunity existed for lead producers, but the Bowes did not exploit it. Sir  
 
William Bowes‟ marriage brought the financial benefits of the Gibside estate together  
 
with the Bowes lands, including coal, in south Durham, and coal and iron as sources  
 
of income must have distracted him from the riskier option of lead. Gibside‟s colliery,  
 
only four miles from the River Tyne by cost-effective wooden waggonway and linked  
 
to London by colliers, was leased to Sir Charles Montagu for rent and royalties. By  
 
1700 it produced around 60,000 tons of coal, on which royalties were based, and the  
 
quarterly rent was £122 10s.
184
 Any profits from the Wear valley coalmines were in  
 
addition to the income from the Gibside lease. Indeed, it could be argued that for the 
 
Bowes it was a straightforward matter of opportunity cost; they had knowledge and  
 
experience of a valuable mineral – coal – that was in beds and more easily  
 
accessible, workable, and therefore low risk, compared to a metal in veins found in 
 
strata – lead – for which their experience and knowledge had waned, and therefore 
 
was far riskier. Consequently, lead was largely ignored at this point, whereas the  
 
known quantity, coal, received consistent attention.
185
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   The extent to which Sir William Bowes earned income from the iron 
 
industry can not be quantified here, but there is evidence of his assistance in the 
 
resourcing of Ambrose Crowley III‟s mill at Winlaton, to whom Bowes also supplied 
 
charcoal and rented land for the workmen‟s animals.186 The impression is that Bowes  
 
invested a considerable sum in Crowley‟s mill for manufacturing iron, but the amount  
 
is unknown. Indeed, the connection with Sir William Bowes has been described as  
 
„enigmatic‟.187  Evidently, there were iron mines around Gibside from the time of Sir 
 
Ralph Blakiston that were the foundation of the Blakiston family‟s prosperity and  
 
status before coal. 
188
 Sir William Bowes appears to falls into the category of  
 
landowner who played a more entrepreneurial role, by extracting and supplying iron  
 
ore to Ambrose Crowley III at a time of growth in iron output which began after  
 
1670.
189
 Assuming Bowes still had this raw material on his land and a ready customer  
 
in a growing market, involvement in the iron industry could have been perceived as a 
 
quicker and less risky source of landlord income when compared to the more costly  
 
potential of lead under lands a much greater distance from the River Tyne and the  
 
Newcastle market. 
 
  The accepted line of argument is that the removal of the Crown‟s rights  
 
over precious metals by the Royal Mines Acts in 1689 and 1693 was a major spur to  
 
lead mining, and metal mining in general, from the late seventeenth century onwards,  
 
having stifled the development of mining for centuries but in a more serious way from  
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the sixteenth century. 
190
 „Finally in 1693 the Crown abandoned its claim to minerals  
 
with a precious metal content, thereby providing a great encouragement to the  
 
opening of new mines by removing the fear that they might involve an infringement  
 
of the monopoly of the Company of Mines Royal‟.191 In the same way Mines Royal  
 
did not interfere with the Bowes involvement with lead before its abolition, similarly  
 
its absence evidently had little or no effect immediately thereafter or during the early  
 
eighteenth century. The various aspects of the Bowes approach to lead production  
 
between 1679 and 1711 will be examined below, suffice to state at this point that the  
 
Bowes estate records reveal that only four leases were granted from1679 to1692, and  
 
three from 1705 to 1711. Such a tentative foray into the exploitation of mineral rights  
 
hardly suggests a positive response to an institutional stimulus; more significantly this 
 
gentle revival of interest in lead confirms an almost complete lack of propensity to 
 
react to fortuitous market conditions.  
 
  Certainly the chronology of the Bowes leases coincides with „the 
 
gracious Act of Royal Mines‟ that „quite altered the scene of the mineral world‟ and 
 
changed the outlook of landowners who previously „endeavoured to conceal their  
 
mines, now they labour to find them out‟.192 Four of these leases were granted before  
 
1693, and none were granted between after 1692 until 1705, which is far from  
 
indicative of a causal relationship between the extinction of Mines Royal and Bowes 
 
lead production. There was probably greater confidence in the lead industry after Act  
 
of 1693,
193
 but confidence alone did not evoke the crucial decision to become active 
in  
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 the lead market in an organised fashion similar to the entrepreneurial Bowes of the  
 
late sixteenth century. Again, the magnitude of the Blackett family enterprise and the  
 
London Lead Company, who burst into life shortly after the Act, put the Bowes‟ level  
 
of activity into perspective – insignificant. Again, their growth cannot be directly  
 
correlated to the extinction of Mines Royal; quite simply the increased demand for  
 
lead and a willingness to invest in deeper mining and technological advancement were  
 
the main reasons for success.
194
  
 
An analysis of metal production during the seventeenth and eighteenth  
 
centuries points to the period 1670-1760 as „a new expansionary phase‟ in the English  
 
lead industry, marked by „an investment boom‟ in mining.195  The underlying causes  
 
for this transformation after the period of crisis were a change in mining laws in the  
 
1660s, which effectively removed restrictive practices, and the availability of cheap  
 
money in times of limited options for investment.
196
 Lead production in the northern  
 
Pennines has been referred to as „marginal‟ until the introduction of new technology  
 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries which allowed this area to enjoy  
 
the „mining bonanza‟ of those years.197 
   
Customary laws in any form did not encumber the Bowes, be they  
 
liberties, common rights, or ancient customs relating to lead mining. Nor was there  
 
any conflict of a political nature between their interests and inhabitants of either their 
 
leased or owned lands where the Bowes could benefit from existing mineral rights.  
 
This is in complete contrast to other lead mining areas in Derbyshire and Mendip, and  
 
 tin mining in Devon and Cornwall.  In Weardale, from at least 1487, a tradition was  
 
established allowing tenants to mine within the Bishop‟s system; there was no right to  
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 mine lead. The moormaster role occupied by the Bowes in the late sixteenth and early  
 
seventeenth century gave them absolute power to resolve any disputes.
198
 During the  
 
reign of Charles II, long after the Bowes had lost the position of moormaster, the 
 
framework in which lead was extracted remained unchanged.
199
 Teesdale lead miners  
 
deposed an argument for their freedom to mine based on unwritten „law‟ during the  
 
reigns of Charles II and William, but the mineral lord defeated their case on the  
 
grounds that the right was a privilege, which allowed him to lease the lead bearing  
 
lands.
200
 Mining customs operating through „courts‟ of free miners were usually 
within  
 
forests and passed down from forest rights. There is evidence of this for lead in  
 
Derbyshire, Mendip, on Alston Moor, and in Allendale forest commoners were free  
 
miners, but devoid of any „court‟ regulation. Teesdale and Weardale were forest areas  
 
in this period, but free from mining customs.
201
   
 
On balance, the Bowes‟ lands were not places where „conflict  
 
developed between the independent miners and smallholders who had traditionally  
 
dominated the English extractive industries, and a series of manorial, lords, crown  
 
lessees and entrepreneurs who were anxious to capitalise on England‟s mineral  
 
wealth‟.202 The extremely small-scale and intermittent nature of lead workings  
 
occupying very few people stultified the evolution of customs and practices found  
 
elsewhere. Consequently, if the Bowes had intended to exploit their lead deposits they  
 
would not have been confronted with restrictive practices. 
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Therefore, during the period 1679 to 1711, despite the existence of a  
 
conducive institutional framework for metal mining after 1693, and a patriarch who 
 
enjoyed a reasonable lifespan, the Bowes did not apply themselves to the exploitation 
 
of lead in Upper Teesdale. There is evidence for only one item of working capital, a  
 
pay bill totalling £21 10s 8d in 1690 at Lunehead lead mine, and none for fixed  
 
capital investment by Sir William.
203
  The Blackett and London Lead Company  
 
enterprises were large-scale investors in the development of lead mining in the region  
 
to meet the demand of an expanding market for lead at home and abroad. Although it  
 
cannot be fully explained, the Bowes family employed a strategy of apparently  
 
passive estate management by granting a very limited number of leases to essentially  
 
local individuals and partnerships who had a low cost speculative interest in lead, but,  
 
apart from two lead mines, refrained from serious financial commitment and direct  
 
involvement. This was a time of search and discovery, of initial small-scale workings  
 
undertaken on the basis of minimum cost. 
 
  The level of activity in lead mining and the very limited direct  
 
participation from the Bowes family is confirmed by the granting of only seven  
 
leases; six to various individuals or partnerships in return for either duty ore or rent, 
 
and one involving the family. There are no records of lead-mining production or  
 
investment before the late 1730s. This small collection of extant records do, however,  
 
offer some evidence as to the nature and form of what appears to have been a mild  
 
revival of interest in the potential of lead during the late seventeenth and early  
 
eighteenth century. Moreover, they offer reasonable proof that the Bowes were an  
 
exception, because their inactivity excluded them from the category of land-owning  
 
mineral lords who behaved as entrepreneurs during an era of expansion and change in  
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lead production. The form and characteristics of these leases must be taken as a  
 
prerequisite for a comparative analysis that proves the mid-eighteenth century  
 
George Bowes regime introduced extensive changes to their nature. The chapters that  
 
follow will demonstrate that greater commitment and financial involvement came  
 
belatedly. 
 
   
Sir William Bowes‟ single venture in lead mining was contained in a  
 
twenty-one year lease of  22
nd
 April 1679 for Green Mines between himself,  
 
Christopher Wall, and Anne and Jane, two of his daughters.
204
 Sir William held a  
 
quarter share, his daughters an eighth each, and Wall the incentive of one half.  
 
Christopher Wall was very probably the owner of the smelt mill at Bollihope, which  
 
he built in 1667 with the permission of the Bishop of Durham.
205
 There was no duty  
 
ore to the Bowes in this lease; it seems to have been structured on a pay-share  
 
arrangement with operations in the hands of Wall as someone regularly involved in  
 
the lead industry. The area of ground granted for work at Green mines was 700 yards  
 
by 100 yards, which suggests the discovery of lead vein where mining was conducted  
 
by hushing and later shafts, and perceived as a potentially good source of lead ore.  
 
Hence the Bowes family taking shares in the mine. Lead ore had been extracted from 
 
Green Mines late in 1657 by Allan Nicholson under a very short term tack from Sir  
 
William, then an infant represented by his mother, suggesting its ease of  
 
accessibility.
206
  The pig lead produced from this ore was to be delivered to the Bowes 
 
for £9 15s per fother. 
 
  It is not clear whether or not the Bowes owned a smelt mill during the 
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 period in question, which would explain the partnership with the smelter Christopher  
 
Walls. There was smelting in Mickleton in 1657/58, because the agreement between 
 
Allan Nicholson and Sir William Bowes mentions „the Blast or ore hearth at  
 
Mickleton‟. Nicholson was probably the smelter there, because the agreement  
 
stipulates he had to smelt the ore into „Piggs‟, and that the Bowes were to pay him per  
 
fother „at the said Blast or Hearth‟.207 The existence of a smelter in Mickleton  
 
indicates that lead mining was carried on around the mid-century, but to what extent  
 
and by whom remains unclear.  
 
  Only two lead mines can be identified in the period 1679 to 1711;  
 
Green Mines, and at Lunhead where two veins were worked. The only surviving  
 
Bowes expenditure recorded is a pay bill for £21 10s 8d for work between 1
st
 June  
 
and 3
rd
 November 1690 at the original Lunehead vein. Again, the agreement  
 
between Bowes and Nicholson of 1657 permitted the latter to extract lead from  
 
Lunehead as well as Green Mines, which confirms at least some exploratory workings  
 
at both mines before Sir William began granting leases in 1679. Unfortunately, there  
 
are no records of production, miners, or any financial information. 
 
  The granting of leases during these years was effectively to consolidate 
 
any initial findings and facilitate the enhancement of the Bowes estate by allowing  
 
others willing to speculate in lead mining to develop known mines and explore likely  
 
areas. Leases were generally granted for either twenty-one years, or for an initial  
 
period of up to one year with an option for twenty-one years; this type of arrangement 
 
appears to have been standard under „the Rules of Art & Fathom of Mining‟.208 The 
 
Bowes family adopted a long term view of the protection and development of the  
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estate‟s potential, and avoided direct involvement unless immediate financial gain  
 
seemed likely, for example the abovementioned case of Green Mines. The Bowes  
 
estate management of lead was passive, allowing others to exploit their mineral rights. 
 
 
TABLE  1 
 
List of Leased Lead Mines 1657-1711 
 
Lease date   Term                     Lessee(s)      Mine                   Duty Ore 
 
 
1657          2mths           Allen Nicholson Lune Head          none stated 
 
 
1679             21yrs  Christopher Wall Green Mines            none stated 
    Anne Bowes 
    Jane Bowes  
 
1687            1 yr  Allinson‟s & Co. Sun Vein (of          none stated 
       Lune Head)  
 
1689              21 yrs  John Morgan  Bradwood Rains                1/7
th
 
 
1692              21 yrs  John Cowley  Green Mines        1/5th 
    Matthew Smales    & 5s. p.a. 
    Anthony Wharton 
    Nicolas Shields 
    George Featherstone 
Godfry Myers     
 
1705            9mths  Miles Sedgwick  Lunehead (area        1/6
th
                    
            21 yr option      south east of it) 
  
1709            21 yrs  Charles Bainbridge   Lune, Holwick,        1/7th 
    William Blackston   Lonton 
    Thomas Deane 
    James Bainbridge 
    (all of London) 
 
1711 1 yr  Robert Allinson     Greenfell Common        1/6th 
21 yr option Hugh Whitle 
 
 
 
Source: Extracted from D/St/B2/1-10 
 
  
Table 1 above lists the tacks and leases granted from 1657, although 
 
the agreement of 1657 with Nicholson cannot be construed as a lease, more a very  
 
 
 
short term tack permitting lead mining at Green Mines and Lunehead to meet a  
 
requirement for pig lead from the Bowes. Other than Green Mines and the two veins  
 
at Lunehead, leases were granted for areas allowing liberty to explore and mine where  
 
lead was found. Most of the leases contained a clause regarding payment of duty ore  
 
to the Bowes lessor, and these ranged from one-seventh to one fifth. Only the lease  
 
for 1692 for Green Mines contained a rent in addition to duty ore. 
 
The lessees, as sources of venture capital, originated mainly in the  
 
northeast and all but that of 1689 were partnerships. The a lease of 1692, for  
 
example, was granted to six partners, one from Newcastle upon Tyne, one from  
 
Gilling in North Yorkshire, one from Wolsingham, two from Stanhope, and one from  
 
Westgate. The partners from Wolsingham, Stanhope and Westgate resided in the  
 
Weardale lead mining area, and must have been aware of the potential of Green 
  
Mines. The area lease for Greenfell Common of 1711 was granted to two partners  
 
from Barnard Castle and nearby Rokeby. There was interest from London in 1709  
 
when a four-man partnership took a twenty-one year lease on the lead mines in  
 
Holwick, Lune, and Lonton, but within months Lady Elizabeth Bowes sought legal  
 
opinion regarding repossession for their failure to work the area according to the  
 
terms of the lease.
209
 
 
  The nature and scale of lead mining on the Bowes lands in Upper  
 
Teesdale at the end of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century is divulged by 
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the form of the leases. Green Mines and the original vein at Lunehead were worked 
 
by the Bowes and partners, but were just beyond the exploratory stage and therefore 
 
small scale. The Lunhead pay bill for 1690 was for only four miners.
210
 Green Mines 
 
potential had been established and needed working capital to progress from hushing, 
 
which must have been the intention of the partners granted a lease in 1692. The two 
 
other workings at Lunehead in 1687 and 1705 both commenced on tacks of one year  
 
and nine months respectively, which indicate exploratory, very small-scale operations  
 
by way of discovery and extraction where possible and easily accessible. Again, the 
 
1711 lease for Greenfell Common began with a one-year tack with an option for  
 
twenty-one years subject to finding lead ore where mining was economically viable. 
 
  The apparently serious intentions of the London based partnership who 
 
were granted a lease in 1709 to mine in Lune, Holwick, and Lonton, proved lacking.  
 
Miners‟ wages were unpaid resulting in cessation of work. The partners proposed to  
 
bring in miners from Derbyshire, but there is no indication that migration of labour  
 
occurred.
211
 That lead mining was very much undeveloped at this stage is further  
 
confirmed by an agricultural lease granted for six years on 4th March 1712 by Lady  
 
Elizabeth Bowes to Henry Simpson, William Sanderson, and Thomas Atkinson all of  
 
Longmartin in Westmoreland, for a farm at Closehouse in Lunedale at an annual rent  
 
of £7 5s. This was essentially for pasture but included the words „Dame Elizabeth  
 
Bowes, her Heirs Tenants or farmers liberty of sinking for cole lead or other  
 
minerall‟ and „with liberty to lead and carry away the same‟.212 This an example of 
the  
 
farmer/miner being granted the basis for mineral exploration, but reiterates the 
 
perception that lead mining on Bowes‟ land was very marginal in the early  
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1700s. This indicates a mixed economic activity where the tenants saw lead as a  
 
casual cash crop alongside subsistence with a pastoral bias, and provides an  
 
illustration of the beginnings in the frontier zone of Upper Teesdale of what Jan 
 
de Vries has termed the „industrious revolution‟.213 The willingness of families who 
 
essentially earned a meagre living from marginal upland agriculture to provide labour  
 
for lead mining would be later exploited by the Bowes in the mid-eighteenth century. 
 
  In summary, during the period 1657 to 1712 there appears to have been  
 
a slowly growing appreciation of the value of lead to the Bowes family and an  
 
awareness to protect the family‟s mineral rights, but the use of the mining lease as a  
 
tool for governing the methods of extraction and the extent of the mineral lord‟s  
 
involvement, and as the mechanism for controlling the growth and structure of lead  
 
production, was evidently limited and certainly not reflective of any business  
 
strategy for the expansion of lead production. The tacks and leases were essentially  
 
simple and variations in wording evident, but the level of control was lacking, which  
 
in turn indicates indifference to managing lead production. Duty ore as a lessor  
 
entitlement, measurements for the area of workings, and terms of forfeiture were  
 
introduced, but lessees had considerable freedom from Bowes management and there  
 
was no template for the growth of a structured lead industry. Throughout the  
 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the Bowes family attitude to the  
 
management of a lead industry on their land was manifestly passive in nature. The 
 
family circumstances that produced this indifference to a potentially lucrative estate  
 
activity have been discussed above.  This stance appears to have prevailed during the  
 
intervening period between the granting of a lease in 1712 and the next in 1738,  
 
sixteen years after the commencement of the George Bowes patriarchy.  
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A view has been expressed that lead mining and smelting in Upper  
 
Teesdale was the main rural industry from the sixteenth century.
214
  This may have  
 
been the case north of the River Tees, but on the Bowes estate south of the Tees the  
 
development of the lead industry was seemingly well behind other mining areas in the  
 
region as well as nationally. This evidence leads us to conclude that the Bowes family  
 
did not direct the progress required to reveal the full potential of their mineral rights,  
 
and in the late seventeenth century only experimented with lead mining at Green  
 
Mines and Lunehead. A lead industry was encouraged in an almost incidental fashion,  
 
putting most mining activity in the hands of lessee adventurers, at their own risk, but  
 
it is not possible to assess the extent or success of exploratory work, other than to say  
 
there was a genuine interest in lead. Perhaps the Bowes family did receive proposals  
 
for working lead veins with a view to further development; if so the surviving leases  
 
do not indicate significant activity nor do they reveal the level of Bowes‟ investment  
 
other than to suggest that there was a financial commitment in Green Mines on a pay- 
 
share basis and very small-scale mining at Lunehead in 1690, but even here there are  
 
no details of production or finance. Even in the later seventeenth century it appears  
 
the Bowes were reconciled to contemporary economist Nicholas Barbon‟s view that,  
 
in a time of debate about the shortage of silver coin in England, precious and semi- 
 
precious metal mining was financially futile.
215
   
 
  Lastly, this inquiry into the extent of the Bowes family‟s relationship  
 
with lead during the seventeenth century emphasises the character of some landed  
 
gentry who showed reticence in extending their estate activities to include mineral  
 
exploitation. Unlike Buckingham in Weardale, they were not the beneficiaries of  
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 patronage, whilst simultaneously suffering the family contingency of being unable to  
 
produce either a patriarch or matriarch who may have pursued a riskier approach to 
 
the lead business. Hecksher, in his substantial work on mercantilism, quotes an  
 
individual who invested much of his money in an effort to obtain a patent or license  
 
from which he would derive a good income and lifestyle. In 1618 he succeeded in  
 
finding an appropriate niche „in the supervision of English lead‟.216 The structure of  
 
patronage was outlined in the previous chapter; generally a marriage of convenience  
 
between courtier and projector, influence and initiator, capital and countenance. The  
 
Bowes family appear not to have been amongst those who solicited influential  
 
courtiers, consequently there was no fruitful arranged marriage with a candidate who  
 
could assist in obtaining patents and licenses for lead. 
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Chapter 4: Management, Mindset, and Monopsony 
 
   
During the period of George Bowes patriarchy, 1722-60, and for eleven years after his  
 
death in 1760, the family held three main estates: two in County Durham, Gibside in  
 
the north and Streatlam; and one further south, Wemmergill, in the North Riding of  
 
Yorkshire south of the River Tees. Gibside performed two functions: it was George  
 
Bowes main residence when not in London, and the operational heart of estate  
 
business. George Bowes could not have single-handedly controlled the estate himself,  
 
which perforce required two levels of supervision: regularity of visitations by him;  
 
and stewards and agents in the field. The management structure for the three estates  
 
during the period 1722 until c.1771 was as follows: 
 
At Gibside 
 
1721-1725       Anthony Leaton Snr., senior steward 
1734-1770     William Leaton, joint senior steward 
1734-1771     Richard Stepehenson, joint senior steward 
 
At Streatlam 
 
1725-c.1755    Thomas Colpitts I, chief steward   
c.1755- 1799   Thomas Colpitts II, chief steward  
 
At Wemmergill 
 
Senior stewards and chief stewards as outlined above for Gibside and Streatlam plus 
 
1741-1761 Nathan Horne, mine manager (or „grove steward‟) 
1761-c.1771    John Bourn 
1756-c.1771    John Gibson, smelt mill manager 
 
 
  There are several points of clarification required regarding the Bowes  
 
lead business. The senior stewards at Gibside appear to have been the first  
 
stratum of management beneath George Bowes, followed by chief stewards at  
 Streatlam, which was closer to Wemmergill than Gibside in terms of day-to-day lead 
 
operations. There was a third stratum on the Wemmergill estate purely to  
 
accommodate the development of lead production: specialists who demonstrated  
 
expertise in the different stages of the process. They were professional and salaried,  
 
but more senior men oversaw their activities. The lead mines manager or inspector,  
 
often referred to as the „grove steward‟, reported to a senior steward either at  
 
Streatlam, or more usually at Gibside from 1756. Similarly, the smelt mill manager  
 
reported to a senior steward at Gibside. The lesser management roles of skilled  
 
smelters at Bollihope smelt mill during the 1740s should not be overlooked, because  
 
they also reported to Gibside and coordinated carriage from mines and to Newcastle.   
 
Information, instructions and enquiries passed between and was shared amongst all  
 
personnel; the level of communication was regular and detailed. George Bowes was  
 
apt to override the lines of communication when he chose to exert directive  
 
authority, so consequently there is evidence of reporting and general correspondence  
 
between specialists in the field and Bowes. This was more usual in the 1740s and  
 
somewhat less so in the 1750s once the structure was firmly embedded. It has not  
 
been possible to disentangle the individual roles and responsibilities of Leaton and  
 
Stephenson as joint stewards at Gibside, but the latter was the chief recipient of most  
 
if not all of any lead related correspondence and reports. Lastly, the stewards involved  
 
in the Bowes lead business were appointed to their overseeing tasks according to their  
 
geographic proximity to the Wemmergill estate in Upper Teesdale, whereas the  
 
specialists were introduced for their expertise in lead mining and smelting.  
 
This chapter explores three inter-related facets of the lead industry on  
 
the Bowes estate in the mid-eighteenth century; management, the mindset of the  
 
managers, and management of the monopsony created by tacks and leases. The  
 Bowes estate management structure, the specialist roles of individuals within it, their  
 
 
levels of authority and discretion, their attitudes, and their creativeness, permit at least  
 
a limited analysis of the Bowes‟ management model in terms of the nature of 
 
management – knowledge, training, behavioural management including labour  
 
recruitment, use of information and accountancy, degrees of trust –and its role in  
 
determining the process of expanding lead production as an estate activity. In this  
 
context, a distinction is made between the role of managers and that of George Bowes  
 
as entrepreneur. The managers‟ attitudes, or mindset, can be grasped to some extent,  
 
allowing some comment to be made about its consequences for their activities. Lastly,  
 
the Bowes‟ monopoly of demand - a monopsony - for lead ore created by the granting  
 
of tacks and leases which reserved the right to purchase it, was the primary focus of  
 
those managing lead mining, the carriage of ore, and the accounting for it. The  
 
development of the lead mining lease under the Bowes regime was the key instrument  
 
in the management of mining, and a comparative analysis of those created before and  
 
during the period 1738 to 1760 points to innovation in the estate‟s ability to contend  
 
with problems in managing both input and output in lead production under the  
 
direction of George Bowes. Eighteenth century estate management differed from the  
 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in that paternalism appears less  
 
prevalent, superseded by an exploitative culture originating in the growth of a market  
 
economy. Yet the Bowes estate appears to have retained a degree of social  
 
responsibility in its attempt to develop its mineral rights, if nothing else by offering  
 
employment opportunities to the estate‟s inhabitants.217 
 
  The final management framework that emerged under George Bowes  
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was characterised by its stability, though Bowes himself seems to have become  
 
relatively distant from the lead business in the late 1750s. What was the nature of the 
 
stewards‟ work? How did they conduct it? What was the extent of their influence on  
 
the Bowes lead business, and can their contribution be assessed or quantified in some  
 
way? Is it possible to uncover their level of creativity? What was the behaviour and  
 
mindset of Nathan Horne and John Gibson? Was Bowes‟ estate management  
 
successful? Recently, in his study from a narrow accountancy standpoint of  
 
management practices on estates in northeast England during the eighteenth century ,  
 
Oldroyd argues that the Bowes estate was an example of one „managed efficiently and  
 
productively, as evidenced by the systematic nature of the accounting and  
 
management arrangement, and the focus in the accounts on making activities 
 
profitable‟.218 It will be suggested here that the management of the lead business to  
 
some extent contradicts Oldroyd‟s conclusion.  
 
  There are well-established views regarding management, including 
 
estate management and the role of the steward. Pollard‟s groundbreaking work, the  
 
only economic history of management as opposed to entrepreneurship during the  
 
process of industrialisation, provides terms of reference for this analysis of Bowes‟  
 
management of lead production on their estate during the mid-eighteenth century.
219
  
 
Pollard identifies the „estate‟ as an early form of large-scale enterprise within which a  
 
framework of administration and management procedure developed from the late  
 
sixteenth century.
220
 His examination of the problems of management in the 
eighteenth  
 
century alludes to the extractive industries as dealing with organisational problems  
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earlier than other industries which were still „at the handicraft stage‟, and that „in  
 
many respects mining became a model for other industries‟.221  Pollard suggests a 
direct  
 
correlation between the age of an estate and the level of development in management  
 
practices.
222
 Mingay‟s study of eighteenth century landed society suggests that the  
 
development in estate management was a feature of the general improvement  
 
movement, that the management of mineral exploitation as an industrial activity was a  
 
natural extension of agrarian change. 
223
 The rise of the agents and stewards was a  
 
feature of a „commercialized society‟: men with experience in industry, commerce,  
 
and finance, such as William Barker, steward to the Duke of Devonshire, and Thomas  
 
Barker, steward to the Duke of Rutland, who together established a mining and  
 
smelting business in the Derbyshire lead industry in 1729.
224
 Mingay also remarks 
that  
 
management adopted a more thorough, scientific approach during this period, whilst  
 
highlighting the role of the land steward.
225
 Other historians have since advanced our  
 
understanding of the importance of the steward‟s role.226  
 
As far as mining was concerned Pollard concluded that „mining, in  
 
which most of the work was done out of sight, and in which a high degree of technical  
 
competence was essential, both for economical working and for safety, was among  
 
the earliest to develop a clearly defined management structure‟ citing lead, tin, and  
 
copper mining as exemplars.
227
 The origins and development of metal mining  
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 management, and lead mining in particular, have received little attention in the period  
 
before 1800, with the exception perhaps of the London Lead Company. Burt suggests  
 
a managerial revolution resulting from the expansion of mining during the eighteenth  
 
century, but concentrates his discussion of lead mining management on nineteenth  
 
century developments drawing largely on corporate growth in the lead mining sector  
 
without reference to estate management as a basis for innovation in lead mining  
 
management.
228
 
 
  At this stage it has not been possible to identify specific Bowes‟ estate  
 
management practices for lead during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but to  
 
the extent that certain family members gained direct experience of German methods,  
 
technology and organisation, and of the organisation of the Weardale lead industry  
 
as Moormasters, they must have adopted a management strategy of some sort. The  
 
English involvement in the Company of Mines Royal in the late sixteenth century, the  
 
principal purpose of which was to exploit copper, did not produce a generation of  
 
technically trained managers, because the „mistake was that no amount of observation  
 
by a non- technically trained person will make him adequate to take over and develop  
 
new ideas‟, and no „facilities were provided for what is now called technological  
 
education‟.229   The Company of Mineral and Battery Works further illustrates the  
 
absence of homegrown management. Put simply, in both cases, there was a failure to  
 
absorb foreign methods, little understanding of the minerals and the potential yield, no  
 
comprehension of costs and transport, and inadequate supervision, not to mention  
 
fraud and bribery, all of which point to lack of appropriate management.
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  The management structure for the period 1721 to 1771 is outlined  
 
above; we can now examine the individuals, their roles, and their levels of influence  
 
and creativity in the Bowes‟ lead business, which will highlight the importance  
 
of the individual in the estates‟ production process. Firstly, by way of background a  
 
brief discussion of the estate management structure‟s raison d’etre. 
 
George Bowes was interested in controlling and developing the  
 
potential of lead production from mine to market, and his enforced life-style, spending  
 
half his time in London and half on his estates in the northeast, dictated the  
 
development of a reporting system, albeit a simple chain of command, which supplied  
 
him with specific details of every aspect of the lead business. He demanded regular,  
 
detailed information from those in his employ, specifics of the production process at  
 
every stage; new finds, trial mines, lessee activities, progress in mining and smelting,  
 
when projected deadlines would be met, local road conditions, and financial  
 
management. It was the latter aspect which concerned him most, and although he  
 
appears to have placed considerable faith in a hard core of men to whom he delegated  
 
the task of managing his estates, they were expected to operate and adhere to the  
 
system of accounting for income and expenditure, because they actually handled  
 
Bowes‟ money. The lead business was by its very nature risky and, accepting this,  
 
awareness of the extent of his financial input was Bowes‟ prerequisite for speculating,  
 
together with detailed knowledge of success in terms of the value of lead produced.  
 
Communication in the form of written reports concerning lead mining  
 
and smelting was the other key feature of Bowes management. The management  
 
reporting structure was straightforward as far as lead was concerned. The mines  
 
steward  -„grove steward‟ was the localism – reported on all events in the field, quite  
 
often very detailed and in lead mining parlance; measurements of lead veins, progress  
 
in fathoms worked, the number of men employed and the bargains struck, methods  
 
and materials used, estimates of ore mined and its quality, amounts carried to the  
 
smelt mills, expected timescales for profitable production, activity at leased mines and  
 
whether the lessees were conducting their operations properly and adhering to the  
 
terms of their leases - because Bowes made money from duty ore - and advice to his  
 
master regarding any of the aforementioned, including views as to the integrity of any  
 
prospective lessee adventurer or partner Bowes was considering. The reports also  
 
included statistical information about ore mined, carriage to the mill, ore „resting‟,  
 
and the estimated value of ore both from Bowes‟ mines and duty ore from lessees.  
 
The mines steward was effectively employed as a knowledgeable inspector, quite  
 
numerate and literate, often capable of assaying potential lead mines before Bowes  
 
decided upon the extent of his involvement. George Bowes knew the value of  
 
this role and the information and knowledge he could derive from it. Generally, the  
 
mine steward‟s reports were sent to a senior steward whose brief it was to ensure the  
 
reporting process was regular and not intermittent, and provided the appropriate  
 
information in sufficient detail, because in Bowes‟ absence the senior steward was  
 
authorised to act on his behalf. In certain circumstances, however, the mines steward  
 
did report direct to Bowes. 
 
  The mines steward also drew up accounts for income and expenditure  
 
at the mines, both owned and leased, and generally kept vouchers to evidence these  
 
accounts to the senior estate steward who audited them annually before they were  
 
signed off as agreed by both parties. This was to ensure that Bowes did not suffer loss,  
 
and was a system of monitoring the trust put in stewards was warranted, because they  
 
were entrusted with cash. Adventurers who leased mines from George Bowes were  
 
required to partake of the agency service offered by their mineral lord, which took the  
 
form of inspections, advice and guidance, and accountancy. They paid for this service,  
 
which was obviously more for Bowes‟ benefit than theirs. 
 
   
The regular and consistent use of information, its collection centralised  
 
at Gibside, demonstrates that the management of lead on the Bowes estate had a  
 
professional quality. Most of the reports were written, and usually carried by a lower  
 
ranking agent to the estate office for the attention of the senior steward and George  
 
Bowes. Occasionally, the mines steward would have a face-to-face meeting with the  
 
senior steward to discuss the state of the mines. At all times the role of the senior  
 
steward was to oversee progress and to pressure the mines steward to drive mining  
 
operations, at the same time managing his main tasks. 
 
  George Bowes could not have attained the level of control he desired  
 
over lead production without consistent reporting; it was a means of managing an  
 
estate activity that he raised from negligible to potentially profitable. Throughout his  
 
patriarchy the same basic structure of management and reporting remained in situ.  
 
George Bowes‟ order of the early 1740s, „Mill & Grove to exchange weekly accounts  
 
of oar‟ which established the information flow, at times became the source of  
 
disagreements between the mines steward and the smelt mill manager, and between  
 
the mines steward and the senior steward, who all sought George Bowes‟ approval for  
 
their work and opinions.
231
 
  
 
There were a number of leading players in the Bowes lead industry  
 
during the 1740s and 1750s. Undoubtedly the key role was that of George Bowes  
 
himself. He was not a landed gentleman sitting idly by watching the exploitation of a  
 
valuable mineral develop in haphazard fashion. He directed the process, and in doing  
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so established the structure of the lead industry in rural Upper Teesdale, whence its  
 
product was distributed across the region to Newcastle and beyond. His personal  
 
involvement is explored in detail below. Estate documents reveal the others as Nathan  
 
Horn, John Gibson who established themselves as the specialists in the field, Thomas  
 
Colpitts I, and Richard Stephenson.  
 
.   Nathan Horn became field agent for Lunehead mines in 1741 and was  
 
paid a salary of £10 per annum.
232
 Horn became the Bowes mines manager or grove  
 
steward in 1742 and remained so throughout the George Bowes era. In fact, Horn  
 
initially played second fiddle to James Raine who was field agent at Isabell-mea-Hill  
 
in 1741 and received a salary of £20 per annum. Raine‟s role at Isabell-mae-Hill was  
 
clearly of greater importance to Bowes‟ plans for expanding lead mining ore, yet  
 
somehow Horn became lead mines steward. Nathan Horn had knowledge of mining,  
 
and particularly explosives, and his first management project was to develop the  
 
workings at Isabell-mea-Hill, but he soon became involved in general management of  
 
the mines as a resource available to lessees to assist in mining methods and ore  
 
production. This was often noted in mine accounts as „agency‟, but in practice was  
 
overseeing to ensure that the terms of leases were met and that George Bowes‟ plans  
 
were followed at both his own mines and those of lessees. Horn‟s opinions appear to  
 
have carried considerable influence with both George Bowes and his senior stewards,  
 
because his experience and knowledge were rooted in. hands-on management on the  
 
orefield and actually in the lead mines. Horn was a Teesdale man – his reports  
 
often contained words spelt in Teesdale dialect – but there is no evidence that Horn  
 
was a product of the Bowes estate management structure; it is most likely that he  
 
acquired his skills and knowledge from working in the lead industry elsewhere in the  
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North East before mining lead on the Bowes estate. 
 
   
Two senior stewards were also main characters. Thomas Colpitts I  
 
whose knowledge of landscape, lead mining, and geology is noted above. He was 
 
based at Streatlam and reported on existing mines, but also had the additional function  
 
of exploring for new lead veins. His son, Thomas Colpitts II, succeeded him in 1755. 
 
 The other senior steward was Richard Stephenson, based at Gibside during the 1750s,  
 
to whom the mines steward and smelt mill manager reported, He acted as an interface  
 
between Bowes and the specialists working in Upper Teesdale. The indications are  
 
that Colpitts and Stephenson were products of the Bowes estate system. 
  
John Gibson managed the mill at Wemmergill from outset in 1757. He  
 
was well-educated, and his documents rank as some of the best amongst the  
 
extant eighteenth century records examined, being highly detailed and beautifully  
 
written. Gibson‟s abilities as divulged in the range of memoranda, general  
 
correspondence, and business reports were of distinctive quality; literate and  
 
numerate, with business acumen and an understanding of the lead business, and  
 
expert knowledge and skills in assaying and lead smelting. Indeed, of all the managers  
 
both in the field and up the line, John Gibson was outstanding in his devotion to and  
 
his assessment of the business strategy George Bowes chose for the organisation of  
 
lead production. His role as assayer of lead ore and silver at Isabell-mae-Hill, and as  
 
management consultant in the planning and construction of Wemmergill smelt mill  
 
are discussed further in chapter six below. George Bowes‟ decision to re-organise the  
 
stages of lead production and reduce costs by building a new mill at Wemmergill  
 
nearer the mines, and to make it the focal point of financial control and general  
 
reporting, required someone of Gibson‟s calibre to ensure the new business regime  
 
operated properly. Experience of lead smelting alone would have been insufficient, 
 but the exact source of his knowledge and experience is unknown. There is no  
 
evidence that he was trained within the Bowes estate management structure, which  
 
suggests that, like Horn, he was a product of elsewhere in the regional lead industry. 
 
Gibson‟s role as manager at Wemmergill continued after George Bowes died in 1760,  
 
and he remained proactive in offering reasoned assessments of the condition of the  
 
Bowes lead industry and how it could be improved. His role, performed at  
 
Wemmergill, also included the organisation and accounting for the carriage of  
 
smelted lead and ore. 
 
  Lastly, there was a category of management which played 
an important  
 
role in the transitional period of the early 1740s; the smelter managers 
who preceded  
 
the appearance of lead specialists like Horn and Gibson. The smelt mill 
and the  
 
connected activities of the carriage of both ore and smelted lead were 
managed by  
 
the leading smelters. In 1741 James Anderson with Thomas Moses 
managed the  
 
Bowes smelt mill at Bollihope.233 During 1742 and 1743 the smelters and 
mill  
 
managers were James Sanderson and Lane Sanderson, possibly brothers 
or father 
 
and son, who also organised the carriage of ore and pig lead and dealt 
with basic 
 
business documentation relating to the financial aspects of running the mill, such as  
 
expenditure on paying carriers and operational costs as well as the smelters‟ pay. 234 
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 It should be emphasised that, prior to Bowes‟ recognition in the  
 
early 1740s that his strategy for growing a lead business required personnel with  
 
appropriate knowledge and skills, the demarcation of specialist roles was nonexistent.  
 
The involvement of certain individuals indicates that their contribution was casual,  
 
that only some experience of mining was sufficient for the task in hand. One example  
 
was Samuel Bland, a field agent in 1737, who handled pay bills and provided powder 
 
for blasting in the mines.
235
 Even as late as 1744 William Horn, a miner who was  
 
partner in a twenty-one year lease at a mine north of Long Crag, acted on behalf of  
 
George Bowes in the granting of a ten-year tack at Closehouse, indeed it appears  
 
William Horn wrote it.
236
 Leaton, a senior steward for the Bowes, reported on ore and  
 
pig lead deliveries to and from Bollihope smelt mill in November 1741.
237
 Although  
 
most of these men were literate and numerate, some wrote in Teesdale dialect and  
 
their reports were very limited in content.   
 
During the 1740s and 1750s, as George Bowes‟ plans for developing 
 
lead production from its latent state into a structured industry were enacted, the two 
 
key roles were played by Nathan Horn and John Gibson who together effectively ran  
 
a rural industrial process interlocking with the Newcastle market. After 1757, when  
 
the financial management, accounting, and reporting became largely centred on the 
 
Wemmergill smelt mill, the management styles of Gibson and Horn often clashed in  
 
hubristic fashion, particularly on the part of Horn, presenting Richard Stephenson as  
 
the senior steward at Gibside, with the awkward role of referee in an industrial setting  
 
where both men had important functions, both were held in good esteem, but Horn  
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was the longer serving yet Gibson, with his greater ability, probably correct. In any  
 
event, Bowes mines and smelt mill became better integrated because of the work of  
 
Nathan Horne and John Gibson. 
 
Apart from the provision of management information, what other roles  
 
did stewards have in lead and is there any indication of their level of discretion in the  
 
field? The senior steward had a role in exploration and trial mining on the Bowes  
 
estate. Thomas Colpitts I even sought to explore in his own right. In 1741 Colpitts  
 
recommended that a Derbyshire partnership, with experience of lead mining in Wales,  
 
be permitted to explore his estate in Upper Teesdale. Before Bowes showed serious  
 
interest in lead mining Samuel Bland wrote in August 1737, as field agent to his  
 
senior steward Thomas Colpitts I, that George Ainsley and partners had offered a  
 
hushing trial at Lunehead, to be carried on at their expense with one-seventh of the  
 
ore as duty to Bowes. Bland remarked that the trial was worth one-fifth duty ore, but  
 
stated that he did not have the authority to grant permission for the trial.
238
  
 
The mines steward and a senior steward in the field were meant to  
 
collaborate and ensure progress in the development of lead mining on the Bowes  
 
estate, including recruitment of miners. A good example of such work was the  
 
discovery of a new mine on Mickle Fell, which Thomas Colpitts I called „Mea-Hill‟.  
 
Colpitts and Horn had been sent to inspect the vein discovered by John Dent. Colpitts  
 
wrote to confirm „Nathan Horn & self let a bargain to Matthew Raine of Lower  
 
Wemmergill & partner to get 20 Bing of ore Dressed fitt for ye Lead Mill‟.239  
 
Colpitss went to Streatlam on 29
th
 September, and to Gibside on 2
nd
 October to report  
 
his findings. The same report notes that £20 was lent to whoever was working  
 
Lunehead mine. In February 1741 Horne wrote to Colpitts that ‟We have a hoall at  
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 Lunehead‟ and that he had made bargains with miners for sinking through limestone  
 
at „6s.6d a fathom and 10s 6d.a bing for five fathom driving‟.240 
 
  The role of mines steward was comparatively diversified. In 
1741  
 
James Raine, then a mines agent, was sent to West Pitts and into Weardale „a-buying  
 
ore‟.241 Nathan Horn was clearly under instruction to consider buying good quality  
 
lead ore wherever it became available in the Pennine ore fields, a practice which  
 
continued remained unchanged. In his letter to Stephenson of 12
th
 March 1758 Horn 
 
confirmed that he had written to George Bowes telling him that he had travelled into  
 
Westmoreland where he “had a preference of buying” some ore, but Bowes did not  
 
reply. Horn wrote “if I cannot give this man an answer whether I will buy it or not  
 
they will sell it to some other”.242 
 
Detailed mining progress reports were demanded of mines steward  
 
Horn. George Bowes was an avid collector of as such information, especially during  
 
the early1740s when the lead mine at Isabell-Meah-Hill attracted him most amongst  
 
those where he was completely committed. A report of 23
rd 
December 1741 remarks  
 
that this mine was “exceedingly good” and “full of oare above head”, and that a level  
 
had been driven past the cross-cut shaft with “14 fathoms to go to Raisbeck shaft”,  
 
and added “its ordered to be followed night and day”.243  The report contains Horn‟s  
 
account of all work at both Isabell-mea-Hill and Lunehead lead mines. The cost of  
 
work was noted at £23 1s 6d for the months of September, October, and the first half  
 
of November, and that £37 had been paid out on account. On 31
st
October 1749  
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Nathan Horn wrote to Bowes in London to confirm that work at Isabell-Mea-Hill was  
 
going well, that a level was being worked  “at 20s per fathom, whilst in the shaft 8s  
 
per fathom and 10s per bing of oar”.244 In the same correspondence Horn also  
 
commented on the new mine at Crinkle How, where George Bowes was in  
 
partnership with Lord Carlisle, that “I hope to cut the vain befoar midsummer day  
 
first‟. 
 
Nathan Horn provided mine management and inspections reports 
 
together with basic financial information about expenditure at the mines, but it was 
 
Thomas Colpitts, a senior steward, who was responsible for the more definitive  
 
reports. Bowes‟ assessment of the potential of Crinkle How must have proved  
 
difficult, because Colpitts wrote in December 1749 to Lord Carlisle‟s steward at  
 
 
Castle Howard, saying “ I grew a little tired of any longer staying in this dismall part  
 
of the world; therefore called in the pay bill from Nathan Horn, and on the 15
th
 instant  
 
cleared off every Demand on Crinkle How at that time”.245 In other words, on Bowes‟  
 
behalf, he made the decision to cease mining, yet contemporaneously provided fine  
 
detail of the strata at Crinkle How and believed the lead vein there was “reckonable  
 
favourable”. Colpitts‟ authority and influence in lead mining appears to have been  
 
greater than that of Nathan Horn at this stage. 
 
  Colpitts produced a further and fuller report on Crinkle How and  
 
other mines, but did not have the discretion to act. Occasionally, George Bowes was  
 
the recipient of bad news and adverse conditions in his lead mining affairs and was  
 
required to react accordingly. The detailed, pointed letter from Thomas Colpitts of  
 
15
th
 February 1750 gave Bowes a précis of the state of operations at several mines  
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other than the problem at Crinkle How: 
 
“I have made all the pays at our unprofitable Lead Mines, and Mr. Ripon having  
 
appointed a day for Crinkle How, I met him accordingly when we cleared off all  
 
expences there off the workmen. A Moyety of the whole of Crinkle How charge from  
 
the beginning comes to £166.12.3 ¼. From the trials hitherto made, it is impossible 
 
to say what may be expected from that Mine,. Nathan says, she is hopeful, Mr. Ripon  
 
keeps silent, and will say nothing either for or against her. 
 
The Tacks at Standards, Arngill, and Close House are all out. The Tennants who had  
 
them hitherto have not pushed on the Workings so briskly as they ought to have done. 
 
Only employing their vacant time they had to spare from their other business. We  
 
think to joyn some more hands to them… 
 
Nothing has been done at Green Mine or elsewhere, thro‟ the severity of the weather,  
 
we hope for better, and shall then set all hands at work. I think it is your design to  
 
make as many trials  and in a many places as there may be any Likelyhood of proving 
 
such veins as are hopeful to get ore, and for this end, please let us have Orders about  
 
what is now mentioned, and afterwards, as occasion may offer, we shall desire the  
 
like approbation….”. 246 Unfortunately, there is no documentary evidence of Bowes‟  
 
response, other than the confirmation by Colpitts in his letter to Cleaver that his  
 
master had dealt with the Crinkle How matter face-to-face with Lord Carlisle.
247
 
 
By the 1750‟s, however, Nathan Horn was in a much stronger position 
 
both as mines steward manager and in terms of his influence within the Bowes lead  
 
business. Horn imparted positive progress at Rowton Sike, where Bowes eventually  
 
offered a partnership to Charles Wensley. On January 6
th
 1754 he wrote to Bowes  
 
in London, that the bottom of the limestone had been reached at Rowton Sike having  
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 driven through thirteen fathoms of it.
248
  Then on 24
th
 May 1754 he sent a progress  
 
report to Bowes informing him that quality ore had been found at Rowton Sike, that  
 
ore had been found at Green Mines ,but not the main vein, where ten men were  
 
working.
249
 These two pieces of correspondence also describe activities at Standards, 
 
Close House, and Isabell-Meah-Hill Mines, and from the first two Horn expected  
 
between ten and twelve bing of duty ore in the summer of 1754. In the January 1754  
 
Horn informed Bowes that fifty-six bing of ore had been delivered to a Mr. Appleby  
 
at Eggleston smelt mill, who had told Horn that the money for this ore would be  
 
ready at Raby Castle, the Vane family residence.
250
  
 
  Nathan Horn, clearly well established in his role as mines steward by  
 
the end of the 1740s and more influential, continued to be managed, however, because  
 
he reported to Thomas Colpitts II, chief steward at Streatlam. In 1755 Horn wrote that  
 
the middle vein of lead at Rowton Sike had been cut, that it was ten feet wide, but that  
 
the rock was very hard and needed blasting. In addition he had made ten bargains with  
 
miners „to sink‟ at 30s a bing, yet only five or six stones of lead ore had actually been  
 
obtained beforehand. So, Horn‟s opinion and management of the Bowes lead mines  
 
remained salient in the field. 
 
  In 1756, when George Bowes was evaluating the state of his lead  
 
business and reconsidering his strategy towards the operation and management of the 
 
mines and the smelting of metallic lead, because he was pondering its viability,  
 
Nathan Horn continued to supply him with optimistic information. In October 1756  
 
Horn reported that Jonathan Watson‟s progress in mining at Closehouse was expected  
 
to last “some years”, that Mr. Furnice had sunk a shaft at Sun Vein at Closehouse, and  
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that hushing was in operation at Standards and Arngill mines.
251
 At this stage Horn‟s  
 
reports appear to have been the only source of management information regarding  
 
lead production on the Bowes estate; he held the monopoly of  trust and influence.  
 
This was to change somewhat after the Wemmergill smelt mill became operational  
 
under the management of John Gibson in 1757. 
 
The significance of tacks and leases as management tools will be  
 
discussed below , but the memoranda exchanged between George Bowes and his  
 
stewards regarding their enactment and the progress of mine workings provides  
 
further clarification of how industrious Nathan Horn was and when many of the lead  
 
mines were actually in operation. For example, Arngill was working in 1746, was  
 
leased out for the two years from 1
st
September 1748, found itself available for letting  
 
in August 1751, was noted by Bowes in projected ore production figures in 1754, and  
 
was still being worked in 1756.
252
 Closehouse mine was leased for three years in 
1747,  
 
was taken on by one Jonathan Watson in 1751, was evidently in continued production  
 
during the 1750‟s, and under Bowes‟ control in the latter years of this decade.253 In 
the  
 
late 1750‟s George Bowes brought Black Ark mine into operation.254 Horn and other  
 
stewards, regardless of rank, were responsible for imposing the terms of tacks and  
 
leases, and for reporting forfeiture which in turn instigated the introduction of new  
 
lessees under new tacks for continuity of lead mining. The continuity of lead mining  
 
                                                 
251
   D/St/B2/93(3) an anonymous report dated 20
th
 October 1756 concerning some of the mines 
      mentioned in Bowes original memorandum of 16
th
 October 1756.  
252
  D/St/B2/81 account of duty ore delivered from Arngill mine; D/St/B2/21 George Bowes‟  
     memorandum dated 20
th
 August 1748; D/St/B2/21 George Bowes‟ memorandum dated 16th August    
     1751; and D/St/B2/93 memoranda and reports on various mines for the period 1756-61. 
253
  D/St/B2/21 Bowes memorandum of20th August 1748; D/St/B2/22 Bowes memo; D/St/C1/3/58  
     (4&5)  letters between Bowes and his agents 1737-1754; D/St/B2/93(1,3 & 4) memoranda 
     and reports on various mines 1756-61; D/St/ C3/76 (9 & 12) letters between agents 
     1751-1765. 
254
  D/St/C3/76(1,6,8, & 11), letters between agents, and D/St/B2/93(1) memoranda and reports  
     1756-61. 
in terms of the number of tacks and leases granted, together with reports of mining  
 
progress, can perhaps be taken as a general, if limited, quantification of the mines  
 
steward‟s efforts. Whether or not Horn‟s management style and application of is skills  
 
and knowledge improved output and productivity is difficult to determine. 
 
Nathan Horn was his mines steward during the 1740‟s and 1750‟s, and 
 
his many reports and letters identify him as a key figure in Bowes‟ management  
 
structure, with considerable knowledge and experience of lead mining, which Bowes  
 
valued and drew upon in his plans for the expansion of lead production. Horn was  
 
clearly an experienced lead miner who became a mines steward, a specialist manager, 
 
who was essential to George Bowes‟ lead business. He dealt with day-to-day mining  
 
operations, whilst Gibson specialised in smelting. Horn‟s role was to oversee both  
 
leased and owned lead mines, which included providing guidance on mine working  
 
methods, sometimes act as a merchant buying ore when the opportunity arose, arrange  
 
bargains with miners at mines owned by Bowes, and ensuring that leased mines  
 
remained in operation, regardless of who the lessee(s) were. The purpose of Horn‟s  
 
work was to maximise the extraction of lead ore and to inform George Bowes of  
 
progress at the lead mines by reporting to Richard Stephenson at Gibside, though in  
 
some instances he communicated directly with his master. Nathan Horne appears to  
 
have been entrusted with this important role throughout the period 1741-60 and was  
 
well paid compared to John Gibson, earning twice as much. Both Stephenson and  
 
George Bowes respected his opinion, but his efforts were closely scrutinised by  
 
Stephenson because Bowes demanded results in the form of lead ore smelted into  
 
marketable lead as quickly as possible. Stephenson‟s instructions, directed by Bowes,  
 
were intended to drive Horn‟s work in the minefields. 
 
  Nathan Horn had knowledge and experience in lead mining, and  
 
though focused on his own task, remained blinkered to the broader aspects of the lead  
 
production process. His standing within the estate and degree of influence with  
 
George Bowes was high during the 1740s and early 1750s; Horn, not Gibson, 
 
communicated directly with George Bowes. Horn‟s management of both miners and  
 
lessees was uncompromising and at times ruthless, characterised by some poor  
 
decision-making. Furthermore, his management style was typified by unconventional  
 
conduct in the field, which miners and lessees probably considered untypical of the  
 
Bowes estate‟s business culture. After the estate lead operations became centralised  
 
on Wemmergill in 1757, Horn proved himself unable to work in tandem with Gibson,  
 
to whom he was accountable for reports regarding ore output. His management  
 
methods, and by implication his honesty, were questioned by senior steward Richard  
 
Stephenson in the late 1750s. Horn also appears to have balked at change for  
 
improvement, and by 1760 was probably becoming a liability rather than an asset.  
 
Nathan Horn was creative in the sense that he managed for almost twenty years to  
 
give the impression that he was performing his role, usually in the form of optimistic  
 
reports. A range of documents supports this summary of his behaviour, conduct, and  
 
mindset. 
 
  Horne‟s influence and position were rooted in happenstance; he was 
 
at the birth of the Isabell-mea-Hill lead mine and enjoyed favour accordingly as the  
 
vein was exploited during the 1740s. Several examples of his direct correspondence  
 
with George Bowes are noted above; progress reports for Isabell-mea-Hill in  
 
the 1740s, and developments at Lunehead, and in the 1750s reports regarding 
 
discoveries at Rowton Syke and Closehouse. Horn definitely had Bowes‟ ear, and  
 
his standing in the field was apparently unsurpassable. John Gibson addressed all his 
 
correspondence and reports to senior stewards, particularly Richard Stephenson; there  
 
are no examples of him communicating directly with George Bowes. 
 
  Horn was uncompromising, at times ruthless, in his management of 
 
both miners employed by Bowes and adventurers, or those working for adventurers,  
 
who held tack and leases on the Bowes estate, which proved poor decision-making.   
 
John Gibson‟s report to Richard Stephenson in October 1758 included an objective  
 
questioning of Horn‟s mining methods and man-management skills, which he clearly  
 
believed were causal in wasteful expenditure on lead production.
255
 At Birkdale Horn 
 
had “ejected the hushers” before they had completed their work of uncovering the ore, 
 
and was “carrying up a level at Blackark, which most experienced Miners say, will  
 
answer no manner of Purpose”. Gibson summarised Horn‟s, and indicating his own  
 
understanding of appropriate management: “He neither promotes our Master‟s  
 
Interest, nor encourages such Persons as have a Lease or Tack of the Mines; for, if he  
 
cannot buy their Ore at his own Price, he threatens to turn the Lessees off as soon as  
 
their Leases are expir‟d. He has told me as much some time ago, with regard to  
 
Watson & Collison, and if he should effect his Design, & the Mines either lie  
 
neglected, or be Managed to a considerable Loss, it would be a great Disadvantage to  
 
our Master”. 
   
  Evidently, Horn‟s handling of adventurers and miners was causing  
 
production problems even before Gibson‟s arrival at the Wemmergill smelt mill. In  
 
February 1753 one Tim Bainbridge wrote to Stephenson on behalf of himself and his  
 
partners, William Tarn and John Bainbridge, asking if George Bowes would meet  
 
them to resolve a problem they had with Nathan Horn, who considered that they had  
 
not met their bargain at Isabell-Meah-Hill made in 1752 and were unwilling to accept  
 
his advice regarding manpower, and refused to either pay them ore collect the ore  
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they had mined. Bainbridge stated that the partners could prove how much ore was  
 
produced because it was sold to a Mr. Appleby at Eggleston mill.
256
 Stephenson‟s  
 
reply upheld Horn‟s account of the dispute, giving us an indication of the weight  
 
within the management structure of Horn‟s opinion.257 The situation worsened within  
 
the next few months, and on 1
st
 June 1754 Bainbridge wrote from Birkdale mine  
 
complaining in no uncertain terms that he and his partners were having success at  
 
Isabell-Meah-Hill, but that Horn was refusing to supply the appropriate equipment,  
 
proper living accommodation, or victuals. Consequently, they were forced to raise the  
 
price of ore per bing to buy food. Horn was accused of making false promises about  
 
payment, and they needed money urgently in order to employ more men to produce  
 
more ore. Bainbridge remarked that “If Mr. Horn or any other of Mr. Bowes agents  
 
think it not worthwhile to lay out money for the things that is needful we are ready to  
 
pay a guinea a bing to Mr. Bowes and quit him from all Expence”.258 In other words,  
 
these miners would accept full liability for the mining and pay a royalty to the Bowes.  
 
Perhaps George Bowes himself had instructed Horn to take this ruthless approach in  
 
dealing with miners, maybe because there was a shortage of working capital in lead  
 
mining in the late 1750‟s and Bowes had tightened the purse strings. 
 
  An inability to commit to collaborative work and the compilation of 
 
objective management information seem to have been two other weaknesses 
 
displayed by Horn. As far as Horn‟s record keeping was concerned Gibson  
 
commented “He gets great Part of his accounts made up from the Work people‟s  
 
Memorandums, hence he has nothing to rely on, but their Word”.259 Early in 1758 
 
Gibson‟s letter to Stephenson pointed out that Horne had not paid the miners in full,  
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enclosed “an account of the Stock Remaining at the Mill December 31. 1757”. This  
 
letter also mentions that Stephenson had requested an account of the lead mines from  
 
Horn, but to no avail. Gibson informed him that he had shown Nathan Horn  
 
Stephenson‟s letter to Gibson of 13th February 1758 requesting the information, and  
 
that Horn said he would comply the following week.
260
 At times Horn showed either  
 
carelessness or lack of understanding of the annual process of production and  
 
marketing. For example, in June 1758 Gibson wrote asking Stephenson to ”acquaint  
 
our Master “ with the fact that Horn had not sent all the ore for smelting, which in  
 
turn would slow down the whole process of getting lead to market in good weather, a  
 
delay of three months, and would “lay the carriers idle”, and ore would be left at the  
 
mill. He respectfully requested from Bowes “an Order of what must be done”.261  
 
Gibson knew that Bowes‟ expectations were not being met, but would not act without  
 
a decision from “our Master”, nor would it seem that Stephenson had the authority.  
 
  Nathan Horn held a position of entrenched trust during the 1740s and 
 
worked to maintain an unchanging mining regime. Horn balked at change in any  
 
form. In Gibson‟s detailed report of 1758 he suggested that “Some Improvement  
 
might be made in Manufacturing the Ore”, but that when he mentioned it to Horn,  
 
Horn informed the smelter at the Mill to ignore Gibson.
262
 He was resistant to  
 
immigrants from other lead mining regions who‟s experience and knowledge could  
 
have potentially improved mines output without his assistance. In a letter to George 
 
Bowes Horn passed an opinion to deter the presence of the “Derbyshire gentelmen”  
 
who had participated in trial mines with Bowes. He was referring to George  
 
Tissington and his colleagues, a member of the Tissington mining family from  
 
Derbyshire, who had an interest in the copper mines at Middle Tyas and who was  
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 granted a lease by George Bowes for lead and copper on Micklefell in 1756. Horn  
 
stated that unless Tissington‟s team were included in the lease with the Earl of  
 
Thanet, then Bowes should not expect them to meet their share of the costs for the  
 
trial mine. Horn cited a similar incident at Black Sike mine where they had not paid,  
 
and Horn‟s son had confirmed this because he had worked at Black Sike from its  
 
very beginning. Horn offered a solution: if Bowes wrote to a “Mr Gors”, presumably  
 
the Earl of Thanet‟s agent, or spoke to the Earl himself, Bowes may have been  
 
allowed to bring in other partners to share costs by introducing working capital.
263
 
  
  Horn was creative in a platitudinous way: his reports were usually 
 
very general, lacking detail and objectivity, and always intentionally  optimistic – 
 
Horn‟s position was at stake! This style of reporting, already noted above, became  
 
more common during the 1750s. Horn wrote to Stephenson in February 1758 and 
 
gave an account of activity at Isabell-Meah-Hill, Black Ark, and Rowton Syke mines  
 
in terms of costs, lead ore at the mines, and the potential of the mines including Black  
 
Sike, his accountability to Stephenson demonstrated in optimistic terms. During  
 
August, October, November, and December 1758 Horn wrote to Richard Stephenson  
 
reporting deliveries of lead together with estimates of its value, itemising ore  
 
purchased from lessees, and mentioning some sales.
264
 These letter seem to have 
given  
 
Stephenson an impression of acceptable productivity at the mines, and ore reaching  
 
the Wemmergill smelt mill on time. In April 1759 Horn wrote to Stephenson twice;  
 
on the first occasion he provided a vague update of smelting activity, saying that he  
 
needed more information from Gibson; on the second he reported good progress at  
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Isabell-Meah-Hill and Blackark mines.
265
 Once again, Horn was supplying 
Stephenson  
 
with a positive picture of lead mining and smelting, without any details, and in  
 
contradiction to Gibson‟s analytical reports. Horn‟s occasional role as a buyer and  
 
seller of lead ore on his master‟s behalf also permitted Horn to show off his prowess  
 
in the field.  Horn requested “to know how lead sells in Newcastle for I have the offer  
 
to buy about 20 bing of ore near Brough”.266 It is mentioned above that Horne wrote  
 
to directly to George Bowes about the same matter  to give the impression he was  
 
working efficiently.  
   
 
Nathan Horn‟s management eventually came under scrutiny, and his  
 
methods and honesty were questioned by Richard Stephenson who appears to have  
 
become very frustrated by Horn. On 28
th
 November 1758 Stephenson wrote to Horn  
 
in response to his letter of 16
th
 November, instructing him to investigate as to why  
 
thirty-four pieces of lead had gone missing when the delivery from the mill reached  
 
the staith.
267
 In another reply to Horn, after considering the contents of his mine  
 
steward‟s recent letters, Stephenson concluded that „the Mines are not in a very  
 
hopeful way after this great expence‟.268 He advised Horn to transport the lead from  
 
the mill to Wolsingham „now when the Roads are good‟. Most notable, however, is  
 
that Stephenson‟s anxiety about George Bowes likely reaction is written clearly in  
 
his final paragraph: „My Master is coming down in a hurry to pressure for a new  
 
Tryal, we don‟t know other than that he will be there this week‟ –the ultimate threat. 
 
In December 1758 or very early in January 1759, Horn wrote to George Bowes in  
 
London detailing the particulars of the most recent pay bills at Rowton Syke, Isabell- 
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Meah-Hill, Closehouse, the Earl‟s Liberty - Bowes‟ lease with the Earl of Thanet for  
 
Silverkellwell, Arngill, and Standards mines. Horn calculated the total to be £505, 2,  
 
9., but Stephenson found this in error by £100 and noted this on the letter as  
 
„particulars of lead pay where there is a mistake of 100 pounds cashing up‟.269  
    
 
John Gibson was appointed as the Wemmergill melt mill manager 
 
because of his experience and knowledge of the lead industry, and particularly  
 
smelting. Nathan Horn hired him on behalf of George Bowes.  Gibson was an  
 
educated, intelligent man, loyal, conscientious, dedicated, and responsible. He  
 
behaved in an entirely professional manner throughout this career on the Bowes  
 
estate. During his four years managing the smelt mill at Wemmergill before George  
 
Bowes died he was effectively the controller of all lead operations in Upper Teesdale  
 
regardless of Horn‟s behaviour. He proved that he was creative and potentially very  
 
beneficial to the Bowes estate, and capable of delivering positive change in a risky  
 
business. The correspondence between Gibson and Stephenson reflects a mutual  
 
respect and understanding of the situation Gibson faced in his genuine desire to assist  
 
Bowes in his expansion of a profitable lead business. Gibson acted professionally; his 
 
reports and accounts evidence his knowledge and general ability, and are of  
 
considerably better quality, both in statistical detail and analysis compared to those 
 
supplied by Nathan Horn. Unfortunately for Bowes and Gibson, his arrival came too 
 
late, because Horn held a deeply entrenched position of influence. In addition to  
 
which Horn could behave in a ruthless manner when necessary, which may have been  
 
to Bowes‟ liking, perhaps exemplifying in the field the George Bowes‟ style of  
 
management. 
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  Gibson demonstrated an understanding of the lead production process  
 
and the consequences of not managing the various stages in timely fashion. On 1
st
  
 
May 1759 he wrote to Stephenson asking for permission to employ the carriers  
 
because  they „have had very little or no Employment for a considerable time …‟ and  
 
„…..if  you think  proper they might be carrying Lead to Wolsingham‟.270 He added  
 
that there was no ore at the Mill, and that the smelter had gone to work as a miner. „I  
 
think we shall have a poor summer‟s work‟, he concluded. The contents of John  
 
Gibson‟s earlier correspondence, tantamount to a prediction, had come true. On the  
 
30th May Gibson wrote again to Stephenson, because he had not received a reply to  
 
his letter of the 1st May, pointing out that weather conditions, long days, and the state  
 
of the roads were conducive to transporting the lead. Gibson begged for an immediate  
 
response. He was evidently extremely worried about the slowing down in production.  
 
Gibson had accepted the adverse circumstances and decided to remain as  
 
Wemmergill Smelt Mill manager, although at the end of September 1759 he wrote to  
 
Stephenson confirming that only a relatively small amount of ore was at the Mill, that  
 
the smelted lead had been delivered , and consequently he had been reduced to  
 
smelting slags.
271
 
 
   Gibson‟s record keeping, reports, and consistently regular  
 
correspondence with as senior steward at Gibside confirm that he was dedicated to his  
 
role as manager of Bowes‟ smelt mill, and capable of demonstrating a deep  
 
understanding of the different stages of lead production. He was loyal to Bowes and  
 
understood his master‟s objectives, but believed that the mines could have been more  
 
profitable if Bowes adopted his suggestions for improving the organization of mining.  
 
Gibson‟s correspondence with Richard Stephenson shows genuine concern for  
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 George Bowes‟ profits and plans for the lead business, yet it also points to the  
 
fallibility of the structure and methods that George Bowes and the inherited estate  
 
management had imposed on the lead business. Gibson was a specialist and was  
 
the calibre of manager Bowes needed. He was evidently highly professional, but at  
 
this time lacking in influence compared to Horn where Bowes was concerned, having  
 
only recently been appointed. Stephenson knew Bowes well, and could predict his  
 
likely ruthless response, knowing that Gibson would be difficult to replace if he  
 
decided to leave the Mill. Yet Gibson‟s professional view of the current state of the  
 
lead mines concurred with Stephenson, but his was more incisive as he wrote in his  
 
letter of 30
th
 August 1758: „If all the Mines were let at 1/6 Duty, a great deal more  
 
Ore would be rais‟d, hence a large Profit would result to our Master‟. He preceded  
 
this considered remark with an unequivocal statement that he was not expecting much  
 
ore at the Mill, unless it was bought in. It would seem his proposal was ignored; there  
 
is no evidence to suggest otherwise. 
 
  Gibson‟s desire to serve the Bowes estate, his conscientiousness, 
 
astuteness, general good qualities, and creative ability are exhibited in his three page  
 
report to Richard Stephenson of October 1758,
272
  and because of its content this  
 
document, encapsulating the very essence of the Bowes lead business in the mid- 
 
eighteenth century, ranks for the purposes of this thesis as probably the most  
 
historically significant in the Strathmore collection.. Gibson produced a detailed  
 
analysis of how Bowes could cut costs, reduce his exposure to risk, and improve  
 
profits by letting the mines at 1/6
th
 duty.
273
 This report was sent to Stephenson, but  
 
 in the sincere hope he would present it to Bowes, warrants some attention, because if  
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Bowes had adopted its contents it he would have wrought significant changes in his 
 
business strategy for lead. 
 
  Gibson‟s diagnosis of the condition of Bowes‟ lead interests in the  
 
late 1750s focused on two sources of the decline in production remarked upon by  
 
Stephenson in his letter to Gibson: the method of organisation; and Nathan Horn‟s  
 
management of the mines in his role as Bowes‟ long term, trusted mines steward. 
 
John Gibson‟s thoughtful and well-presented report analysed ore production at seven 
 
Mines during 1757: Lunehead, Closehouse, Arngill, Standards, Blackark, Green  
 
Mines, and Birkdale, and of these only Birkdale was owned and operated by Bowes  
 
under the direct management of  Horn. His observations demonstrated that at the same  
 
levels of production George Bowes would have increased his profit from £127 13s   
 
7 ½ d. to £200 8s ½d. if Birkdale, „reckon‟d the best Mine in the Lordship, Gibson  
 
remarked, had been let to some other adventurer(s) at the same 1/6
th
 duty ore as the  
 
other six mines. Gibson calculated a loss of £72 -15s at Birkdale, so consequently,  
 
and quite reasonably, deduced that  Bowes‟ „worst Mines would have been attended  
 
with a proportionable Loss, if they had been carried on p. Mr. Horne‟. 
 
  Gibson was forthright and scathing in his assessment of Nathan Horn‟s 
 
management, who he also believed was somewhat dilatory, over-salaried, and the root 
 
cause of  George Bowes‟ unnecessary expense at the mines. „The Mines are in a very  
 
poor condition, & „tis the unanimous opinion of such as are skill‟d in Minery, that  
 
they will never flourish, so long as Mr. Horne has the Direction. The small quantities  
 
of ore he raises are generally attended with a great deal more Expence than the ore is  
 
worth. But if all the Mines were let at 1/6
th
 duty, much more Ore would be raised, 
 
consequently no Loss, but a large Profit would result to our Master….‟.  Then 
 
concentrating on the loss to Bowes he wrote „I shall not pretend to calculate the Loss;  
 
only, shall observe that……..Ore at Lunehead, reckon‟d the far worse end of the  
 
Field, ….the neat Profit arising from. …Duty is £27… If the Paybills for several  
 
Years past were inspected, what was lost at the better End of the Field, where Mr.  
 
Horne was a Director would appear. Which would still be in favour of letting the  
 
Mines‟. Almost a year later, when Gibson sought instructions for lead carriage, 
 
he took the opportunity to mention his report analysing the mines. „Our Master, I  
 
suppose will be down shortly, if he is not already come, & then I hope you will lay  
 
before him the Difference between the Management of his Mines and letting them at  
 
1/6
th
 Duty‟. 274  It is not known if George Bowes received this report. 
 
In March 1761, three months after George Bowes died, John Gibson 
 
produced a sequel to his original report, written and presented in a similar manner to  
 
that of  October 1758, but with further detail and focusing on Birkdale  „as it is  
 
reckoned the best in the Lordship‟.275 Over the period of his profit and loss analysis,  
 
March 1757 to 7
th
 March 1761, he calculated that loss working Birkdale mine over the  
 
four years was £467, 3s, 7d. Gibson stated the loss „In driving Levels etc. at 
 
Blackark…‟ as £340, 7s,0d, which brought the „Loss at Birkdale  
 
Blackark………£807, 10s, 7d‟.  The report then compares working by letting  
 
Birkdale mine at one-sixth duty ore in a worst case scenario, i.e. where costs 
 
of working the mine in terms of pay and other expenses were assumed lower than  
 
would have been the case, thereby weighting the comparison in favour of working, 
 
and calculated that „The profit in favour of letting is……£9, 0, 0,‟. John Gibson‟s 
 
concluding remarks confirm that George Bowes must have either ignored his advice 
 
or had never seen the original analysis after Richard Stephenson received it in  
 
October 1758: „Tho‟ pretty large sums of Money are annually expended at the 
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 Mines, the Workmen in general complain of their Wages. And as so little ore is 
 
Raised; the Mines must either be bad, or, imprudently managed. Hence, it would be  
 
more safe and advantageous to let them at Duty‟.276 Nathan Horn is not mentioned  
 
anywhere in this report, with Gibson referring to the mismanagement of the mines  
 
thus inferring Horn‟s culpability. Nonetheless, George Bowes‟ lead mines were in an  
 
unhealthy condition during the late 1750‟, the years preceding his death, with even the  
 
potentially better mines operating at a loss.   
 
 
John Gibson was undoubtedly an asset to the underdeveloped Bowes  
 
lead business, but he was seriously undervalued, yet his continued to show  
 
indefatigable professionalism and loyalty. Previously he had assayed Birkdale  
 
and Lunehead ore „both for Lead and Silver, drew a Plan of a Smelt Mill, came up to  
 
the Mill several times while it was building………..& never had any  
 
consideration‟.277 Gibson was unhappy about the poor treatment he received.  
 
Subsequently, late in1757 he asked Stephenson to obtain Bowes‟ permission  
 
to rectify the situation. Gibson had written to Stephenson on 22
nd
 September 1757  
 
stating that unless Bowes gave him a salary of £20 per annum he wished to be  
 
discharged from service.
278
 Gibson raised the issue in his letter of 15
th
 February 1758,  
 
and again in his letter of 30
th
 August 1758 when he asked for a salary of  £20 per  
 
annum. Stephenson replied on the 27
th
 September stating that in his opinion George  
 
Bowes would not consider it „For as long as the Lead Mines are in such a declining  
 
state my Master will give out no Salarys but rather lessen them‟.279 He added 
„Without  
 
Flattery I think you a very fit person for the Business‟. The professional he was  
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 prevented him from leaving of his own volition, and he continued to provide detailed  
 
reports and accounts even after Bowes died in 1760. These documents appear to prove  
 
Gibson was correct in his assessment of Bowes‟ lead interests, and that either Bowes  
 
was never made aware of the Gibson report, and therefore continued along the same  
 
lines with Horn managing the whole operation in the field, or that he chose to ignore  
 
it. 
 
 
The monopsony – position of being sole buyer – that existed on  
 
the Bowes estate during the George Bowes‟ patriarchy was generally stipulated in the  
 
terms of  tacks, or short-term licenses, and leases that prevented the adventurers and  
 
miners from selling lead ore outside this artificial market. There were times when ore  
 
was exogenously sourced and bought in by Bowes agents, an activity operating within  
 
 
the local free market. Enforcing the terms of tacks and leases regulated the Bowes‟  
 
monopsony, and the development of  these legal arrangements as property rights 
 
for those engaged in an industrial process during the mid-eighteenth century warrants 
 
analysis as an indication of innovation, at least within the Bowes estate management  
 
system, which had both contemporary and longer term consequences for the  family‟s  
 
estate.  
 
The tacks, or short-term licenses of usually not more than a year for  
 
exploratory and prospecting work, and leases for longer-term mining can be  
 
categorised according to the characteristics of their structure, and there are a number  
 
of variations all largely determined by the Bowes‟ perception of any particular mine‟s  
 
potential, and the extent to which he intended to be directly involved. The main  
 
categories are as follows described by the common items in each case: 
 
1. Duty ore as a fraction of lessee(s) ore production, Bowes to have first call to 
buy the ore, and ore to be dressed „washed and merchantable‟ for smelting, 
and forfeiture criteria, but no money rent. 
 
2. As above and including provision of housing and equipment by Bowes. 
 
3. As in 1 above and including provision for Bowes to share costs of mining. 
 
4. As in 1 above, and including permission to install mining equipment, and 
possibly smelting facilities.  
 
5. As in 1 above and including Bowes as either a partner from outset or the 
option to take a share in the venture at will. 
 
 
There could also have been some degree of variation in the categories outlined above,  
 
but the key features of the different forms of tack and lease have been identified here.  
 
It must be emphasised that the primary function of tacks and leases was to establish  
 
the Bowes position as preferential buyer of washed and dressed lead ore, evidently a  
 
non-negotiable condition for lead mining on their estate . In this way Bowes  
 
 
controlled demand and dictated the price of ore at the mine, the price being a  
 
function of the Newcastle and London markets for smelted lead. George Bowes was a  
 
monopsonist in the lead production process on his estate, a role crystallised in legal  
 
form. In addition, it should be remembered that Bowes operated certain mines alone,  
 
as well as some in partnership, and the different partnerships will be examined below.  
 
The leases in which Bowes agreed to supply equipment, tools and buildings, assist in  
 
clarifying his role as a family capitalist investing in the growth of a rural industry  
 
aimed at exploiting the market for a metalliferrous product. George Bowes must be  
 
seen as capitalist, because his objective was to control the supply of lead ore and its  
 
smelting. 
 
  A comparative analysis of the tacks and leases is fundamental to  
 
understanding how Bowes refined their use as a management tool, indeed as a means  
 
of enforcement, in both the development of  the lessees‟ approach to lead mining  
 
through mining methods and the size of workforce, and the preparative work Bowes 
 
believed was required to preserve the value of the factor endowment bestowed upon  
 
his family. George Bowes saw greater potential for financial gain from lead  
 
production, and directed his agents and managers to exploit its existence throughout  
 
his estates in Upper Teesdale. He harnessed the enthusiasm of miners and non-miner  
 
adventurers, using them to carry out initial explorations and trial workings or to take  
 
on existing workings where leases had been forfeited either because money had run  
 
out or miners had vacated because they had not been paid. A forfeited lease could be  
 
renewed with the next group of optimistic adventurers willing to finance the risk and  
 
pay Bowes duty ore, and agree to other stipulations in a lease drawn up to minimise  
 
his risk of loss. The Bowes‟ lead mines were closely managed, and those not worked  
 
by Bowes himself were controlled using tacks and leases. The development of leases  
 
over time underpinned the organisational changes in lead mining that Bowes managed  
 
into place as a forerunner to increased capitalisation in the later eighteenth century.  
 
Leases and tack notes as indicators of the level of mining activity are discussed  
 
below, but their nature and characteristics as instruments of controlling lead  
 
production as a key component in developing the potential of Bowes estate are  
 
worthy of exploration because they are also a guide to his objective of achieving both  
 
horizontal and vertical integration in the production process. 
 
  There are two views of lead-mine leasing relevant to this study. Burt  
 
has argued that leasing by landowners in England and Wales during the eighteenth  
 
century was more usual than exploitation of their property, either because they were  
 
uninterested or averse to risking the costs of lead mining expansion beyond surface  
 
and shallower workings. Moreover, he suggests that „by the mid-eighteenth century a  
 
general lease of all minerals on a given property to one company was becoming  
 
unusual, even to the largest companies‟.280 Leases were granted by the vein, and often  
 
for separate sections of richer veins, and they defined long, narrow plots along the  
 
vein allowing, subject to the terms of the leases, adequate space for buildings and  
 
equipment to be installed. Lead mining leases were usually agreed for a term of  
 
twenty-one years; tacks for a year. The purpose of the mining lease was threefold: to  
 
obtain duty ore for the mineral lord which converted into income; to develop the  
 
owner‟s estate for future exploitation whilst simultaneously minimising damage or  
 
loss; and to ensure the lessees mined effectively. Burt also maintains that „only in  
 
Derbyshire and other districts where leases were regulated by local mining laws was  
 
there consistency over time‟ when it came to working the lead mines.281  
 
  In the North Pennines, Raistrick remarks that from the seventeenth 
 
century the granting of leases for larger areas of unexplored or little explored land 
 
became more common, but that this process was slower in Derbyshire because of 
 
local regulations. During the eighteenth century, however, Raistrick argues that the 
 
use of smaller tracts or meers along the veins, as described above, restricted the 
 
growth in scale of lead mining, which caused the movement toward area leases, and 
 
cites the London Lead Company as the prime example of this trend because it took  
 
many leases from the Greenwich Hospital to achieve control on Alston Moor.
282
 
 
 
The form and characteristics of earlier leases must be taken as a  
 
prerequisite for a comparative analysis that proves the George Bowes regime  
 
introduced extensive changes to their nature. The development of leases over time  
 
underpinned the organisational changes in lead mining that Bowes managed into  
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place as a forerunner to increased capitalisation in the later eighteenth century. Leases  
 
and tack notes as indicators of the level of mining activity are discussed below, but  
 
their nature and characteristics as instruments of controlling lead production as a key  
 
component in developing the potential of Bowes estate are worthy of exploration  
 
because they are also a guide to his objective of achieving both horizontal and vertical  
 
integration in the production process. In a broader sense a comparative analysis of the  
 
leases before and during George Bowes‟ patriarchy offers further insight into the  
 
economic importance of lead, his business attitude, and business planning in this  
 
particular extractive industry. 
  
During period 1657 to 1712 the Bowes family began to recognise the  
 
potential value of lead to the estate and need to safeguard the family‟s wealth, but the  
 
use of the mining lease as a means of controlling all aspects of lead production was  
 
very limited. The granting of only eight leases cannot be perceived as lift-off stage in  
 
the expansion of lead production. Tacks and leases were basic with some variations  
 
in wording, but lessees had considerable freedom from Bowes management; there  
 
was no template for the growth of a structured lead industry.  Bowes‟ estate  
 
management was passive, showing indifference to the inherent value of lead. This  
 
aspect of the estate management culture remained unchanged until the late 1730s. 
 
Between 1738 and 1760 George Bowes granted leases to lead mining 
 
adventurers and miners as well as operating his own mines, all managed by his  
 
stewards. These leases were the basis of his interest in developing lead production,  
 
and their wording is further evidence of how seriously it was taken compared to the 
 
previous two centuries. Various aspects of the business are revealed in these tacks and  
 
leases, including Bowes‟ direct involvement usually in partnership and with financial  
 
input, how he controlled the actual mining operations in terms of methods and  
 
management, and specific strategic points in the process of lead production relating to  
 
the getting and smelting of ore. 
 
  Initially, most concern was given to the level of duty ore paid to  
 
Bowes. Consequently, tighter control of the weight and measurement of ore which 
 
the lessees extracted were highlighted in the leases granted to prevent deception and  
 
theft, and to avoid financial loss. There are two examples of this in leases of 1738,  
 
which at outset were in the form of tack notes. In April 1738 Thomas Taden and  
 
Jonathan Watson & Co. agreed to pay one-seventh bing of ore as duty to Bowes, the  
 
method and measurement of weighing stated clearly.
283
 The tack note was also very  
 
specific in clarifying the geographic boundaries of lead mining, which focused on  
 
the small area around Wemmergill and Arngill. Later that year a tack note was  
 
granted with an option for a seven year lease to John Longstaff & Co. „to work lead  
 
ore from the East Graine of Mirgill Beck down the beck to Mase Beck, up Mase Beck 
 
to the Birk Sike Foot, up the sike to the top of Mickle Fell and east to the East Graine  
 
of Mirgill Beck ….‟. Again, measuring the ore obtained was the key point; Bowes  
 
was to receive one-sixth of a bing „at the Bingstead Each Bing containing sixty fore 
 
stones the weight of the pokes or sacks excluded‟.284  Bowes accepted that the 
apparent  
 
potential might not be realised, that the option to extend the term of the initial tack  
 
could prove worthless to all concerned, but he was determined to ensure he received  
 
at least his share of any short-term gain without risk and limiting mining operations to  
 
very specific areas of his estate. 
 
  Then, in 1740 John Dent „made a Discovery to George Bowes Esq. of 
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     mea-Hill. 
Leadmines and Load Oar being and remaining at a certain place called Isobel mae hill 
 
in the parish of Romaldkirk in the County of York‟.285 This was a significant 
 
discovery, and for the first time George Bowes became directly involved. He granted  
 
Dent a seven-year lease and agreed he could have a quarter share of this mine. The  
 
lease does not show any involvement of an agent on behalf of George Bowes, which  
 
was normal practice for those of lesser importance. Instead Bowes‟ signature appears  
 
above that of John Dent at the foot of the agreement, which includes the following  
 
specific terms: before Dent received his quarter share, one sixth of every bing of lead  
 
ore „washed and merchantable oar‟, was to be deducted as duty ore for Bowes; Dent  
 
was to pay one quarter of all the costs and was not permitted to dispose of  any part of  
 
his share to anyone without giving preference to Bowes; and George Bowes alone  
 
would decide where the ore would go for smelting and refining, including Dent‟s  
 
share.  
 
  In summary, Dent‟s lease, although classed as a lead mining lease  
 
served a dual purpose. It was a partnership agreement with clearly stated financial  
 
obligations combined with the more usual terms of a lead mine lease of this period.  
 
Bowes was to pay three-quarters of the costs, but received one-sixth duty ore  
 
regardless. In other words, Dent received almost twenty-one per cent, after the  
 
deduction of duty ore, but had to pay twenty-five per cent of costs. George Bowes  
 
dictated the price Dent could obtain for his share of the lead ore if it was to be sold  
 
rather than smelted, and the site of smelting of all ore from “Isabel mae hill” would  
 
also be decided by Bowes. Thus, George Bowes controlled ownership, the production  
 
process, and ultimately the profit. The best Dent could do was to negotiate an  
 
acceptable price for ore from Bowes‟ mine steward, and operate the mine to fully  
                                                 
285
  D/St/B/15 lease dated 25
th
 September 1740 between George Bowes and John Dent, a yeoman of  
     Dufton, Westmoreland. 
 exploit its potential in the hope that ore would appear in volume. 
 
  That George Bowes made a timely decision to become directly  
 
involved in lead was proved by the history of lead ore output at Isabell-mea- hill  
 
mine. Although it may have been that he initially regretted having a partner with  
 
whom he must share profit, the burden was short-lived because Dent died in 1742 and  
 
Bowes only paid his widow a fixed amount of £20 per annum and he became sole  
 
owner. Overall production and productivity is discussed below, but it is suggested that  
 
Isabell-mea- hill‟s potential acted as the spur for George Bowes to consider and plan  
 
the development of lead production rather than allow it to continue on a haphazard  
 
basis to the possible detriment of the Bowes‟ estate, and suffer a lost opportunity to  
 
further bolster his family‟s wealth. The discovery of lead at Isabell-mea-Hill signified  
 
the demise of more than a century of passive management, and the end of the 
 
transition to active management of mineral exploitation on the Bowes estate. 
 
   
Consequently, in 1741 Bowes granted a twenty-one year lease to  
 
William Horn, Edward Rain, Thomas Horn, William Robinson, and Will Robson for  
 
one-fifth duty ore, but with particularly strong stipulations.
286
 Again, this lease 
marries  
 
business structure with the conditions of mining, where the lessees‟ shares encompass  
 
fifty per cent of ownership and costs, and George Bowes holds fifty per cent. This  
 
lease, in effect a partnership pay-share agreement, housed the terms giving Bowes  
 
control over every aspect of the mine‟s future. George Bowes had „the  
 
Refusal of the Oar to smelt at my Mill at the Market Price‟.  In addition, the lessees  
 
must „agree to my having a full moiety, or share of the said Lead Myne if I think it  
 
proper to demand it‟ and „This Grant to be void if the lessees fix their Bounder shaft  
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 any ways within two miles of the present workings at Isabell May hills‟. Any partner  
 
who failed to pay his share of costs for six months would lose his share to the other  
 
partners, and if the partners ceased operations for two consecutive months for any  
 
reason other than extreme weather conditions, the agreement would be void. Lastly,  
 
no partner could dispose of his share without  George Bowes‟ permission. 
 
In 1744 a ten-year lease was granted to mine lead at Closehouse vein,  
 
adjoining the Arngill vein, in return for one-sixth bing duty ore, and containing a  
 
clause giving George Bowes the preference to buy „the ore that shall be good‟. It was  
 
not created in the same detail as the leases mentioned above, and was agreed by  
 
steward William Horn on behalf of Bowes. Clearly, its potential must not have  
 
warranted, at this stage anyway, the parameters already outlined for Isabell-mae-Hill  
 
and Long Crag, but it gave Bowes the economic rent of duty ore and the status of  
 
preferential purchaser of better quality lead ore.
287
 
 
A lease of 1746 provides an example of another development in the 
 
in their use by George Bowes as a business implement to accelerate ore production.  
 
This was granted to Charles Wensley to mine lead at Level Head for seven years,  
 
from Lunehead west to Silverkellwell, for which George Bowes would receive one- 
 
fifth of the ore.
288
 Exact measurements as to where work could be done were quite  
 
common, but deadlines regarding progress where not, whereby failure to meet the  
 
agreed deadlines would lead to the lessee forfeiting half of the area worked, and the  
 
remainder could also be lost if work did not continue with a certain number of men 
 
constantly employed. Of course the lessee could only remove the ore for smelting 
 
after deducting that due to Bowes, and after any other costs had been met – no risk 
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to Bowes whatsoever. Here are extracts from the lease which highlight the details of  
 
management and accountability: 
 
„…Two hundred yards on ye South side of the present Vein, and Two Hundred 
 
yards on the northside of the Vein, with leave for water courses and to erect Hovells 
 
or Hutts….for the use of the work carry‟d on……and to carry off such quantities of  
 
Ore as he shall get & to dispose of the same as he shall think fit leaving one Fifth part 
 
Of the ore…..clean washed & merchantable as Duty to…G.B. Esq. clear of all  
 
charges thereto…….Wensley shall not remove ….any ore without giving notice to the  
 
said Geo.Bowes Esq…….and the said Charles Wensley further convenants & agrees  
 
to drive 20 fathoms to the Sun from the above Levelhead on or before Martinmas  
 
1747, & 20 Fathoms further to the Sun on or before Martinmas 1748, and on Failure  
 
of Driving either of the said 20 Fathoms within ye Times abovementioned then this  
 
agreement  to cease………And it is further covenanted & agreed that if in the third  
 
year of this agreemt the said Charles Wensley do not drive 20 Fathoms now to the  
 
Sun in the sd Levell the 200 yards granted above on the southside of the vein to  
 
Be forfeited………..but the liberty to work the old vein with 200 yards to the North of  
 
it shall be continued for the whole term of seven years, so as that he keep constantly at  
 
work at least four men…. 
 
  Charles Wensley covenants to leave the Shaft and Levell in good  
 
repair at ye expiration of the Term, & George Bowes Esq. to have the liberty to drive  
 
drifts or water courses through any part of the premises above granted‟.289 
 
  Clearly the terms of this first lease with Charles Wensley at Lunehead  
 
are comparatively strict, and suggest that Bowes was keen to make better progress in  
 
this area within a specific timescale. Consequently, the lessee was granted a broader 
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range of terms, including liberty to install equipment, create watercourses for ore  
 
preparation, construct buildings for storage, and housing for miners, but the method of  
 
operation was dictated by specific conditions including distances for sinking and  
 
driving, target dates for mining progress, and forfeitures related to under performance 
 
during the period of lease. George Bowes strove to develop the system of mining at  
 
Lunehead and offered a lease to promote this aim. In this instance he appears to have 
 
neither guaranteed preferential purchaser status, nor direction as to smelting, whereas 
 
control of mining, and therefore the workforce, were paramount. 
 
  The relationship with Wensley developed from 1751 into a partnership   
 
at another mine in the Lunehead area, Rowton Syke, where in 1752 George Bowes  
 
granted Wensley a twenty-one year lease at a rent of one-sixth of the lead 
recovered.
290
  
 
The wording of the lease concentrates on the development of the mine‟s potential and  
 
refers not only to George Bowes, but to his heirs, executors  and administrators, such  
 
was the potential value of this mine to the Bowes estate. 
 
  Wensley was permitted to build lodgings for the miners, erect 
 
„gins and engines‟ and „smelting houses and drills‟ for „the manufacturing of the  
 
said Lead Oar and Mineralls‟. He was also granted „wayleave and passage‟ to and  
 
from the mines and mills. There were several other very specific stipulations: at least 
 
six men had to be employed at any time; work must not cease for more than twenty  
 
days, an then only because of heavy snow or lack of water; all losses, damages, and  
 
accidents were Wensley‟s liability; accounts must be kept and precise measurements  
 
used in weighing the ore  in „bings, sacks, pokes‟; every aspect of the mine was open 
 
to inspection by George Bowes, his agent, a steward, or an overman; all ore was to be  
 
„washed and dressed‟ and must not be removed without Bowes having the choice of  
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 ore as preferential buyer, effectively preventing Wensley from selling to anyone else;  
 
and shafts were to be open and well timbered. The duty ore was one-sixth of ore  
 
mined, and although there is no mention of Bowes having direction over where the  
 
ore would be smelted, Wensley was given the liberty to build smelting houses  
 
contrary to earlier leases, and if Bowes avoided the responsibility of smelting he could  
 
avoid carriage costs. Hence the wayleave granted to Wensley in this lease. There is no  
 
evidence that Wensley did smelt lead near the mine, but Bollihope was out of  
 
commission and Bowes did not commence building a smelt mill near the mines until  
 
1756. 
 
 
The potential for lead mining at Rowton Syke mine was undoubtedly  
 
considered relatively good , consequently the lease aimed at maximising gain for  
 
Bowes whilst simultaneously protecting the future of the mine for his estate and its  
 
heirs. Wensley was prohibited from selling any part of his one-fifth share without  
 
George Bowes having first option to buy. Consequently, Bowes controlled the future  
 
of the mine and the purchase of the ore during the term of the lease.. 
 
  The lease granted for lead mining at Rowton Syke was echoed in that  
 
between George Bowes and a partnership of adventurers in 1755 for Green Mines,  
 
and Quorgill and Langstaff hushes.
291
  The additional point included was the 
 
permission to take peat for fuel used for heating and in the smelting process. At this  
 
stage in his experience with lead, George Bowes leaves us with the impression that he 
 
had undergone a learning process; compared to the late 1730s leases were more  
 
sophisticated. It is not clear, however, whether this learning curve brought Bowes to  
 
the conclusion that there was potentially huge profit in the lead business, or that he 
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 simply sought closer control of lessees and he was becoming disinterested. This  
 
would signal a return to passive management of lead production. 
 
  Tack notes with options for longer-term leases were considered equally 
 
important in terms of potential lead ore output and the development of the Bowes‟  
 
estate. One such license agreed with a Mr. Cradock in the mid-eighteenth  
 
century for Green Mines, Toddy Gill and Langstaff Hush, specified the areas of land  
 
involved, and stated that if at least four men did not work during the year, then the 
 
lease was forfeited.
292
 Another tack note in 1755, with an option for 20 or 21 years, 
 
between Bowes and Thomas Pierse of Pierseburgh, for an area of land on Mickle  
 
Fell, and another, which became known as Nichol Hopple Yard, contained specific  
 
measurements, which were to be marked out by Nathan Horn, George Bowes‟ mines  
 
steward, as were „Founder shafts‟.293  The tack note would have become void if the  
 
option to extend was not taken up during the first year, or if work ceased for one  
 
month, or if four men were not constantly employed. Again, Bowes had the  
 
preference to buy the lead ore at „the County price‟, the ore was to be washed and  
 
dressed ready for smelting, and the duty ore was one-sixth. The fact that the  
 
license was personally drafted by George Bowes is an indication of how seriously he  
 
viewed the lead business, and the significance placed upon the use of tack notes  
 
leading to longer term mining operations. 
 
  Leases and tack notes made during the late1750‟s were drafted in very  
 
brief form. A further agreement was made with Charles Wensley in 1757 for the sole  
 
purpose of Bowes or his agents buying Wensley‟s ore from Lunehead “at a price  
 
determined by them”.294 Another tack was granted in 1756, with an option for a  
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further twenty years, to Samuel Bacon and James Collinson for Standards mine.
295
 
 
A nine-year lease was created in   1757 between Bowes and John Robson, Peter  
 
Allinson and partners, with wording similar to that of the lease with Thomas Pierse  
 
for Nichol Hopple Yard.
296
 
 
  In August 1756 a memorandum of an agreement for mining lead and 
 
copper at Blacksike, “Nickle hopping yard”, White Pitts, and Silverkellwell, which 
 
Bowes had leased from the Earl of Thanet, was signed by George Tissington, a  
 
member of the Derbyshire mining family, and Nathan Horn on behalf of Bowes.
297
  
 
There followed a lease for twenty-one years in September 1756, which referred to  
 
areas of Mickle Fell, and the mine workings at “Nickle Hopple Yard” .298  
 
Essentially, the wording is very similar to the lease with Pierse, requiring one-sixth  
 
of the lead and copper ore as duty, and giving Bowes preference to purchase the ore at  
 
the County price. It was clearly stipulated that Tissington and his partners were  
 
forbidden to build a smelt mill, because Bowes was in the throes of building a new  
 
mill at Wemmergill. It would appear, too, that Bowes agreed to the assignment of his  
 
lease on Silverkellwell, the only lead mining lease in the Strathmore Papers where he  
 
was lessee and not owner, but which at this stage had proved unproductive.  
 
  The agreements for mining at Silverkellwell mine tell the story of  
 
George Bowes as lead mining adventurer attempting to extract ore under a lease  
 
granted by another landowning mineral lord , initially reacting in a dissatisfied  
 
manner to the proposed terms, and wishing to avoid taking a dose of his own  
 
medicine. Bowes‟s solicitor advised him to question various points relating to the  
 
number of miners and how often they would be paid, as well as querying the  
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measurements of the working area on the Earl of Thanet‟s Westmoreland estate.299  
 
Typically, Bowes connived to obtain the best terms he could negotiate. Eventually, he  
 
accepted a twenty-one year lease whereby one-seventh of the ore would go to the Earl  
 
of Thanet, with a £5 penalty for every bing of ore Bowes removed before the ore was  
 
divided up accordingly between him and Thanet. The lease was very specific as to  
 
how Bowes must operate the mine, including the production of quarterly accounts.
300
 
 
  The developing form of the Bowes estate tacks and leases during the  
 
mid-eighteenth century presents an alternative pattern of mining organisation to those 
  
discovered by both Burt and Raistrick & Jennings described earlier in this chapter.  
 
The Bowes estate did not grant a lease to any particular lead mining company, and  
 
there was not a tendency to let large areas of land. 
   
The size of working tracts, the physical basis of mining organisation,  
 
stated in tacks and leases granted by George Bowes varied greatly. At Isabell-mea- 
 
Hill in 1740 it was 800 yard by 200 yards from the first shaft.
301
 In 1746 at Level  
 
Head, Lunehead, it was an area for searching and digging for lead with breadth  
 
measurements of 200 yards either side of the existing vein.
302
 The length at Rowton  
 
Sike in 1751 was 600 yards east to west either side of the existing shaft, or 200  
 
yards in breadth.
303
 The tract granted at Green Mines in 1755 was 1000 by 400  
 
yards,
304
 and at Nichol Hopple Yard 800 by 200 yards.
305
 In 1756 Bowes granted 
1000  
 
by 400 yards at Nichol Hopple Yard, Black Sike, and White Pitts, and 2000 by 800  
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 yards at Silverkellwell.
306
 These tracts or meers were in complete contrast to the  
 
standard measurement on Alston Moor of 1200 by 80 yards in the eighteenth  
 
century.
307
 In Swaledale it was usually 30 yards by up to 200 yards, and in Derbyshire  
 
28-32 yards by 14 yards wide.
308
 Although there is a feint similarity to measurements  
 
used on Alston Moor, those employed by the Bowes estate were granted according to  
 
local conditions; the nature of mineralisation, the landscape, proximity of existing  
 
workings, and perhaps the financial capabilities of the lessees. The absence of  
 
uniformity in this facet of tacks and leases points to small scale mining, an  
 
indifference, or more likely an objection to, leasing larger areas of his lead bearing  
 
land for a royalty to either a bigger regional or national concern, and to George  
 
Bowes‟ ideas of discovering the longer term potential of the family estate.  
 
  A royalty or duty ore was an essential commercial element in any  
 
mining lease. The most common royalty or duty ore in Bowes tacks and leases was  
 
one-sixth of the ore produced and dressed ready for sale or smelting. This level of  
 
duty ore became standard from the early 1740s, and there are only a very few  
 
examples of one-seventh, one-eighth, and one-fifth, and no evidence of money rent or  
 
fixed sum royalties. In the late 1750s the Bowes John Gibson, the smelt mill manager, 
 
expressed a view on the use of duty ore as an incentive to increasing output of ore,  
 
and this is examined below. Again, this appears to be in contrast to other mining  
 
areas. In discussing this key element of mining leases, Raistrick notes that during the  
 
eighteenth century it was between one-fifth and one twenty-fourth in Derbyshire,  
 
one-fifth at Grassington Moor, one-ninth in Swaledale, between a fifth and a seventh 
 
on Alston Moor before 1764, one-fifth in Weardale, and one fifth north of the River  
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309
 In the North Pennine districts duty ore appears to have been comparatively  
 
steady between one-sixth and one-eighth, when in other areas there was a downward  
 
trend as mining became deeper requiring more capital input.
310
 The level of duty ore  
 
for lead mining on the Bowes estate does not appear to have changed regardless of 
 
market conditions in the period 1740-60. George Bowes‟ leases and tacks reflect his 
 
stance on the opportunity of increasing his income from mineral wealth in the form of 
 
lead on the estate in Upper Teesdale. It is also probable, as Burt has noted, that at this  
 
stage in the development of lead extraction  in the mid-eighteenth century, much of  
 
the ore Bowes was more readily accessible because it was shallower. Consequently, 
 
lessees and miners agreed to one-sixth because they were not under the financial  
 
pressures brought by deeper mining from the late eighteenth century.
311
 Any change  
 
in the terms of leases for duty ore would most probably have come in response to  
 
costs, otherwise the mineral lord could find himself with dormant lead mines where  
 
any previous capital investment was depreciating and the estate income falling, and  
 
with less potential for further development and exploration. 
 
   
 
The management of mining activity on the Bowes estate 
during the  
 
mid-eighteenth century was problematic in that it could be intermittent, usually small-  
 
scale, and adventurers and miners tended to have a short-term view of lead mining if  
 
for no other reason than lack of capital for deeper mining. Consequently, the Bowes  
 
stewards dealt with a high degree of uncertainty in managing those taking risks in lead  
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mining. The logistics of developing lead production was akin to herding squirrels;  
 
both lessees and miners employed by Bowes had to be inveigled into working  
 
according to the terms of bargains, tacks, and leases. At the beginning of the 1740s  
 
the form of management was relatively slack, primarily because the nascent lead  
 
mining and smelting on Bowes land did not demand such attention. The strategy  
 
for growth introduced by George Bowes had three basic features; it was businesslike,  
 
regulated, and longer term than at anytime before. The Bowes lead business was  
 
small-scale and regional compared to that of the London Lead Company, which had a  
 
national presence but based in the North Pennines. During the eighteenth century the  
 
London Lead Company employed a hierarchy of agents under a general agent, and  
 
they were trained specialists in mining, washing and preparation of ore, and smelting.  
 
They had defined authority in their roles and were responsible for enforcing a culture  
 
of longer term planning contrary to the small-scale short term thinking of most miners  
 
and adventurers of the time.
312
 The Blackett-Beaumont enterprise, a regional business,  
 
had a chief agent in Newcastle with clerical subordinates for the general management  
 
of mining, smelting, transport, and lead sales. This family business consisted of three  
 
areas, East and West Allendale, and Weardale, with mining, smelting, and refining  
 
each overseen by individual agents. At each mine there were a number of assistant  
 
agents, for inspecting the mines,  ore preparation, and record keeping.
313
 
 
 The numbers of mines and size of workforce on the Bowes  
 
estate did not warrant numerous managers and agents, but George Bowes realised the  
 
need for a team of specialist stewards for the purpose of bringing his plan for lead to  
 
fruition. The system of management he installed during the process of reorganisation  
 
was fundamental to later stages of development in the lead industry in Upper  
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 Teesdale. What can be concluded from this discussion of management, mindset, and  
 
monopsony? 
 
  George Bowes inherited an estate management structure that appears  
 
devoid of endogenous specialist stewards for lead production. Nathan Horn and John 
 
Gibson were introduced into specific roles as the need arose, but there is no evidence  
 
of them being trained for their tasks within the Bowes system. The lead business on  
 
the Bowes estate did not warrant more sophisticated practice, but within the estate 
  
the arrival of mining and smelting managers was innovative. 
 
  Horne‟s experience was essential in the 1740s, but he was limited in  
 
his approach to management because he was a dyed-in-the wool miner lacking  
 
broader vision of the lead production process and resistant to change. His attitude  
 
towards management was based on self-preservation, ruthlessness, uncompromising  
 
behaviour, arrogance, and fear of any change that would result in him losing control  
 
of the mining area.  By 1760 he had become a liability to the expansion of lead output  
 
on the Bowes estate, and it may have been that his honesty was in question. In  
 
complete contrast, Gibson was an asset and clearly had the capacity to manage  
 
change. He was self-less, professional, and devoted to the Bowes family and  
 
their strategy for lead on the estate. 
 
The stewards managing lead production were involved in recruiting  
 
miners and adventurers, but the short-term outlook of these small-scale risk takers  
 
did not change before 1760. There was a good chance that, had Gibson‟s strategy  
 
been adopted, a cultural change in lead mining would have begun in the late 1750s. 
   
George Bowes himself and the senior stewards failed to recognise the value of  
 
Gibson‟s analysis of the lead business, and instead persisted with Horne‟s  
 
approach for two decades. Their failure to initiate a change in organisation and  
 management had adverse consequences for profit and estate development. This  
 
contradicts Oldroyd‟s argument that the Bowes estate was productive and efficient as  
 
a result of the management structure using accounts, certainly as far a the lead aspect  
 
of the estate is concerned. Information was shared and accounts were kept, which  
 
gave a professional edge to management, but the Bowes lead business was not  
 
consistently productive or efficient. George Bowes and his senior stewards failure to 
 
act decisively and reorganise with a different management approach meant that lead 
 
production was in a state of inertia, and was to remain so for many years. 
 
Tacks and leases granted by George Bowes gave him preferential  
 
buyer status - monopsony; in effect he was the sole purchaser of lead ore, and  
 
contributed as little a possible by way of incentive towards lead production from  
 
either lessees or miners at his own mines. George Bowes, with the assistance of his  
 
stewards and solicitors, developed the use of the mining lease during the mid- 
 
eighteenth century, raising it from a basic form of agreement whereby the lessee(s)  
 
had considerable liberty to find lead ore upon which he generally had first option, to a  
 
much stricter form that incorporated specific instructions about the actual mining  
 
operation. The common factor of duty ore aside, Bowes controlled lead ore extraction  
 
by employing the lease as a management tool which his mines steward and other field  
 
agents could wield in their work to organise systematic lead mining. In this way he  
 
managed to monopolise the demand for ore and supply his smelt mills with the raw  
 
material needed for the manufacturing of metallic lead, pig lead for market.  
 
Furthermore, by creating an organised industry lead mining industry on his estate,  
 
Bowes began the process of eradicating its longstanding casual and haphazard nature,  
 
which was conducive to both the conservation and future development of the estate.  
 
Ultimately however, it seems that the market conditions for lead were the invisible  
 influence on how and when different forms of tack note or lease would be employed,  
 
perhaps most easily observed in the late 1750s when tack notes with options to extend  
 
the term became more prominent in an effort to continue exploration and trial mines  
 
in places already identified as potential sources of lead ore and which could become  
 
more viable at a later date. The letting strategy adopted during the1750s suggests that  
 
management of the lead mines became progressively more passive, but that the  
 
process of cultivating lead production was kept alive by granting tacks and leases  
 
even when demand waned.  
 
  Lastly, it is evident that the Bowes estate did behave as a firm; its 
 
behaviour was determined by George Bowes as entrepreneur, who organised the 
 
stewards for the purpose of exploiting lead, planned strategically, introduced working 
 
capital, and generally directed the use of resources on the estate. Although the market  
 
price of lead in Newcastle was largely beyond his control, he seems to have employed 
 
it as the gauge for setting the price of ore mined on his estate, wages, carriage costs  
 
and the price of bought in ore. „A firm, therefore, consists of the system of  
 
relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent  
 
on an entrepreneur‟.314 The role of George Bowes is examined in greater detail below  
 
in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter  5: The Mineral, the Mines, and the Men 
 
 
Historians of the extractive industries have long held the view that lead production in  
 
the Teesdale area of the Northern Pennines was relatively insignificant, if not almost  
 
non-existent, until the arrival of the London Lead Company during the latter part of  
 
the eighteenth century when large-scale mining and smelting began in earnest.
315
   
 
Indeed, there are documents in the Strathmore Papers that confirm the London Lead  
 
Company leased mines south of the River Tees in 1771.
316
 One historian has 
remarked  
 
that in the eighteenth century „Teesdale was worked by numerous small groups about  
 
whom little information has survived‟.317  Another, referring to the activities of the  
 
London Lead Company, states „the Teesdale mines with their centre at Middleton,  
 
experienced an industrial revolution‟.318  
 
Both academic and local historians have focused their attention on the 
 
more Northern Pennine valleys of the rivers Wear, Derwent, and Allen, where lead  
 
mining and its related activities are said to have prospered. Consequently, there have  
 
been several studies which demonstrate their economic importance during the  
 
eighteenth century when Britain was probably the biggest lead producing country in  
 
Europe, and the northern Pennine dales were the main area of lead mining
319
.  In  
 
Weardale, for example, ventures were both more extensive and financially rewarding  
 
meeting the demands of the Newcastle market and trade in lead from the River Tyne.  
 
It was in Allendale, where the mining rights were owned, and Weardale, where lead  
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mines were leased from the Bishop of Durham, that the Blackett -Beaumont  
 
family developed one of the largest lead-mining concerns of this period. 
320
 Raistrick  
 
& Jennings remark upon the „steady development‟ of the Weardale mines during the  
 
eighteenth century in terms of deeper shafts and technology, whereas lead mining in  
 
Teesdale was „slow to develop‟ with „little record of much work being done‟.321 In  
 
the 1850‟s the Blackett-Beaumonts and the London Lead Company together still  
 
represented almost seventy per cent of total lead-mining output in the North Pennine  
 
orefield.
322
 
 
  The significance of lead production in the northeast economy is  
 
underlined by the amount of lead and manufactured lead shipped out of Newcastle  
 
and Stockton-on-Tees during the eighteenth century, which rather interestingly  
 
reveals Stockton as more important for lead only, with Newcastle more important for  
 
manufactured lead, during the period from 1705 until the late 1760‟s.323  Lead exports  
 
from Stockton in 1755/6 were double those in 1725/6, but fell by almost a quarter  
 
between 1755/6 and 1770. Newcastle‟s trade in lead was approximately four-fifths of  
 
Stockton‟s in 1705, but grew by almost the same rate until 1755/6, but then grew  
 
exponentially between the mid-1750s and 1770. 
324
 There is currently no 
quantification  
 
of contributions to this trade from different producers in the region.  
 
  In summary, if the lead mines and mills of Teesdale   
 
contributed to lead production in the North Pennine orefield, very little is known  
 
about it in the period before the late eighteenth century. There are few sources of  
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 statistical evidence that shed some light on the level of activity in lead production  
 
during the eighteenth century in Teesdale. K.C. Dunham‟s study of lead production in  
 
the North Pennines concentrates on the records of the London Lead Company and the  
 
Blackett-Beaummont enterprise, but does not identify output from Teesdale during  
 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
325
 The amounts of lead noted above that were  
 
traded through the two main ports of Newcastle and Stockton, particularly the latter,  
 
suggest that pig lead smelted from ore extracted in Teesdale was a constituent part.  
 
The London Lead Company output in Teesdale before 1771 was derived from mines  
 
and mills north of the River Tees, whereas the Bowes‟ lead was extracted from their  
 
Upper Teesdale estate south of the River Tees, when this river was the boundary  
 
between County Durham and the North Riding of Yorkshire. Any reference to a  
 
regional industrial revolution, aforementioned, in terms of generating economic  
 
growth and its attendant characteristics, could apply to London Lead Company  
 
activities on Alston Moor and Upper Teesdale north of the Tees, but there is no  
 
evidence as yet that such a phenomenon occurred on Bowes lands south of the Tees.  
 
There are scant references to the possibility of lead production on the Bowes estate  
 
during the period of George Bowes‟ patriarchy, mainly in narratives of industrial  
 
archaeology, but even these do not demonstrate a direct connection with the Bowes  
 
estate, nor do they provide details of ownership, organisation, investment or trade  
 
leading to the development of a structured and profitable lead business.
326
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Teesdale lead in the eighteenth century must account for some of the 
 
lead production leaving northeastern ports, probably mainly out of Stockton, as a raw  
 
material for manufacture elsewhere in Britain or Europe, but that it does not appear to  
 
bring about lead manufacturing in Stockton.  Newcastle, on the other hand, was a  
 
manufacturing centre as well as port trading in lead, but at first sight does not appear  
 
as the natural geographical outlet for Teesdale lead. The contribution of Bowes  
 
estate lead mines and smelt mills to the level of production and trade both regionally  
 
and nationally have been unknown quantities. 
 
  In 1722, after more than a century of relative inertia in lead production  
 
and its trade, the Bowes estate came into the possession of George Bowes following  
 
the deaths of his two elder brothers William, in 1721, and Thomas, in 1722. His  
 
patriarchy proved to be the only instance of a Bowes male beneficiary who, in  
 
complete contrast to his descendants, conscientiously exploited the potential of the  
 
family estate until his death in 1760. Coal was evidently the most abundant and  
 
profitable mineral on the Bowes estates before, during, and after George Bowes‟  
 
lifetime. Consequently, coal affairs placed a huge demand upon his business and  
 
political activities, both in London and the northeast. National and local histories  
 
reflect his status as a coal magnate and member of the Grand Alliance which  
 
dominated the north east coal industry and the coastal trade to London during the  
 
eighteenth century, although even these have not revealed the full extent of his role.
327
   
 
Despite the scale of his coal interests, from the late 1720s George Bowes became  
 
involved in the exploitation of the other high value mineral found under the family  
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 lands – lead.   
 
    
This examination of the growth in lead mining on the Bowes‟ estate in  
 
Upper Teesdale aims to address a number of questions. How were the lead veins  
 
discovered, and can a level of geological knowledge be established? Where were the  
 
lead mines located? How and to what extent were the mines developed? What was  
 
the nature of mining technology, and did the Bowes introduce any new methods?  
 
How was lead mining financed and organised the under the Bowes regime, and what  
 
was the range of Bowes‟ direct involvement in the extraction of lead? Can Bowes lead  
 
production be quantified for this period? What was size of the mining labour force  
 
and was mining  a seasonal activity? Is it possible to estimate labour productivity?  
 
Before proceeding with the analysis of records for the year 1729 to 1760 in an attempt  
 
to answer the aforementioned questions, a brief outline of the lead industry‟s national  
 
and regional setting into which George Bowes ventured is essential to the discussion  
 
that follows. 
 
  
  There is a long established view that the quickening development of  
 
the lead industry began in the late seventeenth century and continued throughout the  
 
eighteenth century. Burt has argued that the most rapid expansion was in the 1690s  
 
and early 1700s, a consequence of the termination of the Mines Royal monopoly, the  
 
diffusion of improved mining technology, the lack of alternative sources for capital  
 
investment, the growth in house building, and the growth in overseas trade.
328
 He  
 
estimated lead production at 28,000 tons in 1705/6, and growing to 59,000 tons in  
 
1769/70.
329
  Blanchard‟s work reinforces Burt‟s view, but introduces the removal 
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of restrictive practices in lead mining as causal to a „new expansionary phase‟ after 
 
1670.
330
 Blanchard asserts that the production boom was extinguished by 1760, a 
 
consequence of  „resource depletion problems‟ and the failure of technology  
 
to alleviate these problems. The 1750s „witnessed the end of an era‟ in lead  
 
production, and although seventy-five per cent of production was exported during  
 
this decade, it was the beginning of „the final production cycle of the English  
 
industry‟.331  In terms of production by volume “lead was second only to iron  
 
…….among the metals” and “by the late eighteenth century Britain was probably the  
 
leading lead producer in the world”.332 There was a demand for lead; lucrative 
markets  
 
to be exploited within the North East
333
, in London
334
, and abroad for those willing to  
 
grasp the opportunity in a high-risk business.
335
 The domestic market, with London at  
 
its core, was the primary target for lead producers, for both pig lead and manufactured  
 
lead, with exports not expanding significantly.
336
 
 
 
 
George Bowes did recognise the opportunity for profit in the lead 
 
market and set about the development of mining and smelting on his estate in  
 
Teesdale. The scale of this enterprise compared to that of his seventeenth century  
 
predecessors can be assessed by the number of mines and trials, its productivity and  
 
profitability, its structure and financial requirements, and the numbers employed in it.  
 
Moreover, the significance of this commodity – grey gold – to George Bowes as  
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entrepreneur can be measured by the level of his personal involvement in directing the  
 
expansion of lead production whether he was in residence at Streatlam or Gibside, or  
 
in London. The lead business, by its very nature, was even riskier than coal, yet from  
 
no the later than the 1730s Bowes ventured to organise this particular aspect of his  
 
estate‟s economic activity into an industry in a pre-industrial era. Georges Bowes  
 
directed his agents and stewards to exploit the existence of lead throughout his estate  
 
in Upper Teesdale. He harnessed the enthusiasm of miners and adventurers, using  
 
them to carry out initial trial workings or to take on existing workings where leases  
 
had been forfeited either because money had run out or miners had vacated because  
 
they had not been paid. Forfeited leases could be renewed with the next optimistic  
 
adventurers willing to finance the risk and pay Bowes the royalty of duty ore, and  
 
agree to other stipulations in a lease drawn up to minimise his risk of loss either  
 
financial or damage to the Bowes estate. In stark contrast with lead mining activity  
 
during the preceding century, the period of George Bowes era witnessed an  
 
unprecedented change in approach towards the exploitation of lead on the Bowes  
 
estate. This in turn meant economic and social changes, which lasted until the at least  
 
the mid-nineteenth century, in a barren landscape that would otherwise only have  
 
offered a meagre living from agriculture.   
 
The tacks and leases granted by George Bowes, and all but one of his 
 
own or partnership mines, were on the moors and fells of his estate in Upper Teesdale  
 
in the North Riding of Yorkshire – Mickle Fell, Cronkley Fell, Holwick Fell, Lune  
 
Moor and Lune Forest, Hunderthwaite Moor, Mickleton Moor, and Cotherstone  
 
Moor. The records refer to manors, because the Bowes estate in this region, on the  
 
North Riding side of the River Tees, was organised administratively into manors  
 
named after villages adjacent to the river, one exception being the manor of Lune, an  
 
expanse of highland fell wedged between the manors of Holwick, to the north, and  
 
Mickleton to the southwest (see map opposite Lead Mining Landscapes [Durham  
 
County Council 2003]). 
 
   
 
 
The various mines, both pre-existing and new, can be identified within 
 
these moors and fells. Green Mines, Isabell-mea –Hill, later known as Birkdale, and  
 
Longstaffs Hush are on Mickle Fell. Black Ark, Nichol Hopple Yard, and Cronkley  
 
are on Cronkley Fell. Both these fells can be described as desolate and isolated areas.  
 
Greenfell and Crinkle(d) How are on Holwick Fell. Black Sike, Silverkellwell, the 
 
Lunehead Mines (several veins), Cocklake, Closehouse, Arngill, and Standards are  
 
in the Lune Forest and Lune Moor areas.  There are, too, records of lead mining on  
 
Mickleton, Cotherstone and Hunderthwaite Moors, but before 1760 only for 
 
Hunderthwaite. 
 
   
This inquiry into the structure lead production on Bowes estate during  
 
mid-eighteenth century can be dissected into three strands: the process of finding lead  
 
ore; the organisation of discovering and mining; and production and productivity.  
 
  The existence of Lunehead mines and Green Mines was not ignored 
 
by George Bowes, but in his era three forms of activity appear to have become more  
 
commonplace: exploration of the landscape on the Bowes estate in Upper Teesdale; 
 
prospecting, actually finding lead ore by trial under tack or lease, usually by trenching  
 
or initial hushing, bell pits, but sometimes levels and shafts; and, once the potential of  
 
the lead vein had been assessed, the more expensive exercises of driving levels or  
 
adits, and sinking shafts. It appears that prospecting for lead veins has received  
 
negligible attention from historians of mining, an issue raised by Torrens.
337
 The  
 
extant records give a general indication of how lead was discovered. Suffice to say  
 
that during the first half of the eighteenth century on the Bowes estate there were men  
 
who, apart from observation, had a basic knowledge of soil, vegetation, drainage  
 
systems, and landscape, but not geology, which was enough to discover lead veins on  
 
a trial and error basis. Regrettably, although discoveries on the Bowes estate are  
 
mentioned in agents reports and general correspondence, there are no details of how  
 
they were made. Consequently, to suggest more than the crude knowledge and skills  
 
already remarked upon could be misleading. Explorers and prospectors hunted for a  
 
metal that was found in veins, unlike coal that was bedded in strata. There must  
 
have existed, to some extent at least, within the limits of their existing knowledge and  
 
skills, an ability to predict.   
 
Some detailed examples of discovering lead have been uncovered. 
 
In May 1729 John Tidy, a Bowes agent, wrote a letter of recommendation from  
 
Middelton in Teesdale to George Bowes to inform him that the Derbyshire  
 
partnership of Thornhill & Norman was carrying out trials in the northern Pennines  
 
under the direction of a Mr. John Buxton, who had already „had great success in the  
 
Mines in Wales‟.  John Tidy had agreed with Buxton that Thornhill & Norman could  
 
take a tack on Green Mines, Black Ark, and Lunehead at one-sixth duty, and that  
 
regardless of any outcome they would pay for the trials.
338
  
 
  John Dent, a yeoman from Dufton in Westmoreland, discovered the  
 
lead vein at Isabella-mae-Hill in September 1740, which he reported to a Bowes agent  
 
who immediately inspected the source on Mickle Fell. Consequently, George Bowes  
 
made an agreement with Dent, and within less than a year of the find the scale of 
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 mining there developed from open cast  to the sinking of shafts.
339
 This ore was  
 
assayed for both lead and silver by John Gibson, the man who eventually became the  
 
Bowes‟ smelt mill manager.340 Similarly, on 30th April 1741 William Horn and  
 
Edward Rain discovered „a hopefull Tract of Grownd near Mickle Fell for a Lead  
 
Myne north of Long Crag‟. George Bowes or his agent granted them a twenty-one  
 
year lease that same day at Streatlam Castle, with Bowes himself taking a half share  
 
with strict terms for Horn and Rain and their three partners Thomas Horn, William  
 
Robinson, and William Robson.
341
  
   
Occasionally experienced miners would approach Bowes agents  
 
seeking permission to wander and explore an area of land in the hope of discovering a  
 
vein which could lead to a trial. In 1750, Thomas Colpitts I wrote from Upper  
 
Teesdale to George Bowes in Hanover Square, London that „Watson (the  
 
Husher) with another person came here and asked for a tack to make trial for 
 
one year at 1/6
th
  duty, and then if demanded, to have leave for 14 or 21 years 
                                                                                                                                                
at 1/5
th
, according to the method used in granting Tacks and Leases, and be subject to  
 
such other usual Covenants as are contained in Leases for Lead Mines. They do not  
 
seem to know at present any certain place, but asked to have room to seek about, and  
 
be obliged to keep clear of any of the veins at Is.-m-hill or Green Mines. From what I  
 
cd. Gather, they have an Eye on something about Long Crag.‟342 
 
A Bowes agent, wrote to Mr. Cleaver, Lord Carlisle‟s agent at Castle  
 
Howard, from Mickleton on 26
th
 December 1749 during his visit to Crinkle How,  
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over 1700 feet above sea level on the southern edge of Holwick Fell, complaining of  
 
staying „in this dismall part of the world‟. He was there following a visit from Mr  
 
Cleaver to assess the work required in tracing the lead vein prior to a full exploratory  
 
trial. This correspondence juxtaposes the optimism and exasperation involved in the  
 
search; the hope of discovering high yielding lead ore, preferably silver bearing, set  
 
against the harsh reality of drifting and sinking, the cost, and high risk of  failure. The  
 
correspondent‟s narrative crystallizes the nature of lead mining in the mid-eighteenth  
 
century: 
 
 „The Levell Drift cannot be carryd above four Fathom further without another Shaft,  
 
and then if we pursue the method hitherto practised, the Levell must stand still whilst 
 
a new Shaft is a sinking. At which rate the Tryall intended to be made, may be  
 
prolonged for seven years longer before we can be one jot wiser than at the present. 
 
……………..not doubting, but you will be of the opinion that that the sooner we  
 
know our Doom, the better. After sinking the next Shaft, and when the Levell shall be  
 
carryd beyond it as far as the Air will allow the men to work, We may then set about  
 
to make Trials, and whether we meet with a new Peru, or otherwise, it will at least  
 
serve as a Beacon to guide all future Generations from splitting on that rock‟.343 
 
George Bowes‟ stewards were instructed to search for lead veins 
 
whilst carrying out their managerial functions in the field, and were not averse  
 
themselves to becoming mine adventurers. Thomas Colpitts I wrote in 1750 that he 
 
„shall go for Gibside, carry the cash I have left, and then return hither, where I prepare  
 
to range among the Mountains, and if I stumble upon an unexplored vein, I may be 
 
tempted to invest a little money that way, having as yet no family to take care for, and 
 
may as well waste a little money, not a deal as in any other‟.344 
                                                 
343
  D/St/C4/1/3 letter from a Bowes agent (probably Thomas Colpitts I) to Mr Cleaver at Castle  
     Howard near York. 
344
  D/St/C2/1/5 being Thomas Colpitts I‟s letter to George Bowes of 15th February 1750. 
 In addition to exploration and prospecting on the Bowes estate, George 
 
Bowes also received reports and offers by way of insider information about  
 
potentially lucrative lead mines elsewhere in the North Pennine orefield. For example  
 
in 1758 one Joseph Bowes wrote to him on behalf of Joseph Emmerson regarding 
 
„some Leadmines in the Duke of Bridgewater‟s possession‟. Joseph Bowes described 
 
Emmerson as a mining expert well known to the agents of the Earl of Darlington, for  
 
whom he had worked at Pikelaw, and generally held in good esteem in the lead  
 
mining fraternity. The letter stated that Emmerson believed the remaining eighteen  
 
year term on a lease at Scoregill near Dufton was „the most promising thing that any 
 
Gentleman can chance money in ……‟. He considered it of particular interest to  
 
George Bowes because it was only ten miles from his own smelt mill at  
 
Wemmergill.
345
 There is no record of George Bowes‟ response to this opportunity. 
 
 
The organisation of exploration, discovery, and mining of lead on   
 
Bowes lands was embodied in tacks and leases, the numbers of which are an  
 
indicator of the general growth in lead mining. George Bowes granted twenty-two  
 
tacks and leases, with terms varying between one and twenty-one years. In the late  
 
1720s and 1730s there was a tendency to offer one-year tack notes with options for  
 
twenty-one year leases, usually for exploratory activity in specific, but limited,  
 
geographical areas. During the 1740s leases of ten years or less became the norm, and  
 
all of these were for established mines or mining areas. The tacks and leases granted  
 
in the 1750s were either under five years or for twenty-one years, but again all but one  
 
were for mine workings that had been operated and developed in the previous  
 
twenty years. There does not appear to be any identifiable pattern in the terms granted  
                                                 
345
  D/St/C2/3/75 (6) being a letter from Joseph Bowes to George Bowes, but there is no suggestion that  
     Joseph Bowes was a relative. 
 to lessee adventurers; their view of any particular mine or potential mine will have  
 
determined negotiations with George Bowes agent, who advised his master and in  
 
return applied instructions accordingly. In most cases duty ore was one-sixth bing to  
 
George Bowes, but even then caveats applied, as the comparative analysis of leases  
 
below will reveal. 
 
The list of tacks and leases in Table 2 below provides clear indication  
 
that lead production was taken much more seriously during the George Bowes era,  
 
particularly during the 1740‟s and 1750‟s. Again, it may be that some manuscripts for  
 
this period did not survive, but there is sufficient evidence contained therein to  
 
establish the structure of mining activity on Bowes lands in Upper Teesdale. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
List of Tacks and Leases for Lead Mines on Bowes Land 1727 – 1756 
 
Date           Term    Lessee(s)                                  Field/Mine                           Duty Ore 
 
1727           21 yrs                 Ferdinando Huddleston                   Hunderthwaite            1/8th      
 
1738            1 yr                   Thomas Taden                               around Wemmergill                      1/7 th  
 21 yr option       Jonathan Watson & Co                      & Arngill Beck 
 
1738            1 yr                  John Longstaff & Co.                       Mase Beck area                           1/6 th  
                    7 yr option                                          (covering Green Mines 
                             and Isabell mea Hill) 
 
1741 21 yrs          William Horn      north of Long Cragg                           1/5th                                      
                             Edward Rain                            near Mickle Fell 
 
1741   7 yrs          Jonathan Watson                                  Standards                                1/7 th  
                            Thomas Tedding                   
 
1742            4 yrs                Robert Hind                                           Arngill                                    1/6th  
                                            Nathan Horn 
                                            John Dent  
 
1744          10 yrs                Robert Dent                                          Closehouse                              1/6th 
                                            John Bedell      
 
1744           noted as in        Thomas Tedding                                  High Hush at                           1/6 th  
        tack         Thomas Rain                                         Lunehead 
                                            Jonathan Watson 
                                            John Langstaff 
 
1744             ditto                John Dent                                   Low Hush at           1/6th  
                                            John Robinson                                      Lunehead 
 
1746            7 yrs                Charles Wensley                                Level Head at                            1/5th  
                           (forfeited by 1748)                Lunehead West 
                   to Silverkellwell 
 
1747            3 yrs                Ned Robinson                                       Closehouse                              1/6th  
 
1748            2 yrs                John Dent of „ye Gate‟                            Arngill                                  1/6th  
                                            Robert Dent 
                                            John Shield 
                           John Dent of Scarthead 
 
1748             5 yrs               Jonathan Watson                                   Standards                                1/6th  
                                            Thomas Tedding 
 
1752           21 yrs               Charles Wensley                                  Rowton Syke           1/6th 
                                                                                                          at Lunehead         
 
1754             5 yrs              Charles Wensley                                Old Field east of 
                 Mine Hill, Lunehead                   1/6th  
 
 
1754                          Tim Bainbridge                                   Isabell mea Hill                       not found 
                          John Bainbridge 
                          William Tarn 
 
1754             1 yr                 Samuel Bacon                                      Standards                                  1/6th  
                   21 yrs option 
 
1755           21 yrs               William Dockray                               Green Mines                                1/6th  
                                            Joseph Cradock                                Quorgill Hush 
                           William Watson                                Langstaff Hush 
                                            John Cradock 
                           Anthony Cradock  
 
1755            1 yr                   Thomas Pierce                                 Area of Mickle       not found  
                   21 yr option      (option not taken)             Fell, with Nichol 
                 Hopple Yard 
 
1755             3 yrs                Jonathan Watson                             Closehouse                                   1/6th  
 
1756             2 yrs                                                                        Black Ark                                     1/6th  
 
1756                                     Nicholas Furnice                            Sun Vane at Closehouse 
 
1756            21 yrs              George Tissington                           Nickle Hopple Yard                      1/6 th 
                                                                                                    & areas of Mickle Fell, 
                                Black Sike, White Pitts 
               Near Noon Hill, & 
                                                                  Silverkellwell to be 
               assigned by Bowes 
               to Tissington. All for 
                                lead and copper.    
      
Source:  
Extracted from D/St/B2/11-31; D/St/B2/105, D/St/B/21; and D/St/B/32. 
   
 
After being originally worked by Bowes, Green Mines, Standards,  
 
Arngill, Closehouse, and various veins at Lunehead were all developed and worked  
 
by others through tacks and leases. The mines at Standards, Arngill, and Closehouse  
 
were all worked by various miners under different leases during the 1740s and 1750s.  
 
There were six leases for the veins at Lunehead, but the winning of lead ore in the  
 
veins at Lunehead was largely in the hands of Charles Wensley from1746,  
 
particularly at Rowton Sike. The mine at Rowton Sike, where he was eventually  
 
offered a partnership by George Bowes, was leased to Charles Wensley for twenty- 
 
one years in 1752.  
 
 
 
  
TABLE 3 
 
Lead mines Operated by Bowes or in partnership listed by earliest date 
& record type 
 
Mine Date(s) 
 
Type of Record 
 
Arngill 
 
Birkdale (formerly Isabell 
mea Hill) 
 
Black Ark 
 
Black Sike 
 
Closehouse 
 
Cock Lake 
 
Crinkle(d) How 
 
Cronkley 
 
Green Mines 
 
Isabell-mea-Hill 
 
Lunehead 
 
Nickle Hopple Yard 
 
Silverkellwell 
 
Standards 
1741 
 
1758 
 
 
1757 
 
1746 
 
1731 
 
1758 
 
1748-49 
 
1741 
 
1741 
 
1740 
 
1730-32 & 
1739 
1741-42 
 
1753 & 1755 
 
1737 
Pay bill (see Isabell-mea-Hill) 
 
Report
346
 
 
 
Memoranda 
347
 
 
Memorandum
348
 
 
Pay bill
349
 
 
Pay Bill
350
 
 
Pay bill
351
 
 
Valuation of tools
352
 
 
Expenditure account
353
 
 
Accounts ledger
354
 
 
Expenditure & sales 
accounts
355
 
 
Pay bill
356
 
 
Tack note & lease
357
 
 
Pay bill
358
 
Source: D/St/B2/70,93,103,105,117,119,121,127, &146. See footnotes 32-44 below 
George Bowes operated mines both in his own right and in partnership.  
  
The number is quite impressive bearing in mind the risk involved in lead mining 
 
compared to coal.  These mines are listed in Table 3 above and identified in the  
 
                                                 
346
  D/St/B2/93 (4), reports and memoranda 1756-61 
347
  D/St/B2/93 memoranda and reports on the workings of various mines dated 1756-1761. 
348
  D/St/B2105, memorandum regarding „grove tacks‟ 1747 
349
  D/St/B2/117 a pay bill for Closehouse mine dated December 1731. 
350
  D/St/B2/127 paybill. 
351
  D/St/ B2/121 pay bill for Crinkle How lead mine 29
th
 September 1748-14
th
 December 1749. 
352
  D/St/B2/134 valuation and list of tools at Lunehead, Cronkley, and Isabell-Meah-Hill mines 1741. 
353
  D/St/B2/103 miscellaneous accounts, including expenditure on trials at Green Mines. 
354
  D/St/B2/105 accounts ledger covering the 1740s. 
355
  D/St/B2/146 account of Viscount Vane with George Bowes and John Buxton for ore from Lune 
     Head, 17
th
 August 1730 – 12th May 1732. 
356
  D/St/B2/119 pay bill for Nickle Hopple Yard lead mine, 15
th
 May 1741 – 30th November 1742.  
357
  D/St/B2/70 a one year tack note between the Earl of Thanet and George Bowes; and D/St/B2/71 
     a twenty-one year lease between Sackville, Earl of Thanet Island and George Bowes. 
358
  D/St/B2/117 pay bill for Standards mine 6
th
 August 1737. 
estate records by the year or period of years specified in any particular document  
 
regardless of the content of the document, but of course this does not necessarily  
 
mean that a mine was in operation either before or after the date(s) stated in Table 3.   
 
Furthermore, at different times and different reasons Bowes leased some of these  
 
mines to others willing to risk their money. 
 
 
Bowes instigated exploration, prospecting, and mining proper from the  
 
early 1730s, at Closehouse, Lunehead, Cronkley, Green Mines, Standards, and  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill, and of these only Isabell-mea-Hill remained in his hands, except 
 
between 1754 and 1758. In the late 1740s he and partners attempted to open  
 
a new mine at Crinkle(d) How, and to develop Black Sike. During 1747-48 Black  
 
Sike mine was also a partnership consisting of George Bowes, Edward Gilbert,  
 
Elizabeth Bowes (sister), Jonathan Watson, the most frequently recorded husher, and  
 
John Robinson.
359
 Another partnership existed at “Lunehead mines” in 1740 and 1741  
 
where there were different levels in operation at various times., and its shares were  
 
in sixteenths.
360
 George Bowes granted a lease in 1741 for a mine north of Long Crag,  
 
probably what is now known as Millings Shop, where he held a half share, William  
 
Horn and Edward Rain one-eighth each, and three others a twelfth each.
361
 The  
 
partnership with Charles Wensley at Lunehead began in 1755, for which there are  
 
records of pay bills for the partnership for the 1750‟s, demonstrating the commitment  
 
Bowes made.
362
 Nichol Hopple Yard was a partnership mine from outset in 1741 and  
 
for the next two years, with George Bowes owning five-eighths, but it was let  
 
                                                 
359
  D/St/B2/ 108 is Edward Gilbert‟s account for expenses at Black Sike mine in December 1747, 
     and D/St/B2/158 contains a list of shareholders for this mine together with some accounts.     
360
  D/St/B2/102 is an account for Reverend Mr. Thorpe‟s sixteenth share of income and expenses 
     drawn up shortly after his death. There is no mention of the any other partners. 
361
  D/St/B2/16 the lease, and D/St/P15/5 sketch map indicating Millings Shop. 
362
  D/St/B2/122 incorporates a collection of pay bills for various mines, including Rowton Syke. 
in 1755.
363
 Black Ark was a known as a potential source of lead ore in 1729, but it 
was  
 
not mined until it was let in 1756, then returned to Bowes hands in 1757.
364
 George  
 
Bowes also instigated the Cock Lake workings in 1758.
365
  
 
Silverkellwell must have been assessed as having good potential, 
 
because this is the only mine leased by Bowes from another mineral lord, the Earl of  
 
Thanet; he took the lease for twenty-one years in 1755, after trial workings  
 
conducted under a one-year tack note of 1753. Ultimately, there was a long-term  
 
legal dispute between the Bowes and Thanet, when in fact there was very little lead  
 
ore to argue about.
366
  
     
The number of mines, whether leased to miners or adventurers,  
 
worked by Bowes and partners, or operated solely by him, gives an indication of the  
 
importance and potential value of lead to George Bowes. There is evidence of greater  
 
and more widespread activity compared to the earlier period. Table 4 below lists the  
 
mines and indicates the chronology of activity, regardless of who actually worked the  
 
mines at the time. 
 
   There are thirty mines and mining areas documented for the period  
 
1727 – 1760, of which lessees only operated twenty-five at different times, six by  
 
George Bowes and partners, and eleven by George Bowes himself. Before he  
 
inherited the estate, only two of these mines were operated by the Bowes family,  
 
namely Green Mines and Lunehead, where different levels and shafts were worked at  
 
different times by different parties. Only Green Mines can be identified as having  
 
Bowes family involvement before George Bowes initiated a positive change in the  
 
                                                 
363
  D/St/B2/5/119 and D/St/B2/105, both paybills. 
364
  D/St/C4/1/1 (2) which are correspondence to Bowes 30
th
 May 1729, and D/St/C2/3/76-77. 
365
  DSt/B2/127 a record of lead ore to the smelt mill in 1758. 
366
  D/St/B2/73-80 include records relating to the dispute which continued until the end of the 
     eighteenth century. 
process of exploitation, transforming it from an almost haphazard and incidental  
 
activity, an occasional by-product of landownership, into a more structured local  
 
industry that he directed and organised. 
 
TABLE 4 
 
List of Mines/Workings Indicating Chronology of Activity and Category 
of Operator 
 
   Lessee      Bowes & partners      Bowes only            Pre Bowes 
 
 
Arngill    1742                        1741 
Arngill Beck   1738 
Birkdale (Is –m-Hill)         1758  
Black Ark                     1756                 1729 &1757 
Black Sike                     1756            1747 
Bradwood Rains                      1689 
Closehouse             1744,‟47,‟55                                  1731 &1751-55 
Cock Lake          1758 
Crinkle How                            1748-49 
Cronkley                     1756            1741            
Green Mines   1755                 1729,‟41,‟51-55        1679, „92 
Greenfell Common                        1711  
Hunderthwaite   1727               
Isabell-Meah-Hill                    1754         1740-42   1742-54 
Longstaff Hush                    1755 
Lunehead            1740-4              1730-32,1739                1657 
Lunehead (Sun Vein)       1687  
Lunehead (area S.East)      1705  
Lunehead                       1746 
(Level Head) 
Lunehead High Hush                      1744 
Lunehead Low Hush                       1744 
Lunehead Little Street           1759 
Lune, Howick, & Lonton      1709 
(areas of moor)                      
Long Crag                                       1741  
Mase Beck (area)                            1738  
Micklefell (area)                     1756 
Nichol Hopple Yard                     1756                                             1741-42 
Rowton Syke                                  1752            1755 
(Lunehead) 
Silverkellwell                    1753 & 1755                     
Standards                                 1741,‟48,‟54                         1737 
Quorgill Hush                                 1755 
Wemmergill (area)                          1738  
White Pitts (Noon Hill)                   1756  
 
Source: 
 
Table IV is derived from Tables 1,2, and 3. The author‟s understanding of the Maise Beck area lease of 1738 is that it 
probably included what would otherwise become known as Green Mines and Isabell-mea-Hill. It was granted for the purpose 
of general exploration and workings. Also, Quorgill and Langstaff hushes were part of Green Mines as the orefield 
developed. 
 
 
 
The unpredictable nature of lead mining, largely caused by geological  
 
conditions, entailed regular re-assessment of viability. Table 4 above reveals this 
 
changeability and consequent variations in who operated the mines from time to time. 
 
George Bowes would decide to continue or cease operations, introduce partners, or 
 
grant leases. There are several examples of this process. Closehouse was a Bowes‟ 
 
mine in 1731, but was leased in 1744, 1747, and 1755. In 1679 Green Mines was  
 
leased for twenty years to partners including two members of the Bowes family, but  
 
in 1692 it was leased to another partnership. In 1741 it was re-opened by George  
 
Bowes, then in 1755 let for twenty-one years to another adventurer. 
 
Lunehead, the generic name for the place where various types of  
 
mining activity occurred along the different veins, was first worked under a tack note  
 
in 1657, was operated by George Bowes during 1730-32 and again in 1739, but early  
 
in the 1740‟s he brought in partners to fund the development of this mine. The initial  
 
work at Standards mine was carried out by Bowes in 1737, but was later leased out a  
 
different times during the 1740s and again in 1754. George Bowes opened  
 
Closehouse mine in 1731 and again 1752/3, but it was worked under lease from the  
 
mid-1740s, and again from 1755.  In 1758 Bowes began exploratory work at  
 
Cocklake, but to little end. 
 
  The search for lead and actual lead mining appears to have intensified  
 
during the 1730‟s, 1740‟s, and 1750‟s.Unfortunately, there is no clarification about  
 
the longevity or scale of  production of most of these mines, but Tables 3 and 4  
 
provide broad indication for some. Closehouse was active in the early 1730‟s and the  
 
mid-1740‟s and 1752/3, whilst Green Mines witnessed activity at different times from  
 
the late 1670‟s, and was re-opened in the early 1740s and the mid-1750s. The two key  
 
mines operated by George Bowes with partners were Isabell-mea-Hill during 1740- 
 
42, until his partner John Dent died in 1742); and Rowton Syke from the mid-1750s.  
 
Silverkellwell became a new focus for new mining activity in the mid-1750‟s, but the  
 
lease was assigned to another mining adventurer in 1756. 
 
  The leases, tack notes or licenses, pay bills, and expense accounts  
 
documents examined and itemised in Tables 2 – 4 point to on-going lead mining, but 
 
only intermittent periods of more intensive activity during the period 1727-60.  
 
Memoranda exchanged between George Bowes and his agents regarding leases and  
 
the progress of mine workings provide further clarification of when many of the  
 
abovementioned were in operation. Arngill was working in 1746, was leased out for  
 
the two years from 1
st
September 1748, became available again for letting in August  
 
1751, was noted by Bowes‟ in projected ore production figures in 1754, and was still  
 
being worked in 1756.
367
 Closehouse mine was leased for three years in 1747, was  
 
taken on by one Jonathan Watson in 1751, remained in production during the  
 
1750‟s, and back under Bowes control in the latter years of this decade.368 Black Ark  
 
mine also came into operation under the sole control of Bowes in the late 1750‟s.369 
 
 
  It has been possible to show when and where lead mining was carried  
 
on by George Bowes, he and partners, or lessee miners and adventurers but what was  
 
the nature and extent of the mining activity?  By merging the content of the tacks and  
 
leases with a broad selection of memoranda and correspondence about activities at the  
 
various mines between 1729 and 1760, the different methods of getting ore from the  
 
ground – hushing, levels, shafts - and therefore the physical development of the mines  
 
over time can be clarified. 
                                                 
367
  D/St/B2/81 account of duty ore delivered from Arngill mine; D/St/B2/21 George Bowes‟  
     handwritten memorandum dated 20
th
 August 1748; D/St/B2/21 George Bowes‟ handwritten 
     memorandum dated 16
th
 August 1751; and D/St/B2/93 memoranda and reports on various mines 
     for the period 1756-61.  
368
  D/St/B2/21 Bowes memorandum of20th August 1748; D/St/B2/22 Bowes memo; 
     D/St/C1/3/58 (4 &5) letters between Bowes and his agents 1737-1754; D/St/B2/93(1,3 & 4)   
     memoranda and reports on various mines 1756-61; D/St/ C3/76 (9 & 12) letters between agents 
     1751-1765.  
369
  D/St/C3/76 (1,6,8,11), letters between agents; and D/St/B2/93 (1) memoranda and reports 1756-61. 
   Some mining was begun and occasionally ore was extracted, but did 
 
not necessarily develop into sites of  prolonged activity. Black Ark was known as a  
 
potential source of ore in 1729, yet George Bowes only began workings there in 1748,  
 
but to no avail. Subsequently, he leased it in 1755 to independent miners, but began  
 
working it again 1757. Some progress was made in the late 1750s when the mine was  
 
in Bowes hands; in1758 the miners were „carrying up a level‟; and in 1759 a „strong  
 
vain‟ was reported containing ore „which is promising but very hard‟, and in this  
 
level ore was found  daily. Consequently, in 1759 the agent reported that he was  
 
expecting to have „a  good grove in one year‟s time‟ because he estimated that they  
 
were twenty fathoms from the ore.
370
 There is no evidence of mining here after 1759.  
 
 Clearly, the cost of working Black Ark was beyond the financial capabilities of any  
 
individual or small group of lessees, so Bowes funded the dead work until ore was  
 
found, but then discontinued. 
 
  The initial work at Crinkle How in 1748 and early 1749 involved 
 
sinking and driving, and by 1748 there was the original shaft and a level drift, and the 
 
Bowes agent believed a new shaft was required.
371
 Mining was discontinued and  
 
there are no records of ore production, yet the indications appear to have been  good  
 
for the two wealthy partners, George Bowes and Lord Carlisle. 
 
  The ground north of Long Crag, possibly what became one of what  
 
are now known as either Nichol Hopple or Silver Band or Milling‟s Vein, was let to  
 
two partners in 1741 and the sinking of a shaft is mentioned in the lease. It is not  
 
described in the same way again in any later leases and there are no records of ore  
 
won there.
372
 Similarly, George Bowes did not develop Silverkellwell mining beyond  
                                                 
370
  Black Ark details are from Tables 2 –4 and D/St/C2/3/76-77.  
371
  From D/St/B2/121 and D/St/C4/1/3. 
372
  D/St/B2/16, and if it was Milling‟s Vein it appears on a 1793 sketch map of Green Mines  
     D/St/P15/5.  
 the exploratory shallow shafts in the mid 1750s.
373
Again, there is no evidence of any  
 
ore extracted. In 1756 a lease was granted for prospecting in ground at White Pitts on  
 
Noon Hill, but it appears to have been abandoned or ignored without discovering any  
 
lead ore.
374
 At Nichol Hopple between 1741 and 1743 Bowes drove a level, then let  
 
areas of ground away from the first shaft in 1755 and again in 1756.
375
 Lastly, Black  
 
Sike was originally hushed 1747/48 when George Bowes and partners owned it. It  
 
was let in 1756 for exploration of 1000 yards by 400 yards of ground, and appears to  
 
have been back in Bowes‟ hands in 1758 when a low level drift existed and „sum  
 
pieces of oar‟ had been found.376  
 
  In summary, the mining activity and the expenditure incurred at Black  
 
Ark, Black Sike, Silverkellwell, White Pitts, Crinkle How, north of Long Crag was  
 
serious prospecting using methods already described, but largely unproductive and  
 
assessed as unworthy of any further development before 1760, because the vein was  
 
not traced, or the ore content was reckoned poor quality, or because more risk capital  
 
was unforthcoming in current market conditions. 
 
  Several other mines in more productive veins on the Bowes estate were 
 
developed to a much greater extent by both Bowes and lessees. This is evidenced by  
 
the growth of systems of shafts and levels, as well as continued hushing in some  
 
places, the prerequisite for all of which was the willingness to spend money. The 
 
mines at Closehouse, Green Mines, Isabell-mea-Hill, later Birkdale, and Lunehead 
 
were all sites of relatively intensive extraction; Isabell-mea-Hill and Lunehead during 
 
the 1740s and 1750s,and Closehouse and Green Mines mainly in the 1750s. The  
 
growth of these mines continued in the late eighteenth century and throughout the first  
                                                 
373
  D/St/B2/30 and D/St/B2/73-75. 
374
  D/St/B2/30 
375
  D/St/B2/28,30, 105, and 119. 
376
  D/St/B2/30 and D/St/C3/2/76. 
 half of the nineteenth century , largely in the hands of the London Lead Company  
 
from 1771 in the cases of Closehouse and Birkdale. At Closehouse in 1751/2 the  
 
paybill was mainly for the winning of lead ore, followed in 1752/3 by further sinking  
 
and drifting using timbering. Ore was struck again, and the 1753/4-pay bill was  
 
mainly for extracting ore by the bing. After Closehouse was let in 1755 another shaft  
 
was sunk.
377
 Bowes began sinking and drifting at Green Mines in 1751-52, a further 
 
shaft was proposed in 1752 and fathom work continued in 1754-55 but no ore was  
 
struck. Two areas of ground were let either side of the vein in 1755,and in 1758 ore 
 
was found, but not the main vein. In 1760 hushing continued at Green Mines.
378
 
 
Isabell-mea-Hill was a highly productive lead mine during the 1740s in Bowes‟  
 
ownership with a subterranean system of shafts, levels, and cross -cuts. Sinking and  
 
drifting continued throughout the 1750s, and hushes were also used and are identified  
 
in records for 1754 and 1759.
379
 Lunehead mines worked various veins as we have  
 
already established. Bowes began the driving of levels and sinking of shafts in the  
 
1730s, and in partnership during the early 1740s he continued the sinking through  
 
limestone. Between 1746 and 1748 the lessee Charles Wensley created more shafts  
 
and levels, including at Rowton Sike, where hushing was undertaken in 1751, and  
 
where Bowes eventually became his partner in 1755,. In 1754 quality ore was found  
 
and another shaft was sunk, and in the following year a lead vein ten feet wide was  
 
discovered. Lead mining was still ongoing here in 1757.
380
 
 
   
 
The discovery of lead veins and following them successfully by  
 
sinking shafts and driving levels to extract ore was a painstaking task which  
                                                 
377
  For Closehouse sources D/St/B2/93,117, and 122. 
378
  For Green Mines sources D/St/B2/23,29, and 122, and D/St/C2/3/58 and 76. 
379
  For Isabell-mea-Hill sources see D/St/B2/92-93,105, and 122; D/St/C1/3/58; and D/St/C2/3/75-76. 
380
  For Lunehead sources D/St/B2/19, 21, 24, 101, and 122; D/St/C2/1/5 and 21; and D/St/C1/3/58. 
 demanded perseverance, investment, and a long term business view in terms of  
 
the mineral exploitation of the Bowes estate for financial gain. The description of 
 
the most productive or potentially productive mines above, the expansion of which  
 
continued after George Bowes death in 1760, and particularly after 1771 when they  
 
were leased out, confirms the timescale for dead work and winning lead ore on a  
 
continuous basis, often characterised by intermittent periods of no or little ore  
 
production. As mines became deeper in chasing the lode, capital expenditure  
 
increased, and George Bowes undoubtedly had the means to create continuity of  
 
extractive work at any of the sites mentioned. He appears to have taken up the  
 
challenge of exploiting certain known mines during the 1750s, either because lessees  
 
could no longer afford to, or because the potential of these mines was perceived as  
 
worth the commitment in the then current market conditions. Lead mining on the  
 
Bowes estate at this time was difficult and required an indomitable willingness to 
 
commit capital, skills, and management to the extraction of ore. Lead could be   
 
discovered and the veins followed, but when it would be exhausted was unknown,  
 
other than that this would definitely happen.  
 
  To what extent was lead mining a seasonal activity? The majority of  
 
tack notes and leases granted by George Bowes were dated in the second half of  
 
the year. The months of July, August, September, and October appear on most of the  
 
documentation.
381
 It could be inferred from this evidence alone that mining was an  
 
autumn and winter activity for people otherwise engaged in agriculture; that lead  
 
mining adventurers took up agreements when the labour became free from the  
 
demands of the land and available to harvest another form of produce. There has been  
 
a selection of different views from historians regarding the farmer-miner or miner-  
                                                 
381
  D/St/B2/11-31 tacks, leases and agreements for the period to 1760  
 farmer, the description being contingent upon the bias given to the primary role, but  
 
generally the former terminology is used for the sixteenth and seventeenth  
 
centuries. Joan Thirsk referred to „mineral-yielding areas‟ where „industry and  
 
agriculture were ancient bedfellows‟, and „semi-industrial communities‟ in which  
 
under-employed people primarily involved in agricultural pursuits became involved  
 
in some form of industry, including the extractive industries, such as lead, tin, and  
 
iron mining.
382
 This view was more recently transplanted in an entrepreneurial context  
 
to embrace the late medieval period and the early sixteenth century; landowning  
 
gentry employing an under-employed agrarian labour force as an alternative  
 
investment in the financial potential of mineral extraction, rather than agricultural  
 
improvement.
383
 The argument for an „industrious revolution‟ amongst the  
 
agricultural workforce intent upon earning a supplementary income was introduced by  
 
de Vries; „the industrious revolution was a process of household-based resource  
 
allocation‟ fundamentally rooted in the aspirations of the family unit.384 The extent of  
 
the farmer miner‟s commitment to metal mining was reconsidered by Blanchard in  
 
terms of work psychology i.e. conscious behaviour to achieve a particular level of  
 
required income.
385
 Blanchard maintains that before 1600 lead mining was a dry,  
 
summer season activity, because the technology for draining mines did not exist, but 
 
that after 1600, when adits were in more general use for relieving the problem of mine 
 
drainage, it was no longer restricted to the summer months. The underlying  
 
motivation for mining was the desire to earn 21s per annum, the labour intensity to  
 
produce which was determined by the level of rents and the price of lead.
386
 A more  
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 recent study of rural life and agrarian economy identifies the extractive industries as  
 
an important development and source of improving wealth in upland communities,  
 
but does not explore the role of the farmer-miner or the seasonality of metal 
mining.
387
 
 
There is a broad selection of mining reports and memoranda between George  
 
Bowes and his stewards and agents in the field, and between agents and stewards at  
 
Streatlam and Gibside. The dating of these documents establishes the chronology of  
 
workings at various mines and mining areas, and their contents serves to elucidate  
 
upon the seasonality or not of lead mining on the Bowes estate in Upper Teesdale.  
 
Closehouse was being worked from   October to December 1731;
388
 Standards  
 
during the first half of 1737, and miners were paid in August that year; 
389
 and at 
 
Lunehead between October 1739 and February 1740.
390
  In February 1741  
 
Lunehead and Isabell-mea-Hill were working,
391
 and in November that year Arngill,  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill, Lunehead, and Standards were active;
392
 Nichol Hopple Yard was  
 
mined at least between May and November 1741,
393
 whilst mining appears to have  
 
been continuous at Isabell-mea-Hill and Green Mines at least from July to  
 
November.
394
 Mining went on at Lunehead and Isabell-mea-Hill during the winter  
 
months of late 1741 and early1742.
395
 Crinkle How was mined from September  
 
to December 1749.
396
 In 1750 it was reported that Standards, Arngill, and Closehouse  
 
were not being worked properly because „the tenants who had them hitherto have not  
                                                                                                                                            
     and in particular Weardale miners. 
387
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389
  D/St/B2/117 pay bill for this mine 
390
  D/St/B2/101 Matthew Dent‟s bill of charges for George Bowes 
391
  D/St/C2/1/5 Nathan Horn to Thomas Colpitts I 10
th
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392
  D/St/B2/118 pay bill for these mines   
393
  D/St/B2/119 
394
  D/St/B2/103 Nathan Horn‟s accounts for pay and materials July to November 1741 
395
  D/St/C2/1/5 Nathan Horn to Thomas Colpitts at Streatlam 10
th
 February 1742. 
396
  D/St/B2/121 
 pushed on the workings so briskly…only employing the vacant time they had to  
 
spare from their other Business‟.397 The work at Green Mines had stopped early in  
 
1750 because of severely bad weather but was to continue once it improved.
398
  In  
 
January 1748 work in the levels and shafts progressed at Isabell-mea-Hill, and at  
 
Crinkle How the miners were expecting to „cut the vein before midsummer day  
 
first‟.399 In January 1754 work at Rowton Sike, Standards, Closehouse and Isabell- 
 
mea-hill was making progress.
400
   Ore was found in May 1754 at Rowton Sike, 
Green  
 
Mines employed ten men, and ore was also wrought at Isabell-mea-Hill, Standards  
 
and Closehouse.
401
   In February 1755 the middle vein was cut from Rowton Sike at  
 
Lunehead.
402
   In October 1756 work was reported at Closehouse, Standards, and  
 
Arngill.
403
 Early in 1758 mining was carried on at Rowton Sike, Black Ark and  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill,
404
 and at Closehouse, Isabell-mea-Hill, and Black Ark early 
in1759.
405
     
 
Isabell-mea-Hill, Closehouse, and Black Ark were being mined in autumn 1759.
406
  
 
The early months of 1760 saw mining at Isabell-mea-Hill, Green Mines, and Black  
 
Ark.
407
  
 
Lead mining was carried on mainly during autumn and winter months, 
 
which leads to the conclusion that it was not a full time activity for most of those  
 
employed in it. Mining at Isabell-mea-Hill was the exception, particularly in the  
 
1740s, when at times it continued into the summer months. Bowes invested in the  
                                                 
397
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 building of a shop to house miners throughout the year near the mine workings,  
 
thereby managing the workforce in an isolated place to ensure they remained focused  
 
on their task. Mining activity on the Bowes estate tends to support the view that by 
 
the end of the early modern period it was no longer a summer occupation, and the  
 
the incidence of adits and levels suggests that the problem of mine drainage was 
 
being addressed at this stage, that general mining practice had been adopted.
408
 
 
 
  We have seen above that the extent of mining activity and the methods 
 
were unchanged from earlier times; sinking shafts, driving levels, and 
 
hushing were the most efficient methods of reaching the lead ore, with the latter 
 
clearly the cheapest.
409
 What of the techniques and technology during the middle  
 
third of the eighteenth century on the Bowes estate, and did George Bowes introduce  
 
new technology? The records, including maps drawn by both George Bowes and his  
 
stewards, depict the methods of getting lead ore and the technology involved as very  
 
similar to lead mining in other areas. It is worthwhile to attempt an identification of  
 
the phase of technology and technique exisintg on the Bowes estate by 1760. 
 
  The tools used by lead miners remained as simple as in the sixteenth  
 
and seventeenth centuries. Estate documents, including mine pay bills and smelting  
 
costs, are littered with details of valuations and costs of tools, and those written by  
 
field agents often refer to techniques. In 1741 a valuation of tools was noted at  
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Cronkley, later known as Silverband mine, and Lunehead as part of George Bowes  
 
exercise in protecting his investment against loss.
410
 They are the same simple tools  
 
used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as kibbles and picks.
411
  
Dressing  
 
and washing equipment are also mentioned as expected, such as sieves and  
 
knockstones. Field agents describe boring and blasting, particularly where the rock  
 
was extremely hard. In the 1740s Nathan Horn carried out blasting with gunpowder in  
 
various shafts and levels at Isabell-mea- Hill.
412
 In the 1750s at Rowton Sike, where 
 
the middle vein was described as being ten feet wide, blasting was also undertaken.
413
 
 
  In the deeper mines where Bowes or lessees had invested in the  
 
development of shafts and levels, the problem of ventilation needed a solution. In1741 
 
Bowes and his partner John Dent installed fifteen fathoms of air boxes in a shaft at  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill.
414
 Wooden trunking for ventilation purposes has been identified by  
 
Burt as an innovation when mining became deeper.
415
 Bellows and pumps are also  
 
occasionally mentioned in this regard, and in Charles Wensley‟s lease of 1752 for  
 
Rowton Sike, part of the Lunehead group, Bowes granted him permission to build  
 
„gins and engines‟ where required.416 
 
   Burt concluded from his studies of mining technique and technology,  
 
and ore preparation that, subject to local circumstances – the nature of mineralisation,  
 
the depth of mining workings, the existence of waterpower, and the scale of mining  
 
venture – during the period from the mid-sixteenth until the late eighteenth century  
 
much of the technique and technology changed very little, but that in some stages  
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  Burt, Metal Mining, p. 57. 
416
  D/St/B2/24 
improvement and diffusion of those improvements did occur.
417
  The evidence for  
 
lead mining on the Bowes estate corroborates Burt‟s view that the underground level  
 
and cross-cut to find the vertical lead vein were the „mainstay of exploratory activity‟  
 
up to 1800.
418
 In other words, there was little change in technique and technology, and 
 
consequently no revolution in the lead production process on the Bowes estate. 
 
  Blasting with gunpowder is generally regarded as the most significant  
 
innovation, and this method was in use in the Upper Teesdale orefield. Gunpowder  
 
blasting was in general use in North Yorkshire and the Alston lead mining areas  
 
during the 1690s which countenances Burt‟s view that at times there was diffusion of  
 
technique and technology in metal mining.
419
   There is no evidence of improved  
 
mechanisation or use of steam power in the Bowes lead mines before 1760, but the  
 
use of gins – which brought together manpower and animal power -  for hauling and  
 
transport is recorded as noted above. Evidently, there was no need for mechanical  
 
innovation, and moreover, George Bowes must not have considered such  
 
improvements that may have been available as economically viable for lead mining  
 
on his estate. For example, steam power would have required coal as fuel, but peat  
 
was readily available whereas as coal could only have been supplied at great logistical  
 
cost to Upper Teesdale. 
 
  Essentially, manpower and the art of using basic tools occasionally  
 
assisted by explosives was the chief means of winning lead ore on Bowes lands in  
 
the mid-eighteenth century. The Bowes estate can be linked directly to contemporary  
 
technology and methods at Isabell-mea-Hill, and there is evidence of their use within  
 
the Lunehead group of mines, but the overall impression is that the lead mining  
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 conducted by Bowes‟ small scale lessees was that described by Agricola in the  
 
sixteenth century, and later by Pryce and Hunt.
420
 
 
  In the search for lead ore on his estate, preferably silver bearing ore,  
 
did George Bowes, did his stewards and field agents demonstrate any knowledge of  
 
geology which they could apply to enhancing the process of discovery and extraction? 
 
The history of activity at the various mines during the middle third of the eighteenth 
 
century, when only the direct involvement of George Bowes produced any level of 
 
continuity, is listed above in Table 4.  Discoveries were made, mining in different  
 
forms begun – hushing, trenching, shallow pits, shafts, levels – but in this period of 
 
greater activity the evidence suggests that in most cases the ability to predict the  
 
on-going discovery of lead ore did not exist.  
 
  The generally held view is that geological science was in its infancy  
 
during the eighteenth century and far from being a fully formed body of knowledge,  
 
and therefore incapable of being predictive. During the eighteenth century there was  
 
debate and investigation in earth science, in effect a continuation of  a trend begun in 
 
the seventeenth century, but there was no „geology‟ as such until the early nineteenth  
 
century. Furthermore, „Most eighteenth century mining manuals also kept to existing  
 
traditions, rather than rejecting them. Indeed, this was their declared intention – the  
 
handing down of personal craft experience from generation to generation‟.421  
 
The level of then current knowledge is displayed to some extent in agents‟  
 
reports to George Bowes regarding progress in mining activity, the most regularly  
 
mentioned being „whin sill‟ in descriptions of the difficulties encountered cutting  
 
through igneous hard rock and the costs involved. Bowes mine stewards and field  
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agents possessed some knowledge of rocks and strata, and consequently it is  
 
reasonable to represent these men as practical geologists, experts of their time in  
 
metalliferous mining. 
 
  The most detailed example of this is Thomas Colpitts I‟s report on  
 
Crinkle(d) How of 26
th
 December 1749 to Mr Cleaver agent for Lord Carlisle at  
 
Castle Howard near York. This also contained a sketch of „the Strata or Beds as they  
 
are now found at Crinklehow‟, which unfortunately did not survive. The report is  
 
transcribed below: 
 
 
„Strata. 
 
1. Clay and Ramble; thickness unknown and varys with the Rise or fall of the 
surface 
2. Lime. 5 yards, Dips to the South, but did not come on till the third shaft went 
down, will thicken at the distance of another shaft, being the hills to the south 
rise apace, and this Bed dips into the hill. On this depends all our hopes. 
3. Hazell. 5 Fa:1yd: This also will thicken, and if the Lime next above it prove a 
bearing Bed, then may the Hazell also bear. 
4. Black Plate, or, Chiver. 5 Fa: very Rotten. 
5. Hazell. 6Fa: 3 yd: very strong. 
6. Black Plate. 3 Fa: wherein we now drive and will be out shortly we will sink 
under Lime, and the last Hazell will come on. 
 
Below this last is another Lime, thickness unknown, but if the Beds above give 
any encouragement, may be sunk and wrought by pumps. 
The vein strikes thro‟ the low black chiver exceeding strong, and much more so 
than when you last visit. The workings above ground show it very plain. 
N.B. The range of the vein is from SW to NE reckonable favourable. Dip to the 
South‟.422 
 
  This transcript discloses that knowledge of rock stratification did exist,  
 
and that there was more than a seed of an idea that it could be traced across the  
 
landscape in the search for lead ore. In addition, the content of the report shows  
 
terminology in common use – names of the different strata, beds, dips, vein. On  
 
balance, however, this example of practice on the Bowes estate does not necessarily 
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mean that even some men had detailed knowledge of subterranean ore deposits and  
 
how they could effect the relief of the landscape. The majority of miners probably  
 
worked on the basis of outcrops, the mineral appearing in streams in different places, 
 
and the existence of certain types of vegetation, and all of this very limited knowledge 
 
having been largely assimilated orally through generations. In Upper Teesdale there  
 
was probably more local lore than science. The examples given earlier of ore 
 
discovery hint at traditional methods rather than any scientific approach. 
 
The plain fact of the matter was that to find economically viable deposits of  
 
lode bearing ore, especially when old mine workings were re-opened for further 
 
discovery, the most suitable method for any chance of success was to dig deeper  
 
shafts, drive adits into where the vein was reckoned to be, make cross cuts, or 
 
recommence hushing. In other words, as we can see from the history of mining  
 
activity discussed above, largely characterised by repeated attempts to find ore at  
 
known potential sources, the only means of progress was to cut the ground, and 
 
penetrate the underlying strata, because the nature of mineralisation was simply 
 
unpredictable. Veins containing lead ore once found could change direction quite  
 
randomly; only by men willing to cut their way through dead ground was it possible  
 
to discover more lead deposits and assess the viability of extraction. Their knowledge 
 
above ground was based upon observation of the landscape, characteristics of  
 
vegetation and flora, visible strata, and surface erosion; below ground it was based  
 
upon trial and error, and oral transmission of past experiences. This cumulative  
 
knowledge formed the basis of lead mining on Bowes‟ land , but did not guarantee  
 
success.  
 
  The risk-takers, the mining adventurers, regardless of their scale of  
 
operations on the Bowes estate, including George Bowes himself, operated in the  
 
uncharted nether world. Their challenge was to overcome the huge uncertainty of  
 
 
 
discovering productive lead ore, which could only be achieved by risking money. 
 
The history of lead mining during the mid-eighteenth century on the Bowes estate in  
 
Upper Teesdale identifies small groups of individuals who worked specific areas of  
 
ground or existing mines for short periods of time under tacks and leases from George  
 
Bowes. The ore they produced was relatively small in weight and usually their  
 
discoveries were exhausted in the short term, and lack of working capital precluded 
 
further exploration. George Bowes instigated initial work at several mines, Isabell- 
 
mea-Hill being the most lucrative especially during the 1740s, and continued the  
 
quest for lead ore during the 1750s though much less successfully. Any success he  
 
experienced was due to his willingness to introduce working capital where others  
 
could not, in the hope that potential would be realised sooner rather than later. 
 
 
   
  Mining was an important source of employment on the Bowes estate 
 
in Upper Teesdale, whether it was on a part-time or full-time basis. Examination of  
 
the surviving mines pay bills, which list the earnings of bargains for both individuals  
 
and groups of miners, do not present great enough detail about the numbers of men  
 
and women employed in either actual mining or the washing and dressing of ore  
 
before smelting. The ambiguous wording used by field agents who kept these records  
 
makes it impossible to calculate the numbers employed. For example, there are many  
 
entries that provide the name of a miner followed by the words „and partners‟.  
 
Obviously, the omission of the number of partners means accuracy is out of the  
 
question. The prevalent view of historians of metalliferous mining is that a bargain in  
 
lead mining was anywhere from three to twelve men. Again, this range of how many  
 
could be employed in a bargain only allows very broad estimates.  
 
   
 
 
 
Bearing in mind the abovementioned caveats, it is possible to offer 
 
some indication of  number employed at different times at various mines. As we have  
 
already seen, the Isabell-mea-Hill lead mine was the most productive during the  
 
1740s, and for this very reason the pay bills were well kept and detailed. In 1741 there  
 
were 19 bargains, only two of which were with individual miners, which equates to 59 
 
miners, assuming an average bargain was three miners ; in 1742 fifteen bargains, of  
 
which seven were with individuals, so 31 miners; in 1743 there were 27 bargains  
 
getting ore, so 71 miners; in 1744 fourteen bargains, of which twelve were  
 
individuals; in 1745 there were ten miners getting ore; in and 1746 22 bargains, of  
 
which sixteen were individuals, so 48 miners, and 10 additional workers.
423
 Isabell- 
 
mea-hill was the main employer of lead miners during the entire George Bowes‟  
 
period of management.  During the early year of the 1750s the workforce was at a  
 
much reduced level. From December 1752 to December 1753 there were seven  
 
miners getting ore; four bargains and five men on day work for the period December  
 
1754 to December 1755; and in 1755-56 one bargain only.
424
 
 
  The other mines when in Bowes‟ hands and not leased to other  
 
adventurers employed much smaller numbers of miners. Closehouse began in 1731  
 
with five men on day wages, and when Bowes re-opened in 1751-52 five miners were  
 
getting ore, there were five men sinking another shaft in 1752-53, and thirteen miners  
 
winning ore in 1753-54. There were only seven miners working at Closehouse in  
 
1755-56.
425
 At Standards in 1737 there was only one bargain on fathomtale. Similarly,  
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 initial workings at Nichol Hopple Yard and Crinkle How were also on a small scale;  
 
 
three bargains mined barren ground at Nichol Hopple in 1741; and six bargains,  
 
including three individuals were sinking and drifting at Crinkle How from late 1748  
 
to December 1749.
426
 Green Mines was worked 1751-52 by six bargains, including  
 
two individuals, all getting ore. At Rowton Sike only only six carried on work  
 
bargains in 1752-53, including two individuals, and in 1754-55 by four individual  
 
miners getting ore.
427
 
 
  This broad estimate of the numbers of people involve in lead mining 
 
does not include others who may have been employed in the washing and dressing of  
 
the ore, although it was the miners themselves who generally did this too. Isabell mea-  
 
Hill lead mine could have been an exception, because of the scale of mining  
 
conducted there by George Bowes, who was astute enough to know the importance of  
 
washing and dressing in the lead production process. The tacks and leases granted by  
 
George Bowes nearly always contained a clause to this effect. The washing and  
 
dressing of the extracted ore is discussed below, and the there is a comparative  
 
analysis of tacks and leases in chapter 4 above.  
 
   
  Having discussed the means of production, the process of finding lead  
 
ore, and the organisation of its extraction, productivity and production can be  
 
examined.  
 
  The lead vein at Isabell-meah-Hill, discovered in 1740 by John Dent,  
 
became the main source of ore production. Its discovery was followed by an  
 
inspection recorded in a memorandum dated 29
th
 September 1740 which identified a  
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new mine on Mickle Fell which the author called „Mea Hill‟. It appears to have been  
 
Thomas Colpitts I who wrote “Nathan Horn & self let a bargain to Matthew Raine of  
 
Lower Wemmergill & partner to get 20 Bing of ore Dressed fitt for ye Lead Mill“  
 
paid at a rate of 2s per bing .
428
 George Bowes committed himself hastily to the  
 
potential of this mine. A report of 23
rd
 December 1741 remarks that this mine was  
 
“exceedingly good” and “full of oare above head”, and that a level had been driven  
 
past the cross-cut shaft with “14 fathoms to go to Raisbeck shaft”, and added that “its  
 
ordered to be followed night and day”.429  The report states that Nathan Horn made an  
 
account of all work at both Isabell-Mea-Hill and Lunehead led mines. The cost of  
 
work was noted at £23 1s 6d for the months of September, October, and the first half  
 
of  November, and that £37 had been paid out on account, though not naming the  
 
payee. The Isabell-mea-Hill lead mine, which became known as Birkdale from the  
 
1754, was the centrepiece of the George Bowes‟ lead mining operations, the source of  
 
inspiration for his financial commitment to and growing interest in lead. He partnered  
 
John Dent for approximately two years, because Dent was responsible for its  
 
discovery in 1740 but died in 1742. Isabell-mea-Hill lead mine is worthy of detailed  
 
examination because it demonstrates the operation of a productive mine, and in  
 
particular the capital involved as it developed during the 1740s. 
 
  The numbers working at Isabell-mea-Hill has already been indicated, 
 
that it was the main employer of all the Bowes mines is undoubtedly true, even at  
 
times when ore production fell. The continuity of mining manifests itself in the  
 
system of shafts which developed following John Dent‟s discovery and the original  
 
open cast workings. So, workings began „at the open cast where the mine was first 
 
discovered‟, which was assisted by Jonathan Watson and partners hushing, and then  
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 John Bell and partners sunk a shaft next to the hush. Subsequently, within a year or so 
 
 
of discovery various shafts existed; the cross-cut shaft; Stapple Shaft; Raisbeck Shaft;  
 
Vickers Shaft; Guys Shaft, and Robsons Shaft.
430
 More importantly, Isabell-mea-Hill  
 
was producing ore from outset; the total amount is in Table 5 below, and the annual 
 
figures are in Appendix I. 
 
  The rapid growth of the shaft system is indicative of silver bearing or  
 
fertile, argeniferous lead veins, because sinking shafts was more difficult than  
 
driving levels into hill or valley sides. Put bluntly, the silver content would have  
 
greater value than lead, which made shafts economically viable.
431
 John Gibson, who 
 
became a smelt mill manager for George Bowes in 1757, assayed Isabell-mea-Hill  
 
and Lunehead for lead and silver prior to the development of mining there.
432
 Only 
 
one of the many lead mining records examined for the period 1727-1760 actually  
 
notes silver extracted.
433
 None were found for silver resulting from the process of  
 
refining lead ore.   
 
  The pattern of expenditure at Isabell-mea-Hill, detailed in Table 5  
 
below, is of particular interest, because it is the only clear cut example of its kind in  
 
the period 1740-1760 for a productive lead mine on the Bowes estate. During the  
 
1742 and 1743 the cost of sinking and drifting, dead work, was between one-fifth  
 
and one quarter of the mining costs, falling by approximately half in 1744. The cost of  
 
extracting ore was between fifty and sixty per cent during the years 1742-44, because  
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  This paragraph is derived from various documents; D/St/B2/103 oar bargain book 1741; D/St/P15/2 
       sketch map drawn by Nathan Horn in December 1741; D/St/B2/104 estimates of charges; and  
       D/St/B2/105 lead mines accounts 1740-46. 
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  L. Willies in J. Day, & R.F. Tylecote (eds), The Industrial Revolution in Metals (Institute of  
       Metals 1991) p. 86 supports this view, noting that in Cardiganshire in 1667 silver content increased  
       the lead ore value by four hundred per cent. 
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  D/St/C2/3/71 correspondence between John Gibson and the senior steward Richard Stephenson. 
433
  D/St/B2/120 (3) a paper belonging to the pay bill for Isabella mea Hill‟, undated, but judging by the   
       nature of the bargains for exploratory work probably of 1741/2. 
      . 
 the vein was most accessible, and so production was greater than 1745-46, when this  
 
cost fell below forty percent of total mining expenditure. The cost of sinking and  
 
drifting rose, on the continuing wave of optimism, above thirty per cent of mining  
 
costs in 1745-46. Overall, the cost of dead work increased from one fifth to one third  
 
of mining costs in this short period, and changes in both this cost and the cost of  
 
timber appear pari passu. 
 
  The cost of wood for the structural framework, called 
 
„grove wood‟, was always the lesser of the three itemised in the table, but could be  
 
described as capital formation in that it permitted future mining when the market for  
 
lead rather than pure optimism was the determinant of new work. Indeed, it could be 
 
Table 5  
 
The pattern of mining expenditure at Isabell-mea-Hill 1742-46 
 
 
Year       Total on mining        % grove wood     % sinking & drifting  % getting ore 
                 £         s      d 
 
1742       534       8      7                   9.3                            20.7                       59.5 
 
1743       357     14    11½                7.4                            26.1                       52.0         
 
1744       310     17    11                   8.4                            12.7                       58.7 
 
1745       225     12    11½              10.2                   30.5                       38.9    
 
1746       168     16      5             13.4                            32.6                       38.3 
 
Source: 
 
Derived from D/St/B2/104-105 charges and accounts for Isabell-mea-Hill. It should 
be noted that mining costs include wood, sinking and drifting (fathom work, or 
fathomtale), getting ore (per bing of ore, or bingtale), and day wages (for fixing, 
mending and carrying in the mine shafts, stoop work, cutting water courses, and 
getting stones for the bingsteads). The aforementioned types of work are noted in 
accounts for Isabell-mea-Hill. Carriage costs of ore and lead, and any mill charges, 
have been excluded from the construction of this table. 
 
 
 
construed that the costs mentioned here actually created the capital stock of this or  
 
 
any other mine. In 1742 George Bowes invested £82 2s 0d in the building of the first  
 
house at Isabell meah-Hill, which became known as the „Old Shop‟, where miners  
 
lived during their working week.
434
 In 1756-57 he invested in the building of a new  
 
smelt mill at Wemmergill; the details of this development in smelting of the Bowes  
 
estate are discussed below in chapter 6. 
 
  By  1752 George Bowes had lost interest in mining at Isabell-mea-Hill. 
 
This mine was known as Birkdale from 1754, but only became productive again after 
 
1760. It was let to a partnership of miners in 1754 – John Bainbridge, Tim  
 
Bainbridge, and William Tarn – who had a contretemps with mines steward Nathan  
 
Horn over his alleged failure to provide agreed equipment and to pay them for lead  
 
ore which was sold to Andrew Appleby at Eggleston smelt mill.
435
 In 1758 Bowes  
 
began working Birkdale again, following the success of hushing, and in April 1759  
 
Nathan Horn reported that progress was being made. Horn wrote in June of the  
 
following year that „hard sinking‟ was complete, that mining would proceed „a half  
 
the cost we at before‟, and that „we have a strong vein but no ore in it yet nor do I  
 
expect any yet „til we come to the Green Mines vein, and then we will stand a good  
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  D/St/B2/105 miscellaneous accounts for the lead mines and mills. 
435
  D/St/C2/3/75 correspondence between Horn and Stephenson describes the background. 
chance‟.436 At this stage in the renewed workings at Birkdale ore production in no  
 
way resembled the levels of  any year in the 1740s. 
 
It is possible to obtain the ore productivity for mining expenditure at 
 
Isabell-mea-hill for the years 1742-45 inclusive, by taking the statistics from the table  
 
on page 45 and dividing each year‟s total expenditure into total ore production. These 
 
figures are set out in the Table 6 below. Clearly, on a discreet year basis, productivity  
 
for each £1 invested  declined from just over one bing in 1742 to just over half a bing  
 
in 1745; approximately a fifty per cent fall. Over the four-year period the productivity  
 
was three horse one hundred weight and  ten pounds i.e. seven stones  four pounds  
 
short of  a bing, for each £1 invested. Unfortunately, no figures for mining 
 
Table 6 
 
Ore productivity for mining expenditure at Isabell-mea-Hill 1742-45  
 
     Total mining                   Ore                 Ore per 
  Expenditure £ s d       Bings   horses      £1 invested 
 
1742                  534     8       7             557        0          1 bing  2st  10lbs   
 
1743                  357    14     11½         343        1              3h    4st    9lbs 
 
1744                  310    17     11            236        3              3h    0st  10lbs 
 
1745                  225    12     11½         129        3              2h    4st  11lbs 
 
Total                1428    14       5          1266        3 
Source: D/St/B2/105-105 
 
N.B. The figures for ore production are after washing and dressing. 
 
 
 
  
expenditure are itemised in the lead mine accounts for 1741, only a total of £793 18s   
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  D/St/C2/3/76 Nathan Horn‟s reports to Stephenson; and D/St/C2/3/71 Gibson‟s mill reports. 
10¾d, which would include carriage and smelting costs, and ore production was 514  
 
bing and one horse. By assuming that mining expenditure was the same or thereabouts  
 
as in 1742 would not improve the overall level of productivity for capital invested. In  
 
the period 1742-45 the average amount of expenditure to produce one bing of dressed   
 
lead ore at Isabell-mea-Hill mine was £1  2s  7d. 
 
What of ore productivity per man on the Bowes estate? The imperfect  
 
estimates of those employed in lead mining make meaningless any calculation of 
 
ore productivity per man. The average ore per man would be of no value. Moreover,  
 
productivity was largely determined by geology, which was unpredictable. It is  
 
 
possible, however, to calculate ore per man at particular mines at different times  
 
where documents evidence both the numbers of employed miners and ore production.  
 
For most mines both types of information are not available; they only exist for Isabell- 
 
mea-Hill, Rowton Sike at Lunehead, and Closehouse mines. 
 
  The Table 7 below shows lead ore productivity per man, after washing  
 
and dressing, and prior to smelting. Once again, most of the available information is  
 
for the mine at Isabell-mea-Hill, where productivity was highest in the early 1740s.  
 
Table 7 
 
Productivity -ore per man -for three mines 
 
Mine                                    Ore                      Miners               Ore/man 
      (bings, horses, pokes)                          (bings, horses, pokes) 
 
Isabell-mea-Hill: 
 
1744                      221b     2h                            11               20b     1h        1p 
 
1745                        98b     0h                            10        9b     3h        1p 
 
1746                        80b     1h                   16                 5b     0          1p 
 
1752-53                   90b                                      7                12b     3h        1p 
 
1754-55                   80b                                      7                11b     1h        1p 
 
Rowton Sike: 
 
1754-55                   50b                                     4                 12b     2h 
 
Closehouse (& Thringarth): 
 
1751-52                 140b     1h                            5                   28b     0h       1p 
 
1753-54                   11b     1h                          13                              3h       1p 
 
Source: 
This table is derived from D/St/B2112, 120,122 & 137. 
 
 
  
 
Charles Wensley discovered Rowton Sike; he was granted a twenty-year lease in 
 
1752. Underlying the ore per man figure for 1754-55 is the fact that Wensley himself 
 
won thirty of the fifty bing. Closehouse mine showed signs of its subsequent potential  
 
for lead ore, but like nearly all of the lead mines at this time it was small scale in  
 
every sense. 
 
 
Lead ore production on the Bowes estate was well recorded during the  
 
period 1741 to 1759. The mines recorded as producing ore are Arngill, Black Ark  
 
(initially called Cronkley), Closehouse, Cock Lake, Crinkle How, Green Mines,  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill (Birkdale), Lunehead including Rowton Sike, Nichol Hopple, and  
 Standards. Two others, Little Street and Side Lead Mine, where work was carried  
 
on in the early 1750‟s, but for which there are no production figures (the author  
 
believes these to be two additional exploratory workings at Lunehead). In addition,  
 
Bowes bought in lead ore from Dodd Hill and Pikelaw mines, the former in Weardale  
 
and producing good quality ore (ore yield is discussed below). There were five  
 
partnership mines during this period; Isabell-mea-Hill, although Bowes‟ partner,  
 
John Dent died in 1742 leaving Bowes to benefit from the most productive mine of  
 
them all whilst paying Dent‟s widow £20 per annum; Black Sike, where in 1747  
 
Bowes had a one third share and his sister and brother-in-law also held the other 
 
third share; Lunehead, where there were a number of workable veins, and Bowes  
 
had a fifteen-sixteenths share in 1741-42; Rowton Sike, in the Lunehead group,  
 
where Charles Wensley was the other partner; Nichol Hopple Yard, where Bowes had  
 
a five-eighths share; and Standards, where he had a one half share in the mine. As we  
 
have seen above, shares in a mining operation did not preclude Bowes from an  
 
agreement for duty ore before any split of cost and profit. 
 
   
Production statistics for lead ore from all relevant documents are  
 
contained in Table I of the appendices, and these exclude estimated or management   
 
figures often quoted by agents and stewards in memoranda during visits and sent  
 
either to George Bowes himself or to a senior steward, say Richard Stephenson, at  
 
Gibside. Table 8 shows that Isabell-mea-Hill, later called Birkdale‟ was the largest  
 
producer of ore during the period 1741-46 and the most consistent in that period and  
 
during the period 1752-58.Standards mine was also a consistent producer, but at a  
 
much lower level by weight. During the 1740‟s ore from mines other than Isabell- 
    
Table 8 
 
Total lead Ore Production 1741-1759 by weight in bings, horses, and pokes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mea-Hill and Standards was considerably lower. It was during the second half of the  
 
1750‟s that ore production at Arngill, Black Ark, Closehouse, and Lunehead became  
 
more significant, but that from Isabell mea Hill and Standards remained consistent,  
 
although the amount of ore from Isabell mea Hill, then Birkdale, was only between a  
 
fifth and one-third of the weight produced in the period 1741-44. 
 
Table 8 above clearly indicates the importance of Isabell-meah-Hill  
 
lead mine throughout the period; it produced 63.7% of lead ore between 1741 and  
 
1759 based on available records, whilst Closehouse produced 11.8%, Lunehead  
 
including Rowton Sike 12.3%, Standards 5.3%, and Arngill 4.4%. Almost 90% of   
     B        h          p 
Arngill                                               149      0          0  
Black Ark                                           21      1          1 
Black Sike                         2          0  
Closehouse                                        397      2          0 
Cock Lake                                                     2          2 
Crinkle(d) How                         (no records) 
Dodd Hill                                             15      1         0      (bought in ore)  
      
Green Mines                                      42      2         1 
Isabell-mea- Hill (Birkdale)             2149     3         0 
Little Street (Lunehead)                         1      1         1                              
Lunehead                                            340      3         0 
Nichol Hopple              (no records) 
Pikelaw                                                   8      1         0      (bought in ore) 
Rowton Sike (Lunehead)                     70      3         1  
Side (Lunehead)                                                                  (no records)  
Standards                                             177     1          0 
 
   
TOTAL                                                3375   1         0 
Source: Appendix I. 
 
N.B. The original documents specify production at different Lunehead mines              
consequently their output has been noted here in the same way. 
  total ore from Isabella-me-Hill was wrought during the period 1741-46 when it was  
 
operated solely by George Bowes. Perhaps its declining potential is why it was noted  
 
in 1754 as being worked by Tom Bainbridge, John Bainbridge, and William Tarn.
437
   
 
In 1756 Richard Stephenson wrote to George Bowes listing mines that were working,  
 
and he noted Isabell mea Hill as “in tack at 25s a bing” i.e. licensed to miners at a  
 
rate per bing of ore produced, but not a wage.
438
 
 
  Ore production was evidently confined to two periods during the  
 
George Bowes mining era; 1741-46, when Isabella-mea-Hill was by far and away the 
 
most productive mine; and 1751-59 when Isabell-mea-Hill, Lunehead, Closehouse, 
 
Arngill and Standards were the main ore producers. It must be noted, however, that 
 
during the latter period Isabella-mea-Hill, Birkdale from about 1757, produced far  
 
less than when it was initially worked in the 1740s, and then over a two-year period, 
 
1757-58. The weight of ore from Standards in 1757 was more than twice that  
 
produced in 1741-42, whilst Lunehead, including Rowton Sike, became more  
 
productive than during the 1740s. Standards, the Lunehead group, Arngill, and  
 
Closehouse mines appear to have been those with improving potential, but the lack of 
 
records for ore mined, or indeed the lack of production after 1758, forbids any  
 
further comment on their development before 1760. Green Mines, with it longer 
 
history as a source of lead ore, is not recorded as a productive mine, although thirty 
 
five bings were raised in 1751, but only a few in 1757and 1758. 
 
  Therefore, of all the mines listed above, only nine are recorded as  
 
having produced ore, and then only five continued to show any potential, namely 
 
Birkdale, Arngill, Closehouse, Lunehead, and Standards. It was noted above that  
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  Mentioned in correspondence to Richard Stephenson at Gibside D/St/C2/3/75 (5) 
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  D/St/B2/93 memoranda and reports. 
across the period 1729-60 thirty mines/mining areas have been identified on the  
 
Bowes estate, yet despite the increase in mining activity only a small proportion 
 
were productive. The Bowes estate did manage to coordinate a more sustained  
 
level of exploration, discovery, and mining, especially during the 1740s when George  
 
Bowes was particularly attentive. There was undoubtedly an organised and  
 
concentrated effort to establish lead mining as a developing estate activity, but ore  
 
output over almost two decades proves that it was no more than a marginal aspect of  
 
the Bowes estate, a mere fraction of the Blackett-Beaumont lead business, and  
 
insignificant when compared to the Bowes‟ coal enterprise. Notwithstanding  
 
small-scale ore production and the inevitable lower ranking of lead for the Bowes 
 
family by 1760, this enterprise involved should not be underestimated; lead mining on  
 
the Bowes estate had become an established feature of the regional economy, though 
 
very much in its infancy. 
 
 
  The Bowes lead bearing lands in Upper Teesdale were subject to 
 
greater activity compared to the period 1550 to 1722 in terms of exploration,  
 
prospecting, deeper mining, expenditure, the numbers of tacks and leases granted to  
 
miners and investors seeking an outlet for spare capital, and direct Bowes family  
 
involvement. Regionally and nationally, however, the extent of lead ore extraction  
 
was  negligible. Mines were generally small scale and ore production low by weight  
 
and value; this was not a full-scale extractive industry, though George Bowes  
 
instigated the beginnings of larger scale lead mining at Isabell-mea-Hill in the 1740s.  
 
Most workings were exploratory, but there are examples of attempts at expansion  
 
through further discovery and the driving of shafts and levels, such as at Isabell-mea- 
 
Hill, and the various mines in the Lunehead group. Nevertheless, this comparatively  
 
limited development in lead mining instigated by George Bowes within a small  
 geographical area built the foundation for larger scale mining from the late eighteenth  
 
century and well into the nineteenth century.  
 
  There was a discernible level of knowledge and skill in discovering  
 
and mining lead on Bowes‟ land during the mid-eighteenth century, which has  
 
implications for a theory of mineral discovery at the heart of metalliferrous mining.
439
  
 
Lead was not discovered by chance; Bowes stewards, tenants, and lessee miners  
 
demonstrated knowledge and skills which, when applied to the landscape, facilitated  
 
the process of exploration for and discovery of lead veins, although it cannot be  
 
concluded that their capacities were full proof and predictive. 
 
   There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the standard of technology  
 
and technique prevalent in the Bowes‟ mineral pocket was up-to-date and adequate  
 
for the scale of extraction. The mines at Isabell-mea-Hill and Lunehead offer the  
 
 
primary examples of the use of blasting to improve the rate of extraction, whilst the  
 
problem of ventilation in deeper mining was addressed at Isabell-mea-Hill by the  
 
installation of  boxed piping. There is no evidence of mechanisation; the scale of  
 
mining did not necessitate innovation in the same way as coal mining. Water, muscle,  
 
and simple tools assisted by blasting at some mines, were the drivers of lead ore  
 
production in this Bowes-owned corner of the northern Pennines south of  the River  
 
Tees. 
  
  Lead mining and related activities were a growing source of  
 
employment and income, but mainly as an alternative or additional occupation during  
 
autumn and winter. The Bowes‟ mine at Isabell-mea-Hill was the exception in that it  
 
was a managed mining camp for full-time miners during the 1740s when it appears  
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  For further discussion of discovery see M. J. Morrissey & R. Burt, „A Theory of Mineral  
      Discovery: a Note‟ in EcHR, 2nd series XXIII (1970), pp. 298-313 
 lead was mined throughout the year. George Bowes‟ expenditure was focused on this  
 
mine, where he built a house or shop to accommodate lead miners. 
 
  The output of lead ore on the Bowes estate was comparatively very  
 
low and labour productivity, ore per man, was variable, largely determined by  
 
geological circumstances and either Bowes or lessee adventurers willingness to invest  
 
in shafts and levels to chase the lead veins. Isabell-mea-Hill mine exhibits a decline 
 
in labour productivity during the 1740s. Ore productivity per £1 invested also fell at  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill during the same period. There is a measure of correlativity between  
 
expenditure and output per man in this example, which points to the long-term nature  
 
of lead mining and its capital requirements if output was to expand beyond the more 
 
easily accessible veins. Evidently, neither George Bowes nor his lessee mining  
 
adventurers were committed financially to developing lead mining beyond the  
 
margins experienced at Isabell-mea-Hill and Lunehead n the 1740s and 1750s. 
 
By 1760 the Bowes lead landscape was pock marked with small-scale 
 
workings at the infant mines of Birkdale, Lunehead, Closehouse, and on Cronkley  
 
Fell, which were to experience development in the latter years of the eighteenth  
 
century and during the first half of the nineteenth century.  George Bowes‟ flirtation  
 
with lead mining was effectively restricted to his investment and personal  
 
involvement with the mine at Isabell-mea-Hill during the 1740s, followed in the  
 
1750s by a broader approach to the exploitation of this mineral through the granting  
 
of tacks and leases to develop the value of the Bowes family estate. Lead mining  
 
undoubtedly became established as a more structured rural industry in Upper Teesdale 
 
 as a consequence of George Bowes‟ personal direction, which is examined in greater  
 
depth in chapter 8. He was the progenitor of an industry which developed and  
 
became more fruitful almost a century after his death, and the first individual  
 Bowes entrepreneur since the late sixteenth century to be directly involved in  
 
the lead business, acting as an agent of change in the agrarian economy of the  
 
family‟s upland estate. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Mills, Metallurgy, and ‘Makings-Out’ 
 
 
The getting of lead ore, actual mining operations, was organised and managed through  
 
ownership, including partnership, and leases. Extraction, however, was only the first  
 
stage in production, the most expensive in terms of fixed and working capital, and  
 
only the first step towards profit.  Metallic lead, usually called pig lead, the product of  
 
smelting and refining lead ore, was where substantial profits lay, subject to market  
 
conditions both locally and in London. George Bowes‟ strategy for the lead business  
 
focused on improving the efficiency of the five stages in the production process that  
 
followed lead mining: the washing and dressing of lead ore transporting the lead ore  
 
to the mill for smelting; the actual smelting of the washed and dressed ore;  
 
transporting the pig lead pieces to another mill for refining when it was believed the  
 
silver content was of sufficient value – rare on the Bowes estate; and the  
 
transportation to market of refined metallic lead. These linked stages can be dealt with  
 
collectively for the purpose of this analysis. 
 
   In this chapter the different aspects of smelting will be examined: the  
 
crucial role of washing and dressing ore prior to smelting; the smelt mills; the role of  
 
the smelters and smelting output - including George Bowes‟ plans for its development  
 
and possible expansion outside the Bowes estate; and the linked operations of carriage  
 
of ore to and pig lead from the smelt mills. In doing so, it will be shown that the  
 
smelting stage was improved through reorganisation, and the questions as to whether  
 
or not technological improvement was evident, and if improved metallurgical  
 
productivity was achieved, will be dealt with as far as possible. It is not the purpose of  
 
this thesis to re-write the history of lead mining technology and techniques, rather   
 
establish the level of technology employed on Bowes lands and to identify any  
 
changes introduced in the mid-eighteenth century. 
Ore preparation was instrumental in the improvement of smelting. The  
 
washing and dressing process was fundamental to the potential yield of metallic lead  
 
from ore once the smelter‟s skill was applied. Its significance has been a source  
 
discussion as part of the debate about an industrial revolution in metals.
440
 Bowes 
gave  
 
specific instructions to his mines steward about the washing of ore, which included  
 
deducting the washers‟ pay if the work was below standard.441  The prime question 
here  
 
is whether or not George Bowes was innovative in ore preparation, which is now  
 
acknowledged by historians of mining as a key element in the development of lead  
 
production. 
 
  During the 1740s the washing and dressing of ore was usually done by  
 
the miners themselves at the mine. This was the case for both miners employed at the  
 
Bowes lead mines and those working under tacks and leases. The majority of the  
 
surviving tack notes and leases contain clear statements about the washing and  
 
dressing of ore: this is one aspect of the comparative analysis of leases in chapter four  
 
above. In the late 1750s, however, the organisation of ore preparation changed when 
 
a smelt mill was built closer to the lead mines in Upper Teesdale and washing  
 
and dressing became a process carried on at the mill rather than the mines. In the 
 
1740s when the bulk of the ore mined was smelted at Bollihope, George Bowes 
 
was already acutely aware of the relationship between carefully prepared ore and 
 
the quality of pig lead smelted, and gave clear instructions to this end.
442
 There is 
 
is some indication of the use of stamps for crushing at Bollihope smelt mill, but no  
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  Willies, in Day &Tylecote, Revolution in Metals ch. 3; Burt, Ore Preparation Techniques; and H.  
    Martell, & M.C. Gill, „Voyage metallurgique en Angleterre‟ in Bulletin of the Peak District Mines  
   Historical Society, Vol. 10, No.5, (1989). 
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  D/St/B2/91(3) George Bowes‟ handwritten memorandum dated at c.1740 by the archivists at 
DCRO. 
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  D/St/B2/91 his memorandum about the importance of washing and dressing ore before smelting. 
record of washing and dressing by hand there.
443
 All lead ore mined on the Bowes  
 
estate was smelted at Bowes mills unless stewards were instructed to sell ore, a 
 
practice seldom resorted to before 1760 
 
  There are detailed smelt mill records for the late 1750s regarding 
 
the washing of ore and wastes and the washing and picking of slags, the latter being  
 
a source of lead when smelted. Indeed, in 1759 slag smelters were also responsible 
 
for washing and picking the slags and were paid according to the amount of lead 
 
smelted from the slags.
444
 Examination of the smelt mill costs in the pay bills and  
 
accounts for the years 1757 to1760 reveals no further evidence of mechanisation of  
 
the washing and dressing process. Knockstones and knocking are noted, as are kerns  
 
or cams, which are not harbingers of change or development of existing 
technology.
445
  
 
These circumstances are confirmed to some extent by Gabriel Jars, who visited  
 
Britain in the mid-1760s on behalf of the French Government to observe lead  
 
mining. Jars noted the wasteful ore washing techniques in the northern Pennines  
 
and elsewhere, and that stamps for crushing hard ore were not in use except for the  
 
crushing of slag.
446
 Stamps were in use at London Lead Company smelt mills from 
 
the at least the late 1730s, because stamping of ore into much smaller pieces than  
 
could be achieved by hand tools suited the reverberatory furnaces which their mills  
 
operated for refining lead and desilverisation.
447
 
 
  Washing and dressing of lead ore on the Bowes estate was recognised 
 
                                                 
443
  D/St/B2/103 account of mill charges 1741 mentions cams, which governed the stamping action.  
444
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by George Bowes as a primary skill input in the lead production process which could  
 
enhance the skill of the smelter and in that sense act as a catalyst in determining the 
 
yield of lead from any given quantity of ore. The most that can be said, however, is 
 
that existing techniques were employed at the mines and mills, but that the scale of 
 
production and its intermittent nature did not warrant investment that could  
 
otherwise have effected changes in metallic lead output. 
 
 
When the level of lead mining activity increased under the more  
 
business-like regime imposed by George Bowes, his objective was to have the ore his  
 
agents had harvested, from both leased and owned mines, smelted as quickly as  
 
possible. Metallic lead ready for market was the profit-making stage in the production 
 
process. The importance of smelting, and more specifically the ownership and  
 
location of  one or more smelt mills, was the lynchpin in the whole process from mine 
 
to market. Mining adventurers, Bowes‟ lessees, were not smelters and did not own  
 
mills, although there is some evidence of smelting on the minefields. George Bowes 
 
inherited one lead smelting mill, and ore from his mines and those where he was in  
 
partnership needed to be smelted quickly, because he was financially committed to  
 
these mines. The growth in lead mining organisation already discussed above  
 
necessitated different arrangements for smelting, initially at mills some distance  
 
from the sources of extraction, and later the building of another Bowes owned smelt  
 
mill. Details of the smelt mills and George Bowes‟ strategy for horizontal integration,  
 
leading to both the creation of another mill on his estate and the search for profit from  
 
buying and smelting ore outside his own estate and the northeast, demonstrate the  
 
 changes aspired to in managing the estate during the mid-eighteenth century. 
 
During the 1740s, however, there were at least two mills smelting and  
 
refining lead ore from the Teesdale mines, namely Bollihope and Acton. Acton  
 appears to have been used briefly and specifically for refining lead and extracting  
 
silver when it occurred in the lead veins. The only record found referring to silver is a  
 
pay bill for Isabell-mea-Hill for the period 1744-46 in which itemised payments for  
 
winning silver appear next to miners‟ names.448 At this point it should be stated that,  
 
unlike the Blackett-Beaumnonts for whom silver was always a valuable product  
 
derived from lead output, there is no evidence that the Bowes lead business benefited  
 
from this precious by-product. The Blackett-Beaumonts made a profit from silver  
 
alone of £6,972 between 1744 and 1760.
449
 
 
Between 1741 to 1746 ore from Isabell-mea-Hill mine, and duty ore 
 
only from the Arngill, Closehouse, Lunehead, and Standards mines was taken to  
 
Bollihope Mill, also known locally as Bolliop or Boylup Mill, for smelting.
450
  
 
Bollihope mill was the primary smelt mill for Bowes estate ore during throughout the  
 
1740s, its activities recorded in various memoranda comparing it with possible smelt  
 
mills in other locations, and accounts of deliveries of ore and pay bills.
 451
 This mill  
 
continued to be used until at least 1749, smelting ore from the Bowes‟ mines. James  
 
Sanderson was in all probability the leading smelter assisted by another family  
 
member, Lane Sanderson.
452
  By 1751 Bollihope Mill was owned by a Mr. Bacon, 
and  
 
George Bowes instructed his agents, Nathan Horn and Francis O‟Neale to enquire  
 
about the cost of using it.
453
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449
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 During the 1740s James Sanderson was the organiser of ore and pig 
 
 
lead to and from this mill.
454
 Pig lead produced by smelting ore at Bollihope Mill was  
 
carried by pack horses to Wolsingham where it was held over for transhipment to  
 
Tanfield or Shield Row.
455
 A memorandum of 1742/3 describes the carriage of ore to  
 
Bollihope then pig lead to Wolsingham.
456
 The 1742 account of Francis O‟Neale, a 
 
Bowes agent, details the movement of ore from certain mines to Bollihope and the  
 
movement of pig lead to Wolsingham.
457
 Wolsingham was still the staging point in  
 
lead carriage to the staithes on the Tyne in the late 1750‟s.458 Wolsingham was not a  
 
smelting or refining location for Bowes lead, though it was a terminus for lead  
 
carriage.
459
 In 1746 another mill was also employed to smelt Bowes ore from the  
 
Arngill, Lunehead, and Standards mines which, together with duty ore, were  
 
delivered to Acton Mill.
460
 This smelt mill was built by the London Lead Company in  
 
1710 to handle ore from its mines in the upper Derwent Valley; it smelted ores and  
 
slags, and refined lead and extracted silver.
461
  
 
   Bollihope Mill must have operated an ore or blast hearth, which could 
 
use peat as the main fuel, cheaper than coal, and readily and abundantly available on 
 
the Upper Teesdale moors. The smelting process occurred at a lower temperature, 
 
it was quick to get underway, used bellows, but generally needed waterpower and 
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461
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did not facilitate the refining of lead or the extraction of silver. Acton Mill, owned by 
 
the London Lead Company, very probably operated a reverberatory furnace.
462
 
 
This Company had already in 1733 introduced a reverberatory furnace at its smelt  
 
mill in Swaledale to service its lead mines there.
463
 The reverberatory furnace was 
 
a more sophisticated  piece of smelt mill equipment requiring substantial capital  
 
investment, but it allowed smelting of better quality ores, refining, and the extraction  
 
of silver. The Bowes mines must have briefly produced ores of a certain quality,  
 
which necessitated the skills and infrastructure available at Acton in order to 
 
obtain a more desirable metallic lead product, and quantities of silver. Perhaps this  
 
can be taken as a pointer to Acton as the most suitable for silver in the 1740‟s, or  
 
maybe it was for hire because the London Lead Co. mines occasionally did not  
 
deliver sufficient ore to keep Acton Mill at capacity, though this seems unlikely.  
 
During the early 1750s Egglestone Mill was in operation, probably 
 
owned by Anthony Appleby, but it is not clear whether or not George Bowes  
 
employed the Egglestone Mill in the same way as Bollihope and Acton,
 464
 though he  
 
sold lead ore to Appleby for smelting. Egglestone was, however, geographically  
 
closer to estate mines. For the period 1750 to 1757 Bowes ownership of Bollihope  
 
mill is in question, but it has not been possible identify Andrew Appleby‟s mill at  
 
Eggleston as a smelt mill used by George Bowes in the mid-1750s before  
 
Wemmergill became the hub with the Upper Teesdale mines its catchment area, but it  
 
is a possibility because the ore produced was either held as stock or needed to be  
 
smelted somewhere. There is an indication that Samuel Bacon owned Bollihope in the  
 
early 1750s, and on one occasion George Bowes instructed an agent to enquire as to  
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th
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th
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the cost of using it, which is detailed below in the discussion of his personal role. 
 
 
  George Bowes understood the importance of smelting, the value the  
 
smelter‟s skill added to the end product, yet he was also acutely aware of the costs  
 
involved in not possessing a smelt mill which was sited in near proximity to his  
 
mines. His objective was to own and operate a smelt mill on or very near the orefield,  
 
thereby minimising the costs of carriage of both ore and pig lead over difficult 
 
terrain. After lengthy consideration during the 1740s and early 1750‟s, Bowes 
 
decided to invest in the building of a smelt mill at Wemmergill in Lunedale, which  
 
was closer to the lead mines. Construction must have begun in 1756, but not  
 
completed until the following year. John Gibson, the Wemmergill smelt mill manager, 
 
wrote to Thomas Colpitts II, a senior steward to George Bowes, on 11
th
 October 1757 
 
to inform him that Nathan Horn, mines steward, had visited the new mill to discuss  
 
the building of the wheelhouse.
465
 This would seem to indicate that the mill was not in 
 
use at that time. It has been suggested that Wemmergill Smelt Mill was built and  
 
completed in 1756, but the records show that building only began in 1756 and 
 
smelting operations commenced in late 1757.
466
 Wemmergill smelt mill was fully  
 
operational in 1758, but whether it was always fully employed is a different matter.
 467
  
 
There are numerous documents indicating the level of activity at this mill in the late  
 
1750‟s; Gibson‟s reports,468and Horn‟s reports 469 reveal that in 1757 and 1758  
 
Wemmergill was receiving and smelting ore at an acceptable level, but that lower  
 
production in 1759 was cause for George Bowes to question his lead business. Smelt  
                                                 
465
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466
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 mill production is examined later in this chapter. 
 
 
George Bowes‟ instruction regarding carriage and costs was  
 
unambiguous; he wanted to get smelted lead from the mill „as fast as it is smelted‟.470  
 
However, of the different variable costs which preoccupied Bowes‟ thinking on lead  
 
production, carriage costs were the main source of anxiety. For example, in the early  
 
1740‟s he instructed Thomas Colpitts to look into reducing carriage costs by using a  
 
different carrier.
471
  
 
During the 1740‟s Bowes instigated research into the possibility of  
 
building other smelt mills, which involved comparative analysis of carriage costs  
 
and possible locations for a new mill.
472
 George Bowes was seduced by the discovery  
 
of lead at Isabell-mea-Hill in 1741, and during the 1740‟s this was one of the mines  
 
which sustained his enthusiasm for the potential of the lead business. Perhaps it is  
 
quite reasonable, therefore, to expect that at this stage Bowes should have been  
 
planning, researching, and analysing his options for cost reduction and investing in his  
 
own mill. There is no clear indication of the order in which they were written and  
 
presented; suffice it to say these papers were all produced for the personal attention of  
 
George Bowes, who subsequently wrote memoranda clarifying and comparing the  
 
assessments written by individuals he had instructed to supply him with plans and  
 
costs for the building of a smelt mill.
473
 
 
  „Elliot‟s Calculations for building a mill at Staindrop‟, in George  
 
Bowes hand, assessed that the materials cost would be £1-4s-8d to produce a fother of  
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471
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lead at Staindrop, but only £1-2s-0d if smelting was done in „a mill at ye Mine‟.474 
The  
 
main difference was the costs of carrying 20 pieces of lead to Staindrop; nevertheless  
 
it was still cheaper to build near the source of extraction, probably Isabell-mea-Hill  
 
mine. Another memorandum entitled „A Mill at Holwick‟, again in Bowes‟ hand, also  
 
shows that it would have been cheaper to smelt here rather than Staindrop, by 1s-8d,  
 
and that once again the difference in cost was the carriage of lead to Staindrop.
475
 
 
  The idea of building a smelt mill local to the mines continued in 
 
another memorandum „A Computation maid for a Lead Mill at ye Mine‟, comparing  
 
smelting done at „ye mine‟ at £13-5s-1d with that at Mickleton at £13-5s-10d.476 
These  
 
were calculations for the production of a fother of pig lead including the costs of  
 
carriage for ore and pig lead, the pig lead going to Stockton. George Bowes 
 
extended this comparison of location and related costs in his handwritten  
 
memorandum „Elliot‟s Computation about building a Smelt Mill‟, in this case at 
 
Spurls Wood where the cost of making a fother of lead and carrying it to Newcastle  
 
via Wolsingham was assessed at £13-7s-2d.
477
 A note was made on the reverse side of  
 
this document comparing the carriage cost of  15s 8d for pig lead to Dufton, in  
 
Westmoreland, against 12s 0d to Newcastle. Also on the reverse side of the  
 
memorandum regarding a mill at Mickleton, there are scribblings in Bowes‟  
 
handwriting comparing the differences in specific variable costs – materials, carriage,  
 
and the cost of smelting lead from slags- at Spurls Wood and a mill at „ye mine‟. He  
 
estimated that it was cheaper to smelt lead from slags at Spurls Wood than build a  
 
mill near the mine, noting that for every 400 bing of ore smelted at the mine £20  
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would be lost in smelting the slags.
478
  
   
„Jas. Pattisons computation for erecting a Lead Mill‟ of 1742 does not  
 
indicate a location, but states an exact cost of £130, a not insubstantial capital outlay  
 
of its day.
479
 It was a significantly higher estimate than those produced by Elliot if it  
 
did relate to the idea of a smelt mill near the ore fields. On the other hand, it may be  
 
an estimate for a mill near Keswick, which was of serious interest to George Bowes. 
 
A memorandum of 1743 entitled „The Difference shown between 
 
Smelting at Boylup and building a New Mill at Issabell-mea-hill‟, there is no  
 
mention of building costs, instead it concentrates on the cost of smelting at the two 
 
locations, and is based upon the 600 bing of ore mined at Isabell-mea-hill in 1742. 
 
It states that the cost of smelting at Boylup was £167-3s-4d in 1742, whereas if a mill  
 
was built at Isabell-mea-hill the cost would be only £107-15s-0d, a saving of £59 8s  
 
4d for every 600 bing of ore smelted. Evidently, the main cost difference in this  
 
smelting process was the carriage of ore to Boylup or to a mill adjacent to the mine,  
 
the latter destination saving £120. Pig lead carriage from a site near Isabell mea Hill  
 
to Wolsingham would have cost £87 15s compared to £22 3s from Bollihope, but the  
 
reduction in ore carriage costs tipped the scales in favour of a mill location in Upper  
 
Teesdale.
480
 
 
There are several estimates for the costs involved a smelt mill project  
 
in Thornthwaite, near Keswick. „The Real Charge of building a Lead Mill at Keswick  
 
in Cumberland with One Hearth‟ shows a cost of £99-5s-7¼ d.481  A further version 
of  
 
this assessment dated 23
rd
 April 1742, showing identical costs and naming the  
 
location as „Thornthwaite nr. Keswick‟.482 Yet another, entitled „ „A computation of   
                                                 
478
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479
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 building a Lead Mill with one Hearth‟, which does not state the actual location, was  
 
written by Messrs. Boag & Walton, estimated the cost at £170-4s-0d.
483
 Messrs. Boag  
 
& Walton presented Bowes with a fuller version of their initial costs, which included  
 
a plan of the smelt mill incorporating an extension to double its size.
484
 On the back  
 
page of this document is Mr. Boag‟s figure of £170-4s, which includes bellows from  
 
London at £30, which must also be for a mill near Keswick. 
 
  It is noteworthy that Boag & Walton were Nicholas Walton Snr. and  
 
Henry Boag, who from 1735 were the two Receivers for the Greenwich Hospital  
 
Estate, which had lead interests on Alston Moor and at Thornthwaite near Keswick. 
 
They held influential management positions in that they had the authority to grant  
 
leases and also acted as agents for Sir Henry Liddell.
485
 It may have been that George  
 
Bowes considered a lead mining lease or permission to build and operate a smelt mill. 
 
   Lastly, in „A computation of the Expence of erecting a Smelting  
 
House, Bellowshouse, Wheelhouse, Peathouse, Coalhouse, Bingstead, and Office‟,  
 
the wheel, the bellows, and timber made up almost half of the total cost of £120.
486
  
 
There is no indication of this estimate being connected to a smelt mill near Keswick,  
 
and because there is a note about iron being at Streatlam Castle there is reasonable  
 
probability this document relates to the mill at Wemmergill. It would appear to be on  
 
the same scale as Pattison‟s estimate for building at £120, but there again those  
 
estimates which clarify the Lakeland location show a figure of £99-15s-7¼ d. Perhaps  
 
the documents are a variation on a theme, subject to specification and the surveyor‟s  
 
judgment as to what would result in the most useful mill for George Bowes. Again,  
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the Boag & Walton plans and estimate of costs could relate to an existing mill, which  
 
needed refurbishing with a view to expanding the mill‟s capacity.  
 
  The idea of Bowes refurbishing an existing mill or building a new  
 
mill near Keswick may not have been as wildly speculative as it may appear. In 1474  
 
Edward IV appointed a fifteen-man commission to follow up George Willarby‟s  
 
report of three mines producing lead ore with a high silver content, one near Keswick, 
 
the other two were Blanchland, and Fletcheroos on Alston Moor.
487
 There were  
 
commercially viable lead deposits near Keswick, Helvellyn, and Caldbeck Fells in 
 
the Lake District.
488
  The economic and social history of the Lake counties only  
 
confrims the incidence of copper mining in the eighteenth and early nineteenth  
 
centuries; lead is only mentioned with reference to production in the Alston area of  
 
Cumberland.
489
  
 
  George Bowes instigated the research into the viability of creating one  
 
or more smelt mills. „Some Memds. relating to the building of a Smelt Mill‟ provide  
 
further evidence of his personal, direct involvement in assessing the most lucrative 
 
market - Newcastle or Stockton – and the key variable factors in the development of  
 
the infrastructure for ensuring the most efficient, and ultimately profitable, process of  
 
getting metallic lead to market. Bowes knew that control of costs at the various stages  
 
would determine the profit achieved in his chosen market: smelting costs were paid  
 
by the fother, and these could be mitigated by better washing and dressing of ore and  
 
the skill of the smelters; fuel costs, peat or coal, by the horse load; transportation costs  
 
were based upon the weights of ore and smelted lead carried by pack-horse; travelling  
 
distances and terrain governed the carriage speed of ore and smelted lead; and then  
                                                 
487
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 there was the potential cost of using an agent in marketing metallic lead, subject to the  
 
particular market. So, in the early 1740‟s George Bowes was performing a  
 
comparative cost analysis of whether to market his product in Newcastle or Stockton,  
 
which in turn would enable him to reach a decision as to where he should invest in the  
 
building of one or more smelt mills. 
 
 
George Bowes understood that the knowledge and skill of the smelter  
 
was a prerequisite of  producing good quality metallic lead. In one note he refers to  
 
„Thomas Moses late a Smelter to Mr Vane‟ who had offered Bowes his services and  
 
told him that „there is a great deal of art in building hearths „, as well as demonstrating  
 
his knowledge of the costs involved. Bowes noted that Moses built the hearths for Mr  
 
Vane.
490
 Clearly, Bowes was considering the possible value of this smelter to his  
 
proposals for building a mill. In June 1741he visited Bollihope Mill to assess the cost  
 
of smelting lead ore, where he negotiated with the smelters the smelting of twenty  
 
bing of ore before he would agree their rate of pay. He knew the quality of the pig  
 
lead smelted was heavily dependent on the smelters‟ skill and, of, course, was seeking  
 
to control future costs by discovering the amount of pig lead they could produce from  
 
a given amount of ore.
491
 Bowes was also aware that ore which had been carefully  
 
washed and dressed enhanced smelting and the quality of the metallic lead produced  
 
thereby. Indeed, the better preparation and dressing of the ore was a prerequisite of  
 
smelting in a reverberatory furnace.
492
 
 
  The mid-eighteenth century technology for the extraction of lead ore  
 
by miners on the Bowes estate was current but in no way in advance of any other 
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 lead mining district. Essentially it came down to basic tools and muscle power 
 
assisted by blasting with gunpowder. There is no indication at this stage of either  
 
George Bowes or any incoming lessee adventurer introducing improved technology 
 
to enhance efficiency of extraction below ground. Did George Bowes, who  
 
monopolised the smelting process on his estate, introduce new methods or technology  
 
into smelting? 
 
  The bulk of the lead ore from the Upper Teesdale estate was  
 
transported to the Bollihope smelt mill during the 1740s. The mill was a  
 
water-powered wheel driven mill containing an ore hearth and a slag hearth.  
 
Accounts of materials and equipment used at Bollihope confirm the probability that  
 
this smelt mill was based on an ore hearth rather than a reverberatory furnace.
493
 
There  
 
were two smelters, Thomas Moses and James Sanderson from August to November  
 
1741, and, apart from lead ore, the materials mentioned are peat, coals, and lime. The  
 
types of equipment mentioned are the wheel, bellows, and pigg pan. These materials  
 
and equipment point to ore hearth smelting at Bollihope, which did not preclude  
 
desilverisation if the ore was of silver-bearing quality.
494
 
 
  The smelt mill at Wemmergill was probably ore hearth and slag  
 
hearth, if for no other reason than the ridiculous expenditure that would have been  
 
necessary to transport large amounts of coal there to fuel a reverberatory furnace. 
 
The terrain and complete absence of a road infrastructure made it impossible in any  
 
event. The smelt mill records for Wemmergill are somewhat better than those for  
 
Bollihope.
495
 Again peat by cart, lime, and coals are stated as materials; the coals  
 
were carried in from Craksescarr on the South Durham coalfield. Also stated in the  
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 documents are hearth building, knocking slags, and slag smelting. Again, this 
 
detailed information clearly evidences the existence of ore and slag hearths. 
 
There are but two indicators of how John Gibson was considering 
 
improving pig lead output. In late1758 he wrote to Richard Stephenson at Gibside  
 
suggesting that „All the slags might be worked in winter‟, his primary reason being  
 
that slag smelting was a slower process, which if done in the summer would have 
 
severely restricted the whole process and leaving carriers temporarily unemployed  
 
when they could have been carrying pig lead to Wolsingham.
496
 In the same report to  
 
his senior steward, Gibson wrote „Some Improvement might be made in  
 
Manufacturing the Ore; when I mentioned it, the Smelter told me that Mr. Horn said I  
 
had nothing to do with it‟.497 Gibson appears to have been considering improving the  
 
smelting process, but there is no evidence of how or to what extent. George Bowes  
 
was fully aware of the nature of smelting and the key to successful smelting within  
 
the confines of the existing technology– the smelter‟s skill. George Bowes did not  
 
bring about a change in technology or smelting methods, rather his main concern was  
 
cost reduction, which he achieved by transplanting the smelting process at  
 
Wemmergill, thereby reducing the cost of ore carriage. Peat was readily available as  
 
fuel for the ore hearth, as it had been at Bollihope, and this, combined with the scale  
 
and intermittent nature of smelting ore from the Bowes estate, meant that at this stage  
 
in the development of lead production in Teesdale technological change was  
 
unnecessary and economically unviable. 
 
  The smelt mills receiving deliveries of ore from the mines have been  
 
discussed above, and it is clear that George Bowes strove to establish his own mill 
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as mining developed at Isabell-mea-Hill and beyond in Upper Teesdale. During the 
 
1740‟s and early 1750‟s ore from his estate was smelted at Bollihope, with  
 
refining for silver only identified Acton if a reverberatory finance was essential, but  
 
quite possible in the ore hearth at Bollihope. Bowes mill at Wemmergill began  
 
smelting ore in 1757. There was no smelting activity at any mill for the period  
 
1750-56, because evidently ore production was insufficient, a result of stockpiling and  
 
the consequences of war. 
 
Table 9 
  
Lead smelted and delivered to the staith at Newcastle upon Tyne during the 
period1741-1760 
 
 
 Pieces smelted Mill Pieces delivered 
to Wolsingham 
Pieces delivered 
To Shield Row 
1741        1666 Bollihope          960        960 
1742        1409 Bollihope        1802      1802 
1743        1663 Bollihope        1724      1724 
1744          355 Bollihope          605        605 
1745        1078 Bollihope        1044      1034 
1746          249 Bollihope          248        258 
1747          559 Bollihope          375        375 
1748          275 Bollihope          360        360 
1749            56 Bollihope            56          56 
1750  
 
 
There are no estate records for 1750-56 
 
 
                                                                                   To Tanfield Moor 
1751 
1752 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757         700 Wemmergill          220        920 
1758       1927 Wemmergill        1422      1420 
1759           13 Wemmergill          282        226 
1760         112 Wemmergill                   
 
Source: 
Created from the figures for smelted lead pieces extracted from D/St/B2/105 
(for the1740s), D/St/B2/150 & 157 (for 1757), D/St/C2/3/77 (for 1758), and 
D/St/C3/77 (10 &12) (for 1759). The figure for 1760 is from D/St/B2/150, an 
account of lead smelted. 
  
There are accounts of smelted pig lead for all but one year of the 1740s  
 
and for the years 1757-1760. Table 9 above lists the amounts of pig lead smelted and  
 
delivered to the staith at Dunston on the River Tyne during the period from 1741 to  
 
1759. The difference between the amounts of pig lead smelted and the amount  
 
delivered is accounted for by the lead lying locally. Trade in smelted lead, both  
 
locally and by ship down the east coast, is discussed later. 
 
Lead ore from the Bowes estate during the 1740‟s was smelted at  
 
Bollihope Mill and produced 7310 pieces(or pigs), of which 7174 pieces, or  
 
98.14%, were delivered to Wolsingham and then transhipped by packhorse to Shield  
 
Row, from where the pig lead was taken more cheaply by waggonway to the staith.  
 
One variation occurred in 1746 when 36 bing from Lunehead, 37 from Standards, and  
 
23 from Arngill as delivered directly to Acton Mill, not Bollihope, for smelting
498
. In  
 
the Lead Account ledger for the 1740‟s there is no ore recorded as delivered to  
 
Bollihope in 1746, but there is a record of pig lead smelted at Bollihope in 1746, but  
 
not at Acton.
499
 In the latter years of the 1750‟s ore smelted at Wemmergill converted  
 
into 2939 pieces, of which 2630 or 93.03% reached Wolsingham before it was carried  
 
again to Tanfield Colliery to join the waggonway en route to the Tyne. 
 
The statistical evidence for amounts of pig lead smelted highlights low  
 
output for most of the 1750‟s. George Bowes own efforts were subdued at this stage,  
 
and ore output was mainly a consequence of lessee activity. Ore must have been  
 
smelted, but not at a Bowes owned mill.
500
 In the late1750s there was a resurgence in  
 
activity and in 1758, 915 pieces of lead were carried from Tanfield Moor to the Staith,  
 
                                                 
498
  These amounts of ore mined at the three stated mines are included in Table I of the appendices, 
     and included in the ore production summary in Table 8, Chapter 5 above. 
499
  D/St/B2/105.  
500
  Ore production figures in Table I of the appendices show mining activity in several mines. 
and a further 258 in 1760, but none in 1759.  
 
George Bowes was often preoccupied with the yield of smelted  
 
metallic lead from lead ore, an idea which permeated the estate management  
 
system. The amount of smelted lead that a bing of ore produced relied upon three  
 
factors: the quality of the ore after washing and dressing; the skill of the smelter; and  
 
the basis of the process - smelting in an ore hearth or in a reverberatory furnace or  
 
cupola. The desilverising or refining of metallic lead could be done in either the  
 
reverberatory furnace or the ore hearth. 
 
  In 1741 one of Bowes‟ agents, Thomas Colpitts I produced a summary  
 
analysis of  „Oar Makings Out‟, which included the mines at Isabell-mea-Hill,  
 
Lunehead, Standards, Arngill, and bought in ore from Dodd Hill.
501
 His reckonings  
 
are below in Table 10, , and he commented that „All these very bad‟.502 Unusually, 
 
Colpitts‟ final figures were in decimal form, rather than bings, horses and pokes. 
 
 
Table 10 
 
‘Makings Out’ – the yield from lead ore in 1741 
  
Source of ore     Bings              Fothers  Corrected Bings  
 
Isabell –Meah-Hill  4, 8       to     1                         4, 83 
 
Lunehead   6, 5       to     1         6, 5 
 
Standards   7, 83     to            1         7, 83 
 
Arngill   6           to            1         6, 93 
 
Dodd Hill   5           to            1         4, 77 
 
                                                 
501
  D/St/B2/154 (1) „Oar Makings Out for 1741‟. 
502
  Quoted from D/St/B2/154 (1). 
Source:  
D/St/B2/154 „Oar Makings Out for 1741‟. 
 
 
In 1741 514 ¼ bings of ore were smelted at Bollihope Mill producing 1666 pieces of  
 
smelted lead, or 104 fothers and 2 pieces (where 16 pieces is one fother). The average  
 
bings needed to smelt a fother of lead was, according to Colpitts, 4.83, but the  
 
corrected amount is 4.94. Therefore, the corrected figures show to produce one 
 
fother of pig lead required slightly more ore than Colpitt‟s reckoned, that yield was  
 
very slightly more disappointing than he believed., but that in terms of quality Isabell  
 
mea Hill ore and the bought in ore from Dodd Hill were distinctly better than other  
 
sources in that year. 
 
  Another of George Bowes‟ agents, Mr O‟Neale, reported in 1742, his  
 
assessment of ore yield in 1741.
503
 His figures for the amount of ore from the same  
 
sources to produce one fother of pig lead are identical to those of Colpitts, with the  
 
exception of 0.03 less for Standards mine. A memorandum written by George Bowes  
 
in 1742 contains the comment „If 4 Bing makes a Newc foder or 21Ct… 32oz of Oar  
 
produces 21 oz of Lead‟, a more optimistic assessment of yield than those provided  
 
by the field agents.
504
 He also wrote 3B 3H 4St 12 lbs, suggesting a calculation that 3  
 
bings 3 horses 4 stones and 12 pounds of ore could produce a fother of pig lead,  
 
which would have been a huge improvement in yield. 
 
George Bowes gave serious consideration to O‟Neal‟s report and the  
 
matter of yield and wrote his thoughts on the memorandum. He noted the relative  
 
quality of Dodd Hill ore and that O‟Neal had omitted to mention its delivery to  
 
Wolsingham and queried „why this Oar is not refined (and) if any was sent to ye  
 
                                                 
503
  D/St/B2/155 (18) entitled „Mr O‟Neals Account of ye Lead Mills 1742‟. He includes a breakdown  
      of costs by source for ore, carriage, and smelting involved. 
504
  D/St/B2/135(6). 
Mills‟.505 This would indicate his expectation of silver content. He also wrote „ a  
 
Fother of Lead yields 10 stone out of ye slags unpicked. …(but)…. picked only 5  
 
stone‟.506 Consequently, he wrote a reminder about preventing workers from picking  
 
„to give orders about picking ye lead out of ye slags.507  
 
  Again, Bowes demonstrated his attention to the details of costs when 
 
he wrote beneath O‟Neal‟s figure for yield at Isabell-mea-Hill „Elliot says on a  
 
calculation at Raby it was found that about 8s p(er) Fother might be saved by 
 
building a Mill at ye Mine rather than at their present Mill‟.508 Extending his thoughts 
 
along somewhat more pessimistic lines, and to avoid altogether the problem of yield, 
 
in 1742 Bowes wrote „if not to my Advantage to lay in my Lead Mynes. To consider  
 
if it is not proper carry on the Myne and lay off the oar after it‟s washed in the Mill‟s  
 
shop‟.509 Even at such an early stage in the development of his lead business, George  
 
Bowes gave serious consideration to the ramifications of continued involvement in  
 
the whole process of lead production. 
 
  After the Bowes‟ smelt mill at Wemmergill commenced operation, the  
 
manager, John Gibson, calculated a more precise figure for the yield of smelted lead  
 
from ore. Gibson‟s memorandum of 24th June 1758 to Richard Stephenson at Gibside  
 
contained the following summary of his calculation: „The whole quantity of ore  
 
received is 349B: 2 5/6
th
 h, which is smelted into 87F:14C: 2qr: 7lb Lead. Hence 4B,  
 
2h, 0 stone, 2lb of ore has produced a Fother of Lead at the first Fire. - I think there  
 
will be somewhat above 4½ fother of slag Lead. -      Suppose 4F: 12C: 1qr: 2lb  
 
which added will make 92F: 6C, then 4Bing: 1 horse: 1 Stone: 11 pounds will make a  
 
Fother at first and second Fires, which considering the ore is good produce‟.510 This  
                                                 
505
  Quoted from D/St/B2/155 (18) where it is in Bowes‟ handwriting. 
506
  Quoted from D/St/B2/155 (18). 
507
  Quoted from D/St/B2/155 (18). 
508
  Quoted from D/St/B2/155 (18). 
509
  Quoted from D/St/B2/155 (18). 
 suggests that the yield per bing of ore had improved at Wemmergill in the late 1750s  
 
compared to that of the early 1740s. 
 
   
The smelt mill at Wemmergill was planned and built in close  
 
proximity to the Bowes mines in order to reduce carriage costs, which in turn  
 
would increase profits at market. An improvement in the yield of lead from ore 
 
would further enhance the effect of George Bowes having his own mill. Gibson 
 
estimated that the new mill was productive, although hinting perhaps at the relatively  
 
lesser quality of some ore. During 1758 Richard Stephenson performed an historical 
 
comparative analysis entitled „Computation of the great difference of Lead from the  
 
same quantity of ore smelted at Boylup Mill and that quantity at our own Mill‟.511 
 
  Stephenson‟s case was that in 1743 343 bing of ore produced 72  
 
fothers 6cwt 3qr 0lbs, whereas in 1757 and 1758 the same quantity of ore produced 
 
77 fothers 5cwt 0qr 2lbs - a 4 fother 6cwt 1qr 2lbs increase. In other words a 7.25% 
 
increase in yield from the same amount of ore.
512
 Also contained in the same  
 
document Stephenson calculated the change in yield in stones of lead produced 
 
from one bing of ore. In 1743 the yield was 33 1/3
rd
 stones of lead, but in 1757 
 
and 1758 it was 35 ¾ stones of lead. This improvement equates to a 7.26% 
 
increase in yield. It must be concluded that ore preparation and smelting had been  
 
managed to improve, and that perhaps sometimes ore was of better quality.  
 
  
The linked stages in the smelting chain – washing and dressing of ore,  
 
carriage of ore to smelt mill, smelting, and carriage of pig lead to market - were  
 
                                                                                                                                            
510
  D/St/C2/3/76   Gibson to Stephenson of 24th June 1758.  
511
  D/St/B2/157 in Stephenson‟s handwriting. 
512
  The author believes that there is a minor error of 3 ½ horses of ore missing in Stephenson‟s  
     addition of amounts of ore from the mines he lists for 1757, but this would not make any  
     significant change to his figures for yields and improvement in yield. 
micro-managed by the Bowes estate‟s specialist stewards and George Bowes himself.  
 
Problems in ore preparation were addressed, although the extent of improvement is  
 
difficult to assess. Before 1757 lessees did their own washing and dressing at the  
 
mines, and there is evidence of labour specialisation in this process at Isabell-mea- 
 
Hill in the 1740s, and later at Wemmergill smelt mill in the late 1750s, and stamps for  
 
reducing the size of veinstuff rather than doing it by hand. Generally, Bowes‟  
 
management attempted to improve ore preparation to concentrate the ore so that it  
 
 
made up to sixty or seventy percent of the raw material delivered to the smelter.
513
  
 
Like many mineral owners he was probably more accustomed to bouse or veinstuff  
 
with lower lead content.
514
 Overall, ore preparation was a manual process during this  
 
period, though manual technique was improving and labour saving machinery  
 
beginning to appear, which in turn would have meant a cost saving and better quality  
 
lead for market. 
 
  For most of the period 1739 to 1760 ore mined and prepared on Bowes  
 
land was smelted at the Bowes‟ mills – Bollihope in the 1740s and Wemmergill from  
 
1757. The Bowes estate management, including George Bowes, demonstrated a  
 
detailed understanding of the technology and techniques required for smelting lead  
 
in the small-scale industrial environment of Upper Teesdale estate. The smelting  
 
process was better managed under John Gibson at Wemmergill; the yield from lead  
 
and general productivity received more serious attention, though the significance of  
 
„makings-out‟ were not overlooked by Bowes and his stewards in the 1740s. At  
 
Wemmergill there was more professional oversight and evidence of Gibson‟s ability  
 
to alter the variables the smelter had to contend with in producing pig lead, including  
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  The percentage of concentrate is taken from Burt, Ore Preparation, p. 6. 
514
  W. Forster, A Treatise on a Section of the Strata from Newcastle -on –Tyne to Cross Fell  
     (Newcastle 1883) p.173.  
the smelting of slags
515
. In the late 1750s it seems there was a managed improvement  
 
in metallurgy; the Bowes mill was producing more metallic lead from any give  
 
amount of ore, which also has implications for the standard ore preparation which at  
 
that stage was largely done at the mill. Again, there are no records of silver being  
 
refined from lead, yet silver content in ore in North Pennines is generally viewed as  
 
relatively high, which often made viable lead mines that would otherwise have been  
 
uneconomical.
516
 
 
  Smelting and the carriage of ore to and lead from the smelt mills  
 
became better organised under George Bowes. Carriage costs were cut, most  
 
importantly those for ore, and the management of carriage centred on Wemmergill 
 
from 1757 rather than the apparent dual management by smelters and stewards in the  
 
1740s. The following chapter considers the movement of lead to market, supply and  
 
demand, sales and purchases, and the factors affecting the market mechanism. 
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  See Willies in Day & Tylecote, Revolution in Metals, p.92 
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  Ibid p.86 
Chapter 7: Markets, Movements, Merchants, and Money 1740-60 
 
 
George Bowes‟ grasp of the lead business and his awareness of its significance as a  
 
valuable commodity in regional, national, and overseas markets during the mid- 
 
eighteenth century becomes even clearer when the trade in lead is examined in greater  
 
depth. He and his stewards had to overcome not only problems associated with the  
 
finding and production of lead, but also those related to its movement to market and  
 
operation of the market.  This chapter examines a number of important features of the  
 
lead business: Bowes interaction with the three identifiable markets; the regional  
 
market focused on Newcastle; the national market focused on London; and the  
 
overseas markets reached through both Newcastle and London; the ports and their  
 
roles in the lead trade; the regional trade in ore and pig lead; lead sales, price  
 
movements, and determinants of fluctuations, the characteristics of the lead market  
 
mechanism; the movement of lead to market: and the Bowes response to market  
 
fluctuations during two decades overshadowed by two wars.  
 
 
The recorded lead production on the Bowes estate during the period  
 
1740-60 reflects an apparent surge in demand ending 1749, which was later repeated   
 
on a lesser scale in the period 1757-60. The relative absence of extraction, smelting,  
 
and pig lead sales during the intervening years from 1750 to 1757 do not  
 
automatically imply that George Bowes alone, or as a member of a cartel, stocked  
 
lead enabling him to control supply and price, but it could distract us into believing  
 
that lead production on the Bowes estate was motivated by the opportunity born of  
 
war demand rather than peacetime, largely building related, local and national  
 
markets, and overseas markets. Yet prices were falling, and the only additional  
 
 
 
demand would have been for munitions, an immeasurable factor here, but whatever its  
 
level clearly insufficient to counteract any other sources of demand currently not in  
 
play, thereby boosting prices. Indeed, Appendix I shows ore production from all but  
 
two of the Bowes mines – Closehouse in 1751/52 and Isabell-mea-Hill 1752-56 –  as  
 
relatively very small from 1747 to 1756, with an upturn in output from 1757 to1759,  
 
albeit at a considerably lower level by weight than during the years 1741-46. What  
 
could fluctuations in the domestic building market and the overseas market have  
 
meant for the Bowes lead business between 1739 and 1760? 
 
There is no current measure of the effect of war demand on lead  
 
production, but more can be said about the other primary market for lead  –  building.  
 
Building activity appears to have been connected to war and overseas trade.  
 
Building contracted in London, but not in the provinces, during the second half of the  
 
1739-48 war and in 1762-63.
517
 Building in London was „at its lowest ebb‟ 1743-48,  
 
and the Seven Years‟ War obstructed renewed construction in parts of the capital.518   
 
The 1739-48 building slump was a consequence of timber shortages caused by war  
 
demand for shipping.
519
  The idea of higher interest rates in outports and 
industrialising  
 
areas, like Newcastle, has been posited as causing a decline in construction.
520
 It has   
 
been uncovered that troughs in building occurred during the War of the Austrian  
 
Succession and the Seven Years‟ War, specifically 1744 and 1762, which, as noted  
 
below, coincide with downturns in overseas trade.
521
 In general, the demand from the  
 
building sector for lead must have dropped significantly for most of the war years. 
 
                                                 
517
  A.H. John, „War and the English Economy, 1700-1763‟, in EcHR 2nd series VII (1955) pp.329-
440;  
    and D. George, London Life in the Eighteenth Century (London 1925; 1951 edition) ch. II.  
518
  G. Summerson, Georgian London (London 1945) p.94. 
519
  Wilson, Apprenticeship, p.277. 
520
  T.S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England 1700-1800 (Oxford 1959), p.88. 
521
  J. Parry Lewis, Building Cycles and Britain’s Growth (London 1965) pp.17-19. 
    
Understanding the effects of war on the overseas market is critical to  
 
an examination of the Bowes lead trade in this period. One conclusion is that war  
 
increased the volume of trade generally during the eighteenth century, contradicting  
 
the broadly accepted view that war exerted negative effects on economic growth  
 
manifested in decreasing investment and personal consumption.
522
 An alternative  
 
argument is that during the period 1700-1763 war had positive consequences; British  
 
sea power acquired markets in North America, Europe – especially Holland and  
 
France  – and India, with the redirection of mineral products, like lead, into the market  
 
created by needs of conflict.
523
  Another study of eighteenth-century foreign trade is  
 
based upon statistical evidence for 1699-1701, 1722-24, 1752-1754, and 1772-74,  
 
purposely selected to negate the effects of war yet suggesting that between 1689 and  
 
1774, despite British success, war „slowed the overall expansion of trade‟.524  
 
Nevertheless, the supporting statistics show an upward trend in value terms,  
 
particularly to North West Europe and Southern Europe, whereas before 1760 the  
 
American, Northern European, and East India trade appears relatively stagnant. One  
 
study of trends in British economic growth tends to support the view that war acted as  
 
a brake on trade.
525
  Overall the inference is that war‟s disruption of trade was a  
 
significant factor restricting the growth in English overseas trade in the period  
 
1701-50, that after 1739 „war made trade difficult for most of the following decade  
 
and particularly 1744-8‟, with a recurrence of this effect in 1759 and 1761-2.526  
 
A more recent study of war and trade points to lead exports to Scandinavia in  
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   W.W.Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth  (Oxford 1953) pp. 159-160. 
523
   John, War, pp.329-330. 
524
   R. Davis, „English foreign trade, 1700-1774‟ in EcHR 2nd series XV (1962) reprinted in 
    W. E. Minchinton, The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the 17
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 Centuries (London  
    1969) pp. 99-120. 
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   P. Deane, & W.A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959 (Cambridge 1969) p.29. 
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  Minchinton, Overseas Trade, pp. 13-16. 
 particular years of the Seven Years War as having been higher than the peacetime  
 
levels, both by volume and value.
527
 This was countered in a study of the industrial 
 
revolution which reiterated that the overriding historical perspective is that the war of  
 
1756-63 had a negative impact on trade and the economy in general.
528
 Lastly, the  
 
most recent overall assessment of the impact of war on trade concludes that the effects  
 
were generally positive, but omits an analysis of the consequences for East coast ports  
 
trading to London and Europe.
529
 
 
Perhaps Schumpeter‟s statistics for the value export values of lead and  
 
lead shot during the two wars lasting eighteen years provide greater clarification.  
 
Exports by value were only lower than those of 1738 in three years of the 1739-48  
 
war - 1742, 1744, and 1745, with 1744 showing the biggest fall of almost 21%. Those  
 
for 1739-41, 1743, and 1746 were all higher than the pre-war level. The 1756-63 war  
 
caused more damage to trade in lead: in 1756 the export values were approximately  
 
20% higher than in 1755, after which the trend was downward until 1762-63 when  
 
values were more than 10% above that of 1755.
530
 Schumpeter‟s statistics for the  
 
geographical distribution of lead and shot exports by quantity and weight (i.e. fothers)  
 
reveal a shift in 1740 and 1745 away from the lesser markets of Africa, East Indies,  
 
North American Colonies, and British West Indies because of war, whereas the  
 
Northern and Central European markets changed slightly, the former three per cent  
 
more, the latter almost five per cent less. Exports to Southern Europe were the main  
 
victim of war falling by 26%. Exports to all these markets, with the exception of  
 
Northern Europe, enjoyed growth in the post-war boom in trade. The distribution of  
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exports during the 1756-63 war reflects those for values of lead and shot, in that  
 
during 1755-60 Central and Southern European markets shrank approximately 25%,  
 
whilst those in Africa and East Indies quadrupled, those to Northern Europe and  
 
North American colonies one and half times.
531
  Schumpeter‟s statistics clarify  
 
Ashton‟s remark that during the two mid-century wars exports of both lead and lead 
 
shot „were cut down severely‟.532 
 
  Therefore, it would appear that the overseas market for lead and shot  
 
was less affected by war during the 1739-48 than 1756-63; trade only reduced by 
 
value in three years of the 1739-48 war, but was higher in six. Exports by value were  
 
lower than pre-war in four years of the Seven Years‟ War, but higher in three. Clearly  
 
the overseas market for lead and shot did not disappear during the two wars, indeed  
 
for most of the 1739-48 war export values were greater than pre-war, and similarly for  
 
three of the 1756-63 war. Burt‟s study incorporates an analysis of factors which  
 
determined the price of lead at ports and the London price, and based upon customs  
 
records and parliamentary papers he shows that in 1758 40% of British lead was  
 
exported to the Netherlands, which was the primary market for British lead in the  
 
mid-eighteenth century. This was followed by the Iberian Peninsular and the  
 
Mediterranean markets which received between 20% and 25% of lead exported  
 
between 1700 and 1750. He also points to France as an important outlet, even during  
 
wartime in 1738-40.
533
 Most significantly for the purposes of this discussion, Burt  
 
establishes that during both 1739-48 and 1756-63 the average level of trade in lead  
 
fell compared to the pre-war level, and that prices fell in both periods. He concludes  
 
thus: „War was a major influence on the size and pattern of the export trade and  
 
caused important repercussions for the domestic metal market‟ and „in the  
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 eighteenth century prices and profits were sustained by export markets‟.534 
 
  The supply of pig lead from Bowes‟ land was inelastic; the perceived  
 
increase in demand could not be met in the very short term because it took time to  
 
mobilise labour, sink mines and extend old workings, carry ore, smelt lead, and carry  
 
it to market. Equally, the production process could not be terminated quickly in  
 
response to market conditions. The key factor here was time. In the short term ore and 
 
pig lead output gathered momentum by the expansion of operations mainly at Isabell- 
 
mea-Hill. The nature of mineralisation, and the ability to increase ore production at  
 
old and new workings were the fundamental contributors in the response to market  
 
variations during the 1740s. Again, during Seven Years War of 1756-63, although  
 
lead prices were higher at the onset of hostilities, they fell to the same levels as the  
 
War of the Austrian Succession 1739-48.   
 
 
  There were effectively two regional markets: a minor market for lead  
 
ore and a major market for pig lead. Lead ore was bought and sold, but the bulk of it  
 
was bought for smelting into pig lead for market.  Generally speaking, the price of ore  
 
was determined by the market price of pig lead which was underpinned by the costs  
 
of smelting, possibly refining, and carriage to market. In addition, ore preparation  
 
through washing and dressing in readiness for smelting influenced its price. Quite  
 
often ore was graded according to perceived quality. This outline of the sale of lead  
 
ore remains the received view of this aspect of internal trade, and applies to other lead  
 
mining areas.
535
 
 
   The sale of ore mined on the Bowes estate was essentially controlled  
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  Ibid. p.237 and 243 
535
  Burt, British Lead, pp. 201-207. Burt describes the sale of ore in Derbyshire, the South West, 
     Wales, and other parts of the North Pennines, and mentions that the factors effecting its price were 
     largely unchanged in the nineteenth century. 
by the tacks and leases granted by George Bowes, which are discussed in chapter five  
 
above. The prices of bought-in ore, which is both ore from non-Bowes‟ mines and  
 
from Bowes‟ leased mines, are shown below in Table 11, and the impression is that  
 
buying-in was more common in the late 1750s than in previous years. A full series of  
 
Bowes‟ prices for the 1740s and 1750s do not appear in the surviving records.  
 
Overall, there was not a significant variation in the price of a bing of lead ore, and the  
 
two examples of much lower prices in 1755 and 1758 must relate to the source,  
 
Table 11 
 
Prices of bought-in lead ore from leased Bowes mines and other mines 
 
 
Year           Mine              Amount of ore    Price/Bing               Value 
        Bings    horses    pokes                                     £        s          d 
 
1742          Standards            23          0            2                  45s          52      17        6 
                  Arngill                  6          2            0                  45s            14      12        6 
                  Dodd Hill           15          1            0                  48s 6d        36      19       7½    
 
1755          Rowton Sike       50         0             0                   30s            75        0        0 
       Isabell-mea-Hill     80        0             0                   25s           100        0        0 
 
1757          Lunehead            20         0            0                   47s            47        0        0 
                  Closehouse         20         0            0                   46s            46         0       0 
                  Standards 14         1    0             46s       32       11       0 
                  Arngill                  7         0            0                   46s            37       17       1 
                  Black Ark           21         1            0                   46s            40       19       4½ 
 
1758         Isabell Mea Hill  45         2            0                   44s           100        2        0 
                 Isabell Mea Hill  56         2            0                   42s           118       13       0 
                 Isabell Mea Hill  21         0            0                   35s             36       15       0 
                 Rowton Syke      20         3            1                 various       unknown 
         Closehouse         55         2            0                    42s          116       11      10½  
         Lunehead            40         0            0                    44s           88         0        0 
         Arngill                             2            0                    42s            1           1     10½ 
 
Source:  
Figures for 1742 are from D/St/E3/5/21, for 1755 D/St/B2/107 & 137, for 1757 
D/St/B2/120, and for 1758 D/St/C3/2/76 and D/St/B2/127. Dodd Hill is the only mine 
listed that was not leased from Bowes and was not on Bowes land. 
 
 quality, and possibly short, sharp local market volatility in demand for pig lead, rather  
 
than the any factors affecting the general trend. Most prices were within the range of  
 
42s to 46s. In the years 1757 and 1758 bought-in ore was from mines leased from 
 
George Bowes which, terms of leases aside, must have been to maintain the  
 
capacity of the new mill at Wemmergill. In any event, Bowes was the monopoly  
 
buyer of lead ore throughout this period, so when there was a downward movement in  
 
the price of a fother of pig lead in the local market he paid less for ore, but price aside  
 
George Bowes appears to have been leasing more mines in the late 1750s whilst  
 
continuing to finance his own. Consequently, purchasing ore by first option  
 
agreement within leases became more prevalent in order to supply the smelt mill.  
 
  Comparing the prices of bought-in ore for only several years for which  
 
they are available with the market price of pig lead lends some provenance to the  
 
mechanism outlined above. There is a very slight tendency to lower prices per  
 
bing of bought in ore in the years 1757 and 1758 when there was a minor downward 
 
adjustment in the price of pig lead. The correlation between the sale price of ore and  
 
the price of pig lead is more distinct in the years 1741 and 1747 and the late 1750s,  
 
but to suggest regular linear movement of these different sets of prices either across  
 
the period 1730 to 1760 or even during the two wars would be misleading. The  
 
absence of price data for most years, and the apparent stability in ore prices in the  
 
extant records, supports the view that the reduction in carriage costs achieved by  
 
George Bowes prevented having to reduce ore prices, which would have been a  
 
disincentive to miners in the same way that excessive duty ore could be. The  
 
reduction in carriage costs was the way to increasing profits. 
 
There was another level on which lead ore as a commodity was traded  
 
under the terms of tacks and leases granted by George Bowes as mineral lord – duty  
 ore. In effect this was a royalty in return for permission to mine lead on his estate, and  
 
the ore could then be sold or smelted for profit. This was common practice in the  
 
North Pennines as a source of risk-free income; duty ore as a Bowes‟ management  
 
tool is considered above in the examination of leases granted. 
 
   Duty ore received is listed in Table 12 below together with the then  
 
current market value. It should be noted, however, that the amounts and values herein 
 
do not necessarily give the complete picture, because some records may not have  
 
survived. Nevertheless, it is worth brief discussion as a source of traded ore with a  
 
value to Bowes and its importance when the risks of mining were being avoided.  
 
Table 12 
 
Duty ore received by Bowes at various times 
 
 
Year                    Mine                 Bings – horses –pokes     Value      £           s        d 
 
1741                 Arngill                       1        1/12        0     @ 45s          2        8         9 
         Standards                      3        8/14        0     @ 45s          7      11         0 
   Lunehead                              13/24        0     @ 45s          1        4      4½  
 
1752                Standards                 26            0         0      @ 47s        61         2        0      
                        Lunehead                   2            0         0      @ 47s          4       14        0 
 
1757 
                         Lunehead                   4            0         0      @ 47s         9        8         0 
                        Closehouse                 4            0         0      @ 46s         9        4         0 
                        Arngill                        3            1         1      @ 46s         7      11         5  
                        Standards                    2            3         0      @ 46s         6      10         4 
                        Standards                    5            1         0      @ 48s       12      12         0 
                        Black Ark                   3            2        ½      @ 46s         8        3    10½  
 
1758 
     Lunehead        8            0         0        @ 44s       17      12        0 
                       Closehouse               17            0         0        @ 44s       37        8        0 
               Standards                    3            0         0        @ 44s         6      12        0 
                       Green mines              5            1         0                  no data 
   
Source: 
1741 is from D/St/B2/125 and D/St/B2/105 accounts; 1752 is from D/St/B2/149 
account of lead bought by Andrew Appleby; 1757 and 1758 are from D/St/C/3/77 
Gibson to Stephenson correspondence 
 
 
 
The accounts of duty ore received by the Bowes estate are interesting  
 
for two reasons: the values per bing of ore in the years for which they exist match  
 
those of bought-in ore and ore sold; and the fact that duty ore was largely a feature of  
 
lead mining in the late 1750s. The first point demonstrates consistency of ore pricing  
 
in the regional market, with any variations probably due to the quality of the ore. The  
 
second point adds credence to the view that the interval between two wars and the  
 
early years of the Seven Years War were characterised by a market where Bowes  
 
considered that lead was in abundance and investment in mining less viable, hence  
 
leasing for duty ore and continuation of  mining with a view to the future. It also helps  
 
to explain the absence of local sales of pig lead until the late 1750s, and even then in 
 
comparatively small amounts when set against the early 1740s. After the War of  
 
1739-48 Bowes occasionally decided to sell more ore rather than smelt it. This is  
 
confirmed by the sales of ore to Andrew Appleby at Eggleston Smelt Mill in the years  
 
1752-55.
536
 Bowes‟ mining leases determined that ore mined on their estate was  
 
smelted at Bowes‟ mills; there was no choice or alternative to this practice. Bowes  
 
could choose whether to sell ore or smelt it into pig lead, and then whether to sell or  
 
store it. He could also decide to invest in opening mines, lease existing mines, or do  
 
neither. 
Lead ore was also sold by Bowes to others in the lead trade, usually for  
 
smelting. The market for lead ore was be local, that for smelted lead was national and  
 
international. Table 13 below shows prices, and in most instances sale values, of ore  
 
                                                 
536
  D/St/B2/149 Accounts of lead ore sold to Appleby. 
sold at different times during the period 1730 to 1758. When these prices are 
 
compared to those for bought-in ore in Table 11, it can be seen that there was profit in  
 
selling ore, though it was significantly less than the profit in smelting and selling pig  
 
lead in the regional and national markets. 
 
 
 
In 1730 ore was sold to Lord Viscount Vane by George Bowes and  
 
John Buxton who owned one-sixth and five-sixths respectively of Lunehead mine.   
 
Table 13 
 
The price of ore sold 
 
Year         Mine                         Amount of ore             Price/Bing                 Value 
 
        Bings      horses   pokes     £         s       d 
 
1730        Lunehead             6             ¼          0                 63s            19       1       9 
                Lunehead             3              2          0                 55s              9     12       6 
1741        Lunehead             2            0           0                  45s              4     10       0 
 
1747        Black Sike          18             0          0                 40s             36      0       0 
 
1752        Isabell Mea Hill 40             0          0                  47s             94      0       0 
                Closehouse        26             0          0                  47s              61      2       0 
                Standards             7             0          0                  47s             16      9       0 
                Lunehead             2   0           0                 47s                4    14       0 
 
1755       Rowton Syke      50            0          0                  55s            125      0       0 
               Birkdale              80            1          1                  63s            253      3       7 ½  
               Standards            12            1          0                  50s              35    10       6 
               Closehouse         13            1          0                  63s              41     14       9 
               Arngill                  1            2          0                  50s                4       7       0 
 
1756       unknown                                                             55s 
 
1757       Rowton Syke    122           2           0                  50s            306      5       0 
               Isabell mea Hill                                                  46s 
 
1759      Closehouse          60           0           0                  42s            126      0       0 
              Lunehead             20           0           0                  42s             42      0        0  
 
Source: 
Figures for 1730 are from D/St/B2/146; for 1741 D/St/B2/102; for 1747 from 
D/St/B2/108; for 1752 from D/St/B2/149 for 1755 from D/St/B2/137 and D/St/B2/149; 
for 1756 from D/St/B2/93; for 1757 from D/St/B2/109; and for 1759 from D/St/B2/93. 
 
     
The ore sales in 1752 and 1755, with the exception of ore from Rowton Sike, were to  
 
Andrew Appleby at Eggleston Lead Mill, but the ore from Rowton Sike is noted as  
 
having been purchased for 30s and sold for 50s per bing, a 66.66% profit. Lastly, the  
 
ore sold in1759 was to a Mr. Park in Durham, who was probably either a merchant  
 
or plumber or both. The selling of lead ore was a minor trading activity, perhaps at 
 
times when the market for pig lead was not considered to be worth the expense of  
 
smelting and carriage to market. 
 
There was also a low level of trading activity in purchasing ore from  
 
other sources. George Bowes field agents and specialist stewards often acted as  
 
buyers. James Raine, the field agent at Isabell-mea-Hill in 1741 was sent to West Pitts  
 
and Weardale „a-buying ore‟.537 In 1742 just over six tons of ore was purchased from  
 
Dodd Hill mine for smelting at Bollihope.
538
 When the new mill at Wemmergill  
 
commenced operation in 1757 its manager John Gibson wrote to Thomas Colpitts II 
 
informing him that ore was for sale at Rowton Sike mine.
539
 In 1758, the mines  
 
steward Nathan Horn was in a position to buy twenty bing of lead ore near Brough,  
 
and before proceeding with the purchase wrote to Bowes‟ senior steward, Mr Leaton,  
 
to confirm the price of pig lead in Newcastle upon Tyne.
540
 Clearly, the opportunity  
 
to purchase ore would not be overlooked, subject to market prices, but this aspect of  
 
the lead trade was relatively insignificant within the overall lead production process  
 
on the Bowes estate.  
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  D/St/B2/103 accounts for Isabell-mea-Hill. 
538
  See Table 11 above. 
539
  D/St/C2/1/21 Gibson to Colpitts 11
th
 October 1757.  
540
  D/St/C2/3/76 correspondence between Horn and Leaton, and Horn and Stephenson. 
 The major regional market was for pig lead. The local sale prices per  
 
fother of smelted lead are listed below in Table 14, together with prices adopted in the  
 
Bowes year-end summary accounts, usually the 31
st
 December, to estimate the value  
 
of stock, which was stated as gross profit along with the value of any ore not yet  
 
smelted. Prices from Hughes thesis have been included to create a series for the 
 
Newcastle market. In 1742 and 1743 there was a range of prices, the wider range  
 
appearing in 1743, but the average price for actual sales was quite stable for the  
 
period 1741-46. Regrettably, there are no prices for the following five years, but the  
 
selling price of Bowes‟ pig lead was usually lower in 1752 compared to the Blaydon 
 
Table 14 
 
The local prices of pig lead per fother 1741-1760 
 
  Sale Prices       Prices for estimating         Prices at Blaydon 
          year end stock value         (from Hughes)  
                Highest       Lowest 
 
1741  £11-15s    £12-15s                  £13-5s-0d   £13-0s 0d 
1742  £11 to £12-15s                         £11-10s                    12-15-0       11-0-0 
1743  £10-15s to £12-15s              £11-10s                    11-17-6       10-10-0 
1744  £11-10s               £11-0s                      12- 0- 0       10-10-0 
1745  £11-5s                                                 11-15-0       11-0-0 
1746  £11-5s                                                                       11-15-0       11-0-0 
1747                                                                                               11-17-6       11-7-6 
1748                                                                                               12- 2-6        11-5-0 
1749                                                                                               12- 0-0        11-15-0 
1750                  12-0-0         11-17-6 
1751                  12-15-0       12-0-0 
1752  £10-15s                                                                     14-7-6         12-15-0 
1753                                                                                               16-5-0         14-5-0 
1754  £15-0s                                                                       18-0-0         16-7-6 
1755                                                                                               18-0-0         15-15-0 
1756                                                                                               15-7-6         14-5-0 
1757  £15-15s to £15                    £14-0s                      15-5-0         14-5-0 
1758  £13-10s                                                                     15-10-0       13-10-0 
1759             £14-0s to £11-6s                                                       13-5-0         11-0-0 
1760  £13-0s to £12-10s                            12-7-6         11-0-0 
 
Source: 
Based largely on figures in D/St/B2/105, with the exception of 1752 and 1758 which 
are derived from D/St/B2/161 (3); for 1754 D/St/B2/160; for 1757 D/St/B2/151 (2), 
D/St/B2/109, and D/St/B2/130; and for 1759 and 1760 D/St/B2/130.The prices of lead 
sold at Blaydon are from Hughes, „Lead land and coal’, appendix table 13. 
  
 
price. By 1757 however, the price had increased to £15-15s per fother, equivalent to a  
 
36.36% rise on the average price of £11-10s-6d in the period 1741-46. The 1757 price  
 
 
 
was a 47.62% increase on that of 1752. In 1758 the selling price fell back to £13-10s  
 
per fother, but this was still a 16.88% improvement on the average for the first half of  
 
the 1740‟s. The prices of Bowes lead were slightly higher than those at Blaydon in  
 
1759 and 1760.The assumed prices adopted for the purposes of stock valuations  
 
demonstrate a similar trend, but are more pessimistic. 
 
The absence of prices for Bowes lead in eight of the years listed is  
 
unfortunate, but those available do indicate movements that must be taken as  
 
evidence of change in either supply and/or demand. Furthermore, there may have  
 
been short-term price volatility. For example, the records showing customers‟  
 
purchases for the years when prices are available, reveal that in 1743 pig lead was  
 
sold at £12 per fother in February and March, but at only £10-15s in July  
 
and £11 in September.
541
  The market price of lead could have risen or fallen because  
 
of carriage problems in a region then devoid of  good roads, poor weather,  
 
prevailing credit arrangements, dressing and smelting costs, the effects of war, and  
 
the value of any silver content. In addition to such short term influences, the  
 
seasonality of the mining and smelting process in Upper Teesdale caused logistical  
 
problems in mining, washing and dressing of lead ore, and ore carriage, and especially  
 
during the winter months. Variations in selling price would point to differences in the  
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  D/St/B2/147, in particular the account of Surtees & Atkinson. 
 quality of the pig lead, which was essentially based on malleability  in terms of its  
 
fitness for purpose. Again, the purchase ledger for the early 1740‟s shows pig lead  
 
bought „at several prices‟ by some customers, and in1759 and 1760 the range of  
 
prices at both Dunston and Blaydon reflect the then current market conditions in  
 
which sales appear difficult to sustain. 
 
   
 
Table 14 also contains prices of pig lead per fother derived from the  
 
Hughes thesis, and when these are brought into consideration as supplementary  
 
evidence, the lead market landscape acquires greater clarity. In fact, the range of  
 
highest and lowest prices of pig lead sold at Blaydon is recorded for the period  
 
1724-78. Moreover, although the Bowes prices for the period 1741-46 are not 
 
dissimilar to those for Blackett- Beaumont lead, those available for the 1750s,  
 
with the exception of 1757 and 1759-60, are at the lower end of the price range. There  
 
was a market for lead, before 1741, which focused on Newcastle upon Tyne, yet no 
 
Bowes lead production until 1740/41. The pig lead prices at Blaydon show a  
 
downward trend from a range of £16-8s to £13-9s per fother in1724 to £11-15 s per  
 
fother in 1745-46, mid-way through the War of the Austrian Succession, then rising  
 
steadily to a range of £18 to £15-15s in 1755, on the eve of the Seven Years War.  
 
Lead prices rose to the 1755 level immediately after the war and then became  
 
relatively stable until 1769.  
 
  The records maintained by George Bowes, his stewards and agents,  
 
divulge nothing of this market or of any response to changes in price. Lead production  
 
on the Bowes estate would seem to have been stimulated by war, yet in both these  
 
wars the average price of pig lead was either stable or lower than the pre-war years. 
 
The prices uncovered by Hughes for pig lead sales a Blaydon before, during, and after  
 the periods highlighted in the extant Bowes‟ business papers clearly indicate that  
 
market opportunities for pig lead prevailed, but confirm the variation in prices  
 
between times of peace and war. 
 
  The market for Bowes pig lead can be identified by the statistics 
 
in Table 14 and Table 15 which, when drawn together on a year by year basis  
 
demonstrate that of the 7310 pieces of pig lead smelted in the period 1741-49, 5093  
 
where smelted during 1741-44, and of these 2958 or 56.1% were sold in the local  
 
market. By extending this period from 1741 to 1746 it can be seen that 6420 pieces  
 
were smelted, of which 3236 were sold locally, equivalent to 50.4%, with 1.96% sold  
 
directly to a Dane. 
 
  The amount of pig lead smelted and sold locally is shown in Table  
 
15 above, together with the cumulative stock i.e. pig lead that could have been  
 
held at the staith or shipped out. It can be seen that during the 1740s approximately  
 
half of the pig lead smelted and brought to Newcastle was not sold and must be  
 
accounted for as stock. Stock levels varied more during the 1740s, and it should be  
 
noted that after 1746 another 1139 pieces of pig lead were smelted, of which 791  
 
reached the staith, so further increasing stock levels. This characteristic of a wartime  
 
lead market was even more notable in the late 1750s when pig lead was once again  
 
accumulated, this time 89% of production. The stockpiling of pig lead could have  
 
been a conscious decision Bowes and other producers, such as the Blackett- 
 
Beaumonts, or there may have been other causes. 
 
The prices of pig lead listed in Table 14 above, show that the price  
 
per fother was quite stable during the years 1741-46, with some variability in 1743,  
 
but that in the late 1750s the local price began to fall. The amount of pig lead not sold  
 
locally and possibly held as stock, or shipped to London or other east coast ports, is  
 shown in Table 15 below for the years in which the data is complete i.e. 1741-46  
 
and 1757-60. Unfortunately, Bowes prices do not exist for the period 1747-51, 1753,  
 
and 1755-56. This does not necessarily mean there was no market for Bowes lead,  
 
either locally or elsewhere, but the gaps in available data could simply mean Bowes  
 
records did not survive for those years, although gaps also appertain to ore  
 
production, smelting, and expenditure. The stockpiling of lead appears to have been  
 
imposed upon George Bowes during both periods of war; a force majeure caused by  
 
wartime economic conditions that meant deferring supply until an improvement in  
 
demand caused prices to rise. Enforced stockpiling of Blackett-Beaumont lead worth  
 
 
 
Table 15 
 
Pieces of pig lead smelted, sold, and cumulative ‘stock’ at the staith and 
elsewhere 1741-46 and 1757-60 
 
   Cumulative 
Smelted       Sold             stock        
 
1741                  1666            189             1477 
 
1742                  1409            559             2327 
 
1743                  1663          2163             1827 
 
1744                    355            232             1950   
 
1745                  1078              63             2965 
 
1746                    249              30             3184 
 
Total                  6420          3236 
 
No data was found for the intervening period. 
 
1757                    700            157               543 
 
1758                  1927             10              2460 
 
1759                      13             40              2433 
 
1760                    112             98              2447 
 
Total                  2752           305 
 
Source: This table is constructed from Tables 14, 16, and Appendix 3. 
 
 
£52,000 at Blaydon was reported in 1760.
542
  The prices recorded for both Bowes and  
 
Blackett-Beaumont pig lead confirm that in wartime between 1739 and 1748 they  
 
were lower than the pre-war years, marked by an increase at the end of the war. This  
 
scenario was even more pronounced during the war of 1756-63. 
 
 Burt has demonstrated that lead exports fell away during both the War of the  
 
Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, and that this effect was stronger in the 
 
latter, whereas in peacetime overseas demand absorbed British lead production and  
 
overall exports accounted for half of the lead produced between 1700 and 1750.
 543
  
He  
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  Hughes, „Lead Land and Coal‟ (unpublished PhD thesis) p.105. 
 also notes the effects of war on trade and shipping, and particularly on east coast  
 
shipping, and that between 1700 and 1770 Newcastle played the role of second most  
 
important lead outport after Hull.
544
 Therefore, the sale of lead from the Bowes estate  
 
was depressed because of war stifling foreign demand and disrupting the shipping of  
 
lead to east coast ports and London, though London‟s consumption of lead changed  
 
very little before 1760, again demonstrated by Burt.
545
 This phenomenon is further  
 
confirmed by a comparison of the pre-war and wartime volume of merchant shipping  
 
leaving Newcastle. It was 26,800 tons in 1744 compared to 42,500 in 1737, and  
 
36,400 tons in 1758 compared to 57,900 in 1751.
546
 Burt also argues that British  
 
demand did not act as a counterbalance for two reasons; building, the main source of  
 
domestic demand for lead, was depressed during wars, as noted above; and the  
 
demand for munitions was relatively small, requiring a harder form of lead,  
 
argentiferous lead i.e. with silver content, which is an impurity, as opposed to the  
 
malleable form needed by overseas buyers for industrial purposes. Hughes study of  
 
the Blackett-Beaumont business suggests that „ the requirements of the Ordnance  
 
department, though large, were not such as to make up for the loss in overseas  
 
trade‟.547 
 
  Newcastle‟s lead market and its role as an outport for lead to North  
 
and North-West Europe deteriorated because of war, particularly the Seven Years  
 
War 1756-63. Lead exports direct from Newcastle to these markets shrank; instead  
 
local merchants like Peareth & Sorsbie purchased local lead and sold it to London  
 
merchants for both the London market and export. Some producers who normally  
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  Burt, British Lead, pp. 223-247. 
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  Burt, „Lead Production‟, pp. 263-264 
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  Ibid.p.264; London‟s consumption was on average between 3,000 and 3,500 tons per annum. 
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  P.J. Corfield, The Impact of English Towns 1700-1800 (Oxford, 1982), Table VI p.40. The figures 
     for tonnage include British and foreign shipping.  
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  Hughes,‘Lead, Land and Coal‟ (unpublished PhD thesis) p.114. 
 traded through Newcastle and Stockton avoided merchants and attempted to sell  
 
abroad in their own right. The lead producers in the north-east did not have the  
 
lobbying power of the coal trade when it came to threats of increased export duties  
 
and the potential loss of foreign markets. Nor was there any association or  
 
combination of lead producers capable of controlling lead prices. Prices in Hull,  
 
Stockton, and Newcastle fell during 1756-63, leaving producers with stocks they  
 
could not move even at lower prices.
548
 Demand for lead in Newcastle was especially  
 
poor during the years 1760-62.  Although Brewer maintains that trade did not decline  
 
during the Seven Years War, the conduct of war by the British „fiscal-military state‟  
 
incurred the disruption of Newcastle-centred lead production and trade because 
 
this region and the London and international markets had become interdependent.  
 
The „workings of the fiscal-military state‟ were the root cause of eighteenth century  
 
trade slumps and financial crises, and „economic interdependence was such that  
 
seismic disturbance in on part of the economy frequently produced eruptions  
 
elsewhere‟. 549 
 
  In summary, the factors at play in the lead market were local and  
 
national demand, overseas demand, lead production and supply, and the effects of war 
 
on shipping and the pattern of foreign trade. During the 1740s and 1750s, when  
 
George Bowes attempted to manage the growth of lead production on his estate, the 
 
export trade in lead, mainly to the Netherlands, Iberia, the Mediterranean, and France  
 
and the east coast trade, contracted because of war.
550
 Higher prices, therefore profits,  
 
were obtained in peacetime when overseas markets were open to trade. Consequently, 
 
Bowes lead, along with other suppliers, flooded the Newcastle market which in turn  
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     pp. 189-191.  
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  Burt, British Lead, p.236, based upon Customs records and Parliamentary Papers. 
 caused local prices to fall. The temporary shrinkage of the export market was not 
 
replaced by additional local or London consumption, or munitions, and Bowes was 
 
left with stock. Perhaps lead prices in London were higher because of wartime  
 
insurance costs inflicted upon producers and merchants, but in the absence of such  
 
detailed evidence it must be concluded that the price of pig lead and stocks were  
 
determined by the external factors of war and the suppression of overseas  
 
consumption. Willing or not, Bowes was compelled to hold stock and play the market  
 
as circumstances changed and market equilibrium returned, though unsatisfied foreign  
 
demand was first to be quenched when war ended. The sudden leap in pig lead prices  
 
after the 1739-48 war can be seen above in Table 15, whilst Hughes has noted the  
 
same post war price change in 1763.
551
 Perhaps Bowes learned this market adjustment  
 
and all but discontinued lead production until the late1750s. 
  
The sale of pig lead, metallic lead, in the Newcastle market was the  
 
most significant trading activity and the most valuable. In Table 16 below there is a  
 
summary of sales by weight and value for the first half of the 1740s and the late 
 
1750s, derived from Appendix 3. These sales were to local buyers only, and purchases  
 
made by various merchants are detailed in Appendix 3. There appears to have been a  
 
lull in local trade between 1746 and 1757, and the amount of lead sold locally by  
 
Bowes was considerably greater in the early 1740s, particularly in 1743, compared to 
 
the late 1750s. 
 
The total value of local sales amounted to £2,500-14s 10d in the period  
 
1741-1745, which accounted for 3236 pieces of smelted lead or 226.25 fothers. The 
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  Hughes, „Lead, Land and Coal‟ (unpublished PhD thesis) Appendix table 13. 
Table 16 
 
Sales of pig lead 1741-1746 and 1757-1760 in pieces and Newcastle 
fothers 
 
                                                     Weight (21 cwt = fother)                Value 
Year       No. pcs          F         cwt        qtr        lbs                 £            s              d                       
1741          189             12         4           1           21               157          6            11 
1742          559             39         2           1           14               384          0              9 
1743        2163           153       15           1           14             1732        19              8 
1744          232             14         9           0           21               155          7              2½ 
1745            63               4         9           1             3                 47        18              0 
1746            30               2         1           2           14                 22          5              9½  
1747 
1748 
1749 
1750 
1751 
1752         288             18         19        0              7                193         13           7 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757          157                      154        10           10 
1758            10                                                                          8          8             9 
1759            40      
1760            98 
 
 
Source: Appendix 3 
 
key customer was the firm of Peareth & Sorsbie, a leading Newcastle merchant with  
 
strong London connections, bought 2050 pieces or 63.35%, followed by Ralph Carr  
 
who purchased 349 pieces (10.78%) Surtees & Atkinson with 274 pieces (8.47%),  
 
then Reah & Wilkinson with 180 pieces (5.56%). In the years 1757-60, Thomas  
 
Hanby purchased 227 pieces or 72.06% of the pig lead sold locally by Bowes. Hanby  
 
appears to have been located in Wolsingham, because in 1760 Nathan Horn arranged  
 
for the delivery of twenty pieces there.
552
 Once again, Hanby could have been a  
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  D/St/C2/3/76 (9), which is a note written by Richard Stephenson following receipt of a  
 plumber, or merchant, or both. Peareth & Sorsbie, purchased almost two-thirds of  
 
lead sold during the 1740s, bought 288 pieces in 1752. 
 
There are some noteworthy points regarding other evidently smaller  
 
accounts, because they reveal the nature of the relationship between Bowes as a lead  
 
producer, manufacturers, and local merchants. For example, Ralph Carr (1711-1806)  
 
partnered George Liddell in a lead mine on Alston Moor, was a Newcastle merchant  
 
and member of the Merchant Adventurers, a hostman in the coal trade, and ship  
 
owner.
553
  Isaac Cookson  & Co. purchased 52 pieces of lead in 1744. Cookson was  
 
one of Newcastle‟s principal silversmiths in the mid-eighteenth century when the  
 
town had „a considerable reputation for the quality of its silverware‟. 554 In 1743  
 
Cookson became a partner in a lead mine lease in Middleton-in-Teesdale, and 
 
quite soon thereafter this partnership leased land for a lead refinery in Elswick, 
 
At this refinery pig lead was desilverised and delivered to Cookson for making  
 
his silverware, but they also made sheet lead and cast shot. In 1754 Isaac Cookson  
 
died without a male heir to continue his trade.
555
 
 
  There is only one example of overseas trade in lead contained in the  
 
records examined for the period 1740-60. In 1742, one hundred pieces of pig lead  
 
were sold to John Lanet, who is described as a „skipper‟, and noted as an order for a  
 
Mr. Scott.
556
 The same amount is itemised and noted as „Sold and charged this year to  
 
a Dane‟.557 Lead was one of the minerals exported to the Scandinavian market, and 
one 
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historian has remarked that the official value of these was in the region of £7,000 to  
 
£8,000 per annum during the mid-eighteenth century, and greater in some War  
 
years.
558
  This was approximately 700 to 800 fothers a year if a price range per fother  
 
of £10-£11 is adopted as an optimistic guide, and Beveridge‟s prices give the actual  
 
value as at least twice the official amount.
559
 There is no indication of this trade  
 
affecting the Bowes estate. 
 
    
Newcastle-upon-Tyne was the chosen market outlet for both local sales  
 
of pig lead and transhipment either to London and east coast ports or overseas.  
 
Newcastle was an important lead port, third after Hull and Stockton during most of  
 
the eighteenth century. At first glance regional geography and economy would seem  
 
to dictate Stockton as a natural outlet for Bowes lead, because it was an established  
 
lead port for a significant proportion of lead from North Yorkshire, and because it is  
 
situated on the River Tees. George Bowes performed an analysis of the costs involved  
 
in transporting lead to both Newcastle and Stockton and chose the former, and his  
 
Personal involvement in doing so is discussed below. 
 
  At the beginning of the eighteenth century Stockton was the second  
 
largest outport for lead: Hull was the leading distributor and Newcastle was in third  
 
place.
560
 By 1725 the lead trade from both Stockton and Newcastle had decreased by  
 
one fifth, but by the mid-1750s both these ports had experienced a huge growth in  
 
outgoing lead trade, Newcastle‟s by 172.5% and Stockton‟s by 175.2%.  Therefore, in  
 
1756 Stockton remained the second most important lead port after Hull, but  
 
Newcastle‟s share of the lead trade was growing apace and by 1770 it had become the  
 
second lead port after Hull. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that no  
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 failure on the part of Stockton to trade lead coastwise to London or abroad caused  
 
George Bowes to sell all his pig lead in Newcastle. What underlies the decision  
 
to market all Bowes‟ pig lead via the Newcastle nexus? 
 
There was a range of circumstances that led George Bowes to  
 
choose between the North East‟s two primary lead ports. Firstly, Newcastle was 
 
both a port and a lead manufacturing centre, and consequently as a market it was  
 
trilateral. Lead was bought for local consumption, and it could be exported by ship 
 
overseas or to east coast ports, including London. Newcastle manufacturers of flint 
 
glass and paint needed lead, as well as plumbers manufacturing for general purposes.  
 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Newcastle, and other Tyne ports,  
 
were major ship owning and shipbuilding ports, and lead was used for ships 
fittings.
561
 
 
The northeast was a munitions manufacturing area from the early  
 
eighteenth century.
562
 By the last quarter of the eighteenth century shot manufacturing  
 
was well established in Newcastle, and consequently it seems probable that it was  
 
emerging during the mid- Century.
563
 The amount of metallic lead moving through  
 
Newcastle from the North Pennine orefields force-fed the nucleus of lead  
 
manufacturing there, but before 1760 it was not large-scale manufacturing.
564
  
 
Stockton, on the other hand, received lead from North Yorkshire and Teesdale,  
 
Bowes lead, but „No lead was manufactured into pipe or sheet in Stockton in the 18th  
 
century…..‟.565 Although the lead manufacturing sector in Newcastle was small, the  
 
lead trade through Stockton„led to no manufacturing in that town at all‟.566 
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   Overall then, Newcastle‟s hinterland embraced the North Pennine 
 
lead mining districts, thereby capturing the lion‟s share of the trade in metallic lead.  
 
Stockton was devoid of manufacturing and offered only the opportunity for east coast  
 
and foreign trade, both of which could be restricted during wars, as we have seen  
 
above. The Bowes estate in Upper Teesdale contributed to the supply of metallic lead  
 
into Newcastle rather than Stockton, because it facilitated all market outlets for it as a  
 
raw material. 
 
  Secondly, it appears that the structure of the lead trade differed in the  
 
two ports. Stockton was an established lead port long before Newcastle, and by the  
 
time George Bowes became the family estate‟s patriarch and instigated greater  
 
involvement in lead production, it had developed storage and wharfs owned by  
 
Swaledale lead mine owners.
567
  There is no evidence of the Bowes family possessing 
 
such accoutrements at Stockton. On the River Tyne however, Bowes owned a staith at  
 
Dunston, which although devoted to the coal trade, also acted as a lead wharf  
 
receiving deliveries of pig lead, the final stage of transportation being the waggonway 
 
from Tanfield. Perhaps more significantly, Newcastle was the home of a well 
 
established mercantile community in which diverse merchant houses specialised in  
 
lead, some in close relationships with London houses, others trading with Holland and  
 
Denmark.
568
 Merchants such as Peareth & Sorsbie purchased lead from producers  
 
like the Blackett-Beaumonts and the Bowes and supplied their London clients for both 
 
local consumption and export. 
 
Another feature of the Stockton lead trade was the role of agents who 
 
were engaged to act as negotiators when buyers from London lead companies visited 
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the port.
569
 We will see below when George Bowes‟ entrepreneurial role is examined, 
 
that he rejected, on the grounds of cost, the need to employ agents if he wanted to  
 
trade via Stockton. In Newcastle there was a merchant community that dealt in lead as 
 
one of multifarious activities, and those to whom Bowes sold lead have been named 
 
wherever records permit.
570
  George Bowes sometimes acted as an agent or broker in  
 
Newcastle, particularly during the early1740s. 
 
  The last link in the process of trade through Newcastle was to ship out  
 
lead either to east cost ports or London. Obviously, because of George Bowes  
 
involvement in the coal trade he had immediate access to shipping, indeed Bowes  
 
operated his own fleet. Suffice to say that in so far as the shipping of lead was  
 
required, Newcastle was the most suitable outlet for Bowes lead. 
 
   
Transport by ship was only one consideration in marketing pig lead; 
 
the pattern of inland carriage mattered because it preceded the movement of lead by  
 
water. Although maps clearly indicate that the carriage of lead from Upper Teesdale  
 
to the River Tyne was a shorter voyage for the caravans of packhorses or carts, the 
 
terrain was less difficult to Stockton. Newcastle appeared the natural gateway for  
 
lead, yet Bowes did not initially ignore the possibility of the Stockton outlet. It  
 
seems to have been, along with the necessity for agents, potentially the first  
 
 
choice port.
571
 Yet all the records for pig lead smelted and carried to market show 
 
only the River Tyne as its destination. George Bowes made his choice of port based  
 
on careful considerations: assessments of routes, distances, and carriage costs. These  
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 are discussed below when his direct involvement in the lead business is considered.  
 
A particular aspect of such analysis compared the carriage costs of pig lead to  
 
Stockton and Newcastle.
572
  This supposes twenty-two pieces of lead of 112lbs each  
 
(i.e. 8 stones), which equates to a Stockton fother of 2464lbs (22 hundred-weight), via  
 
Wolsingham and Tanfield Moor, and then by waggonway to Dunston. The alternative  
 
journey to Stockton via Eggleston, Staindrop, and Darlington supposes eighteen  
 
pieces of 140lbs (i.e.10 stones), which equates to 2520lbs (22½ hundred-weight),  
 
whereas a Newcastle fother was 2352lbs. In fact, 2520lbs was a Derbyshire fother of  
 
lead. Bowes concluded that the route to Newcastle cost £1 6s 1d and that to Stockton  
 
£1 1s 4½d;in other words the journey north was 4s 7½d or 22.4% more expensive. As  
 
seen above, if this calculation was the basis of a decision to re-direct lead to Stockton,  
 
nothing changed during the 1750s.   
 
  During the 1740s and 1750s Newcastle was the outlet for Bowes lead, 
 
because it had become the nexus for the lead trade from the Northern Pennines with 
 
pig lead supplied as a raw material by the Blackett-Beaumont, London Lead  
 
Company, and Bowes enterprises, the latter evidently producing the smallest  
 
contribution. Newcastle was the portal for three markets: the local market consisting  
 
of consumption of manufacturers, plumbers, and general uses; east cost ports and  
 
London; and the overseas markets. In addition, Bowes‟ existing arrangements on the  
 
quayside and relationships with lead merchants, together with personal involvement,  
 
meant he was compelled to direct lead produced on the Bowes estate through  
 
Newcastle rather than Stockton. And of course, the Bowes family had traded in lead  
 
from Newcastle since the sixteenth century. 
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It is possible to identify four stages of transportation in the lead  
 
production process; the journey of ore from the mines in Upper Teesdale to 
 
Bollihope, which was broken into two sub-stages, namely „Teesdale carriage‟ and 
 
„Weardale carriage‟; pig lead from Bollihope mill to Wolsingham; pig lead from 
 
Wolsingham to Shield Row; and pig lead from Shield Row to the staith on the River  
 
Tyne.
573
 The stages of transportation changed after 1757 when the new smelt mill at 
 
Wemmergill began to receive all the lead ore from the Bowes estate. The ore was 
 
Carried a much shorter distance, but the smelted lead a longer distance from 
 
Wemmergill to Wolsinghahm, Wolsingham to Tanfield, and from Tanfield to the 
 
Staith.
574
 In other words, there were still four stages in the carriage process, but by far  
 
the shorter was ore carriage, always the mot difficult and most expensive by weight. 
 
There is some indication that on occasion on the Wemmergill to Wolsingham section,  
 
pig lead was carried from Wemmergill to Mickleton then to Wolsingham, but in  
 
smaller amounts of two pigs or thirty-two pieces.
575
 The collection from Mickleton  
 
appears to have been irregular and should necessarily be seen as part of the carriage  
 
staging. There is no record of Bowes pig lead carried to Stockton, although from  
 
outset Bowes was faced with the choice between transporting lead to Newcastle or 
 
Stockton. The latter may have appeared the obvious option, but as we have seen  
 
Newcastle was chosen as the regional market and outlet to London and beyond.  
 
George Bowes‟ analysis of this problem is discussed below when assessing his role 
 
in the development of lead production on his estate and its contribution to the growth 
 
of the lead industry in northeast England during the mid-eighteenth century.   
 
The recorded movement of the product gauges to some extent the  
 
Bowes response to market conditions in Newcastle. During 1741-42 Richard Dobson  
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 was responsible for carrying 2702 pieces of lead to Dunston Staith.
576
 At the end of  
 
1744 1888 pieces of pig lead were resting at the staith, and at the end of 1745 2860  
 
pieces were at the staith. Pig lead was carried to the staith via Wolsingham and then  
 
Shield Row, where it was put on to the waggonway to the Tyne. The deliveries to the  
 
staith indicate a steady movement of lead from smelt mill to market during the  
 
1740‟s, and all but 136 pieces of lead reached the staith. After 1746 the movement of  
 
pig lead slowed somewhat, probably because orders were not forthcoming and lead  
 
stocks were growing. Moreover, it suggests that supply exceeded local demand, that is  
 
both on Tyneside and at Stockton, and that the excess pig lead was held in stock at the  
 
staith in readiness for shipping either down the east coast or abroad as war drew to a  
 
close. Indeed, the fall in the percentage of pig lead sold in the local trade from 56.1%  
 
to 50.4% when comparing 1741-44 with 1741-46 tends to support the view that  
 
supply was greater than demand as the 1740s progressed. 
   
The statistics for the late 1750s create a different view of the trade in 
 
pig lead, because of the 2752 pieces smelted during the years 1757-60, only 1173  
 
are noted as carried to the staith by March 1760, although it had reached Tanfield  
 
Moor via Wolsingham.
577
 By the end of 1758, however, there were 2166 pieces of  
 
lead resting at Dunston Staith valued at £1,568 –11s –5d (or 104.5 tons at £15 per  
 
ton).
578
 More significantly, only 305 pieces or 11.1% of the pig lead was sold locally.  
 
It would appear that the movement of pig lead to the staiths was somewhat slower,  
 
which in turn suggests a different set of market conditions when compared to the  
 
1740s. In other words, 88.54% of pig lead produced during 1757-60 was not sold  
 
locally. Clearly, this bears no resemblance to the level of local trade in the first half of  
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the 1740s. Consequently, the bulk of pig lead must have been held as stock. 
 
  Bowes lead was marketed in Newcastle where it was purchased by 
 
merchants for sale in London, for consumption there and exports, sometimes on  
 
behalf of London merchant houses. Peareth & Sorsbie were the leading firm in  
 
Newcastle, buying Bowes and Blackett-Beaumont lead and acting for London 
 
merchants. Newcastle‟s lead manufacturing industry must have also been supplied by  
 
the city‟s lead merchants, but it is unclear which of those named in Bowes records  
 
were active in this corner of the local market. George Bowes was personally involved 
 
in marketing of Bowes pig lead during the early 1740s; his own memoranda and  
 
correspondence with his stewards indicates a role as merchant or broker in Newcastle. 
 
  Records of prices, sales, and stocks between 1740 and 1760 further  
 
evidence the effect of war on the lead trade, and particularly the Newcastle market. 
 
Although the London‟s consumption remained unchanged, and the needs of war  
 
created some extra demand for munitions, they did not replace the temporary absence  
 
of the overseas markets cut off by war and shrinkage in the demand for lead from  
 
building in certain years of wartime. Lead producers in the northeast oversupplied the  
 
Newcastle market as prices of pig lead fell, which induced stockpiling, a  
 
phenomenon only relieved by immediate post war booms when foreign demand was 
 
reinstated in the market mechanism for lead. Excessive supply also occurred at  
 
Stockton, consequently it did not offer an alternative outlet for Bowes lead.
579
 
 
  The effect of the Seven Years‟ War was more severe than that of  
 
1739-48, when it seems that the disruption of normal trade meant the only market for  
 
Newcastle lead was London. Bowes lead relied upon the operation of its local 
 
market, but its ranking was behind Blackett-Beaumont amongst Newcastle merchants 
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who gave the latter preferential treatment n sales to London.
580
  The Bowes reaction 
to 
 
wartime interruptions was tantamount to a withdrawal from lead production until the  
 
late 1750s. 
 
  The variation in prices during wartime demonstrates just how risky  
 
trading in lead could be. Yet there is no sign that Bowes lead production responded to  
 
post war booms and peacetime price adjustments. It may have been that following the  
 
Bowes experience of the 1739-48 war, George Bowes considered the whole business 
 
too risky. During the inter-war years the level of activity in mining, smelting, and  
 
trade was negligible; ore was sold off locally, there was no Bowes smelt mill in 
 
operation, and the Bowes family were not investing in lead production. Before the  
 
1756-63 war ended, however, there were indications of a reinvigorated approach,  
 
though relatively small scale, and even then the movement of lead to the Tyne was 
 
slower than during the previous war. In any event, as already noted, Bowes was  
 
probably not in a position to lobby for the lead trade in the way he could for coal, nor  
 
was there an association of lead producers supplying Newcastle that could have  
 
influenced prices.   
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Chapter  8: George Bowes - Progressive Patriarchy 
   
 
    
George Bowes is a noted figure in the eighteenth century economic and social history  
 
of northeast England, which has been largely illuminated through the histories and  
 
papers of various landed and merchant families.
581
 His importance is attributed to the  
 
significant role he played in the coal trade as a partner in the Grand Allies.
582
  George  
 
Bowes has been described as „one of the meteors‟ of this trade.583 Another historian  
 
labelled him as  „a prototype of the swashbuckling tycoon‟, because he had an eye for  
 
a quick return and a willingness to incur the wrath of peers and partners to achieve 
it.
584
  
 
The description „tycoon‟ is an apt nomenclature as George Bowes was undoubtedly  
 
wealthy, powerful, and influential at local and regional levels, and in London‟s  
 
financial and political arena. His life and achievements are summarised in Wills‟  
 
architectural history of the Bowes‟ estate at Gibside, and in particular his plans to  
 
develop this substantial residence as the family seat and flagship of his family‟s  
 
wealth, power, and social status amongst the North‟s commercial elite.585 He was 
 
the wealthiest commoner in England by the time of his death in 1760. 
 
The only general history of the Bowes family sets out neither to  
 
investigate George Bowes as custodian of family wealth nor his development of the  
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 estates‟ lead resources.586 One study of George Bowes‟ role in the northeast coal trade  
 
represents him as an absentee landowner and coal magnate who spent his time in  
 
London as an MP and lobbyist for the coal interest enjoying a lifestyle commensurate  
 
with his wealth.
587
  This depiction rests on the argument that, from about 1736,  
 
following the merger of Bowes family collieries with the Grand Allies, George Bowes  
 
extracted himself from business life completely. To some extent, this argument is  
 
given weight by the oft accepted view that he preferred country life in the Northeast  
 
to London society and Parliament.
 588
 In other words, he absented himself from 
business  
 
whether at home or in London.  Oldroyd‟s very recent work regarding accounting  
 
methods used in estate management during the George Bowes era offers a more  
 
detailed analysis and contradicts the view that George Bowes was an absentee from  
 
the coal trade, hailing him as a strategist and the estate‟s management as highly  
 
efficient. He provides an insight into the importance of this aspect of estate  
 
operations, and although accounting procedures were important tools in Bowes‟  
 
business control, this work reveals nothing of George Bowes‟ personal role in the lead  
 
business. 
589
 
 
  The purpose of this chapter is to examine George Bowes‟ involvement  
 
in the family estate‟s lead business, in production, in the market, and in management  
 
at strategic and operational levels, which hopefully will allow a judgement to be made  
 
regarding his entrepreneurship and its consequences for the Bowes estate both  
 
regionally and nationally. George Bowes was not unique in his exploitation of lead, 
                                                 
586
   Streatlam and Gibside: The Bowes and the Strathmore Families in County Durham (Durham  
    County Council publication 1980).  
587
  G. Bennett, E. Clavering,  & A. Rounding, A Fighting Trade: Rail Transport in Tyne Coal, 1600- 
    1800 vol. I, History (Gateshead 1990) 
588
  Wills, Gibside, ch.2; R. Surtees, History and Antiquities of the County Palatine of Durham, 4 vols 
    (London 1816-40), see vol. 2. 
589
  Oldroyd, Estates.  
 yet this analysis confronts his alleged absenteeism by indicating his lead business  
 
activities whilst in London, revealing him as both entrepreneur and estate manager,  
 
and suggesting a role linking the Newcastle and London lead markets. Bowes was a  
 
mid-eighteenth century commuter travelling regularly between the northeast and  
 
London and even rented a half-way house at Ledstone near Nottingham.
590
 He was an  
 
entrepreneur and strategist for the Bowes estate‟s management of lead production, but  
 
also directly involved in the various stages of mining, washing and dressing of ore,  
 
smelting, transport, and marketing. 
 
  George Bowes‟ strategic thinking is evident throughout the period  
 
1740-60. As early as 1742 George Bowes was questioning the viability of smelting  
 
ore from the mines on his estate. On „Mr. O‟Neal‟s Acct. of ye Lead Mills 1742‟, he  
 
wrote: 
      
     „Q. if not to my Advantage to lay in my Lead Mynes. 
      
      To consider if it not be proper to carry on ye Myne 
 
      & lay of ye oar after its washed in ye Mills shop‟591 
 
 
We know that at this stage he did not decide to farm the lead ore then sell it, but 
 
probably considered it because the only productive mine in 1742 was Isabell-mea- 
 
Hill. His alternative was to take a very short-term view and take immediate profit  
 
from this mine and avoid future costs of smelting and carriage. 
 
   Some documents present us with a broader understanding of George  
 
Bowes‟ perspective on lead. For example his memorandum of 10th August 1748  
 
covers finance, projected ore values, and involvement with another lead mining  
 
family, and an instruction to the recipient to ask „of  Mr. Leaton whether he got any  
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share of Mr. Blackett‟s  Agents for ye part of the work in my Lead Mynes‟.592  He 
goes  
 
on to mention working through limestone at Black Syke „which will cost Forty to  
 
Fifty pounds‟, and adds „The present loss …..is £7 3s 4d…… (for) 18 Bing of Oar  
 
got‟. Then above a sketch map of Rowton Sike Bowes wrote a projection of ore  
 
production and value as follows:
593
 
 
„Oar supposd to be got in 1754. 
       
Isobell May Hill 80 Bing at 25  £162 
 
Standards Duty 8 at 58s p. Bing                   23     4 
 
Close House Bing getting 40s                            13     16 
 
Arngill a Bing Duty at 58s                                   2     18 
 
Rowton Syke supposd 20 Bing at 
     13 profit                        33 
             ____________ 
   224   18 
 
 
 
  George Bowes‟ lead business strategy seriously considered the  
 
widening of his smelting operations away from his own estate; the building of a  
 
smelt mill near Keswick, and one in particular at Thornthwaite. The plans and  
 
itemised costs ranged from £99 15s 7 ¼d to £170 4s 0d, considerably more expensive  
 
than most of the figures for mills on or near his estate, but there is no confirmation  
 
that Bowes did expand his smelting operations. Indeed, it may have been that his  
 
interest in the Keswick mining area related to copper rather than lead, although the 
 
the smelt mill plans would indicate lead.   
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   Documents created by George Bowes and his estate stewards, when 
 
conflated prove that he was directly involved in the lead production process – mining,  
 
smelting, carriage and marketing; that he directed the management of miners,  
 
washers, carriers and smelters; that he was informed by and communicated with the  
 
various individuals in the lead management framework; that he was in a range of  
 
different mining partnerships as a means of spreading risk; that he carried out  
 
reviews of his lead business and controlled financial management, particularly costs;  
 
and that he behaved as a capitalist through tacks and leases and the putting out by  
 
agreement of tools and equipment.  
    
George Bowes often directed the arrangements for mining - tacks and  
 
leases - by instructing their contents. Management of mining was left to stewards and  
 
specialists stewards, but most leases were at the instigation of Bowes himself once he  
 
received an offer from potential lessee adventurers, often supported by information  
 
from an agent or steward. Whilst at Streatlam during the summer of 1748 George  
 
Bowes penned  „Memds. relating to my lead mynes and tack notes granted‟594 which  
 
consists of a detailed list of mines and the lessees to whom he had agreed to let the  
 
mines, including Arngill, Standards, Lunehead, and Closehouse. Again, in 1751  
 
Bowes confirmed that Arngill was available for let at „Fifth Duty for any terms not  
 
exceeding 21 years the first year at a sixth‟. His mines steward Nathan Horn was to  
 
carry out this instruction by acquainting any interested person with these terms.  
 
Bowes had personally directed Horn to make it known that he was willing „to let…..  
 
any part of ye Lordship for a Fifth Duty for 21 years or seven years lease for a sixth  
 
Duty‟. 595  
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In 1756 George Bowes renewed his interest in lead mining following  
 
a lull in production after 1749 when the market had been flooded with pig lead. He  
 
implemented a change in strategy by instructing Nathan Horn  in detail about the  
 
letting of his lead mines, and once again focused on the two elements which most  
 
interested him, namely the gain and the costs involved.
596
 This signalled a change in  
 
Bowes‟ view of how the lead mining industry should be organised on his estate.  
 
Rationalisation of the actual mining process became the favoured approach;  
 
evidently letting more mines, with the exception of Isabell-mea-Hill and Closehouse,  
 
for duty ore as the preferred basis of production. His decisiveness is abundantly clear  
 
from the memorandum:  
 
„Lead Mines 
 
Green Mines on tak by Mr Craddock & pars 
 
     at every 1/6 duty. 
 
Isables Miah Hill on tak till May day 1758 
 
     at 25s per Bing 
 
Black Ark upon Cronkly Scar on tak 
 
for two years at every 1/6
th
 duty ending 
 
at Lammas 1758 
 
Black Syke Mr. Tissington & Pars. at every 
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  D/St/B2/93(1 & 2) a copy of George Bowes‟ memorandum to Nathan Horn dated 16th October  
     1756. The original was copied in the handwriting of Richard Stephenson, the senior steward at  
     Gibside. 
1/6
th
 duty for 21 years Commenced at 
 
Lammas 1755 
 
Nick HoppleYard let to do.  do. 
 
White Pitts near Noon Hill do.   do. 
 
Close House let to Jonathan & Co. 
 
at ever 1/6 duty for 3 years ending 
 
one year expir‟d 
 
Sun Vane at Close House Let to Nichs. Furnice 
 
     at 40s per as Bing  Not Wrought 
 
Standards let to Sam. Bacon for 21 years at 1/6 duty 
 
               about ½ year expir‟d. 
 
Arngill to let at 1/6 duty 
 
Lune Head let to Chas. Wensley for 21 years 
 
    enter‟d at Midsummer 1753. 
 
Old Field east of Mine Hill Let to Cha Wensley 
  
For 5 years enter‟d two years ago at 1/6 duty‟ 
 
 
At the same time, as part of the renewed vigour for lead, Bowes began the building  
 
of a new smelt mill at Wemmergill. 
 
 
George Bowes‟ commitment to investing in the expansion of lead  
 
production on his estate through exploration and mining is confirmed by expenditure 
 
accounted for in the period 1731 to 1758, itemised below in Table 17. The total  
 
expenditure on lead mining was £4,869 12s 8¾d, of which Bowes‟ partners at  
 
Lunehead, Nichol Hopple Yard, Standards, and Rowton Sike at Lunehead,  
 
contributed only four per cent. The investment of working capital began in earnest  
 
with the discovery of an accessible lead vein at Isabell-mea-Hill in 1741, but was  
 
reduced after1745 and did not reach the level of the early 1740s until 1757. 
 
Investment through partnership was largely a feature of the late 1730s at Standards  
 
and Lunehead which each lasted for a year, and for brief periods at Nichol Hopple  
 
Yard, Crinkle How, and Black Sike in the late 1740s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 
 
Lead mining expenditure on the Bowes estate, including partners, 
during  
1731-1758  
                
        Partner contribution 
                                         £            s             d                      £                s                d 
 
1731                                 8            3             1 
1737                               12          19             7                    12             19                7 
1739                             351            0           11                    23               8                8 
1741                             986          10             8                      2               4                8 
1742                             534            8             7  
1743                             357          14           11½  
1744                             310          17           11 
1745                             225          12           11½  
1746                             168          16             5 
1747                               23          19             4                    47             18                6 
1748                             106          14             2                    18             12                0 
1751/52                        165          17             7 
1752/53                        191          16             1                    18             13              10½        
1753/54                          34            6             2 
1754/55                        177            4             6 
1755/56                        190          14             7¾  
1757                             423          12           11                    27               6               11 
1758                             405            2             9                    42             15                 3  
 
TOTAL                      4675          13                ¾              193             19                 5½  
 
Source: 
D/St/B2/102-122, with the exception of 1758, which is from D/St/C2/3/76. The years 1756-
61 are indicated so because the compilation of accounts was December to December. 
Expenditure at Closehouse in 1751/52 included workings at nearby Thringarth. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18 below summarises the expenditure relating specifically to the 
 
getting of ore during the period 1731-1758, and clearly demonstrates that George  
 
Bowes, sometimes with partners, was committed to investing in the continuance of  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18 
Bowes’ lead mining expenditure by mine for ore production, including partners,  
1731-1758 (excluding carriage and smelting)  
 
              
                         Partner contribution 
 
                                                                                 £             s           d 
 
Arngill      47      7       1 
Black Ark                                50    12       4  
Black Sike                               33      5       3                    66         10           8 
Closehouse                            236    18       1 
Crinkle How                            97      8       2 
Cronkley                                  29    10       1 
Green Mines                          131      3       8 
Isabell-Mea-Hill                  3186    11       4   
Little Street                                4    19       4 
Lunehead                               407      0     11                      23          8           8 
Nichol Hopple Yard                11      2       0             2           4           8 
Rowton Syke                          355     0       3¾                   88         15        10½  
Silverkellwell                             4   19       4 
Standards                                  41     7       1                      12         19          7 
Side Lead Mine                        37   18       0   
  
TOTAL                                4675    13        ¾                  195        19          5½  
 
Source: Appendix II 
 
 
    
lead mining on his estate. The mine at Isabell-Meah-Hill was the main recipient of 
 
working capital, mostly during the 1740‟s, although there was further investment in  
 
this mine during the 1750‟s, albeit at a lower level. Across almost two decades sixty- 
 
eight per cent of capital was sunk into Isabell mea Hill, Rowton Sike and Lunehead  
 
almost ten percent, and Closehouse over five per cent. Lunehead, and Rowton Syke,  
 
which is also in the Lunehead area, were considered worthy of development, but to a  
 
much lesser extent when measured in terms of expenditure. The more detailed annual  
 
data in Table II of the appendices demonstrates the comparatively narrow focus of  
 
 
expenditure in the 1740‟s on Isabell-Meah-Hill, whereas during the 1750‟s the  
 
distribution of working capital broadened to include other mines, particularly those  
 
at Rowton Sike, Black Ark, Black Sike, and Closehouse, when Isabell-mea- Hill 
 
was less consuming. Again, it must be reiterated that capital input at Isabella  
 
Meah Hill occurred largely during the 1740‟s when it was by far and away the  
 
principal lead mine in terms of actual and potential lead ore production.  
 
  George Bowes‟ willingness to speculate in lead is unquestionable. He 
 
appears, however, to have to have overlooked a mining opportunity in Westmoreland. 
 
One Joseph Bowes, of no relation, offered it to him in 1758 as a short treatise, entitled  
 
“some Leadmines in the Duke of Bridgewater‟s possession”.597  It amounted to an  
 
opportunity for a set of gentlemen with money to venture to take an eighteen-year  
 
lease to mine lead at a place called Scoregill, near Dufton, in Westmoreland, no more  
 
than ten miles from Wemmergill smelt mill. The source, Joseph Emerson of  
 
Newbigin, near Middleton-in-Teesdale, was „looked upon by all the Earl of  
 
Darlington‟s agents to have the most Knowledge in Mines of any man in the North of  
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  D/St/C2/3/75(6), treatise from Joseph Bowes dated 14
th
 January 1758, sent by Elizabeth Horn  
     of Middleton-in-Teesdale „on behalf of an acquaintance‟  (i.e. Joseph Bowes) to Richard  
     Stephenson. 
England‟.598 He was probably working at Pikelaw lead mine for the Earl of 
Darlington.  
 
Emerson believed that Scoregill was „the most promising thing that any Gentlemen  
 
can chance money in ….‟, because most of the exploratory work at different levels  
 
had been completed, though largely unsuccessfully, which could facilitate success.  
 
Emerson wanted a quarter share in the suggested enterprise. Joseph Bowes  
 
suggested that Nathan Horn should be sent to assess the mine and contact the Duke of  
 
 
 
Bridgewater‟s agent.599 
   
A final point is that when the figures for ore production at the various 
 
mines are compared to those for working capital introduced by Bowes or Bowes and  
 
partners, it can be seen that in most cases there was not a long gestation period. Ore 
 
was generally harvested within the very short term if not immediately. This was  
 
certainly the case at Black Sike in 1747/48, at Closehouse between 1751 and 1759, at  
 
Standards in 1758/59, at Black Ark in 1757, at Isabell mea Hill throughout the 1740s  
 
and 1750s, and at Green Mines in 1751/52. Expenditure at Crinkle How in 1748/49, at  
 
Lunehead and Closehouse in the 1730s, at Nichol Hopple Yard and Green Mines in  
 
1741 and 1757/58, all proved fruitless, but in most cases offered the benefit of  
 
continuity of exploration and discovery either for a future date or for lessees keen to 
 
develop a mine‟s potential. The effects of war and peace for the lead market have  
 
been discussed above in Chapter 7, and it has been established that, using the example  
 
of Isabell-mea-Hill mine, production costs were well below market prices. Yet mining  
 
activity on the Bowes estate does not appear to have been particularly responsive  
 
when lead prices rose substantially as war ended. This is more noticeable in the case  
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  Extracted from the text of Joseph Bowes‟ treatise in D/St/C2/3/75(6). 
599
  D/St/C2/3/7 (8) Richard Stephenson‟s letter to Joseph Bowes of 8th February, confirming that 
     George Bowes was too busy involved in a lawsuit, but would possibly consider the matter later. 
of the war ending in 1763 than that ending in 1748, but in both instances we should  
 
seek the cause internally rather than externally, in management rather than market.   
 
  George Bowes was regularly involved in lead mining operations by  
 
gathering reports from his mines steward and senior estate stewards, and by giving  
 
instructions that would allow him to form his opinion of the potential for profitable  
 
lead mining. In 1746, for example, a steward noted his master‟s instructions as  
 
„Orders to me on going to ye Lead Mine pay‟, in which Bowes requests ‟bring me  
 
 
another of Wensley‟s boring & Nathan‟s opinion of Ditto.600 Bowes undoubtedly had  
 
faith in his own judgment, but was sufficiently astute to obtain his specialist steward‟s  
 
view of Charles Wensley‟s prospecting at Lunehead, before he committed to further  
 
leases or provision of working capital. Similarly on a ‟A plan of Langstaff Tryall near  
 
Standards‟ Bowes wrote orders about actual mining operations there: 
 
„22s p. fathom for driving ye drift to flank 
 
ye vein which is supposed to be near twenty 
 
fathom. 
 
Such work tools as are delivered them to 
 
Be then valued & to be made good when returned 
 
in ye paymt for their working‟.601 
 
 
Having gathered information and a sketch map of the proposed mining and 
 
determining the scale of the task, Bowes decisively set the rate of pay for the  
 
deadwork and provided the tools, which had to be returned before the miners were  
 
paid. 
 
George Bowes was evidently the chief source of working capital for  
                                                 
600
  D/St/B2/91(1) a memorandum in Bowes‟ own hand, dated by archivists as c.1740 but more likely 
     c.1746 when cross-referenced with Charles Wensley‟s leases at Lunehead. 
601
  D/St/P15/3 a sketch of trial workings at Langstaff near Standards dated at mid-eighteenth century. 
 lead mining on the Bowes estate, but directed a different strategy during the 1750s  
 
which introduced the transition from small scale to larger scale production marked by  
 
a concomitant change to extraneous sources of investment. The Bowes estate before 
 
George Bowes and during the first thirty years of his patriarchy did not experience the    
 
evolution described by Burt as the demise of small-scale local finance, which had  
 
characterised the industry since the sixteenth century, replaced by the larger scale  
 
regional and sometimes national finance, enterprises formed by investors from  
 
the professional classes, merchants, and the gentry. The reason for this change was the  
 
capital requirements of deeper mining and the reluctance of mineral lords to carry the  
 
risks involved.
602
  Rather, it was representative of Raistrick & Jennings‟ three 
 
categories of investor: the working miners who‟s capital was their skill and simple  
 
tools; the mineral lord seeking to develop and exploit his estates; and from the late  
 
seventeenth century, the sleeping investors, who often speculated individually, but  
 
more often came to share the risks by forming partnerships and, far less frequently  
 
during the eighteenth century, joint stock companies.
603
 These sources were usually  
 
local and included smelt mill owners and merchants willing to risk some of their gains  
 
made in other sectors of the local or wider regional economy, but the key role was  
 
played by the landowner, in this case George Bowes. The circumstances for change  
 
created by George Bowes are divulged in the contents of tacks and leases which state  
 
the types of adventurer and in many cases their place of origin, and when those for the  
 
1740s and 1750s are compared and contrasted a change in the type of lead mine  
 
adventurers and the scale of their enterprises can be identified. 
604
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  Burt, British Lead, ch.2. 
603
  Raistrick & Jennings, History, ch. 8 
604
  The following examination of sources of capital and business organisation is from D/St/B2/11-31     
     and D/St/B2/105. 
    
  In the 1740s, with the exception of George Bowes‟ mine at Isabell-mea 
 
-Hill where for two years he was in partnership with John Dent, most mining activity  
 
was small scale with relatively low ore production. Thomas Taden (sometimes  
 
written as „Tedding‟) and Jonathan Watson prospected as partners in the Wemmergill  
 
and Arngill Beck area of Lunedale in 1738. They were skilled miners, and Watson  
 
was a specialist husher. Similarly John Longstaff, also a husher, worked the area lease  
 
granted in 1738, which embraced the Green Mines and Birkdale orefields. In 1744  
 
Taden, Watson, Longstaff, and Thomas Raine combined to work the High Hush at  
 
Lunehead. In between leases Watson worked for George Bowes at Black Sike where  
 
he had a bargain in partnership with Ned Robinson to work twenty fathoms at 10s a  
 
bing and 8s a fathom. In 1748 Taden and Watson were hushing at Standards, and in  
 
1755 Watson took a three-year lease at Closehouse. These are examples of small- 
 
scale, low cost exploration and exploitation; the capital commitment was in the form  
 
of skill, labour, and basic tools from independent, self-employed, possibly part-time  
 
miners. 
 
  Charles Wensley, described in leases as a miner, was at Level Head  
 
Lunehead from 1746-48, at Rowton Sike Lunehead from 1752 where he became  
 
George Bowes partner in 1755, and from 1754 on the Old Field at Lunehead from  
 
1754. Indeed his exploits resulted in Rowton Sike becoming known as Wensley Vein. 
 
Wensley was a serious miner but lacked working capital, and consequently the 
 
partnership was formed because Bowes was convinced of the potential at Lunehead 
 
and Wensley could not have continued mining without Bowes money. It would be  
 
inaccurate, however, to categorise George Bowes as a sleeping partner, because he  
 
was au fait with lead mining and was represented in the field by knowledgeable  
 
agents whose direct oversight was written into the lease with Wensley. Charles  
 
Wensley appears to have been a full-time lead miner who required partnership  
 
funding to develop his mining operation. 
 
  The third type of adventurer on the Bowes estate in the 1740s was the  
 
salaried Bowes field agent who both worked for Bowes in an overseeing capacity at  
 
the leased mines, and who actually worked as a miner. The most obvious example is  
 
Nathan Horn, who eventually became George Bowes lead mines steward, who  
 
worked Arngill with Robert Hind and John Dent from 1742 to 1744. Another was 
 
William Horn, possibly related to Nathan, who acted temporarily as an agent for  
 
George Bowes, and who in 1741, in partnership with Edward Rain who had  
 
discovered this vein, also took a lease from Bowes north of Long Crag near Lang  
 
Hurst, probably what came to be know as Millings Shop. He was also involved in a  
 
trial mine on Mickle Fell, the exact location unknown, in partnership with Leonard  
 
Robinson, Thomas Horn, possibly a relative, and Jonathan Watson the husher, the  
 
tack note for which became extinct in October 1746. 
 
 
There was almost one notable regional source of finance. In 1739  
 
George Bowes received a proposal for a tack from William Coatsworth, the  
 
successful Newcastle businessman, and his partner John Dixon, to work Lunehead  
 
lead mines for six months with an option for a twenty-one year lease and one-sixth  
 
duty ore Bowes. Unfortunately there is no record of a response from Bowes, nor is  
 
there any evidence of Coatsworth and his partner mining at Lunehead. 
605
 
 
  The independent miners, possibly dividing their time between lead and  
 
land, the miner devoted to chasing the lead vein, and Bowes field agents with  
 
mining skills and knowledge were all local. In 1748, however, the allure of lead  
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  For William Cotesworth‟s activities see Hughes, North Country, ch. II and V, and Purdue,  
     Merchants and Gentry. 
saw the arrival of a partnership that was granted a two-year lease to mine at Arngill,  
 
and at least one of the partners was London based - John Dent „of ye Gate‟.606 Dent 
 
was probably a merchant in coal or lead or both, so would have been aware of the 
 
value of lead in the 1740s when demand was high in the post war boom. This  
 
partnership is the only clear example of an investor who was neither local nor  
 
regional, and was the first sign of the influx of adventurers from outside the North  
 
East. 
 
  At the beginning of the 1750s lead mining on the Bowes estate  
 
appeared moribund; ten years mining at Isabell-mea-Hill had come to an abrupt end; 
 
the tacks at Arngill, Standards, and Closehouse were out; Charles Wensley had  
 
forfeited his lease at Level Head Lunehead in 1748; George Bowes partnership mine  
 
with Lord Carlisle at Crinkled How was unproductive; and Green Mines, then in  
 
George Bowes‟ hands, had become inactive, mainly because of severe weather,  
 
although he planned to bring in more labour for further trials in the Spring.
607
 
   
Revival was in the offing, and from 1752 when Bowes appears to have had another  
 
brief affair with Isabell mea Hill, interest from adventurers was rejuvenated. Charles  
 
Wensley returned to Lunehead to mine at Rowton Sike in 1752, the at the Old Field  
 
at Lunehead in1754, to be partnered in 1755 at Rowton Sike by Bowes. The other  
 
indigenous veteran Jonathan Watson began hushing at Closehouse in 1755. In  
 
addition, a local three man partnership – Tim Bainbridge, John Bainbridge, and 
 
William Tarn - began working Isabell-mea-Hill. 
 
  It was during the 1750s that interest and finance became more regional  
 
and less local, and inter-regional. In 1754 Samuel Bacon, perhaps a member of the  
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  The „Gate‟ was abbreviation for Billingsgate. Henry Liddell, the coal magnate used it when writing  
     about coal dealers in 1710. See R. Smith, Sea Coal to London (London 1961) p. 40 and p. 83. Also  
     Hughes, North Country, quotes the same source pp.178-181. 
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  D/St/C2/1/5 (4) a memorandum from Thomas Colpitts I to George Bowes 15th February 1750. 
family who partnered the Blacketts, was granted a one year tack with an option for  
 
twenty-one years at Standards, and in 1755 Thomas Pierse of Piersburgh in Yorkshire  
 
was granted the same form of lease for an area of Mickle fell including Nichol Hopple  
 
Yard. Green Mines and connected workings, including Longstaff Hush, was taken by  
 
 five partners in 1755 under a twenty-one year lease; William Dockwray, gentleman,  
 
from Backbarrow in Lancashire - a location for iron production; Joseph Cradock of  
 
Denton , Newcastle, a clerk; William Watson, gentleman, of Dikehouse near  
 
Hartlepool; John Cradock, a Barnard Castle merchant; and Anthony Cradock,  
 
gentleman, of Barnard Castle. Lastly, in 1756 a twenty-one year lease was granted by  
 
George Bowes to George Tissington of Winster in Derbyshire, and his unnamed   
 
partners. Tissington was a member of the Derbyshire mining family and the lease for  
 
all lead and copper covered a broad area of Mickle Fell, including Nichol Hopple  
 
Yard and White Pitts on Noon Hill, Black Sike, and the assignment of Bowes lease at  
 
Silverkellwell.  
 
  The evident change in regional and inter-regional sources of  
 
partnership and venture capital during the 1750s can hardly be termed a rush for grey  
 
gold, but the Bowes estate had become recognised for its potential mineral wealth. 
 
Nevertheless, it marks the beginning of a gradual transformation in the structure of the  
 
lead production business on the Bowes estate that was to occur after George Bowes  
 
died in 1760.  Once initial shallow workings were exhausted at low cost, the  
 
development of lead extraction had as a prerequisite the availability of risk capital to  
 
invest in improved technology for deeper mining in the medium to longer term. The  
 
Bowes family adopted a low risk stance in the later eighteenth century. This did not 
 
happen immediately after 1760; instead there was an intervening decade of  
 
reassessment and reorganisation.  
 
   
George Bowes contributed directly to the management of labour 
 
in lead production. He was anxious to maximise man-hours, avoid loss, and reduce  
 
costs in the use of timber, stocks of which were expensive in mining and the main  
 
form of capital formation underground. He instructed that miners and smelt mill  
 
workers were motivated by being paid regularly in order to maintain output and to  
 
prevent them from becoming distracted by other sources of income: 
 
 
 
„Lunehead to be pushed on and more men set to work. 
 
The Mill expenses to be paid every six weeks. Leadings of oar as well as lead 
ditto. 
 
The wood made use of in very shaft & to be noted in ye Bargain Book & 
compared  
 
monthly with ye stock. 
               
Weekly presentns. To be sent to Gibside every week both from Mine & Mill  
 
receipts‟.608 
 
In October 1756 rationalisation took the form of incentives, because  
 
instead of making payments as slowly as possible, a memorandum instructed faster  
 
payments for all those involved in the process of lead production: 
 
„The carriage of Lead Ore to be pd. Weekly. 
 
The hushers at Isabel Miah Hill to be paid Im- 
 
-mediately 60s on Condition that they give up their 
 
Bargains at Christmas and then to be paid clear  
 
Off for all the Ore left 
 
The Ore Carriers to be paid for the pasture every Month. 
 
The Fathom and Sinking to be paid every Month 
                                                 
608
 D/St/B2/91(3) c.1740-42 
 The Ore Washer to be pd. every half year 
 
The house and stables to be instantly Repair‟d 
 
Nathan says the level in Isable miah hill to 
 
where the Ore was last may be carry‟d up for 30s‟ 609 
  
   
Bowes‟ assessment of the lead production process by the mid-1750‟s  
 
had changed. The latter section of his memorandum of 16
th
 October 1756 reveals a  
 
remarkably different stance in his attitude towards the various parts of the production 
 
process. The hushers were to be paid to get on with the task, but then made redundant,  
 
because Bowes, based on Horn‟s opinion, believed their efforts were at the margin  
 
and did not wish to waste money. He also decided to encourage the carriers, the men  
 
who owned the packhorses, which carried the ore and smelted lead from mine to mill  
 
to market. He even thought capital spent on a house for miners and stables was  
 
worthwhile. At Isabell-mea-Hill Bowes considered increasing performance pay for  
 
miners as an incentive to get the ore Nathan Horn believed was there. Thus, George  
 
Bowes injected lead mining in Upper Teesdale with an urgency not seen since the  
 
1740s. 
 
He paid equally close attention to the preparation of ore for smelting,  
 
because he knew this not only aided the smelter, but could enhance the quality and  
 
yield of pig lead - „Great care to be taken in ye washing of ye Oar‟.610. George Bowes  
 
directed that „Nath (an) to be ordered to look very particularly to ye well washing of  
 
ye oar & such as is not well washed to have it washed over again, and to take care for  
 
ye future ye wasters have ….wages allowed.‟ 611  
                                                 
609
  D/St/B2/93 the spelling in this transcription is that of Richard Stephenson not George Bowes.     
     Unfortunately, his original memorandum of 1756 is not in the Strathmore Collection. 
610
  D/St/B2/135, „Some Memds relating to ye building of a Smelt Mill‟. 
    
George Bowes did not introduce technological change in the smelting  
 
stage of the production process, but was responsible for managing the primary input  
 
- the smelter‟s skill - and therefore the efficiency of metallurgy and ultimately its  
 
productivity. He was aware that lead smelting was a craft, and that the skill of  
 
experienced smelters was fundamental to the manufacture of quality pig lead. The art  
 
of smelting lay in the smelter‟s ability to combine ore and fuel at different 
 
temperatures at various stages whilst applying an evenly distributed blast of air over  
 
the hearth. Early in June 1741 he made such a visit to Bollihope smelt mill where he  
 
had „directed‟ the smelters to try smelting twenty bing of ore before fixing a rate of  
 
pay for the 400 bing thought to be at Isabell-mea-Hill.
612
 This canny approach is  
 
noted in a letter from Thomas Colpitts I to Bowes at Gibside in which Colpitts  
 
confirms his agreement to do this, and also mentions their meeting about fuel  
 
requirements and the carrying of peat and ore. To obtain the optimum amount of pig  
 
lead smelted he attempted to hire the best smelters. Thomas Moses was a smelter for  
 
the Vane family, and Bowes intended to set him on at Bollihope and wrote „Thomas  
 
Moses late a Smelter to Mr.Vane came to offer his services to me, Q Mr Vane about  
 
this character and discharge‟.613 Bowes also noted that Moses informed him that Vane  
 
had paid him 5s 6d per fother smelted and that there is „a great deal of art in building  
 
hearths which he always built at Mr. Vanes‟. Bowes interest in employing Moses  
 
stemmed from James Sanderson, the leading smelter at Bowes‟ mill in the 1740s, who  
 
had commented that Moses could smelt twenty-five bing of ore per week, and that he  
 
would like him as an assistant smelter. He also noted that he would be interested in  
 
Lane Sanderson as a smelter, because „Lane Sanderson used to Smelt ore for Mr.  
                                                                                                                                            
611
  D/St/B2/91(3) a George Bowes‟ memorandum, dated by archivist at c.1740, but probably 1742. 
612
  D/St/C1/3/60 (1) Letter from Thomas Colpitts I to George Bowes dated 18th June 1741. 
613
  D/St/B2/135 Bowes memoranda on smelt mills 
 Bacon at 6s per fother‟. Consequently, Bowes ordered Thomas Colpitts I to open  
 
negotiations with Thomas Moses. 
 
George Bowes improved the disciplined work rate of his smelters,  
 
which proved efficacious for both the use of materials and output. This managed  
 
change in smelting skill on the Bowes estate can be identified by analysis of the ratio  
 
of smelter‟s pay to total smelting costs, because there is a strong correlation during  
 
the 1740s between the level of smelting activity in terms of the amount of lead  
 
smelted, and the proportion of smelting expenses - including pay and related  
 
expenses, such as materials – consisting of the smelter‟s pay.  
 
Broadly, the costs for smelting in Table 19 below correspond to the  
 
amounts of pig lead smelted. During the 1740s a smelter was paid 5s 6d per fother of  
 
lead smelted, where each pig or piece was on average between 11 and 11½ stones,  
 
with 16 pigs or pieces to a Newcastle fother of 21 cwt.
614
  In the years 1757-59 a  
 
smelter was paid 7s per fother of lead.
615
  It is worth noting here that in 1757 the  
 
smelter John Langstaff earned £12 whereas the mill manager, Gibson, received £10  
 
salary. In 1742, a year of relatively high production, when the smelter‟s pay rate was 
 
   
Table 19 
 
Expenditure on smelting1741-46 and 1757-60 
 
                                                 
614
  The smelter‟s pay is confirmed in the accounts D/St/B2/105, and cross-referenced in an agent‟s 
      notebook D/St/E3/5/21. The weights are also noted in D/St/B2/105 accounts documents. 
615
  This rate of pay is confirmed in the Wemmergill Smelt Mill pay bills, D/St/B2/126 &127. 
Year    £           s         d 
 
1741    50        18       2 ¼  
1742    36 12     11 
1743    49   9       8 ¼  
1744    28        10       2 
1745    24          0          ¾  
1746    10          8     10 ¾  
1747- 1756                                   no data 
1757             115        14       0 
1758             123        11       0 
1759 
1760    24          9     11  
 
TOTAL                              466        10     10 
Source: 
For 1741 D/St/B2/103; for 1742-46 inclusive D/St/B2/105; for 
1757 D/St/B2/122; for 1758-60 from D/B2/St/127. The figures 
from D/St/B2/105 include materials as well as actual smelting 
costs, as noted in the original document. The figure for 1760 is 
for the period 1
st
 January 1759 to 22
nd
 January 1760. 
 
5s 6d per fother, the total cost per fother of lead smelted was 7s. 9 ¼d. In other words,  
 
the pay was 70.71% of the cost per fother smelted. Again, in 1743 it was 58.26% of  
 
the smelting cost per fother of 9s 5 ¼d. In 1744, when the amount of lead smelted fell  
 
by almost 79% from the previous year, pay was only 21.41% of the smelting cost per  
 
fother of £1 5s 8 ¼d. The 304% increase in lead smelted in 1745 from 1744, saw the 
 
smelter‟s pay rising to 82.46% of the smelting cost per fother, when the smelting cost  
 
per fother was 6s 8 ½d.
616
 Perhaps this is an indication of the smelter‟s skill and  
 
efficient use of materials in times of greater production. 
 
  The same analysis can be applied to the late 1750s, but with  
 
appropriate adjustments to the financial information available, because the accounting  
 
system changed after George Bowes built the mill at Wemmergill. From 1757  
 
                                                 
616
  These calculations are based upon accounting information in D/St/B2/105, and should be 
      considered a good estimates of the cost structure of smelting where the total expense of 
      smelting lead consisted of smelters‟ pay at the given rate per fother and the provision of  
      materials needed in the smelting process, and including such items as repairs and general labour. 
Wemmergill smelt mill became the hub of Bowes mining activity, essentially because  
 
of its proximity to his mines. There were two consequences: firstly, the carriage of  
 
both ore and smelted lead altered, because the transportation of ore was over shorter  
 
distances, but pig lead over longer distances; and secondly, the management  
 
accounting practice of John Gibson, the smelt mill manager changed to include the  
 
cost of ore carriage from the nearby mines and lead carriage to Wolsingham, but not  
 
beyond there. So, in the last quarter of 1757 when a smelter‟s pay rate was 7s per  
 
fother, it made up 61.7% of the smelting cost, as defined for the 1740s, when the total  
 
cost of smelting per fother of lead was 11s 7 ¼d. In 1758, the proportion was 61.71%  
 
of the total smelting cost of 11s 4d, but in 1759/60, a year of very low output, only  
 
9.12%. Again, the correlation between the amount of lead smelted and the ratio of  
 
smelter‟s pay to total smelting cost is demonstrated in the late 1750s – high output of  
 
pig lead is matched with a higher and consistent proportion of pay to other variable  
 
costs, such as fuel, general labour, and other materials required for smelting.
617
 
 
  The yield of pig lead from ore in the smelting process was a focal point  
 
for George Bowes‟ micro-management, which led to the improvement in  
 
productivity discussed above in chapter 6. In the early 1740s Bowes noted his  
 
reckoning that „If 4 Bing makes a NewC foder of 21Ct 32oz of Oar produce 21oz of  
 
Lead‟.618 The application of his knowledge of smelting is further confirmed by 
Bowes‟  
 
notes in a document entitled „A Computation maid for a Lead Mill at ye Mine‟, which  
 
concluded that it would be cheaper to smelt slags at a mill built at Spurls Wood than  
 
at a mill built near the mines.
619
  The value of smelting slags to obtain a greater yield 
 
of pig lead from ore was a serious issue for Bowes, and after reading a steward‟s  
                                                 
617
  These calculations are based upon financial information derived from D/St/B2/ 126 &127 smelt  
     mill paybills. Again, these should be considered as good estimates of the nature of smelting costs. 
618
  D/St/B2/135 Bowes calculation was correct, and equates to a ratio of 1.5:1 ore to pig lead. 
619
  D/St/B2/135 smelt mill memoranda. 
 report on yield from various mines, he wrote on it „To give orders about the picking  
 
of lead out of ye slags, a Fother of Lead yields 10 stone out of ye slags unpicked, if  
 
picked only 5 stone‟.620  On the same document noted adjacent to figures for yield of  
 
ore bought from the Dodd Hill lead mine „Q why this oar is not refined, if any was  
 
sent to ye mills‟, because there was no record of it being carried to the mill or being  
 
smelted but the yield of pig lead from it was reported as better than from the other  
 
mines recorded therein. 
   
Smelting was the final stage in the production process, and the skill  
 
involved was valuable and essential to its profitable marketing. The smelting 
 
process as a variable cost was obviously more manageable and controllable, because  
 
it was a direct function of the amount of ore mined and dressed. Expenditure on  
 
smelting was a much lower level of risk capital than mining, but carriage costs could  
 
erode profit subject to current market prices at Newcastle.   
 
Carriage costs were as much a determinant of the viability of lead  
 
mining on the Bowes estate as anywhere else, because the cost of actual extraction 
 
was beyond the control of both Bowes and his lessees, especially where mining  
 
became deeper.
621
 There was no road infrastructure and no navigable river system 
 
to facilitate the carriage of lead ore and pig lead. Consequently, both these  
 
commodities were carried overland by packhorse. George Bowes was preoccupied  
 
with the carriage costs, and particularly those for ore, because it was bulkier. Carriage  
 
was the most important variable cost in the lead industry; controlling it and reducing it  
 
wherever possible could make a significant difference to profit, and consequently lead  
 
mining viability. Bowes shrewdly gleaned knowledge from other producers in the  
 
                                                 
620
  D/St/B2/155 the produce of mines in 1741. 
621
  See Burt, British Lead, pp-207-212. 
region. For example, in 1742 he noted a comment regarding ore delivery to Bollihope  
 
smelt mill from a smelter working for the Vane family, mineral lords north of the  
 
River Tees; „Elliot says that on a calculation at Raby it was found ye about 8s per  
 
fother might be saved by building a mill at ye Myne rather than at their present  
 
mill‟.622  
   
  In the same way he headhunted the best smelters, George Bowes  
 
sought carriers capable of speedier pack-horse carriage, therefore cost reduction, in  
 
delivering from Bollihope smelt mill to Shield Row. He instructed Colpitts to fix an 
 
agreement with one Ralph Palmesley who had developed a reputation carrying pig  
 
lead for Mr. Bacon in Allendale, because Bowes knew that the rate per mile paid by  
 
Vane family was less than his.
 623
 The costs of carriage were determined by the 
market  
 
price of pig lead and distance, and particularly the distance ore was carried from  
 
mines to the smelt mill, because it was bulkier than pig lead. Conversely, the closer  
 
the smelt mill was to the lead mines meant pig lead was carried over a greater distance  
 
than ore, thereby reducing the overall cost or carriage in the progress from mine to  
 
market. 
 
 
After the discovery of Isabell-meah-Hill in 1740 and the initial spurt in  
 
lead production, George Bowes was confronted with two dilemmas; the carriage  
 
routes and distances involved for both ore and pig lead, and the location of his smelt  
 
mills and proximity to the mines. Both were determinants of carriage costs and  
 
therefore profit. The fuel for smelting, peat, was readily available in Upper Teesdale  
 
and easily and cheaply cut and delivered by cart to Bowes mill wherever they may be.  
 
The lead business records give the impression that George Bowes dealt with the two  
                                                 
622
  D/St/B2/155 accounts of ore delivered to and smelted at Bollihope Mill 1741-42. 
623
  D/St/B2/91 a Bowes memorandum in his hand. 
 dilemmas simultaneously.
624
 There were various proposed locations existed for smelt  
 
mills, and there were two possible carriage routes available for pig lead smelted at  
 
Bollihope; north to the River Tyne and the port of Newcastle, or east to Stockton,  
 
which may appear the more obvious choice. The latter was a major consideration for  
 
George Bowes once Isabell-mea-hill was in production.  
 
  After lengthy consideration he made the key decision that, rather than  
 
distribute lead from his estate to to Stockton, it would go to Newcastle via the River  
 
Tyne. How did he assess and decide upon a route? Bowes instructed his agents to 
 
measure and compare distances for a way north to Newcastle - from Isabell-mea-Hill  
 
mines to Bollihope, Bollihope to Wolsingham, thence to Blaydon or Swalwell on the  
 
Tyne – and a way east to Stockton – from the mines to Middleton-in Teesdale, there  
 
to Staindrop the road from where leads to Stockton, with Streatlam implied as a  
 
staging post only a few miles southwest of Staindrop. 
625
 Bowes described variations  
 
in northerly and easterly carriage routes, one including the „use of Vane‟s Mill‟ then  
 
onward to Raby. 
626
 George Bowes focused on pig lead carriage costs and concluded  
 
that taking the northern route was cheaper, smelting at Bollihope, and then use the  
 
coal waggonway to the River Tyne. George Bowes noted that „3 Fother of Lead may  
 
be conveyd to my staiths for 2s 6d…………and will save ye expense of Agents going  
 
to Stockton and Agents there‟627 Consequently, from no later than 1742 he employed  
 
the waggonway for the final stage of pig lead transportation to his staith at Dunston  
 
on the Tyne. In addition, Bowes avoided the costs of agency at Stockton, which in  
 
turn avoided further eroding his margin. There is no evidence at any point of pig lead  
 
                                                 
624
  D/St/B2/135 containing memoranda, costs estimates, and plans for smelt mills. 
625
  D/St/B2/135 (12 and 13) cost computations for smelt mills, dated at 1742 and later. 
626
  Bowes does not state which mill, but references to „Vane‟s mill‟ and Raby (Castle) would suggest     
     he meant Eggleston Mill. 
627
  D/St/B2/135 Bowes memoranda. 
carried to Stockton, regardless of its appearance as the natural market choice. 
 
  George Bowes‟ initial decision then, was to continue moving ore to  
 
Bollihope rather than hiring other smelt mills, such as the mill at Eggleston used by  
 
the Vane family, and then pig lead to the River Tyne with the last stage by  
 
waggonway. This decision organised four stages of transportation in the lead  
 
production process; the journey for ore from the mines in Upper Teesdale to  
 
Bollihope, which was broken into two sub-stages, namely „Teesdale carriage‟ and  
 
„Weardale carriage‟; pig lead from Bollihope mill to Wolsingham; pig lead from  
 
Wolsingham to Shield Row; and pig lead from Shield Row to the staith on the River  
 
Tyne.
628
  
 
  Smelt mill location was the other element of the organisational  
 
problem. Plans and estimates for the building of smelt mills were drawn up for   
 
George Bowes during the early 1740s, and these together with his own memoranda  
 
relating to distances and possible sites for mills, evidence his business plan for the  
 
reorganisation of lead production including the reduction of carriage costs. The  
 
relocation of smelting at Wemmergill was put in abeyance until 1756, some fourteen  
 
years after Bowes became concerned about the structure of the lead industry on his  
 
estate. The building of a new mill at Wemmergill in close proximity to the mines  
 
changed the stages of transportation after 1757 when it began to receive all the lead  
 
ore from the Bowes estate. The ore was carried a much shorter distance, but the  
 
smelted lead a longer distance from Wemmergill to Wolsingham, Wolsingham to  
 
Tanfield, and from Tanfield to the staith.
629
 In other words there were still four stages  
 
in the carriage process, but by far the shorter part was ore carriage, always the most  
 
difficult and most expensive by weight and distance.  
                                                 
628
  D/St/B2/103 report of carriage and D/St/B2/125 pay bill for ore carriage to Bollihope mill. 
629
  D/St/B2/150 and D/St/B2/127, accounts of pig lead carriage costs. 
   George Bowes personally considered the two aspects of lead smelting:  
 
mill location in terms of operation – power, fuel and roads; and the possibility of 
 
expanding smelting as a business activity. During the 1740s he gathered plans and  
 
costs for smelt mills both on his estate and nearby. Staindrop, Holwick, Mickleton and  
 
Spurls Wood were all perceived as possible sites in relation to water-power, peat and  
 
coal for fuel. The details of these plans have been discussed above.
630
 Perhaps the key  
 
document in Bowes‟ decision to relocate the smelt mill as part of his reorganisation is  
 
„The Difference between smelting at Boylup and building a New Mill at Isabell- 
 
meah-Hill‟. This shows that the overall cost of smelting 600 bing of ore, would be  
 
thirty-five percent cheaper, £59 8s 4d. The main saving was on carriage costs. In other  
 
words, Bowes realised almost at outset that reorganisation of the whole production  
 
process hinged on the relationship between location and carriage. 
 
Table 20 below demonstrates the effects of George Bowes‟ decision- 
 
making in managing carriage costs during the 1740s and relocating smelting in the  
 
late 1750s. Almost all carriage costs for lead ore were for transportation from Isabell-  
 
Meah-Hill to the Bollihope smelt mill, because the amount of ore other mines  
 
included in these figures was relatively small.
631
 During the years 1740-46 the cost of  
 
ore carriage significantly outweighed that for smelted lead, and discrete year analysis 
 
shows that only in 1743 and 1745 was the latter greater than the former. The cost of  
 
ore carriage during the 1740s was generally higher than the cost of carrying pig lead  
 
because the journey distance was greater. It was during the 1740s that Bollihope smelt  
 
mill received all ore from the Bowes estate and any bought in ore. Apart from 1751, 
 
Table 20 
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  D/St/B2/135 documents relating to smelt mills. 
631
  See Table I of the appendices showing ore production from the various mines during the 1740‟s. 
Costs of carriage for lead ore and smelted lead 1741-46,1751, &1757-
60 
 
 
        Lead ore      Smelted lead         Total 
      £        s       d    £         s        d  £        s       d   
1741 125     10      3   35       12      6 161     2       9 
1742 111       8      0   64       14      6 176     2       6 
1743   68     13      0   81         8      0 150     1       0 
1744   47       7      0   25       14      8 ½         73     1       8½   
1745   25      19     0   36       14      6   62   13       6  
1746   16        1     0     2       11      8   18   12       8 
1751   No data found   22         8      1   22     8       1 
1757 
1758 
1759 
1760 
    5        8     6 
  39      13     1 ½  
    8      16     3           
    3        9     9 
  31         7      0 
  88       19      5 
  14         3    10 
    1         0      8 ½      
 
  36   15      6 
128    12     6 ½  
  23     0      1 
    4    10     5 ½      
Source: 
Derived largely from D/St/B2/105 (9), a ledger of 
miscellaneous receipts for expenditure at Isabell-mea-Hill, 
Arngill, and Standards mines, and including the carriage cost 
of bought-in ore from Dodd Hill. The figure for 1751 is from 
D/St/B2/109, an account of receipts and expenditure for all 
mines. For 1757-60 D/St/B2/126-127 smelt mill pay bills.  
  
 
no records of pig lead carriage were uncovered for the period 1750-56, probably 
 
because ore production was relatively insignificant. The effect of building a mill at  
 
Wemmergill closer to the mines is blatantly obvious for both types of carriage  
 
from 1757 to 1760. It is quite clear that the cost of carrying a bing of ore fell by a half  
 
when the 1740s are compared with the late 1750s; this was the desired Wemmergill  
 
effect. 
632
 The average cost per bing of ore during the 1740s was 4-5s,but for the 
period 
 
1757-60 it was 2-3s. 
 
   Did Bowes achieve a worthwhile reduction in the cost of pig lead  
 
                                                 
632
 D/St/B2/125 accounts for the lead mines and D/St/B2/127 smelt mill paybills. 
carriage to the River Tyne from Wemmergill in the period 1757-60 compared to the  
 
1740s? This analysis is somewhat more difficult because pig lead carriage costs are  
 
sparsely documented compared to those for ore in the 1740s. The cost of lead carriage  
 
from Shield Row to the Tyne was recorded by Francis O‟Neale in 1742 as 2s 6d per  
 
fother „Shield Row to the staith per waggon‟.633 Indeed, the waggonway was in use no  
 
later than 1742, and made pig lead carriage much easier.
634
 For the period 1757-60,  
 
however, there is sufficient accounting for pig lead carriage costs. 
 
  In 1741 pig lead carriage cost from Bollihope to Shield Row via  
 
Wolsingham was 11s 10 ½ d.
635
  In 1742, the cost was11s 4d; in 1743 15s 1d, but less  
 
at 10s 2d in 1745.
636
 The cost of the journey from Shield Row to the staith is largely 
 
unknown for the 1740s, except for 1742. In 1757 lead carriage from Wemmergill via  
 
Wolsingham to Tanfield Moor was 18s 4d, but the cost from Tanfield to the staith is  
 
unknown.
637
  This journey cost 17s 6d 1758, and the stage between Tanfield and the  
 
staith ranged between 11d and 1s 4d per fother.
638
 In 1759 Wemmergill to Tanfield  
 
cost £1.
639
 The cost per fother in 1760 for the Tanfield to the staith stage rose to 1s  
 
10d.
640
 The much lower cost per fother on the final leg must be attributed to the use of  
 
the waggonway that served the Bowes coal trade, but the absence of lead carriage  
 
costs for the 1740s from Shield Row dictates that for the purpose of this exercise we  
 
must either ignore the last stage of carriage to the staith, or assume the carriage cost at  
 
this stage was either the same or of insignificance in the overall cost mechanism. 
 
  George Bowes‟ assessment of the impact on potential pig lead profits  
 
                                                 
633
  D/St/E3/5/21 Francis O‟Neale‟s account book for 1742. 
634
  The waggonway was used for coal transportation from 1728. 
635
  D/St/B2/103 Mr. Leaton‟s account book for Isabell-mea-Hill and other mines. 
636
  D/St/B2/105 accounts for the lead business 1741-49, and D/St./E3/5/21 Francis O‟Neale‟s 
     accounts for the Wemmergill estate. 
637
  D/St/B2/126 &150 accounts for lead delivered. 
638
  D/St/B2/127 pay bill for Wemmergill smelt mill. 
639
  Ibid. 
640
  D/St/B2/150 accounts for lead delivered. 
in Newcastle of reducing total carriage costs proved correct. By adopting the three  
 
contemporary calculations of the yield of lead from ore it is possible to compare the  
 
total carriage costs of one fother of lead. In 1741 Thomas Colpitts calculated that 4.83  
 
bing of ore produced one fother of lead (the author has adjusted this to 4.94 after  
 
checking the Colpitt‟s calculation); in 1743 Richard Stephenson reckoned it was  
 
4.7428 bing; and in 1757/58 Stephenson says 4.44 bing made one fother of pig lead.  
 
John Gibson, the Wemmergill smelt mill manager in his report on the smelt mill  
 
production, calculated that 4.28 bing produced one fother of lead in 1758.
641
 
 
  Therefore, in 1741 the total carriage cost for ore and lead from the  
 
mines to Shield Row was £1 15s 1 ¾ d, and in 1743 a 3.13% fall to £1 14s ½ d.  
 
George Bowes had not at this early stage, however, introduced changes to the  
 
structure of carriage. After the opening of Wemmergill and the closure of Bollihope  
 
the ratio of carriage costs changed. The total cost of getting one fother of lead to  
 
Tanfield in 1757 using Stephenson‟s figure was £1 11s 8d, and for 1758 £1 10s 10d.  
 
Taking Gibson‟s figure the total cost in 1758 was £1 10s 4 ¾ d. Consequently, it  
 
should be concluded that the change in carriage costs was due to a 25% drop in ore  
 
carriage per bing, from 5s to 4s, and a 20.83% drop in lead carriage per fother as a  
 
direct consequence of a change in the market price of lead. The analysis of market  
 
prices below certainly proves variability of pig lead prices in 1743 of up to 8.5% 
 
lower and 14.89% higher than in 1741, with Bowes agents estimating stock values in  
 
1743 at 9.8% lower. 
 
  In 1757 when Wemmergill began smelting and ore carriage became  
 
considerably cheaper, the total carriage cost to produce one fother of lead and deliver  
 
it to Tanfield was 9.9% lower than s the base year 1741. The 1758 total carriage cost  
                                                 
641
  D/St/B2/154 Colpitt‟s memorandum; D/B2/157 Stephenson‟s memorandum; and D/St/C/3/77 
     Gibson‟s report to Stephenson. 
 was 12.27% less than in 1741 when Stephenson‟s yield estimate is used for ore, and  
 
when Gibson‟s is used it is 13.5% less. Clearly, whichever ore to lead ratio is used, 
 
George Bowes‟ assessment of the effect on total carriage cost, and therefore potential  
 
profit, of the ore cost element along the established routes was correct. The cost of  
 
ore carriage during the 1740s appears to have been insurmountable; it was  
 
determined by the market and beyond the control of George Bowes. His decision to 
 
build a mill nearer the orefield brought about a worthwhile lowering of ore carriage  
 
costs, which had a potential impact on the profit of pig lead in Newcastle. In 1741 the  
 
960 pieces of lead delivered to Shield Row would have cost Bowes £105 8s 9d. The  
 
same amount in 1743 would have cost £102 2s 6d. In 1757, however, the cost would  
 
have been £95; and in 1758 £92 10s using Stephenson‟s figures, or £91 3s 9d using  
 
Gibson‟s figures. This is equivalent to a 12.89% reduction in carriage cost to the point  
 
where the pig lead was led to the staith on the waggonway. 
 
  George Bowes‟ experience of the lead business in the 1740s taught  
 
him that controlling and reducing this particular variable cost would enhance profit.  
 
Although he did not succeed in achieving lower carriage costs in the 1740s, his belief  
 
in 1756 that the market for lead was changing brought capital investment in the form  
 
of Wemmergill smelt mill, which meant the character of carriage changed to shorter 
 
journeys for ore and longer for pig lead, which in turn reduced carriage costs.  George  
 
Bowes changed the lead business model following his diagnosis of its performance of 
 
the 1740s. The outcome by the late 1750s was that ore carriage costs were slashed,  
 
and pig lead carriage costs were significantly reduced, and consequently Bowes was 
 
supplying lead more competitively.  
 
   
The relationship between movements in the market price of pig lead  
 
and restrictions on trade are stated above. Lead production was affected either  
 
negatively or positively according to pig lead prices, and in this context the Bowes  
 
estate must be seen as a microcosm of an industry-wide characteristic of abrupt 
 
changes in lead mining output. How did George Bowes manage this market-driven 
 
phenomenon?  
 
  Bowes appears to have expanded mining output, primarily from  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill, in the early 1740s in response to war demand and steady or  
 
slightly rising prices in the brief period 1739-42. Pig lead sale prices did not exhibit 
 
sudden downward movement thereafter, but a slight rise in 1748, the last year of war. 
 
Bowes did not hurriedly increase output at this point, probably because he was  
 
holding stocks of pig lead from early years. When prices began to rise from 1752,  
 
again Bowes did not drive up lead production. Indeed, he only reopened Isabell- 
 
mea-Hill, by then renamed Birkdale, in 1758 after prices had peaked.
642
  
 
Correspondingly, smelting ceased at Bollihope and the evidence suggests that it  
 
passed into the hands of Samuel Bacon from 1750/51. Horne was also instructed with  
 
his colleague, Francis O‟Neal, „to wait on Mr. Bacon when he comes into ye County  
 
& desire to know what he charges for ye use of Bolliop Mill. Nathan says she is not  
 
worth above £4 per annum‟. Ore from the Bowes estate was sold to Eggleston Mill in  
 
the early 1750s, an Bowes did not become directly involved again in smelting until  
 
Wemmergill mill was completed in 1757. 
 
  George Bowes reacted to positive price change or market equilibrium  
 
by mobilising resources in order to increase output. Obviously, a period of time  
 
elapsed before lead mining output could react, but he seems to have accomplished this  
 
in the early 1740s at the mines he worked, especially Isabell-meah-Hill. This feat of  
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  See Table 14 Chapter 7 above, and 1730s prices in Hughes, „Lead Land and Coal‟ (unpublished 
PhD  
     thesis) Appendix Table 13. 
 expediency in the wilderness of Upper Teesdale involved attracting more labour and 
 
possibly paying more, which we have seen was a function of market price. The  
 
features of this managed process of change in a rural frontier economy are evidence 
 
of Bowes as a capitalist. He knew that, because of the nature of mineralisation, lead  
 
mining was centralised; that it was possible to expand existing workings or re-open  
 
older ones; that more labour, or paying more, would not involve a huge injection of 
 
capital; and that an increase in production could be achieved in the very short term. 
 
Working capital was expended on paying miners who were in effect self-employed; 
 
their incentive was a rate per fathom – fathomtale- for deadwork by the fathom i.e.  
 
not winning ore, or a rate per bing of ore extracted – bingtale. Both rates were a  
 
reflection of how difficult the task would be. Paying miners a guaranteed wage was  
 
not an incentive for miners to achieve the owner‟s objective, and man-management  
 
would have been almost impossible.
643
 Bowes, through his stewards, made these 
 
bargains, and generally supplied tools and equipment. At Cronkley in 1741 tools 
 
were valued at £29 10s, and at Lunehead £10 1s 8d. As well as tools, Bowes invested 
 
£82 2s 0d for the building of a house in 1742 for miners to lodge in at Isabell-meah- 
 
Hill.
644
 „The house to be built with all expedition‟ referring to the need for  
 
accommodation at Isabell-mea-Hill.
645
 In other words, there was no prerequisite for  
 
enormous capital outlay, but the arrangements for tools, equipment, and mining  
 
expertise encouraged and supported small-scale enterprise. 
 
The Bowes response to negative price change from 1758 was to  
 
promote the continuation of exploration and mining by granting tacks and leases 
 
for duty ore, and, with the exception of Birkdale, refraining from working his own 
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  All mines paybill records D/St/B2/116-122 and other financial statements show these two forms  
     of payment. Wages were rarely paid, usually only for a day‟s work when extra labour was needed. 
644
  D/St/B2/101, 105, and 134. 
645
  D/St/B2/91(3) a George Bowes handwritten memorandum of c.1740 
 mines on the estate. The letting of mines removed risk in a poor market, but the option 
 
remained for revisiting these mines at a later date when viability and risk became  
 
acceptable in the knowledge that workings were not long dormant. Regardless of the  
 
type of strategy adopted to meet market conditions, close management by George  
 
Bowes and his stewards was essential; optimisation of labour, both in leased and  
 
Bowes own mines, was based upon control. 
 
 
George Bowes was an important figure in he Newcastle lead trade, but 
 
he also played a significant contributory role in London that affected both lead  
 
production on the Bowes estate and trading relationships in the northeast. His direct  
 
involvement ranged from management on the estate to face-to-face negotiations in the  
 
capital. In this way Bowes lubricated the mechanism of regional trade which  
 
ultimately supplied the London market and ultimately foreign markets. 
 
Bowes directed the trade in ore and pig lead, especially during1740s.  
 
He ordered stewards and agents in the field to act as buyers of ore. Aware of lead  
 
mining in Weardale, the location of his mill at Bollihope, in the early 1740s  
 
Bowes established this role by instructing Horn „to look at oar near Bollihope & to  
 
buy it if to be had at a reasonable Rate‟.646  Later, in 1758, Bowes via Richard  
 
Stephenson, offered to buy Jonathan Watson‟s ore at between 42s and 45s  
 
subject to the price per ton of pig lead „at Market‟, and that Horn would be the  
 
buyer‟.647  
 
  In the 1740s George Bowes appears to have acted as merchant in 
 
Newcastle, and probably London. The lead business records place him in Newcastle 
 
during the summer months when he was resident at Gibside. He frequented Thomas  
                                                 
646
  D/St/B2/91 memoranda concerning lead pay, ore profits, and smelt mills. Undated, but probably 
     c.1741/42 
647
  D/St/C2/3/75 Stephenson to Watson 20th August 1758. 
 Swifts in Pipe(r)gate where he received regular reports from James Sanderson, as to  
 
pig lead production leading smelter at Bollihope. Bowes was keen to sell his pig lead  
 
quickly in Newcastle, and summer and early autumn was the time to do it, when  
 
sailings to London where frequent and roads from Upper Teesdale were passable.  
 
Bowes gathered detailed reports from Bollihope that addressed all aspects of the  
 
production process, which allowed him to compile a cumulative total of pg lead  
 
produced. Not only did he maintain cumulative totals of lead output, he wrote sub- 
 
totals for each mine.
648
 The importance of Isabell-Meah-Mill to Bowes trading profits  
 
is higlighted in James Sanderson‟s letter to George Bowes of 1st August 1743  
 
addressed to Bowes at “Thos. Swifts, in Piper Gate, Newcastle-upon-Tyne‟,  
 
confirming that twelve fother of lead had been made, that there was more than  
 
twenty-four bing of ore from this mine at the smelt mill, and “that we have Delivered  
 
Eight hundred and Seventy two Pecs of Lead from the Mill this account which Makes  
 
 
 
fifty four fudor And Eight Pecs of Lead”.649 Similarly, Nathan Horn‟s account of 
1746  
 
itemises 96 bing of ore and 15 bing of duty ore delivered to Acton Mill, owned by the  
 
London Lead Company, from Lunehead, Standards, and Arngill mines.
650
 George  
 
Bowes was eager to get lead to market, consequently detailed accounts of progress  
 
and estimates of production at different stages in the process facilitated his  
 
understanding of the industry and allowed him to gauge the return he could expect on  
 
his investment. 
 
Bowes often conducted lead business in London where he interacted  
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649
  D/St/C1/3/59 a letter from James Sanderson to George Bowes giving an account of production 
     at Isabell-Meah-Hill dated 1
st
 August 1743. 
650
  D/St/B2/81, Account of ore delivered to Acton Mill 1746. 
with members of the aristocracy and gentry who were also mineral lords or investors  
 
in lead mining. The earlier examination of the Bowes management framework for  
 
lead shows that stewards and agents employed in the lead industry reported to George   
 
Bowes both when he was in the North, and in London, not necessarily through the  
 
interface of a senior steward at Gibside or Streatlam. The London entrepot was the 
 
primary outlet for lead, Newcastle was one of its main feeder ports, and consequently  
 
Bowes‟ role in the capital was significant both in terms of lead sales and finance. 
 
The joint venture lead mine at Crinkle How, where Bowes was in 
 
partnership with Lord Carlisle, was handled by Bowes in London when it became  
 
problematic. Consequent upon Colpitt‟s cessation of work, Carlisle owed Bowes a  
 
share of the costs.
651
 Early in 1750, in reply to Colpitt's letter to him at his address in  
 
Hanover Square, London, Bowes confirmed that he met Lord Carlisle to discuss the  
 
state of the mine and instructed Colpitts to meet Cleaver, doubtless instructed by Lord  
 
Carlisle, „on the spot‟ to resolve the matter and inform „the principals‟ to enable  
 
them „to settle that Business in some more certain way than hitherto we have been  
 
able to effect‟.652 This gives the impression that George Bowes preferred face-to-face  
 
negotiation, leaving his stewards to carry out instructions and finalise matters. In  
 
contrast, the Earl of Carlisle was prone to leaving his agents to deal with his estates.
653
  
 
The contretemps between the Bowes family and the Earl of Thanet over the lead mine  
 
lease at Silverkellwell remained unresolved long after the death of George Bowes,  
 
again somewhat hindered by Thanet‟s reliance on stewards on his Westmoreland  
 
estate.
654
  Thanet, with others, owned lead mines in Eyam and Stony Middleton in  
 
Derbyshire for royalties during the first half of the eighteenth century, and  
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  J.V. Beckett, The Aristocracy of England 1660-1914 (Oxford 1986) p. 216. 
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  Ibid. p.152  
 consequently did not need to have the same presence as Bowes, who both worked and  
 
leased lead mines.
655
   
 
  London was also the scene of lead-related financial transactions.  
 
George Bowes paid Sir Walter Blackett numerous amounts during the years 1749-56, 
 
although at this stage the precise reasons for the payments are unclear, because details  
 
are not recorded on the Child & Backwell bank statements
656
. The payments were as  
 
follows: 
 
           £ 
                     May 3
rd
    1749    1,000 
                          “                                                 500 
                     Feb  1
st
    1752                            1,200 
                     Mar 18
th
  1754                            1,000 
                     Jun  16
th
  1755                               313 
                     Mar 25
th
  1755                                 48 9s 
                     Feb 20
th
   1756                               500 
 
 
Apart from these considerable sums of money, in May 1755 Bowes also paid £300 to  
 
C. Blackett, probably Christopher Blackett the Newcastle agent for Blackett lead  
 
sales. In addition, Bowes received £500 from „the Lead Co.‟ in February 1756 and  a  
 
further £24 in November that year. An initial suggestion is that this abbreviation  
 
most probably refers to the London Lead Company. Again, the nature of the  
 
transactions is unclear, but they are evidence of dealings in London between lead  
 
producers in the North, and George Bowes personal relationship with them. 
 
   
   Did George Bowes create a profit from the lead business on the family  
 
Estate?  The value of smelted lead produced at Newcastle prices for the years when  
 
Table 21 
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  Burt, British Lead, p.30.  
656
  D/St/C1/3/66 George Bowes‟ bank statements. 
The value of lead produced at Newcastle market prices 1741-60  
 
     
                           Pieces of 
                       Smelted Lead                                Value 
                                                                     £          s          d 
1741                      1666                          1223        10         0 
1742                      1409                          1045        15         0 
1743                      1663                          1221          5         3 
1744                        355                            255          3         1½  
1745                      1078                            759        19         4½  
1746                        249                            175          1         2 
1747                        589                            414        17         8 
1748                        275                            208          7         0 
1749                          56                              42          0         0 
Sub-total               7340                          5345        18         7 
 
1752                                                          193        10         0 
 
1757                        700                            672        13         1½  
1758                      1927                          1625        18         1½  
1759                          13                              12          9         2 
1760                        112                              89          4         0 
Sub-total               2752                            2593       14         5 
 
TOTAL               10092                            7939       13        0 
 
Source: 
Generally, sixteen pieces of smelted lead made a fother. The value 
has been calculated per fother. Wherever possible Bowes prices 
were used from Table 14 above, and Blackett-Beaumont prices 
where there are no Bowes prices. An average price was used where 
data exists in ranges 
 
output and prices are available is listed above in Table 21, though as already noted  
 
much of the smelted lead was not sold immediately. The total value was just under 
 
£7,940 for the years spanning 1741-60, of which sixty-seven per cent of this was  
 
produced during the 1740s. Market conditions and the effects of war on the lead  
 
business are discussed above. 
 
Table 22 below shows estimated profits after deducting expenditure  
 
from sales, but should be viewed with caution, because expenditure on mining and
    
 Table 22 
 
Estimated profits from lead 1741-46, 1752, and 1757-58 
 
   Sale value                     Expenditure                             Profit 
                       £         s        d               £         s         d                  £           s           d 
 
1741             157       6       11          1197     11        7¼           (1040         4            8¼)  
1742             384       0         9            747       4        0                (363         3            3) 
1743           1732     19         8            557       5        7¾           1175       14              ¼  
1744             155       7         2½         412       9        9½             (257         2            7) 
1745               47     18         0            312       6        6¼             (264         8            6¼)  
1746               22       5         9½         197     17       11¾            (175        12           2¼)  
 
1752             193     13         7          no full expenditure data 
 
1757             154     10        10           576      2          5               421        11           7 
1758                 8       8          9           657      6          3½            648        11           6½ 
 
Source: Tables 14-17 
  
 
 
  
 
smelting in any given year does not necessarily mean the pig lead produced was sold  
 
in the same year. Lags in carriage and smelting, subject to market conditions, and the  
 
consequent delay in sales, were an inherent feature of lead production. Enforced  
 
stock holding in a market disrupted by wars has already been remarked upon, and to  
 
some extent Table 22 above is a guide to the risk to which the Bowes estate was  
 
exposed in the lead industry. The only trading profit was in 1743, and when  
 
considered on an aggregate basis, and assuming all lead produced was eventually  
 
sold at the prices used in valuing output in Table 22 above, then a possible profit over  
 
the years 1739-60 was  £7,939 13s 0d less expenditure of £6,193 4s 1¾d i.e. £1,746   
 
8s 10¼ d or the equivalent of a twenty-eight per cent return on capital over the long-  
 
term. Even the busy 1740s, a period of accelerating mining activity and smelting,  
 when taken in isolation appear to have been unprofitable. It is impossible to see the  
 
Bowes lead business as profitable before 1760, but there again the nature of mining  
 
should be taken into consideration.
657
 The Bowes‟ financial position is in complete  
 
contrast to that of the Blackett-Beaumont business. During the period 1739-1760 their  
 
total profit amounted to £85,554 on sales of 374,667 pieces of pig lead, and a steady  
 
supplementary profit from the refining of silver.
658
 The Blackett-Beaumont profit  
 
in 1741 from lead alone was £7,223. 
 
 
George Bowes‟ management style was clearly not that of absentee 
 
landowner; it was autocratic in that he directed those in the management framework 
 
described earlier, but at the same time his judgments were based upon reported 
 
information and the views of stewards and lead industry specialists. He was  
 
assiduous in the assessment of his lead business; this was a feature of his behaviour  
 
from the discovery of Isabell-mea-Hill, and although more prevalent in the 1740s, the 
 
the impression is that it remained unchanged until the late 1750s. Bowes‟ hands-on  
 
approach embraced all aspects of the lead industry on his estate from exploration to  
 
smelting to trade, and was often circumspect in its nature. He was a strategist, and  
 
possibly more entrepreneurial in lead than coal, yet was also involved in the micro- 
 
management of lead production. 
 
It is not the purpose of his thesis to examine George Bowes role in the  
 
coal trade, or to compare and contrast the extent of his management activity with his  
 
role in the lead business. Yet a cursory examination of a limited range of coal-related  
 
documents substantiates the argument that George Bowes played a personal,  
 
                                                 
657
  The figure for expenditure does not include the cost of any bought in ore nor the counter-effect of  
     ore sales. We have seen that at times ore sales were profitable, but could hardly have made a 
     significant difference to lead profits on the Bowes estate.    
658
  Hughes, „Lead Land and Coal‟ (unpublished PhD thesis) Appendix Tables 11&17.  
meaningful role in lead production on his estate and in the Newcastle and London  
 
market.
659
 He did not retreat from coal affairs, even though the scale of the operation, 
 
membership of the Grand Allies, and the estate management structure for coal  
 
would evidently have facilitated an exit. George Bowes‟ continuous personal  
 
commitment to the coal business, by way of correspondence about collieries,  
 
shipping, staith building on the Tyne, the Billingsgate coal market, and monies  
 
received across three decades. He was in London for several months of the year, but  
 
his behaviour contradicts categorisation as the archetypal absentee landlord. Bowes  
 
was a chief Parliamentary protagonist for the coal interest, his bank – Childs &  
 
Backwell – was in London, and his connection within the network of aristocrats,  
 
gentry, and merchants was there. His apparent absenteeism was in fact very  
 
productive for the family estate, which included a direct role in the lead business too. 
 
George Bowes was not unique in his desire to develop the mineral 
 
potential of his estate; gentry and aristocratic landowners with any wisdom  
 
understood the financial benefits of exploiting their estates.
660
 The general view 
 
is that landowners adopted the easier, risk-averse stance by leasing mineral rights 
 
in return for royalties. In the North, highly valuable royalties were paid to the Denys 
 
family and the Earls of Pomfret for their mines in Swaledale, and the Duke of 
 
Devonshire for Grassington Moor.
661
 This is not to say that they did not initiate some 
 
of their own operations, but Bowes appears different in that he leased mines, worked  
 
his own mines at times, and worked mines in partnership. 
 
  The extent of his involvement in partnership mines varied; George 
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Bowes‟ assessment of risk and reward at any particular mine determined the  
 
partnership arrangements. The partnership with John Dent in1740 gave Bowes three- 
 
quarters; Dent‟s death in 1742 left Bowes with Isabell-meah-Hill, which remained in  
 
his hands apart from a few years in the early 1750s. He had a half share at Standards  
 
with John Langstaff & Co in 1737; a fifteen-sixteenths share at Lunehead in 1740-41  
 
with Reverend Thorpe; five-eighths at Nichol Hopple in 1741-42; one-third at Black  
 
Sike in 1747-48 with his sister Elizabeth and her husband Edward Gilbert, and  
 
two miners; one-half at Crinkled How in 1749-50; and from 1751 four-fifths at  
 
Rowton Sike, Lunehead with Charles Wensley. 
 
 
It is clear that George Bowes was personally involved in all stages of  
 
lead production on his estate; the lead industry was small scale compared to both coal  
 
and the activities of other lead producers in the North East and other areas, but Bowes  
 
was seriously committed to its development as a source of profit. He instigated  
 
change in the structure and organisation of production, and as such must be seen as an  
 
innovator. There is no evidence that diffusion of different technology or methods was  
 
part of this innovation; records of mining and smelting on the Bowes estate show that  
 
both were based upon muscle and skill assisted by waterpower and peat for fuel. In  
 
all aspects, increased activity was achieved within the bounds of existing knowledge  
 
and technology. Bowes was, however, innovative within the estate management  
 
system, because he introduced specialist stewards and managers purely for the benefit  
 
of lead production. He invested in excess of £5,000 in mining, carriage and smelting,  
 
almost three-quarters of which was on mining. Most of this expenditure was in the  
 
form of working capital, but he did build a new smelt mill at Wemmergill and a house  
 
for miners at Isabell-mea-Hill. 
 
  George Bowes introduced the bulk of working capital for mining,  
 smelting, and carriage, but only a small proportion of this was in partnership. His  
 
personal interest and financial commitment were greater in the 1740s, on the wane  
 
during the early 1750s, but around 1758 showed signs of reinvigoration. He did 
 
positively encourage the change away from small-scale regional sources of capital –  
 
merchants, miners, businessmen of various sorts, and professionals – to external 
 
sources, such as merchants and businessmen from Derbyshire and London.  
 
  The level of Bowes‟ working capital was miniscule compared to the  
 
nearby Blackett-Beaumont organisation, and although the Bowes estate encouraged  
 
and subsidised small-scale enterprise from within, there is little evidence of deliberate  
 
inchoation of extra-regional sources of finance. By 1760, other than perhaps at  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill, there was no deeper mining requiring larger scale investment. 
 
The very limited investment, particularly in mining, would indicate that following the  
 
initial euphoria of the 1740s George Bowes, leading the management structure, did  
 
not move lead production as an estate activity into the next stage of development  
 
characterised by deeper mining and a much greater capital funding over the medium  
 
to longer term. Lead production remained in a germinal condition by 1760, following  
 
almost thirty years of intermittent capital input which targeted the most accessible  
 
lead ore. 
   
Notwithstanding his role and level of commitment to the continuation  
 
of exploration and mining activity on the estate, George Bowes did not invest in  
 
deeper mining, nor did he grant leases to the larger companies nearby – the Blacketts  
 
and the London Lead Company –who could have initiated larger scale extraction. 
 
There is no evidence of offers or proposals from either of these companies, and  
 
indeed Bowes himself had the financial capability to expand lead mining in Upper  
 
Teesdale. The analysis of different aspects of expenditure and the market for pig lead 
 during the period 1740 to 1760 give the impression that in response to positive market  
 
conditions Bowes was willing to invest more. Furthermore, although he behaved 
 
in patriarchal fashion towards the development of the family estate for purposes of  
 
continuity, his plans for lead did not go beyond the reorganisation of the production  
 
process and the financing of shallower mines and existing workings. He did, however,  
 
make progress in the re-shaping of the lead industry on the Bowes estate. 
 
  Oldroyd correctly refers to George Bowes a inheriting a system of  
 
estate „practice, organisation, and accounting‟.662 He maintained a stable management  
 
structure in terms of both personnel and roles, and the system he inherited and  
 
developed survived his death in 1760. This will be examined below in Chapter 9.  
 
Oldroyd suggests that Bowes was a strategist and uninvolved in the day-to-day  
 
management of all aspects of the estate. The estate system and the specialists he  
 
introduced into lead production undoubtedly dealt with operations in the field,  
 
however this analysis demonstrates that George Bowes certainly did not leave them to  
 
their own devices. He may have delegated, but retained ultimate control through his  
 
insistence upon receiving regular management information and accounts. Moreover,  
 
he was an inveterate visitor to his various estates, and became engrossed in the lead  
 
business, especially in the 1740s. Regularity of written communication and visits  
 
show that to some extent he did inject himself into the field management of mining  
 
and smelting. Correspondence and his own reports and memoranda reveal a man with  
 
an in depth understanding of the different stages in the production process 
 
  George Bowes was innovative compared to his predecessors‟ approach  
 
to the lead industry, because he planned and instigated its change from a rather casual, 
 
often part-time rural activity into an organised, business-like production process  
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 aimed at profit and the enhancement of the Bowes family wealth. He fits neatly into  
 
Wilson‟s definition of an entrepreneur as someone with „a sense of market  
 
opportunity combined with the capacity needed to exploit it‟. 663 His role consisted of  
 
several functions; landowner and mineral lord; financier; managing director; and  
 
merchant. These functions manifested themselves in Bowes‟ ability to organise, a  
 
characteristic of entrepreneurial behaviour suggested by Mantoux in his discussion of  
 
the men who as manufacturers were at the forefront of economic change in the  
 
eighteenth century.
664
 Bowes‟ objective was to control the supply of ore and pig lead  
 
on his estate, and he understood that the location of lead mining and smelting were  
 
determined by mineralisation and the sources of power and fuel. The management of  
 
labour and general mining activity were therefore his primary problem, and  
 
consequently George Bowes had to consider the scale of production and the 
 
relationship between costs and demand. Evidently he decided that small-scale mining  
 
and smelting was the optimum structure for lead production on his estate in the mid- 
 
eighteenth century, and accordingly he reorganised and integrated the different parts 
 
of the lead production process. He controlled the raw material and the product by  
 
means of a legally structured monopsony; at Bowes owned mines he paid for labour  
 
in order to enjoy the profits; and at some mines lent tools and equipment and gave  
 
cash advances against potential ore production. In doing so, George Bowes created a  
 
capitalist industry founded on small-scale enterprise, in which he controlled the means  
 
of production and property rights, and the preconditions for the expansion of lead  
 
extraction in the late eighteenth an nineteenth centuries. It is no exaggeration to say  
 
that without his entrepreneurship lead mining would not have developed during the  
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 mid-eighteenth century, and probably not after his death in1760.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 9: The Lady’s Lead 
 
 
George Bowes died without a male heir in December 1760, leaving the estate to his  
 
sole heir and daughter Mary Eleanor Bowes aged eleven. This unfortunate family  
 
contingency must have been anticipated and strenuous efforts were made to ensure the  
 
Bowes name and legacy remained intact. His will contained very specific instructions  
 
regarding the continuation and development of Bowes coal interests, but nothing  
 
about lead.
665
 „And my Will is that my Family Collieries may never be let but that the  
 
same may be carried on in the same manner as they now are…..‟. Similarly,  
 
partnership and leasehold collieries would continue to operate in the same way: „And  
 
my will is that my said Trustees shall not be compelled or compellable to sell and  
 
dispose of any part of my Stock in Trade or to call in any of my debts, but such as  
 
they shall think proper‟. The will also stipulates that any surplus of rents and produce  
 
should be used to acquire more land. All aspects of lead production were conspicuous  
 
by their absence. Estate documents, mostly written by George Bowes, corroborate the  
 
omission of lead; they show significant valuations for the Bowes estate for the period  
 
1752 to 1767, essentially Mary Eleanor‟s inherited fortune, but they are undated and  
 
contain no mention of lead production.
666
 
 
 
The history of lead production can be sub-divided into three distinct  
 
periods for the years between George Bowes‟ death in 1760 and Mary Eleanor‟s in  
 
1800: 1760 to 1771, when the estate management system filled the void after George  
 
Bowes‟ death, and the end of opportunistic, profit-driven Bowes business culture  
 
coincided with the marriage of Mary Eleanor Bowes; 1771-1792, when the London 
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Lead Company held a lease for most of the Bowes lead mines in Upper Teesdale; and  
 
1791 to 1800, when the mines reverted to the Bowes family, and production fell once  
 
again into the hands of lessees. This chapter examines the three periods identified  
 
above, and in particular 1760 to 1771, the years preceding the interregnum created by  
 
the arrival of the London Lead Company. Different aspects of the Bowes estate‟s lead  
 
business will be analysed; the management; the production of ore and pig lead;  
 
expenditure; and distribution and the market for the estate‟s ouput.  
 
The transitional period from late 1760 to 1771 was in essence a 
 
continuation of the late 1750s prior to the death of George Bowes, when lead  
 
production was at a lower level than in the 1740s, but the overall condition of the 
 
lead industry on the Bowes estate was somewhat parlous. At the time of George  
 
Bowes‟ death and very shortly thereafter, the lead business appeared to have been  
 
unprofitable and suffering from weakened management and lack of direction. John  
 
Gibson remained in post at Wemmergill Smelt Mill and penned yet another detailed  
 
report in March 1761 demonstrating that lead mining was essentially a loss making  
 
enterprise, and argued that this was either because of poor veins or bad management,  
 
but clearly biased towards the latter, thereby implicating Nathan Horn‟s abilities as  
 
mines agent.
667
 He showed that mining at Closehouse and Lunehead were in profit for  
 
the period from October 1758 until March 1761; the former made £32 4s 2d, the latter  
 
£23 13s 4d, and both had been let at one-sixth duty ore rather than worked by the  
 
Bowes. Birkdale, formerly Isabella Mea Hill, and still then regarded as having the  
 
greatest potential had, together with Blackark mine, suffered heavy losses from  
 
February 1759 to March 1761; Birkdale lost £466 4s 5d, and Blackark £340 7s 0d,  
 
totalling £807 10s 7d. Gibson argued that bad management in the form of dismissing  
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 the hushers and making costly bargains thereafter was the root cause of loss at  
 
Birkdale, and that it should have been leased at one-sixth duty because „it is reckon‟d  
 
the best in the Lordship‟, and added „tis very probable larger Quantity of ore would  
 
have been produced‟. Gibson concluded „Tho‟ pretty large sums of Money are  
 
annually expended at the Mines, the Workmen in general complain of their Wages.  
 
And as so little ore is raised, the Mines must be either bad, or, imprudently managed.  
 
Hence, it would be more safe and advantageous to let them at duty‟. In April 1761 he  
 
reiterated the poor state of the lead mines,
668
 and mentioned an agent from a  
 
„Derbyshire Company‟ viewing the mines which had made a loss.669 
   
In October 1762 Gibson reported on the lead mines to Richard  
 
Stephenson at Gibside confirming little positive change; Birkdale seemed more  
 
promising, Lunehead and Closehouse both poor, Standards was promising, very little  
 
ore at Blackark, and a trial working in progress at Cocklake.
670
 Evidently, most of the  
 
mines were being worked by hushing, but a very dry summer in 1762 had meant little  
 
lead ore was produced by this method. In September of the following year Gibson  
 
wrote that „The mines in general are very poorly‟,671 and his report included the East  
 
End of Lunehead, West End of Lunehead, Longstaff Hush, Closehouse, Standards,  
 
and Birkdale. Although lead was being extracted and smelted, the volume of  
 
production of both ore and pig lead concerned the estate managers.
672
 In June 1768  
 
Gibson‟s memorandum to Stephenson notes that no lead ore was being delivered to  
 
the smelt mill, and that he was setting out to visit the mines to discover why.
673
  A  
 
year later Gibson, referring to the smelt mill at Wemmergill, noted that „the Lead Mill  
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 has for some time been unfit for use‟, which reconfirms the rather bleak picture of  
 
lead production on  the Bowes‟ estate during the 1760s.674 
 
  In summary, the period from George Bowes‟ death until the granting 
 
of an area lease to the London Lead Company in 1771, incorporating most of the  
 
mines on the Bowes estate, was an extension of activity in mining and smelting begun 
 
in the late 1750s. The output of both ore and pig lead evidently ground to a halt in the  
 
late 1760s, and Wemmergill smelt mill fell into disrepair before the end of that  
 
decade. Indeed, compared to the intermittent heightened production during the 1740s  
 
and late 1750s under George Bowes direction, lead on the Bowes estate reached its  
 
eighteenth century nadir in so far as the estate withdrew its direct involvement and  
 
low production and losses followed as outlined above. 
 
  There was no plan for the development of the industry on Bowes land  
 
during the 1760s; it was more a case of continuity rather than change, and the  
 
management was strained by the differing methods of individuals and changes in  
 
personnel. The management structure galvanised by George Bowes for the purpose of  
 
lead production remained in situ after his death, and, in the circumstances in which  
 
the Bowes estate now found itself – without a patriarch with business acumen and  
 
being run on behalf of a female minor – should have been the keystone for the  
 
survival and growth of a metalliferrous mining business on the family estate.  
 
Unfortunately, it appears that the management functioned, but lacked the benefit of 
 
George Bowes‟ direction. There was no substitute for George Bowes, and no widow  
 
like Lady Bowes of the early eighteenth century. Perhaps more significant is the fact  
 
that regardless of the apparent sophistication of the estate management structure, its  
 
development still relied upon the family. 
                                                 
674
  D/St/C2/3/77 Gibson to Stephenson 19
th
 July 1769. 
   The conflicting approaches of John Gibson and Nathan Horn, as the  
 
lead mining and smelting specialists, have been discussed above, and after George  
 
Bowes died personalities continued to prick the management structure. Gibson‟s  
 
report of March 1761 identified once again the management of the mines as the  
 
source of the problem in Bowes lead production.
675
 In a memorandum to Stephenson  
 
in April 1761, however, Gibson notes that Nathan Horn was expecting to be  
 
dismissed, then unreservedly complains that Horn received three times his own salary  
 
but failed to extract anywhere near enough lead ore, which in turn meant that  
 
Wemmergill mill was under capacity.
676
 Gibson suggested that the „Mill agent‟ did  
 
more than the „Mine agent‟, therefore he should have been paid more to avoid having  
 
to work as a teacher to make up his income. Gibson asked for £20 per annum, which  
 
Horn had „thought poor‟, meaning Horn would not have accepted it. Nathan Horn was  
 
discharged on 29
th
 December 1761,
677
 and in November 1764 Horn wrote, 
presumably  
 
to Stephenson, regarding his disagreement over £13 he believed he was owed by  
 
Bowes.
678
 The chronology of Gibson‟s correspondence and references therein to the  
 
lead mines, certainly from 1762 onward, suggest that Gibson had become responsible  
 
for Horn‟s role, in other words he was smelt mill manager and at least acting mines  
 
steward. 
 
  The recruitment of miners and smelters also incurred differences of  
 
opinion. Referring to John Langstaff as „Setter on for some time‟, Gibson wrote to 
 
Stephenson in May 1763 expressing the view „yet he very seldom handles the  
 
Gavelock, is not fit to be an Undertaker‟.679 Gibson added that it would be „greatly  
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 D/St/B2/93, though in this report he does not name Nathan Horn. 
676
 D/St/C2/3/77 Gibson to Stephenson 22
nd
 April 1761. 
677
 D/St/C2/3/38 Nathan Horn to William Leaton, dated 2
nd
 January 1762. 
678
 D/St/C2/3/76 Nathan Horn‟s letter, probably to William Leaton, saying he will refer the matter to 
    Mary Eleanor Bowes. She would be only 15 years old at the time. 
 disadvantageous to our Mistress‟ to employ the men John Dent had suggested.680 
 
He recommended John Baty, who had previously worked at Wemmergill. In 1769, 
 
however, John Gibson himself was informed by John Bourn, a relatively new middle- 
 
ranking steward, that he would probably lose his position because of lack of work, but  
 
agreed to pay his salary until Gibson found another job. In summarising Gibson‟s 
 
career as smelt mill manager for the Bowes, his loyalty and integrity are undoubted, 
 
yet he was under-paid and his potential probably underrated, because his  
 
insightfulness seems to have been ignored. He was numerate and literate, and clearly  
 
exhibited a deep understanding of the lead production process and the market for lead. 
 
The impression of Gibson is a man of intelligence with knowledge and a capacity for  
 
management which, if exploited earlier, could have been an appropriate understudy  
 
for George Bowes, who would have been in a better position to develop the lead- 
 
bearing potential of the estate on behalf of Mary Eleanor Bowes. Gibson told John  
 
Bourn that he did not want to „leave the honourable Family at Gibside‟, but that he  
 
must because he needed a greater income.
681
 Gibson‟s devotion and deference were 
 
trumped by the need for financial reward. 
 
  Lead mining activity from 1760 to 1771, measured in terms of tacks  
 
and leases granted, is most accurately described as being status quo ante George 
 
Bowes‟ death. Table 23 below lists those arranged after 1760.The tacks and leases  
 
agreed before his death remained in place with the exception of three new 
 
agreements: a nine-year lease granted to John Robson, Peter Allinson, and partners for  
 
ground at the east end of Black Ark mine known as Coe Bank;
682
 a nine-year  
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 D/St/C2/3/77 Gibson to Stephenson 31t May 1763. 
680
  Ibid. 
681
  D/St/C2/3/77 Gibson to Stephenson 19
th
 July 1769. Gibson earned additional income from 
teaching. 
682
  D/St/B2/32 Thomas Colpitts II on behalf of Mrs Bowes to Robson, Allison and partners. 
agreement for the West End of Lunehead;
683
 and a six year lease to John Alderson and  
 
Jonathan Horn for Cocklake, a relatively new lead mine.
684
 
 
 
Table 23 
 
Tacks and lease granted 1761 to 1771 
 
Year             Term                    Lessees                            Mine                  Duty 
Ore 
 
1761            9 yrs                   John Robson,                 Coe Bank at              1/6
th
 
                                               Peter Allison,                 Black Ark 
                                              & Partners 
  
1761            9 yrs                   Thomas Rain                 West End of                 0 
                                               Robert Dent                    Lunehead 
                                                                                             
1762            6 yrs                   John Alderson               Cocklake                   1/6
th
 
                  Jonathan Horn 
 
1771          21 yrs                   London Lead                 Birkdale                    1/5
th
 
                                               Company                       Blacksike                  1/6
th
 
                                                                                     Closehouse                1/6
th
 
                                                                                     Arngill                       1/6
th
 
                                                                                     Standards                   1/6
th
 
                                                                                     Cocklake                    1/6
th
 
 
Source: D/St/B2/32-35 inclusive 
 
   
The potential for lead ore at Isabell-meah-hill, by this time known as  
 
Birkdale, continued during the 1760s. In March 1761 William Dent, who was  
 
working Green Mines,
685
 wrote to Gibside estate office asking for a twenty-one year   
 
lease at Birkdale, but to no avail. Birkdale was worked by Jonathan Watson and  
 
Thomas Taden (Teding), and in September 1762 Gibson reported that „the Partnership  
 
                                                 
683
  D/St/B2/33 a memorandum 
684
  D/St/C2/3/39 Henry Bourn on behalf of Mary Eleanor Bowes to Alderson and Horn. 
685
  D/St/C2/3/75 Dent‟s letter to Stephenson regarding Birkdale and mentioning his ore for sale at  
     Green Mines dated 19
th
 March 1761. 
at Birkdale have made some discovery‟. 686 This mine was still the most productive  
 
and perceived as having most potential, so much so that it appears there was a plan to  
 
commandeer it by Bowes management employees together with other individuals  
 
experienced in the lead industry. Mary Eleanor Bowes does not appear to have   
 
formalised this partnership arrangement. A partnership agreement of 30
th
  
 
December 1762 included Thomas Colpitts II, a senior agent, John Gibson, the  
 
Wemmergill smelt mill manager, William Dent and Samuel Bacon and John Dent,  
 
whose names appear in various documents in the Strathmore records, James Elliot,  
 
Thomas Walton, Thomas Watson, and Mark Newby.
687
 The terms of this agreement  
 
were for equal shareholdings, the preferential option of all partners to purchase the  
 
share of any partner leaving the partnership, otherwise he could sell to anyone  
 
acceptable to the remaining partners, and proxy voting if any partner could not attend  
 
meetings. Mary Eleanor Bowes‟ mother was not a named partner, nor is Thomas  
 
Colpitts II cited as acting on her behalf, though it may have been the case because  
 
some tacks and leases granted during the eighteenth century contained a Bowes‟  
 
agent‟s name without mention of  George Bowes. It would seem reasonable to suggest  
 
that, although these partners would benefit financially, key employees who had  
 
already demonstrated their abilities in lead production in effect, by creating a firm,  
 
planned to cocoon the lead mine with most potential. The eight-man partnership was  
 
working Birkdale in the year 10
th
 June 1765 to 16
th
 May 1766,when it produced  
 
63.4% of Bowes lead mines output,
688
 of which Mrs Bowes received one-sixth duty,  
 
although receipt of duty ore did not necessarily exclude her from acting in her own  
 
right or on behalf of her daughter Mary Eleanor as a partner. 
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  D/St/C2/33/77 Gibson to Stephenson of 7
th
 September 1762. 
687
  Dt/St/B2/34 partnership agreement regarding mining at Isabell-meah-hill dated 30
th
 December 
1762. 
688
  D/St/B2/123 mines pay bill 1765/6. 
  In 1763 the East End of Lunehead was worked by Thomas Taden, the 
 
West End by Robert Dent, Langstaff Hush and Closehouse by Jonathan Watson, and 
 
Birkdale by Watson and Taden who had made the discovery in 1762,and Standards  
 
was also leased. By 1766 all lead mines leased at one-sixth duty ore: Arngill by  
 
Joseph Raine and partners who also had Standards, Birkdale by Thomas Colpitts II  
 
and partners, Cocklake by Joseph Collinson, Closehouse one vein by Jonathan  
 
Watson and the other by John Kipling and partners, Lunehead by Thomas Raine and  
 
Robert Dent.
689
 There is no suggestion that the Bowes estate was directly working any  
 
lead mine on their land during the 1760s; they harvested a portion of the ore and  
 
bought ore from the lessees and elsewhere when leases determined, or when the  
 
market conditions made it worthwhile. The financial risk was minimal: expenditure  
 
on the purchase of ore by agreement, and occasionally the provision of tools and  
 
equipment to encourage miners to undertake extraction.  
 
.  In terms of mining activity, apart from the mines established before  
 
and during the George Bowes lifetime, there was very little new working. John  
 
Gibson‟s reports of the early 1760s narrate the decline of lead mining and smelting  
 
on the Bowes lands in Upper Teesdale. The lead vein at Cocklake, discovered in the  
 
late 1750s, became a trial mine in 1762 when it was in the hands of John Alderson  
 
and partners.
690
 The only new operation undertaken directly by the Bowes was a nine- 
 
year agreement with Thomas Rain and Robert Dent that commenced on 25
th
 March  
 
1761. This was exploratory work from Cawsey Gill westward to Silverkellwell four  
 
hundred yards in breadth, which was the West End of Lunehead. Despite the term of  
 
the agreement it does not appear to have been the usual form of lease, rather a  
 
bargain with miners whereby tools and a smith‟s shops were provided on the field,  
                                                 
689
  The details of leases and mining activity are from D/St/B2/123 and 127. 
690
  D/St/C2/3/77 noted in Gibson‟s report to Stephenson of 5th October 1762. 
 which they agreed to repair if necessary, and Bowes paid them 35s a bing for mined  
 
and washed ore.
691
 Overall, as John Gibson observed, lead mining on the Bowes 
estate  
 
by the mid-1760s was in its death throes. 
 
  The use of tacks and leases as management tools for the development  
 
of lead mining on the Bowes estate is discussed above in chapter 4. There were  
 
only three new agreements before the granting of the London Lead Company‟s  
 
twenty-one year lease in 1771, but there contents mirrored those of the pre-1760  
 
period. The arrangements for working provide a good example of the continuation of  
 
the tried and tested structure of the Bowes leases. The 1761 lease for the east end of  
 
Blackark, an area otherwise known as Coe Bank, permitted hushing, trenching, and  
 
driving together with the building of water courses for washing and dressing, on a  
 
piece of ground 800 yards by 400 yards. Mrs Bowes received one-sixth duty ore,  
 
washed and dressed ready for smelting, and preferential buyer status for the remainder  
 
of the ore extracted. The lease would be forfeited if less than four men were mining  
 
for one month.
692
  The 1762 lease for Cocklake contained an arrangement for working  
 
an area of ground 100 by 800 yards at one-sixth duty ore, and would be forfeited if  
 
not worked for two months, except in storm or tempest. Again, ore must be washed  
 
and dressed and Mrs Bowes, on behalf o the estate, had first option for the rest of the  
 
ore after duty ore had been deducted. Henry Bourn granted this lease on behalf of Mrs  
 
Bowes, and he included a clause stipulating that the lessees must give one week‟s  
 
notice for the weighing of ore.
693
 Quite clearly, the lead leases continued to be  
 
employed as instruments of control, and stewards were concerned about the accuracy  
 
of their contents and practice once agreements were in place. For example, John  
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 Bourn wrote to William Leaton requesting his advice in August 1762 when the  
 
lessees at Cocklake queried the practice of his retaining the copy lease he had signed  
 
on behalf of Mrs Bowes. Bourn wondered whether or not the Bowes would prefer a  
 
clause to be inserted in future leases covering this type of dispute.
694
 Leaton‟ reply of  
 
2
nd
 September 1762 confirmed that Bourn‟s actions were correct, and therefore no  
 
change in practice was necessary. 
   
It would be churlish to undertake a comparative analysis of the 
 
differences between this lease and those granted to small-scale partnerships and  
 
individual miners who were the usual categories of lessee interested in lead mining on  
 
the Bowes estate prior to the arrival of the London Lead Company. The decision was  
 
made to withdraw from not only direct involvement in lead production, but also the  
 
management of groups of adventurers and miners who would otherwise have risked  
 
relatively small amounts of capital in the search for lead in Upper Teesdale. The  
 
opportunity arose for an area lease that embraced most of the established lead  
 
mines on the Bowes estate, with an expectation of significant investment in the  
 
development of the mineral rights by applying large-scale mining methods and up-to- 
 
date technology together with professional business methods in terms of management,  
 
accounting, and marketing. An extremely wealthy landowning family welcomed a  
 
range of benefits for the future heirs to the estate, whilst simultaneously ensuring the  
 
best possible arrangement for those living and working on it. The insertion of clauses  
 
regarding wages and general working conditions for the benefit of the local  
 
inhabitants is an excellent example of paternalistic philanthropy. The Bowes estate  
 
dictated the terms of the lease to the largest lead producer in Britain, but obtained not  
 
only beneficial terms for themselves but also for the labour force, many of whom  
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  D/St/C2/3/39, Bourn to Leaton of 27
th
 August 1762. 
 would be rent-paying tenants, on their lands. The economic value of an extractive  
 
industry, in this case metaliferrous mining, on a landed estate to both the owners and  
 
those who needed to earn a livelihood from it is crystallised in this relationship  
 
between family capitalism, in the form of a landed estate, and corporate enterprise.  
 
Once again the Bowes became rentier mineral owners, almost by default in this  
 
instance, foregoing the market opportunity for lead, yet through the medium of the  
 
lease with the London Lead Company imposed a long-term, broader process of  
 
economic and social development in Upper Teesdale by seeking to protect incomes  
 
from the lead industry, which in turn would assist in suppressing rent arrears on  
 
Bowes land where the dual occupation of farmer/miner and that of full-time miner  
 
were key components in the upland frontier economy. 
   
 
Lead mining activity was generally at a low ebb at this stage on the  
 
Bowes estate, a condition regularly reported by John Gibson during the early 1760s,  
 
as noted above. Apart from interest in Birkdale, Green Mines was worked, but the  
 
only surviving record notes that John Smith sought a twenty-one year lease at Black 
 
Sike mine.
695
 There are only a few extant records 1760s regarding the productiveness  
 
of the lead mines, but an estimate can be made for the years 1761 to 1764 based upon  
 
the stock figures for pig lead smelted (see Table 27 below), though this may give an  
 
under-estimate, because the stock figures may disguise sales of lead locally. Evidently  
 
Bowes agents reckoned that four bing and one horse of ore produced one fother of pig  
 
lead,
696
 and accepting that a fother of lead consisted of sixteen pieces, then at least  
 
approximately 271 bing of ore was extracted over a four-year period on the Bowes  
 
estate, which confirms Gibson‟s view, noted above, that the Bowes‟ lead mines were  
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 in a dire condition and comparatively undeveloped.  
 
  There are some statistics of ore production for the two years May 14
th
  
 
1763 to May 16
th
 1764 and 8
th
 June 1765 to 16
th
 May 1766, which are different  
 
accounting years than for pre-1760 records. Table 24 below incorporates the available  
 
information for ore produced and goes some way to confirming the estimate already  
 
made for the production level of lead ore extracted during the early 1760s. 
 
 
Table 24 
 
Lead ore output 1763/4 and 1765/6  
 
 
    1763/4                                      1765/6 
 
   Bings  horses  pokes               Bings    horses   pokes 
 
Closehouse                     8         0           0                      25          2          1 
 
Lunehead                      17         0           0                      24          3          0  
 
Standards                        7         2           0                      19          0          0 
 
Cocklake                        2         3            0                      20          0          0 
 
Arngill                               no data                                   7          1           0 
 
Birkdale                             no data                               167          0           0 
 
TOTAL                       35         1             0                   263          2           1   
 
Source: D/St/B2/127 smelt mill pay bill documents  
   
 
 
The level of Bowes‟ financial commitment shrank significantly after  
 
1760; the „putting in‟ capitalism – lending tools and equipment, and sometimes  
 
advancing money - which characterised the George Bowes era all but disappeared  
 
during the 1760s. Expenditure was focused on the purchase and carriage of lead ore,  
 
the carriage of pig lead to Newcastle, and the operation of the Wemmergill smelt mill  
 until its production expired after 1766. Expenditure on lead mining was non-existent,  
 
even at Birkdale. Table 25 below shows expenditure for the two years 1763/4 and  
 
1765/6. 
 
  The consequences for expenditure following the building of the  
 
Wemmergill smelt mill were discussed above in chapter 7.  Ore carriage costs almost  
 
doubled over the two year period for which records exist, and since the rate of  
 
carriage, 2s per bing with the exception of Birkdale ore, which was 3s per bing, ore 
 
Table 25 
 
Expenditure on carriage and smelting in 1763/4 and 1765/6  
 
 
    1763/4                           1765/6                          
        £         s       d                  £       s       d 
 
Ore carriage                      3       10      6                  6      11     0 
 
Lead carriage                   14        0      9                10        1     6 
 
Smelting                             9      13     4½              3         4     4½  
  
 
Total expenditure             41        1     9½             35        7     5½  
 
Source: D/St/B2/127 smelt mill pay bills 
Total expenditure included all of the above items, together with any other labour, 
repairs, carriage and purchase of materials – mainly coal, lime, and peat – washing 
and dressing of slags, and any incidental expenditure. 
 
 
    
production in 1765/6 must have been approximately twice that of 1763/4. Lead  
 
carriage costs to Wolsingham fell 28%, which indicates that the movement of lead  
 
was slower in1765/6 compared to two years earlier. Lastly, the costs of smelting pig  
 
lead, both ore hearth smelting and slag smelting, dropped by almost two thirds over 
 
this two year period, stark revelation of the decline in metallic lead output and the 
 
dying embers of an ailing rural industry on the Bowes estate.  The rate of pay for  
 smelting was unchanged in the two years identified in Table 25: 7s. per piece for ore  
 
hearth lead, and between £3 3s and £4 18s per fother for slag smelting, subject to the  
 
quality. In 1763/4 ore carriage costs were a little over 8% of total expenditure, and  
 
lead carriage costs 34% i.e. total  carriage costs amounted to just over 42% of total  
 
Bowes expenditure in the categories outlined above. In 1765/6 they were 18.5% and  
 
26.75% respectively i.e. 44.25% of total expenditure. In other words, the costs of  
 
carriage of both ore and pig lead change only very slightly over this short period. The  
 
the rate of carriage per bing remained unchanged, but a larger proportion of the  
 
extracted ore was from Birkdale, which as noted above, cost one third more to  
 
transport, so it must account for much of the increase in ore carriage costs. 
 
 The limited information illustrated in Table 25 above highlights the  
 
fact that during the 1760s the Bowes were only active in the carriage and smelting  
 
stages of lead production, and even then only in a small way. Essentially, the small  
 
scale lead business that Mary Eleanor Bowes inherited from her father was tolerated  
 
whilst in the end stage of production. The under-age and unmarried heiress was both   
 
incapable and uninterested in directing the development of lead mining and smelting 
 
which in its nascent stage benefited from the nurturing it received from George  
 
Bowes. Moreover, the estate managers specialising in lead did no more than  
 
subtlety take advantage of the positive market conditions in the post war period; 
 
ironically, John Gibson‟s detailed reports immediately prior to and following the  
 
death of George Bowes recommending the way to develop lead mining may have 
 
been the primary influence, more so than market conditions, in deflecting more senior  
 
stewards from advising his widow and their daughter Mary Eleanor Bowes to permit,  
 
and invest in, the development of lead production on the family estate. After all, the 
 
management had overseen and witnessed the demise of lead as an estate activity after 
 the initial euphoria of the 1740s, and must have realised by then that progress required 
 
capital investment for deeper mining. 
 
 
 
 
Table 26  
Prices of Pig Lead per Fother 1760 to 1800 
Year                      Sale Prices (Strathmore)                  Prices at Blaydon (Hughes)           
                 Highest             Lowest 
      £       s       d                               £       s       d       £       s       d 
1760                                                                     12       7       6      11     0      0 
1761                                                                     14       0       0      12     5      0 
1762                  14      15      0                             14       5       0      13   12      6 
1763                  15      12      6                             15     15       0      14   17      6 
1764                         14     10       0      13   10      0 
1765                                                                     15       5       0      13   10      0 
1766                                                                     15       5       0      14   17      6 
1767                                                                     15       5       0      14   15      0 
1768                                                                     15       2       6      14   10      0 
1769                                                                     14       7       6      14   10      0 
1770                                                                     14       5       0      14     0      0 
1771                                                                     17     14       0      14     0      0 
1772                                                                     15       0       0      13   15      0 
1773                                                                     13       2       6      12   17      6 
1774                                                                     13     15       0      12   15      0 
1775                                                                     14       0       0      13   15      0 
1776                                                                     14       0       0      13     5      0 
1777                                                                     13     15       0      13     7      6 
1778                                                                     13       7       6      13     0      0         
                                                                            Average Price  (Burt) 
            £        s        d 
1779                                                                    13        8        0     
1780                                                                    13        8        0 
1781                                                                    15      14        0 
1782                                                                    17      16        0 
1783                                                                    18      12        0 
1784                                                                    17      10        0 
1785                                                                    18        0        0 
1786                                                                    17      16        0 
1787                                                                    20        6        0 
1788                                                                    23        4        0 
1789                                                                    21      10        0 
1790                                                                    18      18        0 
1791                                                                    19      18        0    
1792                                                                    21        2        0 
1793                                                                    20        4        0 
1794                                                                    18      18        0 
1795                                                                    18        4        0 
1796                                                                    21        4        0 
1797                                                                    19      10        0   
1798                                                                    19        2        0 
1799                                                                    21        4        0 
1800                                                                    23        8        0   
Source: Burt, British Lead, Appendix A; Hughes, „Lead, land and coal‟, Appendix 
Table 13; and D/St/B2/150                     
  
The Bowes lead output during the first half of the 1760s was in 
 
response to the rising prices after 1760 and the expectation of an immediate post-war  
 
increase in demand when overseas markets reopened to British lead exports. This was  
 
a well established pattern of behaviour, as noted above in chapter 7, but George  
 
Bowes‟ reaction to pre-Seven Years‟ War price increases caused by war demand  
 
for lead was not sustained. Evidence of prices for the period 1760 to 1800 is given  
 
above in Table 26.  
 
Pig lead output on the Bowes estate tailed off after 1764 and the  
 
smelting of lead at Wemmergill had ceased no later than 1769.
697
, even though 
 
the market price for pig lead at Newcastle increased 23% from 1760 to 1768.    Apart  
 
from 1771, the trend of prices was downward until 1781. Roger Burt estimates that  
 
lead output grew to between 50,000 and 60,00 tons per annum during the third quarter  
 
of the eighteenth century, with an inconsiderable decline noticeable in the 1770s and  
 
1780s.
698
  There are several items of data missing from the records, but it can be seen  
 
from Table 27 below that lead production continued after 1760 with net accumulated 
 
stock at the staith growing to 3455 pieces of smelted lead, or 216 fodders, yet this was  
 
small-scale output compared to other producers. Production continued, but at a 
 
reducing rate, so that by 1769 the Bowes lead business appears to have ceased. Prices  
 
for pig lead began to fall in 1767, a trend which continued throughout the 1770s, with  
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698
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the exception of 1771. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 
 
Pig Lead Output, Deliveries, and Stock measured in Pieces - 1761 to 1768  
 
Year         Pieces      Pieces Delivered         Pieces Delivered 
699
        Delivered    Stock 
                Smelted    to  Wolsingham           to Tanfield Moor            to Staith     pieces 
 
1760                                                                                                        258          2434                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
1761         434 
700
              408                                  199                         153 
 
1762         261                    98                                    47                         261          2848                                                           
 
1763         400                  422                                                                 409 
 
1764         388                  106                                  346                         366 
701
      3455                                               
 
1765         203 
 
1766         194 
 
1768           96 
 
 
Source:  
For lead smelted D/St/C2/3/77 Gibson to Stephenson correspondence, and 
D/St/B2/150 accounts; for deliveries to Wolsingham D/St/B2/150, D/St/C2/3/75 
William Carr‟s letter to Stephenson, and D/St/C3/77 Gibson to Stephenson letter; 
to Tanfield Moor D/St/B2/150, and D/St/C2/3/77 Gibson to Stephenson letter; to 
Staith D/St/B2/150 accounts, and for stock D/St/B2/150 accounts for lead smelted; 
and for 1756 and 1766 D/St/B2/127 Wemmergill smelt mill pay bill 
 
 
That pig lead output and the trade in lead ore were sensitive to the  
 
price mechanism at the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 is brought out in the 
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700
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701
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correspondence between Bowes stewards and agents about market conditions. At 
 
the end of 1762 Richard Stephenson at Gibside wrote to John Bourn requesting that  
 
he should buy ore whilst it was cheaper before the price of pig lead rose. Shortly  
 
afterwards he asked Bourn to mark pig lead smelted from the cheaper ore in order to  
 
distinguish it from the rest when it reached Tanfield Moor.
702
 It has already been 
noted  
 
above that the market price of pig lead determined the price of ore in the field. Indeed, 
 
as early as May 1760 John Gibson advised Stephenson to prepare for higher prices at  
 
the end of the war by purchasing cheap ore while it was available.
703
 By late 1762  
 
Bourn wrote to William Leaton asking the price of a Newcastle fodder,  
 
simultaneously informing him that pig lead had been delivered to Newcastle,  
 
exclusive of expenses, at under  £13 per fother,.
704
 In other words, it could be sold for  
 
a competitive price, as shown in Table 27, and Bourn noted that he „suppose the  
 
Markets are rising‟. There is no evidence of panic buying of lead ore, but purchasing  
 
activity can be described as hasty, in the knowledge that a war was in its latter stages  
 
and a stronger overseas demand was likely to affect the market for lead imminently,  
 
though the extent of this demand appears not to have outweighed regional supply to  
 
the Newcastle market because prices became relatively stagnant, as seen above. 
 
  The recurrent problem of whether Newcastle or Stockton should be  
 
the market for Bowes pig lead rose its head again late in 1760, just prior to George  
 
Bowes‟ death, and remained in post-war market conditions. In October 1760 Nathan  
 
Horn wrote to William Leaton at Gibside stating that he had calculated it was 13s 11d  
 
cheaper per fother to carry smelted lead from Wemmergill to Stockton rather than to  
 
the Bowes‟ staith at Dunston on the Tyne.705 And, true or not, Horn stated that  
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 John Gibson concurred. This was contrary to George Bowes‟ own assessment of lead  
 
carriage to market in the 1740s when he decided upon Newcastle as the cheaper  
 
option for the reasons outlined above. Perhaps there had been an increase in carriage  
 
costs to Newcastle. Importantly, Horn confirmed that Yorkshire lead made 5s more  
 
per fother than Bowes lead, which meant either that there was  a greater margin to be  
 
had by carrying and selling pig lead in Stockton, or that pig lead from the Yorkshire  
 
dales was of better quality. In the context of Horn‟s correspondence, it probably  
 
meant Bowes could get more for their lead in Stockton, hence the argument in favour  
 
of directing lead there. During the summer of 1763 Leaton wrote to Bourn instructing  
 
him to base his ore purchases on a guide price at Newcastle of £15 12s 6d per  
 
fother .
706
 This meant buying ore at no more than £3 1s a bing, whereas John Bourn  
 
was negotiating around the £3 10s mark for Birkdale ore.
707
 Leaton informed Bourn in  
 
June 1763 that he could not obtain £15 15s per fother for Bowes lead in Newcastle in  
 
the current market,
708
 which indicates that regional producers were beginning to over  
 
supply the Newcastle market. Leaton made a further qualification regarding the  
 
Newcastle market, that „The Best refin‟d Lead has not sold for above £16 at  
 
Newcastle as yet‟, and furthermore that lead had sold at Stockton for £18 per 
fother.
709
  
 
William Leaton‟s last word on the matter was „I suppose you can buy no oar till ye  
 
Stockton and Newcastle price come nearer together‟.710 Again Table 27 above shows  
 
that Newcastle pig lead prices did not reach expectations, and certainly not the level  
 
Leaton quoted for the Stockton market. In fact Bowes lead was selling at £14 15s per  
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fother in November 1762,
711
 which was above the price quoted for Blaydon. 
Newcastle  
 
prices appear to have stagnated in the mid 1760s, then dropped in 1769. There are no  
 
records for smelted lead output for 1765, but there is clear indication that it was no  
 
longer considered automatic to carry pig lead quickly to Wolsingham and then to  
 
Tanfield Moor and the staith. In the summer of 1765 John Gibson at Wemmergill  
 
sought instructions from Richard Stephenson at Gibside as to whether or not more  
 
lead should be moved.
712
 The movement of pig lead to the Newcastle market was no  
 
longer a rush: the Bowes at this stage were carrying stock, because the level of sales  
 
locally had declined. 
 
  The lead trade was highly price sensitive at this time, and it was often 
 
more profitable to sell ore rather than pay the cost of smelting and carriage only to  
 
end up with stock that could not be sold in the short term at acceptable prices. The  
 
Birkdale ore Bourn was interested in buying had received an offer of £3 10s from Mr  
 
Elliot, a smelter whom the Bowes estate had dealt with previously, and Elliot  
 
described this price as „five shillings within the Stockton Market‟.713 Consequently,  
 
Bourn suggested to Leaton that if Elliot was willing to buy this ore at £3 15s, then  
 
Bourn should sell Elliot the Bowes duty ore and not bother smelting it, and  
 
encourage Elliot by offering six months credit for payment „with proper security‟,  
 
which presumably meant a bond from Elliot. On another occasion Bourn was n  
 
competition with „the Potters‟, presumably either smelters or lead merchants from  
 
outside the area, for 40 bing of Birkdale ore which he described as „the finest and best  
 
that ever I did see‟.714  He had offered 49s per bing, but the Potters had offered 59s,  
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and again Bourn suggested that if the competition would pay 59s then Bowes duty  
 
ore too should be sold to them at that price. Clearly, to sell ore on was often the most  
 
profitable option if the market price for pig lead was insufficient to make smelting and  
 
carriage costs worthwhile. John Bourn had calculated that if he paid £3 10s for ore,  
 
the end product, metallic lead, would sell for £17 per fother in Newcastle,
715
 but his  
 
leading steward pointed out the reality of the lead market; that demand at that price  
 
did not exist, and would not be until the early 1770s (Table 27 above). 
 
  The surviving accounts for lead smelted and delivered confirm two 
 
things; firstly, that Bowes lead continued to be marketed in Newcastle rather than  
 
Stockton, though the option of selling pig lead there was evidently a serious  
 
consideration during the market conditions of the early 1760s and the cessation of war  
 
in 1763; and secondly, that most lead produced on the Bowes estate was sold in  
 
Newcastle. 
 
Table 27 above, which is derived from the sources cited, a combination  
 
of accounts and correspondence written by individuals in the Bowes management  
 
structure, demonstrates that lead carriage continued to be along the route established  
 
during the mid-eighteenth century – from Wemmergill to Wolsingham, then onward  
 
to Tanfield Moor whence the lead was transported on the waggonway down to the  
 
staith at Dunston on the River Tyne. Pig lead was often stored at Wolsingham or left  
 
resting at the mill, subject to the level of urgency imposed by the Gibside steward. 
 
There is no evidence that Bowes lead ever reached Stockton, regardless of allegedly  
 
higher prices there. It has been discussed above that the Newcastle market was more  
 
attractive for a variety of reasons, particularly the existence of lead manufacturing 
 
as well as coastal and foreign trade. 
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  It was the magnetism of the Newcastle market and the ability to sell to  
 
local customers on the back of their standing in the mercantile community which  
 
caused the Bowes to leave the logistics of lead production unchanged. They had but a  
 
few customers for their lead; Peareth & Sorsbie, who had a long-standing business 
 
relationship with the Bowes; Mr. Tempest; and Thomas Hanby, who appears to have  
 
been a local plumber dealing with the Bowes from the late 1750s. In 1762 Mr 
 
Tempest bought 80 pieces of pig lead; equivalent to 30.65% of the lead smelted that  
 
year and 2.8% of the stock then currently held at the staith of 2848 pieces
 
.
716
 Peareth 
 
& Sorsbie bought 2946 pieces of lead in 1764, which was 85.3% of the Bowes  
 
stock.
717
 Assuming sixteen pieces a fother and a price of £14 10s, this sale amounted 
to  
 
£2,669 16s 3d. In October 1764, after the sale to Peareth & Sorsbie, only 319 pieces  
 
are recorded as resting at the staith, which means a further 190 pieces were sold, but  
 
the purchaser cannot be identified from the documents examined. Thomas Hanby is  
 
mentioned in certain correspondence in connection with Mr Tempest‟s purchases of  
 
lead, and it may be that it was he who bought the 190 pieces.
718
 The quality of Bowes  
 
lead seems to have been known and recommended; in 1762 John Legg seeking to buy  
 
pig lead on behalf of Mr Tempest, for work to be done by Thomas Hanby, wrote  
 
that Hanby considered that „Mrs. Bowes to be the best‟ of lead produced locally.719 
   
 
   
Most of the lead mines established on the Bowes estate, regardless of  
 
their scale, were leased in 1771 to The Governor and Company for Smelting down  
 
Lead with Pit Coal and Sea Coal, otherwise known as the London Lead Company or  
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 Quaker Lead Company.
720
 This twenty-one year lease marked the end of the George  
 
Bowes era, because the changes he wrought were not developed during the interim  
 
period before the London Lead Company ventured south of the River Tees, thereby  
 
extending their existing enterprise and capturing the monopoly of lead mining in  
 
Upper Teesdale. Lead production did continue after her father‟s death, on the basis of 
 
existing arrangements, and the Bowes estate management structure facilitated the 
 
continuation, but without plans for expansion.  
 
   
 
  After her Father‟s death and before her marriage, Mary Eleanor Bowes  
 
was all but neglected by her grieving mother Mary Bowes; they moved to London and  
 
the management of the estate in the North was left to the stewards
721
. Mary Eleanor  
 
received no guidance in estate business. Although by the late eighteenth century  
 
wealthy members of the landed estate tended to show interest in but distanced  
 
themselves from business and industry, the behaviour of Eleanors‟ Mother was in  
 
complete contrast to that of George Bowes mother, Lady Bowes, who was active in  
 
the coal trade in the early eighteenth century. Perhaps the late eighteenth century  
 
culture as reinforced by gender in the case of the Bowes, but in any event the retreat  
 
to London appears to have marked Mary Eleanor‟s withdrawal from estate business,  
 
including lead.  
 
Upon marriage, Mary Eleanor and her new husband The Earl of 
 
Strathmore decided to grant a lease, which encompassed the whole lead mining area  
 
of the Bowes estate. The six mines included in the area lease Isabell-meah-hill or  
 
Birkdale, Blacksike, Closehouse, Arngill, Standards, and Cocklake; the Lunehead  
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complex, Green Mines, and Blackark were excluded. The Bowes were to receive one- 
 
fifth duty ore from Birkdale and one-sixth from the other five mines; once again, in  
 
similar fashion to the Bowes of the seventeenth century, lead production became a  
 
rentier activity with the Bowes as indifferent lessor mineral lords, yet with one  
 
difference – the London Lead Company had the resources to develop the Bowes 
 
mineral asset, which in turn could enhance the value of the family estate without any  
 
risk for the Bowes. Risk-averse family capitalism had given way to corporate  
 
adventurism and the capacity for large-scale lead mining. 
 
The 1771 agreement with the London Lead Company was unique in 
 
terms of its contents: the Bowes‟ management of a corporation created for the purpose 
 
of large scale lead mining operations necessitated a lease the like of which had not  
 
been previously drafted.  The details of this twenty-one year lease were as follows: 
 
1. The LLC was not to stray from the exact areas allocated at each mine i.e. 1800 
by 400 yards. The mines included were Isabell-meah-Hill or Birkdale, 
Blacksike, Closehouse, Arngill, Standards, and Cocklake. 
 
2. It was permitted to erect appropriate buildings and watercourses, heap rooms, 
and mills, including „smelting engines and gins‟, and shops for miners. 
 
3. The LLC was granted wayleave for the carriage of ore and pig lead over 
Bowes lands. 
 
4. Materials for building and fuel could be taken from the Bowes lands. 
 
5. The LLC was permitted to sub-let the lead mines contained in the lease. 
 
6. Duty ore was one fifth for Birkdale and one sixth from the other mines named 
in the lease. 
 
7. The LLC was to give ten days notice for the weighing of lead ore, and it was 
forbidden from carrying off ore without it being weighed and inspected by a 
Bowes agent. 
 
8. The LLC accepted complete financial liability for the mines contained in the 
lease. 
 
9. The security of the lead ore was the responsibility of the LLC. 
 
10. Accounts of ore must be sent to the Bowes. 
 
11. The LLC‟s books and accounts must be open to inspection by Bowes‟ agents. 
 
12. The lead mines must be worked for at least nine months of the year, and there 
must be a minimum of four „pickmen‟ at each of the six mines. The exceptions 
to this were events caused by combinations, civil war, and serious accidents, 
drought, and severe weather. 
 
13. There were to be monthly inspections of workings, including shafts. 
 
14. The LLC must pay wages at the current rate, and no less than annually, and 
this included carriers 
 
15. The LLC must provide proper accommodation for miners and other workers. 
 
The period following the granting of the London Lead Company in  
 
1771 and before the death of Mary Eleanor Bowes in 1800, a span of only eight years,  
 
and indeed the continuation of lead production during the nineteenth century on the  
 
Strathmore estate in Upper Teesdale, is beyond the scope of this thesis. At this stage, 
 
however, some comment can be made regarding the years before the death of the 
 
Bowes heiress by way of shedding some light on the general condition of the British  
 
lead industry and how the Strathmore estate handled its potential lead production. 
 
The market for lead was relatively buoyant in the last three  
 
decades of the eighteenth century, mainly because general domestic demand  
 
had expanded 
722
 and even though the War of American Independence between 1776- 
 
1783 interrupted the export trade in lead by reducing the average tonnage exported by  
 
twenty per cent compared to the period 1768-1774.
723
 In addition, lead output in the  
 
Mendips and Derbyshire, the latter long recognised as the centre of British lead  
 
production since the sixteenth century was slowing down.
724
 The supply of lead  
 
lagged behind growing war demand during the 1790s and into the first decade  
 
of the eighteenth century, and consequently the were huge increases in pig lead prices  
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 as shown in Table 26 above. Simultaneously, the growth of domestic demand during  
 
the French and Napoleonic Wars of 1793-1815 was greater than the shrinkage  
 
in exports caused by war.
725
  The Bowes, however, passed on the opportunity of  
 
substantial profits from their Upper Teessdale mines by granting a twenty-one year  
 
lease to the London Lead Company. 
 
  The market conditions prevalent between 1771 and the early  
 
nineteenth century lead to the assumption that the London Lead Company 
 
demonstrated almost perfect timing in agreeing a lease which would further enhance 
 
its lead output as demand grew. Unexpectedly, no records were discovered of  
 
correspondence between the London Lead Company and the Strathmore estate during  
 
the term of the lease, 1771 to 1792. The terms of the lease indicate its importance as a  
 
source of estate income, and the clauses stipulating the relationship between the  
 
Strathmores and the London Lead Company by way of practice and the exchange of  
 
management information, yet there is no evidence of any mining or smelting during  
 
the twenty-five year term. Perhaps the London Lead Company did not undertake any  
 
operations, or maybe it decided to sub-let the mines. Furthermore, there is no  
 
evidence of the enforcement of the forfeiture clause.  Either way, a void appears to  
 
exist in the Strathmore Collection for lead production in the late eighteenth century on  
 
the family estate, and perhaps more significantly for the duration of the longest lease  
 
granted to the largest lead mining company, and one capable of large-scale investment  
 
to develop the mines. 
 
  It may be, of course, that documents relating to the extraction and  
 
smelting of lead performed by the London Lead Company are held elsewhere, for  
 
example in the Company‟s own records. A brief examination of lead business records  
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 in the Strathmore collection for the years 1792 to 1800 reveal a renewed regional  
 
interest in lead evidenced by proposals to obtain leases from experienced miners,  
 
merchants, and local professionals, most notably in Weardale, which remained a  
 
regional hub for the lead industry. It could be suggested that there was a queue of  
 
adventurers awaiting the departure of the London Lead Company; partnerships of  
 
various sizes expecting to benefit from extensive mining operations conducted by a  
 
probably the largest British lead mining organisation of the eighteenth and nineteenth  
 
 
centuries. Without the London Lead Company records the history of the lead industry  
 
on the Bowes family estate during the latter years of the eighteenth century remains  
 
incomplete. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
 
The preceding chapters have examined two centuries of the Bowes estate‟s  
 
relationship with its lead mineral rights. They go some way to closing the gap in the  
 
existing knowledge of lead production in the northeast where the market, concentrated  
 
on Newcastle as the entrepot supplying London‟s consumption and international  
 
export, appears to have been in the hands of only a few producers, an oligopoly, from  
 
the late seventeenth century. The extent and nature of changes in the Bowes‟ role was  
 
largely determined by patriarchal dynamism – the role of male heads of the family.  
 
Yet notwithstanding variations in entrepreneurial capability, the history of the  
 
family‟s involvement in a major regional extractive industry demonstrates continuity  
 
in a number of ways. There are conclusions to be drawn about different aspects of  
 
lead production on the Bowes estate between 1550 and 1771, and for wider debates in  
 
economic and social history.  
 
   
Bowes family members became leading figures in the northeast lead  
 
industry during the late sixteenth century, founded upon business acumen, social and  
 
political standing, and Crown favour and patronage.
726
  They were directly involved 
in  
 
mining, smelting, and trade from at least 1550, demonstrating gentry entrepreneurship  
 
contrary to the prevailing view, yet were not granted mineral bearing lands by the  
 
Crown until 1593.
 727
 The Bowes, in the vanguard of upper gentry enterprise in 
mineral  
 
exploitation, seized the opportunity for profit presented by mines leased from the  
 
Crown in Teesdale, and in Weardale, the most productive, from the Bishop of  
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Durham.
728
  Smelting was the keystone of the Bowes lead organisation, and Sir 
William  
 
Bowes built a water-powered bellows-blown smelt mill before c.1595 – an exception  
 
to the view that gentry were exploiters rather than innovators – which changed the  
 
spatial organisation of this mining area, whilst the technology and techniques of lead  
 
production remained otherwise unchanged.
729
 There is no evidence of any direct 
foreign  
 
influence, either in the form of capital or technical expertise, upon their achievements  
 
in the late sixteenth century. The Bowes were the chief lead merchants in Newcastle- 
 
upon-Tyne with an effective monopoly created via the regulation of the Merchant  
 
Adventurers. They also supplied London merchants and the north European market,  
 
the former often providing working capital for mining to the order of several hundred  
 
pounds per contract.
730
  The dearth of statistical records prevents meaningful  
 
extrapolation, but a reasonable estimate is achievable for the Bowes‟ role in northeast  
 
lead production. In 1599 they supplied 80 fothers of pig lead to the Newcastle market,  
 
and 100 in 1600. In 1601 Newcastle shipped out 59 ¼ fothers. By way of an inter- 
 
regional family comparison, in 1600 the Bowes lead supplied to Newcastle was  
 
equivalent to 42% of that produced by the renowned Talbot family in Derbyshire.
731
 
 
  The Bowes were leading northeast lead producers between c.1564 and  
 
1600 – lessee entrepreneurs – yet vacated their position in an expanding market  
 
underpinned by the demands of domestic construction during the seventeenth  
 
century.
732
 Their role, evidenced by extant leases, metamorphosed into passive, rentier  
 
activity on their Teesdale estate.
733
  The Bowes‟ relative inactivity in lead production  
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 was not a consequence at any stage of either the existence from the 1560s, or its  
 
extinction in 1693, of the Mines Royal, an oft promoted cause of landowners‟ failure  
 
 
to exploit minerals. There are identifiable reasons for this change.
734
 In 1611 the  
 
Bowes lost the Bishopric lead lease, the Moormastership, when Sir William Bowes  
 
died without male issue; the loss was substantial and never regained, and the Bowes‟  
 
estate mines were insufficiently developed to replace it. Until Sir William Bowes  
 
attained his majority in 1677 there was an absence of patriarchs capable of developing  
 
the family estate.
735
 It could also be argued that the family‟s socio-economic and  
 
political standing waned as a consequence of the Bishop of Durham‟s relationship  
 
with the Crown. Between 1679 and 1712 there was negligible commitment to  
 
discovering new and exploiting existing lead veins; lead production on the Upper  
 
Teesdale estate was viewed as a risky, incidental source of income, and its nature was  
 
haphazard and intermittent. The Bowes were laggards compared to other  
 
organisations in the northeast, namely the Blacketts and the London Lead Company,  
 
and it would appear their interest in lead did not extend beyond the estate. Sir William  
 
Bowes was preoccupied with profits from coal following his marriage in 1691 to the  
 
coal heiress Elizabeth Blakeston of Gibside, mother of George Bowes, and to a lesser  
 
extent with his business relationship with ironmaster Ambrose Crowley III.
736
   
 
George Bowes became the estate‟s patriarch in 1722, when the  
 
family‟s wealth from coal was already established, later enhanced by his  
 
membership of the coal magnates‟ cartel – the Grand Alliance. Despite such wealth,  
 
he personally directed the development of the estate‟s lead producing potential. 
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Bowes inherited an unchanged estate management structure established in the late  
 
seventeenth century, but was innovative in his introduction of stewards specialising in  
 
mining and smelting, respectively Nathan Horn and John Gibson, who brought better  
 
integration of mines and mills. This commercialisation of the estate, management for  
 
gain, was transfused with George Bowes‟ insistence on a regular flow of stewards‟ 
 
management reports, sometimes directly to him in London.
737
 
 
             Bowes and his stewards‟ primary management tool was the  
 
development of the mining lease, which legally crystallised the Bowes monopsony of  
 
lead ore and the control of smelting.
738
 Leases did not take a generic form;  
 
individualisation of arrangements subject to circumstances and conditions is the  
 
striking feature of Bowes estate management between 1740 and 1760. The leases  
 
were the basis for strict management  – Bowes‟ regulations  –  rather than customary  
 
arrangements and mining laws, and frequently incorporated partnership agreements  
 
when shared risk was preferred. Equipment and tools, steward expertise, and  
 
sometimes money were „put in‟ through the medium of the lease, demonstrating the  
 
Bowes estate operated as a capitalist firm, albeit family based and to an extent  
 
paternalistic.
739
  
 
During the period 1740-60, as a consequence of an unprecedented  
 
approach to the possibilities of a metalliferrous product, lead production became a  
 
more organised economic activity on the Bowes estate in a barren landscape.  
 
Exploration, discovery, and mining became an embedded, continuous process and  
 
expectations were high in anticipation of finding sources of silver.
740
 In 1748/9  
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awaiting his master‟s instructions, steward Thomas Colpitts I wrote „We may then set  
 
about to make Trials, and whether we meet with a new Peru, or otherwise, it will at  
 
least serve as a Beacon to guide all future Generations from splitting on that rock‟.741   
 
George Bowes granted twenty-two tacks and leases and thirty mines/mining areas  
 
were worked – twenty-five at different times by various lessees, eleven by George  
 
Bowes, and six by Bowes and partners.     
 
Lead mining on this estate conformed to current practices  –  
 
gunpowder blasting, and levels and ventilation at the deeper mines, and mechanical  
 
stamps for dressing ore – and there was little change in technique or technology, no  
 
revolution on the estate. Knowledge was cumulative, geological understanding  
 
practical, but neither scientific nor predictive. Similarly, the smelting process was up- 
 
to-date, using the ore hearth and slag hearth, preceded by improved washing and  
 
dressing. George Bowes instigated managed change in metallurgy producing an  
 
improved yield by the late 1750s at the new Wemmergill smelt mill.
742
 Lead ore 
output  
 
was 3,375.25 bing between 1741-59 (a bing = 0.4 ton); smelted pig lead output was  
 
457 fothers 1741-60 (a fother =1.05 tons at Newcastle). Labour productivity and   
 
return on capital were variable, determined by the presence of the mineral rather than  
 
technique or technology. The analysis of scant data from extant records is  
 
inconclusive; only greater Bowes investment would potentially have improved total  
 
factor productivity. 
 
The Bowes estate traded locally in lead ore and pig lead, the former  
 
being relatively insignificant, whilst direct export was virtually non-existent.
743
 Most  
 
lead was sold to leading merchants; of the divers merchants specialising in lead, two- 
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thirds was sold to Peareth & Sorsbie, who traded with London merchants, and 11% to  
 
Ralph Carr. Bowes lead held a minority share of the Newcastle upon Tyne market  
 
compared to Blackett-Beaumont lead; George Bowes had no influence over the price  
 
of lead, nor was there any association of producers to control it, in contrast to the  
 
Bowes‟ coal business. Bowes‟ expansion of lead output suffered enforced contraction  
 
because of war, particularly that of 1756-63, suppressing lead exports to Europe  
 
which were not replaced by increased local or London consumption. Consequently,  
 
the Bowes were compelled to stockpile lead, because short-term inelasticity of supply  
 
meant producers flooded the Newcastle market causing prices to fall until market  
 
equilibrium returned after war.  
 
A Bowes‟ estate model for lead production was moulded into shape  
 
during the period 1740-60. It presents a number of characteristics, some differing  
 
from other regional producers, which have implications for proto-industrialisation.  
 
Leases created a monopsony of extracted lead ore for the Bowes; they smelted it and  
 
supplied pig lead to the Newcastle market, which fed London‟s consumption and  
 
export overseas. The leases encouraged small-scale enterprise by self-employed  
 
miners and adventurers, but most working capital – ninety-six per cent – was  
 
introduced by the Bowes, often subsidising output. They were also adroit instruments  
 
that allowed the Bowes to enter into partnership during the life of a lease when  
 
mining potential appeared strong. The organisation of mining was a variant on the  
 
types of arrangements for mining known to have existed elsewhere in the North  
 
Pennines. There was much variation in the size of tracts, areas of land, granted.  
 
Division of labour, specialisation, emerged in the different stages of the production  
 
process, some paid by results and some in the form of wages; employment in lead  
 
began changing from a secondary source of income controlled by the seasons in the  
 
agrarian system, to a primary source, often on a full-time basis. The estate pay bills  
 
evidence skill based roles – miners, smelters, carriers, washers – including some  
 
female lead miners and family groups performing different functions.
744
 The changing  
 
nature of occupations hints at an „industrious revolution‟, but the numbers were small  
 
in an upland area of very low population density. By 1760, even 1771, this was not an  
 
industrial society on the scale described for coal mining Whickham.
745
 There were no  
 
mining customs or laws: only Bowes‟ governance.  
 
The role of George Bowes is singular.
746
 Until recently seen as an  
 
archetypal absentee landowner, MP, and wealthy coal magnate from at least the time  
 
when the Grand Alliance was formed, his personal participation in the exploitation of  
 
lead alters this assessment. His uniqueness as a landowner lay not in his exploitation  
 
of lead, but in his direct personal involvement. So there is no indication before his  
 
death in 1760 that he considered either granting a lease to, entering into partnership  
 
with, or selling out to a larger enterprise. 
 
George Bowes was a dynamic entrepreneur attempting to develop a 
 
lead business as another strand of estate development to further extend his family‟s  
 
spectacular wealth. A member of a national commercial elite, he was a leading light at  
 
the forefront of economic and social change in the region. He fits Mingay‟s definition  
 
„of the squire-merchant-industrialist, the composite entrepreneur who played so great  
 
a part in developing such areas as Cumberland and Durham and Northumberland in  
 
the eighteenth century‟.747 He ventured to change a rural, organic industry on his 
estate  
 
into an organised and potentially profitable business. In doing so he faced a number of  
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challenges: lead mining because of its nature was riskier than coal mining; there was a 
  
lack of infrastructure in the landscape, only packhorse roads existed; the control of  
 
property rights in relation to estate development, appropriate letting arrangements  
 
were required; the extent of capital investment required assessment, because lead  
 
mining was risky; the effectiveness of the management system, an inherited structure  
 
without speiclist roles for lead; and market conditions, which were controlled by the  
 
variables of transport costs and possible disruption. George Bowes understood the  
 
nature of the lead trade: that production was responsive to the selling price of pig  
 
lead; that restrictions on overseas trade, especially war, could cause price volatility;  
 
and that if trade was hampered, even temporarily, price falls could prove disastrous. 
 
He was a strategist, and alongside his stewards also managed each  
 
stage of his estates‟ lead business, and thereby transformed it from inert to active.  
 
Strategically he moved the estate from active, direct exploitation of lead in the 1740s,  
 
to largely passive management in the early1750s, with renewed direct interest from  
 
1756, all in response to learned market mechanisms. The Bowes commitment to lead  
 
is confirmed by expenditure of £4,869 on lead mining alone during 1731-58, whilst  
 
that of the previous century amounted to less than £200. George Bowes introduced  
 
most of the working capital, but during the 1750s actively encouraged, through leases,  
 
exogenous investment, though small-scale, from both local sources and other lead  
 
regions, such as Yorkshire and Derbyshire.
748
 This was hardly a rush for grey gold, 
but  
 
indicates recognition of the Bowes estate‟s lead potential at a stage when it appeared  
 
as the final frontier of lead mining in the North Pennines. Furthermore, his use of  
 
leases was a direct incentive for small-scale enterprise in the extractive economy. 
 
George Bowes found no necessity for technological change, because  
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 his estates‟s production structure was of a small-scale nature. Instead he increased  
 
activity within the bounds of existing technology, and in doing so revealed  
 
exceptional knowledge of a metalliferous process. He focused on improving pig lead  
 
yield, and by managing the disciplined work rate and key skill of smelters was  
 
responsible for more efficient metallurgy and ultimately greater productivity.  
 
Similarly, he micro-managed washing and dressing which directly affected ore  
 
quality for smelting, and the labour force in terms of remuneration and  
 
accommodation in an upland wilderness environment.  
 
Compared to his predecessors, George Bowes was innovative in two  
 
ways: he directed change in the structure and organisation of the production process;  
 
and he recruited specialist stewards for mining and smelting and encouraged the  
 
poaching of reputable smelters and carriers from nearby families with lead interests,  
 
like the Vanes of Raby Castle. He understood that progress in change would be  
 
restricted without the installation of these stewards; coordinated patriarchalism was 
 
at the core of the Bowes firm.  
 
George Bowes was eager to market his lead and acted as merchant in  
 
Newcastle during the summer months of the 1740s, coordinating the output,  
 
movement, and delivery of lead. The crucial variable factor in general viability and  
 
profit margin was the cost of transporting both lead ore and pig lead. Consequently,  
 
George Bowes was confronted, in the absence of infrastructure, by the spatial problem  
 
of smelt mill location, and the logistical one of routes and distances and capabilities of  
 
packhorse carriers. Suffice to say he resolved both; in 1756 he decided –  based upon  
 
power, fuel, and roads – to relocate smelting nearer the mines, and chose the  
 
northerly route to the Newcastle nexus rather than the easterly one to Stockton. By  
 
1758 overall carriage costs were reduced by 13%, and for bulkier ore alone by almost  
 50%. Consequently, Bowes lead was supplied to Newcastle manufacturers and the  
 
London market more profitably.
749
  Lastly, George Bowes continued his family‟s  
 
practice of occasionally conducting lead business in London. For example, in 1749 he  
 
dealt with the Earl of Carlisle regarding their partnership problems at Crinkle How  
 
mine on the Bowes estate, and there are financial records disclosing transactions  
 
between Bowes, the Blacketts, and the London Lead Company, relating to lead  
 
business in the northeast.
750
 
        
  George Bowes‟ patriarchal estate management wrought several  
 
changes: improved organisation and structure, including a level of capital formation;  
 
more extensive mining activity; improvement in metallurgy; and innovation in estate  
 
management. Whereas many other landowners deputed or delegated to their stewards 
 
thereby creating the circumstances that facilitated their absence, his role contradicts  
 
any notion of mineral lord absenteeism; he was the progenitor of an estate industry  
 
that came to full fruition after his death, a „composite entrepreneur‟,751 and a capitalist  
 
working to control demand and supply of lead ore and smelted lead. 
           
Unfortunately, although he was the first directly involved family member  
 
since his sixteenth century predecessors, the Bowes estate‟s overall position in the  
 
northeast lead industry was comparatively insignificant. Its mineral endowment was  
 
underdeveloped, and remained so until after 1800.  In so far as its lead business  
 
remained marginal, the argument that the Bowes estate management system was  
 
productive and effective in a similar way to coal, because of its structure and use of  
 
accounting practices is proven specious by this analysis. 
 
 As has been shown in Chapter 8, even after George Bowes‟ outstanding  
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involvement and commitment to lead production, it cannot be described as a  
 
profitable estate business activity, which raises the question – what was his  
 
motivation for developing a lead enterprise? Already in 1735 his profit from coal as a 
 
member of the Grand alliance was £9,778; in 1736 it was £10,588; and for the ten  
 
month period 1
st
 March to 31
st
 December 1738 it was £13,057.
752
 A range of possible  
 
impelling forces can only be suggested at this juncture. George Bowes may have  
 
enjoyed the competition with regional lead producers, because it was a different  
 
market to that for coal, in that there was no target market, and consequently there was  
 
no cartel. The evidence for the 1740s in particular indicates a genuine anticipation that 
 
the estate was a potential source of profitable lead production, and possibly silver too. 
 
There again, estate rental income may have been suffering arrears problems during  
 
the mid-eighteenth century and Bowes, as beneficent patriarch, expanded small-scale  
 
lead output in order to occupy inhabitants who could earn and pay rent. The estate,  
 
with its monopsony, was the source of cash payments, but enjoyed the profit margin  
 
at market.  Whatever motivated George Bowes in his lead business, he did not  
 
financially expose the family estate to any real risk, because its wealth from coal  
 
could easily have provided the working capital for the exploitation of lead.  
  
The Bowes lead pocket was at the margin amongst a cluster of organisations  
 
specialising in the extraction of lead in a region largely characterised by large-scale  
 
investment and long-term strategy. George Bowes‟ efforts were restricted to multiple  
 
small-scale operations requiring little capital, unlike coal, avoiding the risk of greater  
 
capital input for deeper mining. Consequently, the pace of industrialisation on the  
 
estate was relatively slow, demonstrating a variation in the development of lead  
 
production within the northeast. Yet he made progress by creating the beginnings of  
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an industrial environment in a fundamentally agrarian setting. Lead production on the  
 
Bowes estate in the mid-eighteenth century provides a strong example of proto- 
 
industrialisation, and in a regional context contributed, albeit on a smaller scale and a  
 
slower pace, to the process of industrialisation.
753
 
 
  
The findings of this thesis also contribute to several wider debates: 
proto- 
 
industrialisation; the role of the landowner as entrepreneur; the role of the 
estate  
 
steward; family capitalism; and the nature of the relationship between the 
regions and  
 
London. 
 
 The extractive industries, regardless of the commodity involved, are 
rarely –   
 
if ever –  presented by historians as an example of proto-industrialisation.754  
Proto- 
 
industrialisation is a model adopted by some historians to understand industry 
in the  
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countryside during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that 
supplied   
 
regional and overseas markets. Its characteristics are low capitalisation and a 
paid  
 
labour force usually consisting of two-job individuals such as farmer-miners, 
and so  
 
proto-industrialisation is a stage of change before larger capitalisation, 
factories, and   
 
largely wage based labour force generally accepted as industrialisation. Bowes 
lead  
 
production in the late sixteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries offers a prime 
example  
 
of a product generated by small-scale rurally located industry which was delivered to  
 
local, national, and international markets. The Bowes exploitation of lead was  
 
characterised by comparatively low capitalisation, improvements in productivity  
 
within the parameters of existing technology and technique, and a growing    
 
division of labour with some evidence of women in the mines and ore preparation. By  
 
organising the extraction, preparation, carriage, smelting, and marketing of lead  
 
George Bowes initiated a process of change; the transition from an agrarian to a  
 
mixed economy on the periphery of a family estate and at the frontier of an otherwise  
 
established lead producing region. The Bowes case should assist the promotion of the  
 
lead industry into the group of industries currently preferred for analysis when  
 
discussing proto-industrialisation, whilst suggesting that the beginning of the usual  
 time frame is extended backwards to the late sixteenth century. It is clear that by  
 
1771 lead production on the Bowes estate was not full-grown, but that a hybrid   
 
form of proto-industrial and industrial production existed there, for example at  
 
Isabell-mea-Hill lead mine in the 1740s where the workforce were paid, dedicated 
 
lead miners.  
 
 During both the late sixteenth century and the mid-eighteenth century the  
 
Bowes lead business was driven by the entrepreneurship of particular patriarchs; Sir  
 
George followed by his son Sir William before 1611, and George Bowes between  
 
1740 and 1760. The nature of this entrepreneurship changed across the period  
 
examined in this thesis. From the 1570s until 1611 the Bowes actively managed lead  
 
under the terms of leases; their Teesdale estate was only passively managed using a  
 
very limited number of leases between the 1670s and 1710s. George Bowes,  
 
motivated by the prospect of profit introduced an active, vigorous style of  
 
management after 1740.  
 
 Under the direction of George Bowes the inherited estate management  
 
system experienced the innovative introduction of specialist stewards to develop 
 
lead production. The Bowes estate lead, regardless of its comparatively small output  
 
between 1740 and 1771, can be identified as being amongst those estates that were  
 
structured for the serious exploitation of lead.
755
 The significance of the steward‟s role  
 
is re-emphasised by this case study, and gives some indication of this niche role in  
 
estate management with its direct influence on industrialisation. It is worth re-stating  
 
here that the mining lease emerged as perhaps the most significant tool of Bowes‟  
 
estate management.  
 
 The Bowes estate operated as a firm based upon gentry entrepreneurship.  It is  
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 an example of family capitalism, and the extent of the financial commitment has  
 
already been noted. It is clear that George Bowes invested the appropriate level of  
 
working capital, as well as subsidising some mining lessees and „putting in‟ tools and  
 
equipment. There were incentives for small-scale enterprise, including the granting of  
 
leases to adventurers from outside the region willing to invest in mining. Essentially,  
 
the Bowes use of the mining lease captured output on the estate and controlled market  
 
supply. Yet the Bowes‟ persistence with lead at times when either geology or adverse  
 
market circumstances determined poor returns rather suggests that even during the  
 
mid-eighteenth century there was an underlying paternalism, a desire to sustain,  
 
subsidise if necessary, industrialisation for the benefit of estate inhabitants. 
 
Alternatively, the Bowes may have ensured long term social stability for the 
 
profitability of lead and the security of rental income from estate tenants capable of 
 
earning from mining, ore preparation, lead carriage, and smelting. Ultimately, self- 
 
interest appears to have been at the core of George Bowes‟ strategy for the family 
 
estate. 
 
 London was the lead staple throughout the period; the city-port was the  
 
main domestic consumer and gateway to foreign markets. The Bowes lead 
 
enterprise of the late sixteenth century reveals the financial nature of the northeast‟s  
 
relationship with London as a source of merchant capital for lead mining enterprise, in  
 
contrast to coal mining.
756
 This regional-capitol axis continued, but the mechanism 
had  
 
changed by the mid-eighteenth century; the Bowes estate no longer required  
 
occasional injections of capital – they had enormous wealth from coal – and sold its  
 
lead to Newcastle merchants who supplied larger London merchant houses. 
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  Lastly, to what extent did the Bowes estate‟s management of lead exploitation  
 
contribute to creating a defining context for industrialisation on the northeastern  
 
periphery? This case study draws lead production somewhat further out of the 
 
shadows of larger scale industries generally granted by historians a greater strategic  
 
role in the process of industrialisation during the early modern period. The Bowes  
 
family provides an example of gentry entrepreneurship during the late sixteenth and  
 
mid- eighteenth centuries, revealing its role in the economics of lead mining,  
 
smelting, and marketing, and the consequences for the inhabitants and workforce of  
 
an upland estate. During the late sixteenth century, the Bowes experienced the good  
 
fortune of occupying an institutionalised role, as Moormasters, through the lead mines  
 
lease granted by the Bishop of Durham; they were active managers of a lead business  
 
outside their lands which required little entrepreneurial creativity. Whereas, in  
 
the mid-eighteenth century, George Bowes began with a blank canvas and directed  
 
change for gain. Clearly, therefore, most of the answer as to the extent of a  
 
contribution to creating a context for industrialisation lies in period of his patriarchy. 
 
 A fixed lead mining zone was established; it was close to a cheap, abundantly  
 
available fuel, peat, so consequently the transportation of coal was not a problem in a  
 
region lacking infrastructure. Change was wrought within existing technology and  
 
technique; the coal-fired reverberatory furnace for smelting was unnecessary at this  
 
stage. The yield of pig lead from ore was, however, increased through a managed  
 
improvement in metallurgy, and this smelted lead contributed to the regional market,  
 
particularly Newcastle‟s consumption, and indirectly the London staple. 
 
 Bowes encouraged small-scale capitalist enterprise appropriate to the higher 
 
level of risk incurred in lead mining. Fundamental to attracting adventurers and  
 
miners was the level of security offered in property rights, which benefited both 
 them and the Bowes estate. This process was controlled through the institution of the 
 
mining lease, which was strictly in favour of the Bowes, yet a comparatively flexible  
 
management tool. The required change in the organisation of lead production  
 
demanded different management; this was achieved by introducing specialist stewards  
 
to the inherited system who enforced the leases. Capital from merchants within the  
 
northeast and other lead mining regions such as Derbyshire, Lancashire and  
 
Westmoreland, and Yorkshire was gradually attracted by the nature of the Bowes  
 
leases. Most capital was working capital invested by the Bowes, but a level of capital  
 
formation accrued in the form of underground systems of shafts and levels which 
 
facilitated the continuation of mining. 
 
 The organisation of the production process – mining, washing and dressing,  
 
smelting, transport, and marketing – was generally effective in reducing costs and  
 
thereby improving viability. In particular, the reduction of ore and pig lead carriage  
 
costs were very important for profitability in fluctuating market conditions. Improved 
 
organisation led gradually to the division of labour and skills at different stages in the 
 
production process, and these were different to the usual agrarian occupations. The  
 
development of an extractive industry meant the continued existence of a secondary  
 
occupation and source of income for some, and a full-time occupation for others on  
 
the estate regardless of the season. The movement towards occupational and income  
 
change perhaps maintained a balance in the estate‟s economy by supporting the  
 
payment of rents otherwise unaffordable.  
 
  
Overall, this case study of the Bowes estates increases our knowledge of 
 
the British lead industry, particularly in the northeast during the mid-eighteenth  
 
century. Although the nature of Bowes entrepreneurship changed over two centuries, 
 
it was the catalyst in lead production that wrought change through the process of  
 
industrialisation, because a „stage‟ of growth was achieved, though lead production  
 
on the Bowes estate was late in developing. Moreover, George Bowes‟ personal  
 
involvement is a rare example of the gentleman landowner playing a direct role in the  
 
exploitation of the family estate. Lead extraction and manufacture did create the  
 
context for industrialisation on the Bowes estate, contributing to this industry‟s  
 
expansion in the northeast. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
 
Lead ore production by mine 1741-60 (in bings, horses, and pokes) 
 
                  Bings              horses              pokes 
 
Arngill                         1741                      6                      2                     0 
                                    1742                      6                      2                     0 
                                    1746                    23                      0                     0 
                                    1757                    56                      2                     0 
                                    1758                    56                      2                     0 
 
Black Ark                    1757                    21                     1                     2 
 
Black Sike                   1748                    18                     0                     0 
                                    1757                      0                     2                     0 
 
Closehouse                  1751/2               140                     2                     0 
                                    1753/4                 11                     1                     0 
                                    1755                    20                     0                     0 
                                    1757                  148                     2                     0 
                                    1758                    83                     1                     0 
                                    1759                    14                     0                     0 
 
Cock Lake                  1758                       0                     2                     1 
                                   1759                       0                     1                     0 
 
Crinkle How               no data 
 
Dodd Hill                    1741                    15                     1                     0   (bought in)  
 
Green Mines                1751/2                35                     0                      0 
 
Isabell-mea-Hill/         1741                  465                     3                     0 
Birkdale                       1742                  556                     2                     0 
                                     1743                 331                     2                      0 
                                     1744                 221                     2                      0 
                                     1745                   98                     0                      0 
                                     1746                   80                     1                      0 
                                     1752/3                90                     0                      0 
                                     1754/5                80                     0                      0 
                                     1755/6                88                     0                      0 
                                     1757                 108                     3                      1 
                                     1758                   27                     1                      1 
                                     1759                     2                     0                      0 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 (continued) 
 
 
Lunehead                     1741                     3                    1                       0 
                                     1743                     7                    0                       0 
                                     1746                   36                    0                       0 
                                     1757                 214                    1                       1 
                                     1758                   80                    1                       0 
                                     1759                   13                    2                       0 
  
Nichol Hopple Yard      no data 
 
Pikelaw                        1743                     8                    1                        0   (bought in) 
 
Rowton Sike                1754/5                 50                   0                        0 
                                     1758                    20                   3                        1 
                                     1759                      2                   1                        ½  
 
Standards                      1741                    23                   2                        0 
                                      1742                    23                   0                        0 
                                      1743                      3                   0                        0 
                                      1746                    37                   0                        2 
                                      1757                    58                   2                        0 
                                      1758                    31                   2                        0 
 
 
Sources: 
 
D/St/B2/157; D/St/B2/22; D/St/B2/127; and D/St/B2/108 
 
Notes:  
1. Standards 1743 is duty ore 
2. Isabell-mea-Hill 1752-1756 was accounted for December-to-December. This 
mine also became known as Birkdale from the mid-1750s. 
3. Green Mines 1752 was accounted for December to December 
4. Closehouse 1752 included nearby Thringarth 
5. Arngill 1755 includes nearby Wemmergill 
6. Rowton Sike 1754/5 was accounted for June to June  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
Bowes Estate Mines Expenditure 1731-58 (excluding carriage and smelting) 
  
Mine                                                                                   £                s               d 
 
Arngill                         1757                                              37                7               1 
                                    1758                                              10                0                0 
 
Black Ark                    1757                                              50               12               4½  
 
Black Sike                   1747                                              71               17              10½  
                                    1748/9                                           27               18                0 
 
Closehouse                  1731                                                8                 3                1 
 
Crinkle How                1748/9                                           97                 8                2 
 
Cronkley                      1741                                              29                10               0 
 
Green Mines                1741                                                3                  9                2 
                                     1751/2                                         114                  2                6  
                                     1754/5                                           13                12                0 
 
Isabell-mea Hill/           1741                                            340                  6             10½  
Birkdale                        1752/3                                           73                  6               5 
                                      1754/5                                        125                 14               6 
                                      1755/6                                        164                   9             10¾  
                                      1757                                           118                 10               5½  
                                      1758                                           164                   9             10     
 
Isabell-mea-Hill/           1741                                           602                   2               7½  
Arngill/Standards                        
 
Little Street                    1753/4                                            4                 19               4 
 
Lunehead                       1739                                            351                  0              11 
                                       1757                                              56                10               0 
 
Nichol Hopple Yard       1741                                              11                  2               0 
 
Rowton Sike                   1752/3                                           75                15               6  
                                        1757                                            109                  3               8½    
                                        1758                                            171                  1               1 
 
Side Lead Mine              1754/5                                           37                 18               0 
 
 
 
Appendix (continued) 
 
 
Silverkellwell                 1758                                                4                     19           8 
 
Standards                        1737                                              12                     19           7               
                                        1758                                              28                       8           0 
  
 
 
Source: 
 
 D/St/B2/102-122, and D/St/C2/3/76 for 1758 only. 
 
Notes: 
 
1. Closehouse 1751/52 includes the nearby workings at Thringarth. 
2. Isabell-mea-Hill 1752/3 onwards was accounted for December to December. 
3. Rowton Sike was accounted for December to December 
4. Generally, the estate records for mining expenditure are not itemised in detail, 
Isabell-mea-Hill accounts for the 1740s being the exception. The mines‟ pay 
bills provide most details of expenditure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Table I  
 
Sales of Bowes pig lead (smelted lead) to various Newcastle purchasers 1741-46 
 
                             Weight 
              Purchaser                  Pieces     Price/Fother      Fthrs     cwt        qtrs        lbs 
                                                                     £  -  s 
1741    „Several accounts‟          139                                     8          15         3             7 
             Peareth & Sorsbie            50           11-15                3            9          2           14 
 
1742    „Sold at mill‟                      1                                                   1         1            14 
             Ralph Harle                     50            12-15                3          10         0              7 
             Surtees & Atkinson         60       11 & 11-15            4            4         1            14 
             John Lanet                     100                                     6          19         2              0 
             Ralph Carr                     349                                   24            9         0              7 
 
1743     Peareth & Sorsbie        2000      11  & 11-10        142           4          0             7 
             Surtees & Atkinson        122    10-15, 11, & 12        8         13          1           14 
             Henry Morgan                    1                                                  1          1           21 
             Reah & Wilkinson            40           12                     2          17          2             0 
 
1744     Reah & Wilkinson          140           several            10            0          2           14 
             Isaac Cookson & Co.        52                                    3           12         0           14  
             Lionel Dixon                     40           12                     2           17         1          21 
 
1745     Surtees & Atkinson           62                                    4             7         3            4 
             miscellaneous                      1                                    0             1         1          17 
 
1746     Surtees & Atkinson           30           11-5                  2             1         2          14 
 
 
Source: 
  
D/St/B2/105, D/St/B2/147, D/St/B1/20/68 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1. The numbers of pieces of lead (pigs), weights, and prices have been taken 
directly from the records examined. 
2. In 1742 Surtees & Atkinson bought 30 pieces at £11 15s and 30 at £11. 
3. In 1743 Peareth & Sorsbie bought 1000 pieces at £11 and 1000 at £11 10s. 
Surtees & Atkinson bought 30 pieces at £10 15s, 30 at £11, and 62 at £12. 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 3 
 
Table II 
 
Value of pig lead sales by purchaser at various prices 1741-46  
 
                                                                                        
              Purchaser                  Pieces                          Value      
                                                                             £            s           d 
 
1741    „Several accounts‟          139                  118          7         10    
             Peareth & Sorsbie            50                    38          9           1   
    
1742    „Sold at mill‟                      1                                 17           0                      
             Ralph Harle                     50                     42        10         10             
             Surtees & Atkinson         60                 
             John Lanet                     100                     84          9         11               
             Ralph Carr                     349                   256          3           0             
 
1743     Peareth & Sorsbie        2000                 1599        14          2 
             Surtees & Atkinson        122                     45        15          7 
             Henry Morgan                    1                                 16          6                                           
             Reah & Wilkinson            40                    34           0          0        
 
1744     Reah & Wilkinson          140                  116           0         2½       
             Isaac Cookson & Co.        52                    39           7         0                              
             Lionel Dixon                     40                    32         16         6         
 
1745     Surtees & Atkinson           62                   47            1         6                                    
             miscellaneous                      1                                 16         6   
 
1746     Surtees & Atkinson           30                   22            5         9½            
 
 
Source: 
 
Appendix 3, Table I. 
 
Notes: 
1. Values for 1743 have been estimated using the known price per fother derived 
from cited records. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
  
A lead mine lease of 25
th
 September 1740 
 
Whereas John Dent of Dufton in Westmoreland Yeoman hath this day 
made a Discovery for George Bowes Esq. of Leadmines and Lead Oar 
being and remaining at a certain place called Isabel mae hill in the parish of 
Romaldkirk in the County of York. The said George Bowes in Consideration 
thereof has hereafter agreed that the said John Dent shall have and Enjoy 
one fourth Share of such Leadmines and Lead Oar to be gott at the place 
aforesaid for a Tenure of seven years first Deducting Every sixth Bing of lode 
washed and merchantable oar And the Bounds and Limitts of the said 
Leadmine to Contain from the first founder Shaft Eight Hundred Yards 
in Length and two Hundred yards in breadth. And the said John Dent 
hereby agreed from time to time to pay a fourth part or Share of all 
said expenses as shall be Expended and Laid out in his winning  
and working of the said Leadmines as well for working of the Sixth Bing 
first to be delivered and aforesaid and also for all other Charges and Expenses 
to be laid out for the working of all other parts and Shares herein. And 
the said John Dent hereby agrees that he will not at any time during  
the said Term hereby intended to be Demised Lett or otherwise Dispose of 
any part or share of such fourth part or share (after deducting  
very Sixth Bing aforesaid) to any person or persons whatsoeverwise 
Lease in writing first had from the said Mr. Bowes. And that Mr. Bowes 
Shall have the Direction and Disposal of all such Lead Oar as shall 
from time to time be wrought and arise from such fourth part or Shares 
above agreed to be for the said John Dent and the same to be Carried 
to such places to be Smelted Refined and so forth as he this said Mr. 
Bowes shall order and not otherwise. And witness our hands this day  
and year above written 
 
Witness 
 
Ro. Shafto                                                                  G. Bowes signature 
 
Ferrer Wren                                                                John Dent signature 
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